






To James R. Piatt.

Sept. 1, 1942.

From his Grandmother
Bessie Cook Richardson



 Bureau, Engraving & Printing.

GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY

BY

DONN PIATT

WITH CONCLUDING CHAPTERS

BY

HENRY V. BOYNTON

CINCINNATI
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PREFACE.

There is probably no political disturbance culminating in an armed conflict so little known to the world as this of ours that from 1861 to 1864 convulsed the people of a continent. Not only is its origin lost in obscurity, but the actual events are so distorted that instead of history they make a romance far more improbable than fictions evolved from the brain of novelists and poets. To get at the reason for this extraordinary condition, we have to remember that war in its larger meaning was unknown to us when this fearful one broke upon us. For two hundred years we had been engaged in the conquest of a continent, reclaiming it from the dominion of nature, and so earnest and industrious had we been that we were lost to all else. The conflict of arms that won us our independence was in truth a war between England and France, in which the thirteen colonies did little but exhibit an indomitable will, animated by the loftiest patriotism. We could have fought England single-handed and alone if need were, and probably would have been conquered, but France, for selfish purposes of its own, did the fighting for us. The infamous invasion of a sister republic, known as the Mexican war, was a small affair and ended ere our people could learn aught of arms. Immersed in labor, trade, politics, and speculation, we were suddenly called on to consider the exigencies of actual war upon the largest scale. To the masses it was novel in the beginning and quite unknown in the end. All that the people

knew was that the households of the land were filled with mourning and the cemeteries, the silent cities of the dead, numbered their million.

We learn from early travelers that nothing is so prolific of distortion as the unknown. Reputable explorers return from unexplored lands and distant seas with accounts of monsters that have existence only in the imagination, but are accepted from the proneness of poor human nature to welcome the improbable. The brave men who shouldered their muskets and fell into line marched into the unknown. Campaigns and battles were heard of but not understood. We are not altogether alone in this. Historians who narrate and artists who illustrate great fights are among the class that never witness what they put to record. The result is that truth gives way to dramatic effect. As probably there never was a campaign executed as it was planned, and as every battle is an accident as to how it is fought and how it comes to be finished, we can see the play given to the military fancy of the generals in their reports and the wide field of imagination open to more legitimate reporters. As there seldom was an official report that did not sacrifice the truth far more fearlessly than its author did his foes, so there never appeared a pictorial illustration of a real battle. All the fierce charges, crossed bayonets, hand-to-hand encounters in the whirl of a terrible conflict, are the work of the imagination. If the historical journalist and artist could know that the element counted on by officials in their calculation of chances is fear, and not courage, they would be saved much absurd work.

"Do you mean to say," asked a civilian of a veteran officer who had seen many fierce fights in Europe, "that bayonets are never crossed in battle?"

"Oh, no! I don't say that. What I asserted was that I

had heard of such but never saw it, and I have my doubts whether it ever occurred."

"Well, when a charge of bayonets is ordered, what happens, how does it end?"

"Why, if the other fellows don't run away, we do."

Reports of battles, then, were to the people as much stories from the unknown as Stanley's tales of a dark continent. Not only this, but the hearers had no information by which to test their truth or probability. A most ludicrous instance of this occurs when General Sheridan's army was surprised and defeated by General Early. The commander was asleep in bed at Winchester, twenty miles away. He would have been called to account for thus absenting himself from the front at a time of great peril to his forces from the immediate presence of the enemy, and had to answer to a court of inquiry or a court-martial; but for a crazy poet and a patriotic actor. The very dereliction of duty was made the basis of a rhymed eulogy, and instead of being tried for willful absence, he was glorified by the mob and promoted by the administration. The returning general is pictured as galloping back to the roar and rumble of a terrific fight and meeting his entire army in full flight. According to the wild fancy of the rhymester, he alone rallies the panic-stricken thirty thousand and turns them back to victory. The prosaic fact is, that General Wright had reformed the broken lines and was actually moving into battle when Sheridan returned. The fight was made and won without half of the army knowing that General Sheridan was present.

We are not asserting that General Sheridan might not have exculpated himself had a court been called, but we do claim that it was a case where a court should have been called instead of a crazy poet and a patriotic dramatist. The

story told that Sheridan was on his return from Washington, where he had been summoned by Secretary Stanton, needs confirmation. Secretary Stanton was not given to calling commanders from the front, and one naturally demands the record at the department of so important an emergency.

If so absurd a story as this can pass into history, what are we to expect from the bulk of matter accepted by the masses as facts. Fictitious heroes have been embalmed in lies, and monuments are being reared to the memories of men, whose real histories, when they come to be known, will make this bronze and marble the monuments of our ignorance and folly.

There is yet another reason for the popular distortion of public events, that is found in the fact that our disturbance was political, and the politics did not die with the war of arms. The fame of certain generals came to be a political quantity to be claimed and built upon as much as the soldier's vote left over from the conflict. Any attempt, then, to investigate the career of a political general, and question his right to the eminence awarded him is furiously resented by his partisans. Fortunately for us, these partisans make but a small part of the population of the civilized world. The truthful recorders lie mainly outside our borders, and while we have the truly great under epaulets in the persons of Thomas, Rosecrans, Buell, McPherson, Pope, Logan, Schenck, McClelland, and Wallace, we should hasten to re-adjust the record and make our history. There is danger that pilgrims to the shrines of famous heroism may pass monuments now being erected at the north to place their immortelles on the shrine of one, whose purity of character, heroism of resolve, and great devotion to a cause that was a lost cause at its beginning, makes such a powerful appeal to the world's sympathy. It is well for us that we have one

man whose higher qualities must, when better known, win to us the admiration of the world. No marble gleams, no bronze defies decay above his narrow grave, but he was great in deeds, and grand in character. Thanks to him, we not only won the fight, but we won the glory of that terrible conflict.

Another source of error in our records comes from the press facilities, that edited events on the wing in the confusion of great fights. These editings are now strangely regarded as history. We had some new features in our war unknown to those of other lands in the past. We had railroads, telegraphs, iron-clads, and the press. This last was the most novel, and in some respects, embarrassing. True, the *London Times*, during the Crimean war, gave an instance of press interference, when that journal took the management of the conflict from an imbecile department, and carried it out to a triumphant close. This, however, was an exception. The European press contents itself with a report of events sanctioned by the military. But with us, all movements in the field had to receive the sanction of the press. Campaigns were freely discussed when planned, and approved or condemned as the editorial mind saw the proposed advantages or defects. Every head-quarters from those of a colonel to a major-general's had its press reporter who slept and ate with the officer in command, and never left his side until it was necessary to go to the front to get the facts. It was a startling innovation, and fiercely resented by West Point. The editorial fraternity was sneered at, but these stern disciplinarians accepted services so necessary to their personal popularity with the people. Like the ancient Pistol, they ate their leek, but grumbled as they ate. There was good in this innovation, for it not only infused a needed quantity of intelligence in the conduct of the war, but it went far toward

making it acceptable to the people. The brain of our country is in its press, and on this occasion that brain was animated by the highest and purest patriotism. We fought the war out by volunteers, and how much we owe to the press and the pulpit for the enthusiasm that grew stronger over disasters than victories can never be fairly estimated. For over two years we had little but shameful defeats and fearful slaughter, and yet the heavy reinforcements kept step to the music of the Union, that had for its refrain, "We are coming, Father Abram, a hundred thousand more."

These were the advantages of a powerful and patriotic press. But it had its defects, and the more prominent is in the so-called history that it has made. There is nothing more fatal to a correct perspective than an electric light. Of this sort was the light thrown on events by the press. What it shone on was exaggerated; what it failed to exhibit was entirely lost in the gloom of night. The very effort to sustain the government in its military management distorted events. Incapable men in command were made great captains of until some terrible calamity made indorsement impossible, when the pens that had so liberally praised as fiercely consigned their hero to oblivion.

The best illustration of this uncertainty of report and record is to be found in this volume. The war offered upon the Potomac was accepted by our side, and from the beginning to the end, attention was devoted to that arena, and it escaped public knowledge that the campaign which carried the fortunes of an empire to a triumphant close was at the west. So little was known of the march of the Army of the Cumberland from Nashville to Chattanooga, that when General H. V. Boynton published his admirable series of articles devoted to its history, it read to the public like a history of a war never heard of before.

There is much in this volume that students of newspaper history will protest against. That we have not confined ourselves to the personal achievements of George H. Thomas, but given briefly a statement of military movements elsewhere, will be a subject of complaint, but we submit that without this view of the entire field of military operations, the reader can not clearly comprehend or appreciate what was accomplished by our general. Indeed, the story of his life during the four eventful years in the field is a history of the war. It is impossible to separate what he proposed doing and what he did from contemporary events that made or marred his work. There is, for example, no event that so clearly illustrates his masterly knowledge of the situation as the plan of a campaign he submitted in the beginning of the war, that was adopted in the end, and in its adoption made that end not only possible, but a fact accomplished. We refer, of course, to that plan submitted to the government of moving a column of twenty thousand men through Cumberland Gap to East Tennessee and Chattanooga. This was offered the War Department when he was ordered to report to General Robert Anderson at Bowling Green, Ky. We can not comprehend the value of this without taking in view the entire field.

In every war there is what military men call an objective point, which, if secured, will go far toward ending the armed conflict. With the Confederates this was Washington, for the capture of that capital meant the armed intervention of European war powers. In less than thirty days after the fall of Washington, the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia would have been upon our coast, and the republic of the fathers, a dream of the past. Our objective point, on the contrary, was the capture of Chattanooga. As the Confederate government had gathered, with a heavy cost it

could illy bear, its one great army about Richmond, the loss of Chattanooga would have rendered their proposed field of operation untenable, and turned them from a defensive position when attacked to an attacking force to drive us from where our presence menaced their interior where they lived. This was as important in the commencement of the war as it was when Lee hurried Longstreet with the flower of his army to aid Bragg that they might retake the great gate-way to the South at all hazards.

Throughout the war, with one exception, our military men on both sides seemed to be groping in the dark. They marched without a purpose and fought battles without other result than slaughter to their troops. The continuous victories of Lee's army are not pleasant to remember, and it is only a grim satisfaction given us to know that we owe our triumph at least to his lack of ability. He never could realize on his successes in the field that were after all defeats in the end. The newly formed government could not bear the awful drain of men and means. He brought about the condition that enabled the iron-willed Stanton to say: "We have no generals to maneuver, but we have men to fight, and I will crowd them in until this treason is stamped out. We can give three men to their one and win."

From this view of the dark side of our conflict we can turn for consolation to a memory of an heroic people that never hesitated for a moment in a high resolve to restore the Union. We can take pride in the able statesmen at Washington, found in Lincoln and his cabinet, who, through the darkest hours, when shattered armies were drifting back through the capital, and they expected to hear the artillery of Lee that would have been minute guns over the grave of the republic, yet never lost heart, and held the people and armies and foreign powers to the line of duty till the cause

was won. And above all we can unite in doing justice to the memory of the one hero, who, neglected by the government, led into peril by the blunders of his superior officers, had yet the power to render great service to the republic and leave us victories unmarred by wanton slaughter, untainted by selfish ambition.

Our work herein is not in justification of history. That will in time care for itself. Nor is it for George H. Thomas. He is gone from our midst.

"After life's fitful fever, he sleeps well;
Treason has done his worst; nor steel, nor poison,
Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing
Can touch him further."

We seek to hang immortelles upon his tomb, not for him, but for ourselves. His great life is a lesson and an example to the living—an example and a lesson to the noble youth of our land for all time to come. From the career of the great soldier, they can learn the true worth of a high-toned integrity and a keen sense of honor that never faltered and never for a moment forsook him. We know how his sensitive nature suffered from the slights unjustly put upon him and met no retort save that of a dignified remonstrance. We know how he longed for command, feeling within himself the power to rectify blunders, bring order out of confusion, and lead our brave men to victory without great loss; and yet when that command was to be reached over the unmerited disgrace of a comrade, he resolutely declined. He loved his country much, but his honor more. And yet we see how his very virtues are used to deface his memory. It is for the true chroniclers of those troublous times to pass the dear memory of the dead hero from the hearts of his soldiers, where it has so long been treasured, to the hearts of all the people, that he may live forever as he was.

THE WAR.

INTRODUCTION.

Histories are the annals of war. The dramatic effects found in campaigns and startling results of great battles alone go to record. The historian caters to the taste of his patrons; and as the subtle origin of armed conflicts found in antagonistic elements of popular impulse are obscure and make dull reading, they are neglected or ignored. The active movements of armed bodies, the quick decisions and dash of gold-braided and full-feathered commanders, attract the attention of the many and charm the few. The artist pictures only the breakers coming along the shore—the thought of the league-long roller that comes in from a storm a thousand miles out at sea, or the unseen gathering of sands built up from depths below the ocean, make no part of his picture. The oak felled by the woodsman loses in the thundering crash of its fall all thought of the slow growth through centuries on the one side, or the slower growth of civilization on the other that brought the ax to its trunk.

The historians of to-day are only the troubadores of the past, who sang great deeds of arms to please the ears of their patrons. We have whole libraries devoted to campaigns and battles that made but a third part of the conflict between the North and the South. The statesmen at Washington who held the people through frightful disasters to the bloody issue, who warded off foreign intervention, and so managed our finances as to arm, clothe, and feed a million of men in the field, are all forgotten in favor of the full-breasted captains

whose defeats make us shudder as well as ashamed. Nor is one thought given to the cause of this apparently unnatural and senseless fight. The ready chroniclers either ignore the subject or seize on the nearest and most popular, as a chorus to their drama of blood. This cause, accepted at home and recognized abroad, is slavery.

Abraham Lincoln never uttered more wisdom in fewer words than when he said at Springfield, in 1861, that no community ever arose in wrath to grasp at each other's throats on an abstract political proposition—all violence originates in an antagonism of feeling and not in an intellectual difference. Few are aware of the fact—and their number proves the assertion—that thought has little to do in shaping human events. The dim-eyed delvers in libraries who get faint glimpses of humanity through dust-covered, cobwebbed windows, labor under the strange delusion that the leaders of men are the kings of thought, and that knowledge heads the civilization of earth. With a self-complacency that amuses, we are solemnly warned against errors of judgment, and given in books histories of errors that come from false teachings. We are told, for example, that the great French revolution has its origin in the works of Rousseau, Voltaire, and other intellectual iconoclasts of the libraries. When one remembers the great mass of ignorance that arose in its wrath and smote down in blood the social and political fabric about it, one is struck with the absurdity of the proposition. The true student turns from the immediate violence, to trace back through a thousand years of ill-usage and abuse awarded labor, as if the laborers were beasts, until it culminated in blind violence that was as senseless as the tyranny had been cruel. Thus, when Paris was swept in a night and day by the mob on barricades and with wild cries, it means not that Paris has been led astray

by communistic doctrines, but that Paris is starving. The hungry masses, like the blind Samson, seize on the pillars nearest them, and hurl into common ruin not only the political but the social structure.

Our blessed Savior, in his mission of mercy, made no appeal to the intellectual processes. He could easily have demonstrated his divine mission to the few, by unfolding to scientific eyes the subtle mysteries of nature; but, putting science behind him as a vain Satan of temptation, he appealed to the feelings of the masses and won their love through miracles of mercy, wherein the sick were cured, the cripples made perfect, and the sorrowing consoled.

He sought no schools for philosophers, but selected his apostles from among the ignorant tent-makers and fishermen of Judea. The anxious student searches in vain through the annals of the period for a trace of the Messiah. Art, science, and literature are alike silent. And yet the divine power spread and gathered strength until culture came in to put to record what it had no hand in creating.

The currents, drifts, pools, and eddies of human events have their laws, as all other movements of creation have. There is no chance, and these efforts of our intellects, upon which we so pride ourselves, are but the white-caps of troubled waves swelling to a break from causes far above and beneath them.

We seize on some one event, some one man, to date our worry from, as two-thirds of the good people hold Jeff. Davis responsible for the late civil war. They can not comprehend that this Jeff. Davis was born some three centuries since, in the troublesome times of England, and was as much beyond his own or our control as any other wave that indicates a current.

To one who doubts what is here asserted, because new

to such doubters, let him consider that of this sixty millions of people filling our continent from sea to sea, there are only about three millions who read books. Indeed, it may be doubted whether there are five millions of the sixty who read at all. Newspapers so widely spread are, as their name indicates, but vehicles for news, and tell in the briefest phrase what has happened and give us the facts without the slightest attempt at the reasons for them. They make the mirror of passing events. As mediums of advertising for the business classes upon which they prosper, they are careful to please, and thoughtful speculations as to the busy world are not pleasant.

It is the pet craze of the day to believe in evolution, and this teaches that humanity is slowly evolving within itself a higher plane of thought and feeling. This may be true, but it is a mere speculation based on a very slender thread of fact. Our life on earth has been very brief and is without a record, and brief as it is, we are forced to remember that from the death of Christ to the invention of printing, this great vehicle of thought and knowledge, nearly all there is of Christian civilization made its spread and gained its hold on humanity. How much art and its product of huge libraries are doing for Christianity, let Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley answer. In their answer we would learn that this much vaunted engine of knowledge serves rather to arrest than to advance the cause of Christ.

What, then, is humanity moved by? It is moved by its stomach mainly and much by its instincts, but of these come the feelings. By these the masses, as such, are influenced. Thought, the high product of knowledge, is the smallest motive power of all. The church, built on the wants and weaknesses of the human race, has, through centuries, made its appeal to the Christian feelings. The candles, lit by

human hands about the altars, have illumined our temples of worship, and no cold star-eyed goddess of science; and poor humanity finds relief, not in being lifted into dreary regions of thought, but in grasping at the divine sympathy of Him, who, taking on the semblance of man, shared his sufferings and sought through these to bring heaven to earth.

It has gone to record in libraries and newspapers at home and abroad, that the system of slavery was the immediate cause of our civil conflict. To appreciate the absurdity of this, one has only to remember that slavery was not confined to the South. The entire people of the United States held the negro in the bondage of legal enactment to his unrequited toil. The horrible system was more popular at the North than in the South. The North realized enormously in moneyed gain on the labor of the slaves. Cotton was king, but the master only made what the merchant accumulated, and to attack the iniquitous system was to disturb the business of the country.

Few obstacles are so fatal to reform of evils as this business relation. Our Blessed Savior was crucified, not because of his heavenly teachings, but for that he disturbed the business relations of Judea. He drove the money-changers from the temple and denounced the greed of gain through which one man accumulated the luxuries of life while thousands starved. Through all time the money-changers have held the temple and cried out lustily against the fanatics who sought to disturb the business relations. How property enters into all our affairs of life, the woful history of poor humanity tells us. Our principal business on earth is to gain a livelihood from its surface. The struggle for life is an instinct, the lust of gain its abuse. A clever author has called our attention to the fact that so long as sacred shrines remain such, the roads hither are marked with human bones.

When such shrines become marts of trade, the highways are made safe and the bones disappear. Property is dearer to us than life itself. The iniquity of Mormonism never struck our religious sense so forcibly as when the polygamous followers of Brigham Young became possessed of rich mines and vast stretches of valuable lands. We murder the Indians we have degraded in the name of Christian progress, and persecute the Mormons in the name of God.

The delvers in the deep, rich soil of the West found a ready market for their products at the South, which slave labor returned in cotton that, sold in Europe, returned to all great wealth. To disturb this business relation by cries of "shame" was simply abominable, and had its origin in the disordered brain of fanatics. The press praised what the pulpit blessed.

Abolitionists, hung if caught at the South, were mobbed out of Faneuil Hall, at Boston, and the same audience of respectable business men that applauded Yancey at Cincinnati, hissed, hooted, and rotten-egged the eloquent Wendell Phillips into silence a few nights after, and that only a short time before the firing on Sumter.

The moral sense of a community that could fight the extension of slavery to the territories and speak with bated breath and uncovered heads in presence of the guarantees of the constitution that held the sum total of all villainies sacred in the states—nay, made such community slave hunters over their free territory for the masters when the poor wretches escaped—is so thin that it provokes contempt. Let the blistering shame go to record, that we may be punished for our sins in recognition of the fact that to call a man an Abolitionist was to condemn him in popular estimation to the level of thief and murderer combined.

The truth is, slavery was more popular at the North

than in the South. This not only on account of the successful business relation above referred to, that had in the Northern man a stronger instinct and a wider development, but because the North had all the benefits without any of the evils that afflicted the Southern planter.

Wrong can not be made right, though sanctified by custom and sanctioned by constitutional enactment. The justice of God makes the criminal code the same throughout the earth. The wrongdoer makes his fight against the law of our being and feels instinctively that retribution follows on the track of crime with unerring certainty of light after darkness. Fraud breeds violence as surely as poisoned atmosphere from swamps sucked up breeds the storm. The master at the South felt instinctively that he was allied with hell in the fear of that most horrible of all violence, known as servile insurrection. At the hearthstone in the night sat grim danger that could not be shut out, for in the household itself lurked the treacherous animosity of the oppressed. The master ate his meals in fear of poison and got sleep from the soothing presence of his revolver under his pillow. This may be denied, but we remember the frightful atrocities of the Nat Turner insurrection and the fear that paralyzed all Virginia when Ossawatomie Brown with only thirty men held Harper's Ferry. And yet, as the subsequent war demonstrated, no people ever gave proofs of a higher courage than those same Virginians.

Again, if the system of slavery was the immediate cause of the civil war, how did it happen that the border slave states were so indifferent to the cause that they only sympathized with—a cause they would not fight for? They were the immediate sufferers from abolition aggressions. It was from these border states that slaves escaped, and in them were the facilities of the underground railway that stretched

from slave territory to Canada. The remote cotton states, and rice and sugar plantations, where slavery was secure, took the lead in an appeal to arms, and fought the fight out to the bitter end.

In addition to all this, the fact is of record that when the war did come, the government forces marched into the South, not to free the negro, but to restore the Union. For nearly two years the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac were engaged in restoring to the masters the wretched slaves that took refuge in our camps. We burned dwellings, we robbed farms and towns, we laid waste wide fields; and yet, obsequiously returned the slaves, when we would not give back a horse, or even a chicken. "As between the alligator and the negro," cried Stephen A. Douglas, while the storm was brewing, "I am for the negro,"—"as between the negro and the white man, I am for the white man." Abraham Lincoln, the wisest of all, summed up the situation in one sentence, which he wrote to Horace Greeley, that if to save the Union slavery had to be maintained, slavery would be maintained; if to save the Union slavery must be destroyed, slavery would be destroyed. And when at last the emancipation proclamation was promulgated, it freed slaves where the government could not reach them, and held the negro to his unrequited toil where the government had power to set him free.

We were Union savers, not abolitionists. The South plunged into an armed conflict to win its independence from a hated Union, and the North accepted the issue, although Chase, Seward, Greeley, and nearly all the abolitionists cried aloud, "Let the erring sisters depart in peace." In the fierce contention of arms that followed, slavery went to pieces. It is pitiful now, in face of these facts, for us to claim a lofty philanthropic intent, and "Praise God from

whom all blessings flow," that we had the manhood to knock the shackles from four millions of slaves.

To get at the real origin of our civil war, we have to go back some distance in the history of our country. The cause, although remote, is not obscure.

It was brought to our shores mainly in the cabin of the *Mayflower*, and all that was left for transportation came in crafts that carried adventurers to Virginia. The fierce civil wars of England, between the Cavaliers and Roundheads, in which the dissolute Swashbucklers of Charles I were driven into holes by Cromwell's Puritanical Ironsides, were bequeathed to us when the pirates sought for plunder in Virginia, and the Puritans found refuge on the coasts of New England. We, their descendants, have transformed the one into holy pilgrims seeking freedom of worship, and the other to blue-blooded aristocrats in search of adventure. The truth is that our Puritans were bigots in rebellion to a prescribed form of religion, who immediately made their form law, and hanged and burned all who dared follow their example in resisting the law. Many of the boasted Cavaliers were criminals escaping conviction, and convicts escaping punishment. This, however, does not militate against the claim of blue blood in the fugitives.

It is not necessary to dwell on these unpleasant facts of history. We refer to them merely to show the origin of the two peoples, differing in the first instance so materially, and growing more widely apart as time went on.

In this same history, we learn that state rights originated in chartered privileges that enabled the Puritans to hang and quarter their theological opponents, and gave monopolies to the middle and southern communities that were as precious to them as persecutions were to New England. From abstract political propositions they came, in time, to be

superstitions, underlying the social and political structure. How these rights weakened as they widened among homogeneous communities and held their own against aliens, how after the revolution, and in the seventy-five years of a common government, the communities making the eastern, middle, and western states, came to be one, while the south grew into another, the annals of the country tell us.

The intolerant bigotry of New England that sought to drive certain theological dogmas down the throats of other than their believers, was strengthened by the hardships that made life itself so barren and insecure, that it was well to keep heaven in view as a refuge. Reading the Bible of the Hebrews for lessons as to how they might, through fraud and cunning, get the advantage, and then the extermination of their first enemies, the Indians, they in the service of a just God as readily exterminated their religious foes. Their force of character was strengthened by the hardships they endured.

It was the building of a strong race from the ground up, and the belief that they were not only God's chosen, but the select instruments of his vengeance, added to the sturdy self-reliance of a race in a region where only the stronger born survived to manhood. It is little to be wondered at that such a people impressed itself upon a civilization that, running along Mason and Dixon's line, filled the wide borders of a vast domain with all that makes the material life of today a marvel to the more thoughtful.

Gradually nature reasserted herself, and the warped and twisted form of intolerant bigotry of the Puritans disappeared, leaving the better strains of manhood in full force. Slowly but surely poor distorted humanity returned to that health which regards in its true light the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and is the true foundation of

religion. The perils and hardships of early settlements in a new country developed a kindly dependent feeling among the settlers. Such was the history of emigration to the wild West. The pioneers, in groups, exhibited a helpful disposition that found exercise in the building of each others' log cabins, clearing away the forest, and hewing the logs, fighting Indians and outlaws, while administering to the sick and burying the dead.

At a later day the immense stream of emigration from Europe helped on the great work. Within the memory of the living man, the vast continent given over to savage natives was swiftly reclaimed. The tramp of millions was heard scaling mountains, felling forests, spreading our plains until the song of the wild bird and the cry of savage beasts breaking the silence of wide solitudes, were changed to the busy hum of human industry, and the great wilderness bloomed into civilized life.

Over all, through all, animating and leading, went the spirit of Puritanism. It was a marked and distinctive civilization. Its sturdy independence and force of character were equaled only by the ingenuity that molded and manipulated dead matter until it was a living, and seemed a thinking agent.

This civilization, as we have said, was checked at the border of the Southern States. It fretted at without passing this barrier. The bold adventurers who conquered without peopling the South were no silken aristocrats. At no period in the world's history have such been known to emigrate or lead emigration. The only title the early settlers of that region had to such appellation was in their loose morals and plundering habits.

There was, in fact, too much manhood in these hardy first settlers for the blood that is claimed for them. Starting

originally from a point widely differing from that which originated the Puritans, they had that easy-going religious belief which tolerates a difference in others; and while recognizing God in a denunciation of sin, has a kindly feeling for Satan in their love of the sinners. Blessed with a deep rich soil and a pleasant climate, they were not driven to hopes of heaven by the hardships and uncertainties of life on earth.

To these conditions, in which a nationality was molded, came the system of slavery to further stamp distinctive traits upon the people. Slavery had originally held all the colonies, and, after, all the states. It was being wiped out from economical considerations as a sort of labor found to be unprofitable when the inventions of the cotton gin and spinning-jenny by two ingenious Yankees arrested further emancipation by making the worthless negro a valuable slave. New England rum and Virginia tobacco had worked in common to keep alive the slave trade, and it was no conscientious scruple that left tobacco and cotton to continue their dealing in human flesh. The system, however, strengthened the South in its peculiar civilization, and made its people more clearly and positively a distinct and separate race from that of the North.

Devoted to agriculture, it had no basis in that toil which goes to make a nation of laborers and is the true foundation of a state. No country on earth had such an impassable gulf between capital and labor as the South. Before the master and the slave, the sturdy laborers that go to make a people disappeared. The poor whites were regarded as a nuisance by the masters and despised by the slaves. They were spoken of by the one as "white trash," and by the other as "greasy mechanics" and "mud-sills." The life was

more patriarchal than that of the Arabs and as stationary as that of the Turks. Divided into huge plantations, the master and his family dwelt on each as old barons of Europe were wont to do, each the head of a home and a law unto himself.

It is singular, looking back to days before the war, to note how little social intercourse existed between the North and South. The masters and their families sought eastern cities and fashionable resorts in summer, where they were welcomed for their courtly manners and lavish expenditures of money; but the Northern people seldom reciprocated the visits, and intermarriages were still more rare. There was nothing in common between the two extremes.

The planters despised their Northern neighbors for their economical habits and love of money. The Northerners retaliated by laughing at the wasteful habits and rude life of the South. Culture may grow out of oppression in cities and densely settled districts, for the splendor that makes distinction as such finds expression in architecture, sculpture, and painting, and develops music, eloquence, and poetry. But in the isolation of a planter's life there was no such competition. The generous hospitality that distinguished the slave states had its origin in the easy life gained from a new soil and unrequited labor. At the North, where a living was wrung by hard toil, money gained its full value and hospitality a cold form of duty that nearly destroyed its fascination. Charity at the South was impulse, at the North a religious obligation. The first found expression in spasmodic gifts from individuals, while the second took a business form in combinations, or, if in individuals, it expressed itself in a monumental shape that did its good while perpetuating the name of the donor.

This is not altogether just, although true to some extent.

Human nature is after all about the same in all extremes. Long training through generations gave impulse to one section, while a widely different process replaced it by a sense of duty in the other. At the South, the stranger was seized on and made welcome to all the master could reasonably part with. On the contrary, if in any part of New England the wayfarer were seized with a sickness, or, falling down, broke a leg, he would be taken in, tenderly nursed into convalescence from a sense of duty, and yet he could not borrow five dollars or a horse in any part of New England with which to get away. A story is told illustrating this difference. During the war, a family from New Jersey, living in North Carolina, had their house burned and farm despoiled by the Confederates. A captain of volunteers, coming upon them in their distress, not only kindly shared his rations and tents with the distressed women and children, but furnished means of transportation to get them to a place of safety. The father sought the first opportunity to thank the Good Samaritan under epaulettes for his kindness. The recipient of this kindness was not surprised nor offended to have a bill presented him, in which not only the money expended, but the time lost, was duly claimed. Not long after, this same officer, stricken down with fever, was carried by his comrades to a wretched log-cabin, and given in charge to a shoeless, half-clad woman. When this ill-clad nurse, however, was offered money to repay her for the care of the sick enemy, she drew herself up indignantly and informed the amazed men that her father was a gentleman.

It was, however, in the material difference between the sections that one found the two races most distinctly marked. With but a river or an imaginary line parting them, on the one side the observer saw the fierce competition of labor that crowds the hungry generations down, and one looked at

turnpikes, canals, railroads, telegraphs, while the very air was tremulous with the ceaseless motion of machinery. On the other, note the profound quiet of primitive rural life, disturbed only by the mirth from the idlers about a country store, or the cries of indolent slaves at slow-moving oxen. The wide difference, however, can be summed up in a single sentence: on one side a dollar represented a hard day's toil, on the other, ten mint juleps. To comment on the advantages or defects of either civilization, forms no part of our effort here. We might dwell upon the pleasant social life of the South and contrast it with the hard, money-getting spirit of the North. On the other hand, we could call attention to the intellectual as well as the material progress of a people who gave us all the science and literature of which we can boast. Our one purpose in tracing to its origin the cause of the war, is to show the union of states held in its embrace two separate peoples, born and reared under two separate and antagonistic civilizations, and that a conflict between the two was sooner or later inevitable.

We can see that, when the rupture occurred, as a great field of ice cracks and separates from a ground swell, the shallow causes for a difference rapidly disappeared. The South, making a loud acclaim in behalf of states' rights, resolved itself into a single military despotism with its headquarters at Richmond.

The North, holding the doctrine of state rights high treason, fought the war out through state organizations. These were the white-caps of a vexed sea, and not the cause of the commotion.

Another cause for the civil war, and one entirely overlooked, is to be found in the fact that our form of government afforded no tribunal to which the contestants could

appeal for a fair settlement in a peaceful way out of their contention. An appeal to arms was a necessity.

In a pure despotism, there is a power that, appealed to under any exigency, settles all disputes.

In a constitutional monarchy there is a sovereign power lodged in the government, that administers through a ministry subject to the popular will. This power, lying back and above the administration of its functions, holds all constitutional provisions in perpetual trust, and forms a tribunal from which there is no appeal.

This is not our condition. The fathers meant that it should be such. It was their intent that the executive selected through a delicate, intricate electoral college should be as far removed from popular—or, as it is now called, political control as possible. The president thus selected was to be the monarch, and as to popular or political control utterly colorless. The office itself was to be sovereign, and the incumbent, in the fact that he was to be taken from the body of the people and return to the condition of citizen at the end of his term of office, was a republican feature. The legislative department was tempered by a senate, composed of representatives from the states. It was to be our House of Lords, differing from that body and made republican in form, as the executive was, by selections from the citizens and rotative in office, instead of born legislators, as in England. To this was added a judiciary appointed for life, or good behavior. All this was tempered by one democratic feature found in the House of Representatives with its members returned every two years.

This scheme of government had its origin in the fertile brain of Alexander Hamilton, who modeled it upon that of England, in his estimation the most perfect government on earth. He was aided in his efforts by two elements then

potent in the minds of the fathers. One was the jealousy of the states, that parted reluctantly with their power, and that only after guarding the compact of states, as it was then called, with the most stringent and positive recognition of state sovereignty. The other was a fear of the people that haunted the minds of the government builders. The political fabric that was to be "of the people, for the people and by the people," was to be guarded by a breakwater of granite and cement against the people.

This form of government lasted through the administration of George Washington. The hold of that great man upon the people of the United States was so powerful that his clear, cool intellect, purity, and force of character silenced all factional opposition and popular discontent. For eight years we had, pure and simple, the government of the fathers. This remarkable man saw, or felt, perhaps, our danger, and in his farewell address he warned us against parties—factions they were then called—as one of the great perils that threatened our government. He little dreamed that within a brief period, measured by his life, that this government would come to be a government of the very factions he denounced.

After the termination of Washington's service as president, the delicate fabric, with its nicely adjusted guards and balances, went rapidly to pieces. The political parties came to the front. Under Adams the Federalists organized to be opposed by the Democracy under Jefferson, and the president that was to be a potent and impartial executive of all the people, resolved himself into the president of a party, and such he remains to-day.

This was natural, and not only to be expected, but a political necessity. All issues agitating a people must find expression in the government, or the power of the people is

set at naught and the agitation is without avail. The trouble with us is that there is no sovereign power in perpetual existence, holding the government as a high trust, administering its functions for the good of all. And above all there is no high court of appeal, nor impartial tribunal to determine the vexed questions under the constitution.

When Alexander Hamilton modeled his government on that of England, he omitted the one significant feature found in a ministry subject to the House of Representatives. This would have left our executive colorless as to politics, for the president, elected for a term of years by one party, might find himself called on to administer the government in accord with the will of his political opponents. This is a feature in the constitutional monarchies of Europe, that makes their constitutional despotism more democratic than our boasted republic.

As it is, we have fastened upon us a cast-iron, immovable concern that is further removed from popular control than any government on earth.

A president elected for four years is hedged about by a senate representing states returned every six years, and against the barriers the House of Representatives, a great unwieldy body, may beat in vain. It has come, in fact, to be a dependency on the executive and the senate through despotism of official patronage.

Now, if our divine Creator had so made the human mind that it should be open to change every four years, this strange government of the people, for the people and by the people would have been subject to the people's will. This not being the condition, popular agitation of a policy for the better government of a country, and in accord with a majority under the constitution, is in vain. The impulses of a people, unless crowned with immediate success, are short lived.

It is only at long intervals that a presidential election meets some great demand, and when it does, the day after the inauguration the demand may cease or change sides—the majority, however great, may swing from under the administration, and yet it is there, fixed, heavy and immovable for four years.

If this resulted in the death of all parties, it might be well, although in such case we would remain stationary—without progress through all time. But the result bears this defect in a worse form. It is the nature of human beings to lose in an organization itself the purpose for which it was organized. This obtains in politics as in religion. Sects survive in great vigor of existence when the dogmas on which they were founded cease to exist in the minds of the members. A man will fight for the mere name of his sect when the simplest proposition upon which it was founded can not even be stated, much less explained by him. This is the same in the political arena. There is no question but that the two parties now dominating the country had their origin under Hamilton and Jefferson on grave issues, affecting the nature of government and the relations of the people to the political structure. Hamilton held the government to be a thing apart and above the people, that was parental and perfect, when it gave benefits to the governed. Jefferson guarded it simply as a trust, held in obedience to the popular will, and good only so far as it insured equal rights under the constitution to all. We have the country to-day divided between two hostile camps, and yet a microscope would fail to detect the difference in principles between the two. A man can be a republican and hold any political opinions he pleases, provided he stands by the camp and votes the ticket. This is the like condition of the democratic organization. Instead of views being promulgated as

a test of party fealty, they are avoided or concealed. Success depends on the number of votes obtained, and as opinions are apt to offend, they are hidden or ignored. Nothing is so amusing as a platform, as it is called, solemnly proclaimed at intervals.

The evil of all this is that parties degenerate into factions—a party means an organization called together to sustain certain principles. A faction is the same body that for mere success in obtaining power, or putting some man or men forward, holds together under a name only. We are called upon to note in shame that while European communities in their political contentions are moved by the greatest questions affecting human progress, our elections turn on a personal feeling with an abuse that would taint our pages even to mention them.

However, it forms no part of this essay to exhibit the evils of our system. We might call attention to the fact that the deplorable civil service under which we suffer is no abuse, but the natural development of the government itself. The government is the party, and in popular estimation, and properly so, the vote that elects a president elects the humble applicant for a cross-roads or water-tank post-office. Public office is a public trust, but the successful party, in the eyes of the people, as in fact, is the trustee.

Now there is no tyranny so oppressive, cruel, and intolerant as that of a majority in a popular vote. To believe that this may be restrained by conscience or a paper constitution, is to set aside all that is taught us through experience, made plain by the history and character of humanity. A paper constitution is an attempt to legislate on a knowledge of the past for all future exigencies and wants of a people. To make it perfect is to call a halt on progress and deny to the future what is relied on in the past, and that is

experience. The fathers, for example, sought to destroy the aristocracy of a class by wiping out primogeniture and entail. They could not see that the corporation would come in and replace the old evil with additions that made the wrong destroyed a light affair. The constitution legislates no remedy against incorporated power and privilege that has come to be, not an abuse of the government, but the government itself. It is the power behind no throne, for it is the throne itself.

So long as differences among the people were confined to abstract political propositions of no grave importance in their results, the government of the fathers worked easily. When, however, a great interest affecting the nation in its very existence came to be considered, each side felt that truth and justice, be what they might, the contention had to be settled by numbers. The tribunal for eventual decision was one party or the other to the contention such as a bare majority might secure.

The first grave symptom of this diseased condition was manifested in a tariff for protection, when John C. Calhoun made his appeal in behalf of a more perfect union in his plan of nullification that gave a veto power to each state when its constitutional rights were involved. The Democratic party, under President Jackson, denounced this as treason, and but for the compromise measure of Henry Clay, that reduced protection to revenue, the war that followed years after would have been then precipitated on the people. The government virtually accepted Mr. Calhoun's principle of nullification by a prompt reversal of its policy in the presence of an appeal to the states.

The government, therefore, was not framed, nor is it fitted, to handle a great national question agitating the minds of the people. In such contention, the successful

party becomes the government, and from it there lies no appeal. What would be said of a case in court where the tribunal consisted of the number of witnesses and not the weight of evidence, where, having taken a vote, the party possessed of the larger number of witnesses should ascend to the bench and decide the case?

All the laws ever enacted, all the decisions ever put to record, and supposed to govern the court thus constructed, would not make the losing side content. This was our condition that brought on the clash of arms. The losing side appealed from the brute force of numbers that made a court to the brute force of bayonets.

This is the lesson of the war, and unless we can find some remedy in reconstruction of our government, we must expect to have the evil of violence repeated when a like exigency occurs. Had we a colorless executive put in power to administer under the constitution with even-handed justice the power of the government, and under this a ministry subject to the popular will as demonstrated in a majority of the House, we would have our court of appeal with its judge unbiased by political feeling to admonish and restrain partisan zeal and abuse. We might yet suffer from the tyranny of a majority, but such majority would be based on an appeal to reason, as we see in Europe, that educates as it agitates, and so escape a senseless contention for mere power that enables the successful party to inflict on the land a standing army of inefficient and dishonest office-holders. The queen of England is said to reign but does not rule. This is true only so long as rights under the constitution are respected by the party in power. Let these be invaded, and the queen's rule begins.

Alexander Hamilton, in his admiration of the British rule that gave us our government, omitted the saving clause

that makes the government more of a republic than our own. Perhaps that accounts for the omission.

The successful party with us becomes the government, and it is not only despotic, but its displacement, since it has come to be hedged in by all the material interests of the country, depends on casualties, not to be counted on in the ordinary contest. The Democrat votes the Democratic ticket, the Republican in like manner supports his organization; and under this condition, the Republicans, having driven out the Democrats at the point of the bayonet, might have remained the government till the end of our political structure, but in the reconstruction of the South, it, unfortunately for itself, appealed not to the governing power of the South, found in its intelligence and force of character, but to the ignorance and imbecility of the slave populations. The government gave the late slave the ballot with a carpet-bagger and a bayonet, and thus inaugurated not only a war of races, but a war on civilization.

When the civilization of two different races made their appeal to the government at Washington, they found there the case decided and judgment rendered, based solely on success at the polls. An appeal from the brute force of numbers to a brute force of arms was a necessity. We could not help ourselves. The unseen but not silent antagonisms of nearly three hundred years culminated in a storm no earthly wisdom could avert. Our government is a success only so long as it remains untried. We are slow to learn the lessons of the past. It feeds our vanity to be considered philosophers and philanthropists, with our actions based on the purest reason and our motives animated by the highest patriotism and goodness. Such conceit blinds us to our faults and renders all reform difficult, if not impossible. Before the

physician can prescribe, he must truthfully diagnose the disorder.

To the more thoughtful and patriotic, the dangers that menace our great republic cause deep concern. The seeds of disorder and death planted in the system itself remain to plague us. It was arranged by the fathers to have the sovereignty rest in the people, with full power to settle all questions, but we fail to see that this will cut off from all expression through the cast-iron, invisible condition of the trusts called a government.

We have a government of parties without process through which the party can find expression. The result is most deplorable. Elections no longer turn on a diversity of opinions or a difference of policy, as to how the government may be controlled, but upon a fraudulent use of money at the polls. Of course, the capitalists thus investing in politics, seek to recoup themselves through a use of the government they control as official agents.

In this condition, what are we to expect when again a grave question such as slavery was, seeks solution at the hands of the government. The bayonets that drove the slave power from the capitol will, we fear, be once more in demand.

However, our pen is with the past, and not the future, and it is pleasant to turn from these dark forebodings to the brilliant achievements that yet live to strengthen our self-respect, pride, and patriotism, as a people.

LIFE OF THOMAS.

CHAPTER I.

Early Life—The Child is Father to the Man—Home Life in Old Virginia—West Point and what it did not Teach, but what Young Thomas Learned.

The brightest name upon the darkest page of our country's history, gives title to this book. The story of that life in the four years of a war that made such a crucial test of vitality in the great republic, is the true history of our country. From his first fight to his last great battle, we have a succession of victories in strange contrast to the campaigns of disaster and bloody defeats of others, above whose graves are being built lofty monuments, while that of George Henry Thomas remains almost unmarked.

In one campaign, that from Nashville to Chattanooga, and back to Nashville again, his army carried the destinies of our great republic to the front, and its eagles swung through the smoke of terrible battles to victories that won, finally, the empire of a continent. About his name cluster all glories that the republic can boast of in the way of military ability and achievement, and yet so far his memory holds its monument only in the hearts of the soldiers he led on to victory. It is well for us then, who love our land and seek to transmit its deeds for the love, admiration, and example of the coming generations to gather up from the thinning ranks of veterans the memory of our hero.

All that we have to relate is of record, but a record obscured, if not distorted, by partisan prejudice that will at any time sacrifice truth to an ignoble success of party.

Probably we are not yet far enough removed from a terrible conflict to correct or destroy the false that like clouds from swamps sucked up, are glorified by the sun, but we are near enough to great deeds themselves to build our monuments to the truly great. The slow but sure decay that eats into and destroys error, however plausible and popular, leaves untouched the truth that grows brighter and stronger as time wears on. The monuments built of bones and cemented by the blood of butchered men in terrible disasters, however foolishly called victories, will be the first to crumble, and men will hasten to forget the memories of shame. To cling to such is to condemn our race as not only ignoble, but imbecile.

It is true that some defeats have in them higher merit than many victories, but the merit in this instance is not in the generals who won disaster through their inability, but to the men under muskets who closed up undismayed their thinned ranks, and to the spirit of a heroic people that defeat excited more than victory, and after each disastrous campaign sent a hundred thousand more of their sons to the slaughter. For the one Quintus Curtius sacrificed in the chasm, we gave half a million to save our great republic.

There are two types of eminent men we are frequently called upon to study. In one we are amazed at the man having achieved what was claimed for him; in the other we are astonished that he did not accomplish more. In this last class George Henry Thomas stands conspicuous. There was a reserve force about him that impresses one as does the deep undertone of Niagara that dominates the swash and roar of waves in that falling sea. One can not contemplate General Thomas and not pass from his brilliant achievements that made the victory at Mill Springs, our first prestige to Union arms; from his saving our army at Stone River, again at Chickamauga, and the nation at Nashville, to the thought of what might have been spared us in blood and treasure had he been put in command of our army at the beginning of the conflict.

The impression he made upon the great men then in

control of our government was in advance of any achievement that demonstrated his capacity. The strange, silent, solitary man carried his God-given commission in his presence, but he was a native of Virginia, and, so intense was the feeling at that time, that both Lincoln and Stanton distrusted a Southern soldier of West Point who would offer his sword in defense of the Union. "Let the Virginian wait," said Lincoln, and what that waiting cost us we are now called upon to count.

To the real student of our war history, who, lifted above partisan feeling, sees events in their true light, next to the fools who mistook vanity for genius and so forced themselves to the front that they might learn war through defeat; the most exasperating are those who since the war have gone about with their button-holeing memoirs claiming victories when they suffered defeats, and begging the world to believe them great men. Now this differs from the great man who blushed like a girl when praised and with calm dignity sought his grave in silence, leaving his deeds to speak for themselves.

No man is a truly great man who courts applause and seeks to build a monument to his own memory. The consciousness of power carries in itself its own reward. The breath of popular acclaim is but a breath, vain, uncertain, and fleeting, while all the marble and bronze monuments of earth are to the dead less than the dust they seek to commemorate. The applause of multitudes—the praise of the world falls unheeded upon the cold, unhearing ears of death. The mortal remains molder silently and swiftly into dust, while the spirit has passed into another existence so far removed from the brief, vain life of earth that it ceases to claim attention or even, probably, a memory. When one is born the world begins, and when one dies the world ends. It is a weakness and not a strength that makes one long to live in memory after the grave claims its own. Nothing has more marked the character and career of our great soldier than his dignified indifference to the opinions of others as to what he had achieved.

We have said that our story of heroic effort is of record. It is history and a matter of deep regret that it should deal with this great man purely in his public capacity. It was a peculiar trait of his strong character to remove himself from public recognition as far as possible. He denied his private papers to his would-be biographers while living, and leaving all such to his dear wife after his death, she carefully obeyed his injunctions. "All that I did for my government," he said, "are matters of history, but my private life is my own, and I will not have it hawked about in print for the amusement of the curious."

We refer to this, we say, with regret. It was a weakness in General Thomas, as there was absolutely nothing in his private life from which he should shrink; there was no reason why he should disappoint the world that sought to know, and knowing love, the man so much admired. When speaking of the neglect he experienced in the wrong done him by the misrepresentations of the envious, he said: "History will do me justice." He did not reflect that in refusing for record his private life, he, to a great extent, made his public career obscure. How much of Washington's life is known from his voluminous letters, and how clearly we come to know McClellan through the free, but unfortunate missives sent almost hourly from the front to his wife. It is the man off parade we must see to know, and in knowing him we can the more correctly judge as to his work. While General Thomas was singularly reserved he was neither cold nor austere.

Undemonstrative as he was under all circumstances, he had the quiet of a deep, calm current—quiet because deep. No mere mannerism could conceal the sweetness, the kindness of his nature, and while he stood before his superiors in rank or moved among his associates in a way to repel familiarity of manner, he had that which won to him instinctively the sympathies of dogs, negroes and children. While his brother officers were held at a distance by his quiet manner, the humblest private would unhesitatingly approach him with his petition or grievance, and would receive the kindest and most patient attention.

All this would appear in words and acts if we had access to his private papers, but, as it is, we must content ourselves with such as come to us well authenticated outside the records we long for. Among these is a story told us by a southern woman, a lady of high social position and culture, who tells of a meeting between Generals Thomas and Hood after the war. These great captains found themselves by accident in the same hotel. At the instance of Hood, this lady sought and asked Thomas if it would be agreeable for him to meet the Confederate he so signally defeated at Nashville.

"Certainly, my dear madam," responded Thomas, "I shall be most happy to meet General Hood. Will he come to my room?"

The minister of peace carried her message to General Hood, and they returned together. Entering the corridor that led to Thomas' room, Hood clattered along on his crutches without speaking, and as they approached the door it was suddenly thrown open, and, Thomas appearing, threw his arm around Hood and helped him in with a tenderness that was touching. The kind mediator left the two together, and when an hour after she saw her friend, the bravest fighter of all the Confederate forces had the trace of tears in his eyes and voice.

"Thomas is a grand man," he said, in a tone full of emotion, "he should have remained with us, where he would have been appreciated and loved."

Of a deep religious nature that approached Puritanism in its observance, he kept his faith strictly, as all else of a personal nature, to himself. But no exigencies of camp life, that at times destroy privacy, kept him from prayers taught him in his childhood, that brought him rest at night.

He differed strikingly from his brother officers in being entirely free from profanity. "An oath weakens an order," he once said, "for it is an expression of excitement, and takes from instead of adding to the force of a command, for it lowers the officer in the eyes of his men."

This religious feeling in General Thomas came from his Huguenot blood on one side, while his Welsh temperament on

the other gave him control of himself. This was singularly marked. Under no circumstances was he known to lose the cold, calm manner that was his striking characteristic. At Stone River, when utter defeat seemed surging through his lines, he was forced to change front in the face of the enemy, and he was as cool as if on parade. Again at Chickamauga, when the entire right wing was crumbled away, leaving the road open to his rear, and the bulk of the Confederate forces were pounding on his front, a most perilous condition, General Garfield found the great commander in the pauses of the attack as cool and quiet as if no monstrous disaster to our arms were impending.

There is a striking illustration of truth in heredity presented us by the Huguenot blood to which we have referred. There is probably no history of a class or race in which blood is more distinctly marked than in that of the men driven from France in the early part of the seventeenth century to the American continents. Wherever found, the same strong characteristics and high traits manifest themselves. A New England Puritan was a fierce propagandist. The Huguenots, on the contrary, had no creed to crowd down the throats of others. Their religion was a confidential matter between God and themselves. They resented the despotic interference in their worship, not because it was blasphemous, as the Puritans held, but for the reason that it was an insult to their manhood. It was a degradation they protested against with their lives. After all we are slow to learn that it is the man and not the creed that creates the religion. The negro makes a fetich of the most elevated and refined religion, while the Huguenot, holding the darkest dogmas that ever depraved humanity, lifted his belief into the highest plane of brotherhood on earth and Fatherhood in heaven.

Be that as it may, the Calvinistic creed of predestined damnation was but a surface indication of a sturdy manhood that resisted interference, and lapsed back most generally into the mother church after the pressure was removed.

So far as religious belief extends, the Huguenots of the United States are such only in character. In a majority of instances they are either Catholics or agnostics, and illustrate

the truth of the old maxim that "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church," and makes persecution the cause of growth.

It is not the creed that is strong, but the human nature that is obstinate. General Thomas was an Episcopalian, with a character that forced itself into an acceptance of truth whenever taught or found. His perfect temperament, generous impulses, and kindly nature transmuted the narrowest creed he might accept into the broadest plane of Christian excellence.

George Henry Thomas was born in Southampton county, Virginia, 31st July, 1816. Of Welsh extraction, as the name indicates, on one side, he was French, as we have said, on the other. The well preserved annals of the family and their good sense saved them from the weak pretensions of so many American families to aristocratic origin. There were no cavaliers in the Thomas family and not the remotest trace of the Pocahontas blood. This fact has not prevented one of his biographers from referring to the cavaliers in a hazy, speculative way. The fact is, however, that the early settlers of our continent were hardened and, let us hope, honest laborers. The aristocrats never emigrate. They may be driven out by political or religious controversies, but in such case they rapidly disappear. The down-trodden laborers, inured to privation and toil, faced the dangers of an unknown deep, and a struggle for life in an almost untrodden wilderness, to better their condition. The aristocracy had no such incentive to change. The life of ease and luxury they led at home neither trained them to bear privation nor made any other mode of existence than their own attractive.

The zeal with which we hasten to dishonor the graves of our ancestors is pitiable. All the parade of imaginary pedigrees and emblazoned coats-of-arms, stolen from families fallen into decay, shame us as a people. There may be little romance in our conquest of a continent, but there is much honor. We owe our all to the hard hands and bowed backs of honest toilers, before whose high manhood and indomitable will a howling wilderness was changed to sunny fields of industrial life, and a new people came into existence, to rank

among the foremost nations of civilized humanity. There is more true pride in such ancestry than any to be found in tracing our lineage back to thieving barons, whose only mission on earth was to oppress and kill.

George Henry Thomas had none of this false pride in his nature. He was wont to tell with glee how when a boy he made a saddle for himself, an article he was unable to purchase, by watching the saddler day after day construct one, he following at home the lesson learned at the shop until the saddle was completed. That he would have made a first class mechanic we can well believe, for he had that in him which would have insured success in any walk of life.

The early youth of our hero was as quiet and uneventful as his later years were full of tumult. He retained to the last that quiet self-poise which reminds one of the eagle balancing his pinions on the storm-cloud, while all else is in the hurried confusion of seeming destruction.

The home life of old Virginia, in its patriarchal simplicity, was exceedingly beautiful. One acquainted with it can picture the quiet old mansions gleaming white amid their oaks, rude enough in their architecture, but so homelike in their calm. Generations of intermarriage had made all akin, while the ties of family strengthened the domestic bond that found something nearer and dearer to live for than the mere pursuit of wealth. Their homes were full of sweet human gossip, and proud, yet kindly, they lived out the quiet lives of brave men and chaste women, in striking contrast to the money-getting world around them.

Whether it is our peculiar climate or some other subtle cause that develops the nerves at the expense of all else, we are a restless, moving race, without that sense of home which so distinguishes Virginians. We are Arabs in boots, and our resting-places in life are no better than tents, giving us shelter and wanting in all those sweet associations that make of a locality a fairyland. And yet in the home itself is planted all that makes a people really great. In it a mother's love and a father's care train good citizens and give stability to government that is secured by no other process. We are enthusiastic over common schools and public institutions,

and firmly determined to make the pedagogue do the duty of the parent. We build houses, not for homes, but as show places to sell and build again. Our very cemeteries are public parks, in which the sacred memories of the beloved dead are lost in the exhibition of grand avenues and costly monuments. We cart our wealth to the verge of the unknown land, and leave its evidence to the living in a stunning monument. The mourners hurry back to business, to keep the dead man's notes from protest. How this sort of life is marring our destiny as a people, is manifest in the frightful increase of insanity and crime.

The perfect and beautiful influences of home life as practiced in old Virginia, make one of the noticeable incidents of the late civil conflict.

Virginia, the cradle of patriots, presidents, and statesmen, was not remarkable for either her wealth or intellectual life. But few authors were born to her, no great books were made, no millionaires larded the lean earth with their ill-gotten gains; but the standard of manhood was on an average so high, the love and respect for the old commonwealth so strong, that the entire war centered around her capitol. When Virginia fell, the cause was lost.

I have dwelt upon this subject, because in the home training of George Henry Thomas may be found so much that in subsequent years made him famous. He was a man of such sterling integrity, so frank, brave, and truthful, so tender in his nature, generous in his impulses, so sensitive to the calls of honor, and so true to duty, that we are forced back to the early years when such qualities were impressed upon the plastic nature of youth. What a mother, what a father General Thomas must have possessed.

George H. Thomas graduated at the Southampton Academy, and had entered upon the study of law, when the genial John Y. Mason offered Mr. Rochelle, George's maternal uncle, a cadetship at West Point. The place was left to the young man to take or refuse, and it was promptly accepted. Having passed the examination, George returned home by way of Washington to thank the Hon. John Y., then his member of Congress, for his kind patronage. The

honorable official said to the youth: "No cadet appointed from our district has ever graduated at West Point, and if you fail, I never want to see you again." He spoke to one whose lexicon contained no such word as fail. Could the genial John Y. Mason have known what that appointment meant to the future of Virginia, he would have rejoiced at the youth's failure. A *bon vivant* who found content, as Benton said of him, in a good dinner, and a full hand at poker, he had in common with all Virginians, a blind infatuation in favor of things southern, that changed wrong into right, and made good out of material that filled other men with horror. The Hon. John Y. Mason, after holding many high offices with credit to himself, and of benefit to his government, died in the volcanic eruption that buried state sovereignty and human servitude in one common ruin.

He left, however, a nation of fanatics, who resisted the world's progress, and fought statistics as an insult to their peculiar civilization.

WEST POINT.

This little school upon the Hudson is popularly supposed not only to give instruction in the so-called art of war, but to supply through such process the lack of brains found in many of its graduates.

As war is not an art, reduced to rules, one is naturally puzzled to know how it can be taught, and if taught, how it is that instruction supplies the ability that seeks to be instructed. The books devoted to military formulas are few, and when applied to actual war, practically useless. All the axioms left by great captains can be counted on one's fingers, and, while the condensed wisdom of long and varied experience by master minds, are quite useless when applied to a school. Take for example, the greatest given us, which says: "War is a calculation of chances." How can such chances be known to a school? They cease to be such when they become sufficiently known as to be taught.

When we come to analyze the institution, we find it differs from others devoted to education, in the fact that the students are trained to the drill and discipline of private

soldiers. Take this out and nothing of a military nature remains. Now, while training and teaching may make a private, there is nothing whatever in it to make an officer of a grade necessary to the command of a brigade. What is aimed at in creating armies has nothing in common with what goes to make the general. To have a body of men so drilled and disciplined that the mass move efficiently to the command of one mind is possible to a drill sergeant. But to create the mind capable of such command, does not lie within the province of an academy. Government makes the private. God alone creates the capable general.

Even in universities devoted to teaching exact science, it is supposed that a brain able to receive such instruction is on hand. But war is not an exact science, as we have said. It can no more be taught than thinking, and capacity in that direction defies instruction. If we analyze this military ability carefully, we find that very little of it is intellectual. The qualities that go to make a successful leader of men, either armed or unarmed, are not intellectual, but matters of temperament. The self-reliant force of character that never hesitates and gives to others the confidence felt by its possessor, is not the product of brain. On the contrary, thought antagonizes action. The more we know, the less confidence we have in our knowledge, and doubt, the offspring of study, creates distrust. In the calculation of chances one must be quick to act. The road to military success is lit by flashes of lightning on scenes that shift as rapidly as the sea, and no time is given the leader for thought and study. The prompt action that sends fools in where angels fear to tread, sometimes leads on to victory. There is no place in such a field for

“The kings of thought who wage contention with their time’s decay,
And of the past are all that will not pass away.”

Given an army well equipped for service, and a clear, quick eye to the topography of a country to a man so confident that he will risk an empire in a campaign and a campaign in a battle, and we have the higher qualities of a general. In this we find a solution to a mystery that has puzzled

men through the history of all the wars, and that is, that in the host of men killers from Cain to Moltke two only have gone to record as thoughtful men. These two are Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte. The one left us the Code Napoleon which he did not compose, the other his commentaries. These throw gleams of thought upon the brutal killing that rendered them famous. We claim a like distinction for our hero, George H. Thomas, who so permeated his work with intellectual excellence that from this alone he won his place upon the page of history.

There is a popular superstition, prevalent among the masses, so strong that even intellectual leaders hesitate to attack it, and that is that the processes of instruction create the mind that it only helps develop. While recognizing in actual life the inequality so varied and wide-spread that no two men are alike in capacity, we yet insist upon the excellence of a machine that is claimed to lift all to a common level. This in the face of the fact that after graduating a thousand, one only is found capable to take his place as a leader among men. No man selects a merchant, physician, or lawyer because such has graduated at any college or university. In the keen test of merit in the world's arena, such indorsement goes for naught.

True education means that development of the intellectual qualities which facilitates thought. Popular education is a mere exercise of the memory. To store away facts without the power to assimilate them is the grand elevating process that is to lift our youth by platoons to the same plane. Now memory, however necessary it may be in its normal condition to assist in securing information, is not mind. On the contrary, when made monstrous by over use and stimulation, it eventually destroys the intellectual faculties it was meant to aid. Popular education means an abuse to the memory. The net purport and upshot of success in the schools is to make it abnormal. They turn us out the learned fool. The impatient child of genius who doubts or disputes the fact given him to swallow, is plucked and expelled, while the dull, plodding fellow who pigeon-holes

away a vast store of facts he can not comprehend is graduated.

Our great republic solemnly decrees that this graduated dullness shall command its armies. As we have said, the so-called art of war is not taught and can not be taught at any school, and we have, therefore, at West Point that only which makes the private. When the war came, all that is taught through training at this school was turned over to civilians, while that which is not found at West Point, the ability to command, was monopolized by the graduates. The officers from civil life saved both sides from immediate disaster. Learning at night what they taught next day with a facility peculiarly American, they lifted the armies North and South from armed mobs to a plane of efficient discipline. If the graduated dullness could have responded with like readiness to the high commands so abruptly given them, we would have been saved the horrible slaughter and shameful defeats that make up in the main the history of our four years' war.

These, however, are not the worst failures of our military system. It is copied after that of the English, where a born aristocrat makes the officer and a peasant the private. As we have no aristocracy of birth, we strive to make one by commission. This is extremely difficult, and depends mainly on the haughty mein of the officer. He must treat the private as a peasant or his rank is endangered, if not lost. This is called discipline. The old definition of prompt obedience to military orders is shifted to the humble deportment of an inferior to a superior being. What makes this difficult and at times melancholy, is the way in which the cadets are selected. The appointment is given to members of the House of Representatives at Washington, and as it is so much political patronage in the hands of politicians, it is used as such. The member takes his young man from the family of the constituent having the most political influence, and as this is often a saloon-keeper or head of a corner grocery, we get little or no aristocracy in the selection. From this class we look for our recruits, and it has happened that from the same family that gave the aristocratic officer

came the peasant of a private. It is no uncommon event for some loving old mother or father to seek for and worship naval or army aristocrat of her or his household, and to return humiliated by the discovery that the boy was ashamed of his parent.

All this is foreign to our form of government, and antagonistic to the nature fostered through generations of democratic teachings and traditions. An army is of necessity a despotism, but it is possible here as in France to eliminate the social difference that is the more odious. It is possible to maintain discipline on duty and be comrade when off. When an officer can not only enforce military obedience upon the private but menial service at all times, the army becomes odious, and no self-respecting American will enlist. This opens the ranks to a low order of foreigners or Americans so debased that they are really what the system seeks to create, social inferiors. Whether the epaulets adorn a gentleman or not the muskets are carried by servants.

The result of this condition is that desertions, at the present rate of increase, will soon equal the number recruited. The remedy is in putting the officers and men on an equal social footing. To do this instead of graduating a cadet into a commission send him into the ranks to serve one year as a private. At the end of that time, if he is qualified, make him a corporal. After two years' service as a corporal he will probably be eligible to the post of sergeant. From the sergeants select the officers.

We learn little from our own experience and nothing from that of others. An army means a mass of men so trained as to respond to an order as one man. For a thousand years the war powers of Europe have been perfecting the private, leaving the Almighty to furnish the captain. We, on the contrary, devote all our energies and means to making the officer. The way we make him as shown is grotesque. But when done we point with pride to the product and cry: "Behold our army."

What George H. Thomas gained from West Point was not what the academy professed to teach. He accepted the drill and discipline, and resumed the studies upon which he

had graduated at the Southampton Academy. But his thoughtful mind turned instinctively to the real meaning underlying a military system, and that he grasped at once. He saw that what West Point was giving him as the formation of an officer really belonged to the private, and the ludicrous lack of a logical sequence between the premises and conclusion gave him a clear view of what had to be done in a military way to be practical and effective. His subsequent career in the great civil war illustrated and demonstrated the soundness of his conclusions that he did not get from West Point, because West Point did not teach them.

"To what, General," asked the late President Garfield, "do you attribute your uniform success?"

The question brought a blush to the cheek of Thomas, but it also brought a reply that should be engraved over every door at West Point.

"To my men. I made my army and my army made my success. I learned at an early day that a good army with a poor commander was better than a good general with poor men. Now, most of my associates in the service seem to think that when one received his commission that he received an army, and he planned campaigns without the force to make the campaign effective. I took my commission as an order to find an army, and I began from the first to organize, drill and discipline the men upon whom after all falls the real work of the war. We had splendid material, quick to learn and ready to obey; one has only to win their confidence to secure that staying power that makes it necessary to kill a man to effectually dispose of him. I began with a brigade and ended with the army of the Cumberland. The brave fellows of that noblest military force the world ever saw made the Rock of Chickamauga, not I. On that sunny September afternoon as they stood in a half circle facing the enemy that again and again poured a superior force three lines deep upon our front, not a man of them but knew that our right had been shattered and our left disorganized; and yet the brave fellows plied their guns cool, firm and determined. They made success possible under all circumstances."

He taught in the field all that he had thought out in the academy, unaided by the drill sergeants, called professors, of that sickly imitation of a bad original. The lesson written in blood and of record in the acres of graves in the national cemeteries that tell of bloody defeats and shameful disasters remains unheeded. We are building mighty monuments to heroes of defeat and leaving bronze and marble to make our imbecility conspicuous to an amused world for all time to come. Were war to be declared to-day, our government would again call upon the cotton-breasted, full-stomached young men of West Point to leave their drill rooms and be great generals by the grace of God and the magic process of a commission.

CHAPTER II.

West Point and After—Services Preceding the Mexican War—Its Origin and Infamy—Sam. Houston—Distinguished Dash at Monterey—Resolutions and the Sword.

George H. Thomas entered the Academy of West Point 1st June, 1836, and graduated in June, 1840. His standing is recorded as that of twelfth, and to demonstrate the value of this, Wm. T. Sherman is marked as sixth. Thomas is remembered by his associates at the academy for the same qualities that marked him through life. He was reserved without being shy, silent and undemonstrative yet not offensive, earnest and studious with yet enough quiet humor to make him companionable. The more impetuous qualities of a healthy youth seemed to have exhausted themselves in his earlier years, and although he had none of that unpleasant condition known as an old head on young shoulders, he seemed self-poised and strangely quiet in all his ways for one of his years.

He passed from West Point to service as second lieutenant in the Third Artillery. In November of 1840, he was ordered with his company to Florida, where we seemed to have an endless war with a handful of Seminole Indians. He saw the end of that absurd affair when a few blanket savages, aided by swamps and malaria, had put the army of the United States at defiance. Having taken part under Major Wade in the capture of seventy Seminoles, he was brevetted first lieutenant for gallantry and good conduct. In January, 1842, he and his company were transferred to Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. In December of 1843, he was assigned to Company C, stationed at Fort McHenry, Baltimore. Promoted first lieutenant 30th April, 1844, in October he joined Company E, at Fort Moultrie. He left Fort Moultrie 26th June, 1845, with his command, under order to report to General Zachary Taylor at New Orleans, and on the 24th July,

under command of General Taylor, sailed for Texas, the advance ordered for the invasion of Mexico.

Thus the first real military service that Geo. H. Thomas was called upon to perform came to him in the war of invasion, that sent an armed force to the conquest of Mexico. That war was a shameful affair, of interest to this narrative, for it made the war of secession possible. A people can no more lower its standard of morality and justice without the evil consequences that follow the taint of character than can an individual. Neglected wrongs in a nation breed violence, but a premeditated national wrong lives through generations and seems to be without end. The story of this infamy can be briefly stated.

The slave power that poisoned our social existence for two hundred years and dominated our government for over half a century demanded new lands to render barren, and gave truth to the manifest destiny which meant that slavery could not be limited and live, and called for the conquest of a continent. The spirit was as cowardly as it was criminal. When we encountered a power such as Great Britain, or even Spain, our manifest destiny weakened to polite demands and humble negotiations; but when it met an inferior, the wanton aggression was not covered with even a flimsy pretense of right. This last is what happened in the Mexican War. Texas, a part of Mexico, had been opened on liberal terms to emigration, and with such emigrants went a small body from our Southern States led and controlled by Sam. Houston. No more picturesque and purely American figure than Houston ever appeared upon our historic page. Born in the wilderness, he was bred by Indians to all the ways and habits of their free hunter's life, and through all the tumult of his stormy career carried the intense personality that grew in him from his blood and early training. When but eighteen years old, he stood six feet in stature, a splendid specimen of physical manhood. Adopted by an Indian chief as a son, he developed into the soldier of fortune, and when he returned to the borders he carried with him primitive, half-savage views, with a force of character that not only assimilated such views with his rough existence, but

made him a noted leader. Returned to Congress, he carried to Washington the reserved, dignified manner of the Indian that made him conspicuous in his silent, solitary ways. The fact that, subsequent to a long service in the House, he beat a member of that honorable body nearly to death for personal comments on Houston's conduct as agent of the Cherokees, surprised no one acquainted with the assailant. While governor of Tennessee, he married a lovely girl in January of 1829, and hearing that in the marriage she had been sacrificed to the ambition of her parents, he resigned the governorship, parted abruptly with his wife, and returned to his savage life among the Cherokees.

Three years after this strange event, we find him in Texas, leading the revolt against Mexico caused immediately by the Mexican government enforcing its laws against slavery, the emigrants from the South having taken their slaves to the territory the masters had been invited to occupy. The war that followed was the most savage ever witnessed upon our continent, and through it all this remarkable man appeared as leader. The end came in a signal defeat of the Mexican forces and the capture of their president.

The events that followed uncovered the treacherous character of the entire movement from its first conception. Our government was swift to recognize this bastard of its own shame as a new power. Then, of course, followed annexation, and as soon as convenient the war with Mexico. This was claimed to have originated in a disputed boundary. All that strip of territory lying between the rivers Nueces and the Rio Grande Del Norte was declared part of our country upon a shadowy claim that it was part of the annexed state. It was inhabited by Mexicans. From side to side along its entire length there was not a solitary citizen claiming allegiance to the government of the United States. This small body of so-called emigrants from our country, armed and supplied openly by our citizens, although victorious in their rebellion, had no more right to settle a boundary line with Mexico without recognition than had the Czar of Russia or the Emperor of China.

However, we were not nice. Possessed of the nature and impulses of the bully, we who had negotiated boundary lines with Great Britain with assurances of profound respect and a submission to the result in a truly Christian spirit, at once declared war and moved our armies to the disputed boundary of a weaker power. This war ended in a peace dictated at Washington, in which, under a pretended purchase that had but one party to the contract, a large part of the Mexican territory, with all the people therein contained, was added to the United States.

We have dwelt upon this war with Mexico at greater length probably than our main theme warrants, but, as we have said, this unholy war was the pioneer wrong that opened the way to the war of secession. We who sought to make treason odious forgot that we in that Mexican affair made treachery acceptable. The people of the seceding states were no more bound to their allegiance as citizens of the general government than were the emigrants subjects of the power that had kindly invited them to become citizens. But while commending the one we condemn the other, forgetting that example is more potent than precept, and armed Confederates only presented to our lips the cup we had held to the mouths of the sickened Mexicans.

The field afforded the young lieutenant of artillery was not wide, and save the record of a prompt discharge of duty and quiet coolness under fire there is nothing to indicate the high qualities which subsequently made him so conspicuous. He seems to have been of the command under General Taylor that first occupied the soil of Texas, and, subordinate to Major Brown, made part of the garrison of the fort opposite Matamoras that for a week was besieged by the Mexicans. A fearful bombardment of five days resulted in the killing of Major Brown and one private. After this achievement the siege was raised in consequence of victories won by General Taylor at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.

It was at this bombardment that an incident occurred singularly illustrative of our heroes thoughtfulness and quality of calm observation. When the enemy opened upon the little garrison from over the river with artillery the garrison

promptly responded. While merrily loading and firing at the foe in the distance the officer in immediate command turned to a young lieutenant seated upon a keg looking on with a calm indifference that contrasted strangely with the excitement of his associates.

"Well, Tom," he asked, "what do you think of our service; good, eh?" "Service excellent," was the quiet response; "but I am thinking that we will need after awhile the ammunition you are throwing away."

The hint was taken, and the next day proved the wisdom of young Thomas' suggestion. The garrison was embarrassed by a lack of the ammunition they had been so active in wasting.

Subsequently in the battles about Monterey young Thomas was brevetted captain for "gallant and meritorious services," and one general, J. P. Henderson, in his enthusiasm, goes so far as to say, after complimenting young Thomas and his men for their "bold advance," that, "when ordered to retire, he reloaded his piece, fired a farewell shot at the foe, and retired under a shower of bullets." George H. Thomas was a young man at the time when this extra shot was contributed to the poor Mexicans, and it may be that for once in his life he exhibited a force of impulse ever after so foreign to his nature. We are inclined to believe, however, that the noble general of volunteers drew on his imagination for this questionable act of individual audacity. The fame of the young officer thus made conspicuous by General Henderson's account of "another shot" and the unpleasant "shower of bullets" reached the home of Thomas, and the citizens thereof were much excited. A meeting was called at Jerusalem and Captain James Magill was selected to preside. "Colonel Wm. C. Parker," the rural press of that locality informs us, "in his naturally eloquent and happy style, proceeded to deliver a spirit-stirring eulogy upon the character and conduct of our hero." He then proposed "the following resolutions, which were adopted by acclamation," and are so dignified and forcible that we copy them entire:

"Resolved, That whilst we glory in the unfailing fame which our heroic army in Mexico has acquired for herself

and country, our attention has been especially drawn to the military skill, bravery, and noble deportment of our fellow-countryman, George H. Thomas, exhibited in the campaign of Florida, at Fort Brown, Monterey, and Buena Vista, in which he has given ample proof of the best requisites of a soldier—patience, fortitude, firmness, and daring intrepidity.

“*Resolved*, That as a testimonial of our high appreciation of his character as a citizen and a soldier, we will present to him a sword, with suitable emblems and devices, and that a committee be appointed to collect a sum sufficient for the purpose, and cause to be fabricated a sword to be presented to the said George H. Thomas, through the hands of his noble and heroic commander, Major-General Z. Taylor.”

Fourteen years after this presentation of a sword, Thomas' neighbors, friends, and relatives were startled by his adhesion to the cause of the government in the war which broke with such violence upon the country. Their grief was only rivaled by their wrath and indignation.

Of course nothing reached home about young Thomas save the report that claimed for him the highest courage. All the higher qualities that subsequently made him famous, were quite unknown. On the contrary, the enthusiastic brigadier had given him a dash which he did not possess, but the bravery was sufficient. This was the one, and about the only quality popularly believed to be essential to men so ignorant of real war, that recruits armed themselves with revolvers and huge bowie-knives, firmly believing that the conflict was to be fought out in personal encounters, when the pluck of the individual was to tell in the result. This was especially the condition in the South, and after the first few months of actual service, their revolvers and knives thrown away as useless incumbrances, marked the location of every deserted camping ground.

The resolutions, handsomely engraved, and the “fabricated sword,” were duly forwarded to the young Virginian. The sword in itself was well worth preservation, aside from the kind motives that proposed its presentation. We get a description of it from the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, while the weapon was on public exhibition: “The pattern of the

saber," we are told, "is that used by the United States dragoons. The blade is of the truest and prettiest steel, finished in a manner that defies superior workmanship. The scabbard is of solid silver, standard value, beautifully enriched with engraved scroll-work encircling military trophies with the words 'Florida, Ft. Brown, Monterey, Buena Vista,' and an engraved vignette of the battle of Monterey. The hilt is of basket form, very elaborately chased. The grip is solid silver, also enriched with engraved scrolls. The pommel is of gold, grasping an amethyst, and the rings and bands in bas-relief, and upon the grip is engraved an elephant."

In the battle of Buena Vista, 22d and 23d July, 1847, Lieutenant Thomas was brevetted major "for gallant and meritorious conduct on the field." General Taylor, in his official report said in reference to the subalterns of the artillery, including Thomas by name: They were nearly all detached at different times, and in every situation exhibited conspicuous skill and gallantry."

Captain T. W. Sherman reports: "I was directed to take my battery back to the plateau, where I joined Lieutenant Thomas, who had been constantly engaged during the forenoon in the preservation of that important position, and whom I found closely engaged with the enemy, and that, too, in a very advanced position. Lieutenant Thomas more than sustained the reputation he has long enjoyed in his regiment, as an accurate and scientific artilleryman."

General Wool gave to the artillery the credit of having gained the signal victory over a force far superior to ours in numbers. He says in his report: "I also desire to express my high admiration, and to offer my warmest thanks to Captains Washington, Sherman, and Bragg, and Lieutenants O'Brien and Thomas, and their batteries, to whose services at this point, and on every part of the field, I think it but justice to say we are mainly indebted for the great victory so successfully achieved by our arms over the great force opposed to us—more than twenty thousand men and seventeen pieces of artillery. Without our artillery we could not have maintained our position for an hour."

There is good ground for doubt as to the numerical superiority of the Mexican force. It has been learned through experience in our late civil war, that this numerical superiority greatly depends upon which side furnishes the report. There was not much credit to be gained to our little army in its Mexican war if the estimate of Mexican capacity in campaigns, and courage in the field, is to be accepted from official reports on our side. In this the army does itself an injustice. It marched triumphantly from coast to capitol, defeating these same Mexicans who subsequently so gallantly held their own against the power of the French army.

The battle of Buena Vista terminated the services of George H. Thomas in Mexico. After that war he was on duty at Brazos Santiago until 1st of February, 1849. After he served at Fort Adams until 12th of September of the same year, when the interminable Seminole war breaking out again, he was ordered to Florida. There was not much fame to be garnered from such a war, and yet the young officer gained all that was to be gathered in the province given him by his superior officers. Any work calling for prompt execution with an accompanying responsibility of a separate command devolved upon him. The traits of character that subsequently rendered him famous were early well developed. There was no claim on his part for service or promotion. He was not the man to shoulder his way through life, for he was not only without the selfish motive, but without the necessity. His devotion to duty, his solid, sterling sense that made his superiors first consult and then employ, brought to him as his right what others had to struggle for. No soldier ever lived who had a deeper, stronger sense of the discipline that is the soul of the service, than George H. Thomas. That he could be advised with by his officer in command and then ordered to execute what probably he had suggested without impairing the delicate, yet well defined, relation between the two, was a rare excellence that all felt who came in contact with him. He lived his life upon a high plane that had in it no vanity, no self-assertion, and was guided first by his keen sense of personal honor, and second only to that by his pride of pro-

fession that made his calling as sacred to him as if it were his religion. It was more a matter of temperament, perhaps, than intellectual conviction. The fine, delicate and yet healthy, compact fiber that made his manhood held him to what he was. He had the strongest personality ever given a man, and it was built up through generations of the best our American life could give. The serious earnestness that he shared with the Indian was modified by a quick adaptibility gained through two generations of life when each generation takes from our American individuality some new trait in its peculiar environments.

An instance of this prompt seizure of responsibility is given at the time we treat of. In a voyage from Charleston to New York in a vessel carrying the lieutenant's troops, a violent storm arose and Thomas's attention was attracted to the inebriate captain of the sloop. The wild orders of this man that the crew obeyed were endangering the safety of the vessel and all on board. The first officer under the captain admitted this to Thomas, but said that he had to obey orders or be punished for mutiny. Thomas promptly took the responsibility of imprisoning the captain in his state room, and, turning the command over to the first officer, saved the vessel.

On the 7th of November, 1852, George H. Thomas was united in marriage to Miss Frances L. Kellogg, of Troy, New York. That it was a love match goes without saying. The youthful lieutenant, if aware of the social privileges pertaining to his commission that enables so many poor officers to marry into wealthy families, set such aside and attached himself for life to the accomplished and beautiful woman whose grace and dignity were such fitting additions to his own noble life. Mrs. Thomas was robbed of much of the happiness due such an admirable union by her husband's absorbing devotion to military duty. But their lives—or rather their life—for it was one in both, proved prosperous in the tenderness, devotion, and confidence that gave a rest from turmoil of life to our hero and a home to both.

During the administration of President Franklin Pierce with Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, 3d March, 1855, two

regiments of cavalry and two of infantry were added to the regular army. To the second cavalry George H. Thomas was promoted from a captain to the position of major. The fact that this second regiment was officered by Jefferson Davis from the Southern States impressed General Thomas that the Secretary of War anticipated at that time the armed conflict over the Union that afterwards broke out. Thomas was in error about this. While Jefferson Davis saw at an early day that secession was inevitable, he saw no war, nor could he be made to believe that such a dread calamity would ever occur. In common with all prominent men of the South, he thought the business instincts and peaceful habits of the North, together with the sympathy so freely bestowed in behalf of the slave-owners, would force the free states to submit to a peaceful separation. It was the misfortune of each side to be profoundly ignorant of the other. While President-elect Lincoln laughed and jeered at the belief that the South meant war, Davis, Toombs, Yancey, and Stephens sneered at the Northern people, the millions of merchants, mechanics, and farmers offering to fight if the South once moved out of the Union.

It is well for us, however, that such was the condition. Had the gift of prophesy fallen either upon Lincoln or Davis after the presidential election that gave the administration to the Republicans, the one would not have sat calmly at the new capitol of the South waiting for Virginia to pass her act of secession, nor would the other have given his time to a consideration of a million claims to office. Jefferson Davis could and would have seized Washington, and President Lincoln, at Philadelphia, would probably have been negotiating for a peaceful settlement of a broken Union. No, fortunately for us and for all, the clouds of war were hid behind a dim horizon and the Southern leaders were listening entranced to the cry that gathered strength from the conservatives and abolitionists of "let the erring sisters depart in peace," when the gun at Sumter caught its echo in the roar of a people's wrath and the leaders on both sides were stunned. Jefferson Davis awakened to the fact that he had lost his golden opportunity when with a regiment of raw

militia he could have taken the national capitol, while President Lincoln turned from his horde of hungry office seekers to accept the regiments that poured into Washington to fight for the Union.

As for West Point, Jefferson Davis believed that there was no necessity to fill offices of regiments from Southern States for secession purposes. He claimed to have all West Point. He openly boasted that he could "have his pick in case of civil war of West Point," and it was no idle boast. A majority of West Pointers went South, and, as the world believes to-day, the ablest lot. It is not difficult to understand that this was from honest sense of duty. In our anxiety to create an aristocracy from which to select our officers, in imitation of the English army, we have secured a sort of aristocracy without getting the officers. The Almighty has not seen fit to endow the graduates with military qualities, to say nothing of his refusal to give that little school a monopoly of military talent. The consequence is, that it had come to be in President Lincoln's time, and is for that matter yet, a social affair. Now, previous to the late war, all our aristocracy pertained to the South, and with that class West Point sympathized. An abolitionist in the eyes of both was a low, scurvy fellow, not to be tolerated for an instant. President Lincoln in their eyes was a vulgar, plow-born rail-splitter, and his mass of followers no better than socialists, to use the mildest terms.

TRUE REFORM IS NEVER RESPECTABLE.

"These men are not gentlemen," said a disgusted dame from the Fabourg St. Germain, after being introduced to the conspirators who overthrew the republic of France to make way for the empire.

"My dear," was the significant response of the brilliant woman who took part in that infamy, "we do not make revolutions out of gentlemen."

Wrong ever sits crowned with jewels under its silken canopy, and smiles with dignified contempt upon the hungry and naked wretches who would demolish the throne to get at the treasure of which they have been robbed. And they

who are not yet deprived of all and able to destroy the impudent usurpation are cowed by epithets. When our Savior left his divine mission on earth to win its way alone, to be called a Christian was to become lost under a loathsome avalanche of filth that buried civil rights and character together. It seems strange even now that to be an abolitionist previous to the late war was to not only lose cast socially, but subject the poor philanthropist to a suspicion of dishonesty. He was regarded as a negro thief, although his larceny gave no other return than to be egged in Boston and hanged in South Carolina.

To become a soldier of West Point one ceases, so far as political rights are concerned, to be a citizen. The blind obedience to the powers that be taught at the academy leaves nothing to the graduate but his social privileges, and of course these become precious. It has since the war, under the domination of trade instincts of greed, been discovered that cadetships were sold for money. The interesting part of the result was the market value of a cadetship. This amounted to five thousand dollars. Now, when one remembers that in time of peace the graduates can never hope in a long line of service to be more than a captain, the value depends on some other privilege than rank and pay. It is the social standing that is paid for. Seats in the Senate are on market for the same purpose. There is money, however, in both. A cadet can marry a rich girl and generally does so, and the Wall street operator who buys his chair in the Senate as he buys his seat at the Stock Exchange gains confidence from his senatorial robes that are thus made to cover transactions dangerously near theft.

To be fair and just to the little military school, we must remember, as we have said, that patriotism is as little taught as the art of war. That blind obedience which is considered essential to a soldier precludes political instruction, and without that patriotism is a blind impulse, and it is small wonder that the poor officers were puzzled between the claims of state and their allegiance to the government. They solved the to them troublesome problem by clinging to old associations and following the familiar and pleasant social

lights. The case of General Robert E. Lee is one in point. This leader of the Confederate armies hung doubtful between a sense of duty to his government and the loving association of family and friends that the claim of his native state held on his heart. He could not continue in the service and so make war on his own people. He shrunk from offering his services to a cause that he knew and confessed in writing to be so uncalled for as to be treasonable. He could not resign and retire to private life while ringing in his ears were the cries of his own kin and people for aid in a death-struggle. He ended by laying down the sword of a subordinate and taking up that of a leader in behalf of a state against a nation. How differently a clear brain and a stronger character solved this same question we will consider directly.

An évent occurred about this time that throws a strong side light upon the character and convictions of George H. Thomas. While in Texas, finding that he could not have a servant for his family, he bought a colored woman. When recalled from Texas economy dictated that he should sell again the human chattel he had purchased. This he could not bring himself to do. He might buy, "but he could not sell a human being," to use his own words. Opposed to slavery he was not an abolitionist, for he recognized as sacred the guarantees of the constitution that he was so soon to assist in tearing from the national charter with bayonets. While true to himself he was conservative to all others, and in the consideration of all moral questions gave to his fellow the same freedom he reserved to himself. As it was a matter belonging exclusively to himself and his God, he recognized in his fellow-men the same responsibility and the same security from human interference. While always for reform he had in him nothing of the reformer. He had little patience with the man who, not content with walking himself in the direction of the sunlight, sought, as a special agent of God, to drag others into the same path. He would not sell the woman, and there was nothing left but to take her with him at an expense he could illy endure to his home in Virginia. Her subsequent history illustrates the difficulty attending the

attempt to lift a race of slaves, made such through generations of servitude, to an equality of freedom with the master in one generation. Major Thomas had really liberated the slave he purchased. To make her free, however, was difficult. When the war sent the poor creatures out to struggle for a subsistence they had not been trained to meet or make possible, this poor woman persistently clung to the man who had bought her but would not sell again. She came, not only herself, but with husband and children. Major Thomas made kindly and with patience many efforts to throw the poor family on their own resources and train them to live independently in their new condition. It could not be done, and the family remained dependent upon him so long as he was alive to meet their pitiful demands.

The Second Cavalry, of which Thomas was major, went to Texas under orders, and he joined his command in that state May the 1st, 1856. In 1859, the Texas reserve Indians being assigned to the Indian Territory, Major Thomas commanded the escort. Under orders he explored the region lying about the head-waters of the Canadian and Red rivers. His turn for study, and the long habit of close observation, made the service of great benefit to the government. Indeed, the records of the War Department give a singular history of explorations and study on the part of this accomplished officer in whatever new country his services found him. They prove him to have been well versed in botany and geology. The boy who could make his own saddle and shoes had developed into the man who not only could but would utilize every occasion for investigation and thought. The department found this habit so available in its exceptional major of cavalry that in 1860 he was sent to explore the sources of the Concho and Colorado rivers. The work of this single officer contrasts strikingly with the expedition sent subsequently to triangulate unknown regions, made up mainly of Congressional dependents, such as sons and friends of members who voted heavy appropriations to pay the expenses of these scientific picnics. We have at this writing a huge bureau at Washington held

together and perpetuated by a system of lobby triangulation far more effective than that in mythical canons.

In this expedition Major Thomas received his only wound in life. In a skirmish with the Indians an arrow passed through his chin, pinning it down in a most painful manner to his breast that it had entered. He quietly drew the arrow from the wound and continued the pursuit. As this gives us the only instance of a wound received by our hero, although ever at the front and in peril when present in an engagement, we reproduce from his report an account of the affair. It is an extract from his report of August 31, 1860:

"I have the honor to submit for the information of the department commander, the following report of the operations of the expedition under my command, to the headwaters of the Concho and Colorado rivers, during the months of July and August. . . . On the morning of the 25th inst., about fourteen miles east of the mountain pass, one of the Indian guides discovered a fresh horse trail crossing the road. As soon as the packs could be arranged and our wagons dispatched with the remains of our baggage to the post, with the teams (two sick—the hospital steward and a private of the band—too sick to ride) I followed the trail with all the remainder of the detachment and three guides, in a west-north-west direction for about forty miles that day, traveling as long as we could see the trail after nightfall.

"On the 26th, about 7 A. M., the Delaware guide discovered the Indians, eleven in number, at camp. He and their spy discovered each other about the same time, and giving me the signal agreed upon, the party moved at once in a gallop for a mile and a half before coming in sight of their camp, which was located on the opposite side of a deep ravine (running north, and, I presume, into the Clear Fork), impassable except at a few points. Here we lost considerable time searching for a crossing, and only succeeded, finally, in getting over by dismounting and leading our animals. In the meantime, the Indians, being already mounted and having their animals collected together, had increased their distance from us by at least half a mile. As soon as the

crossing was effected and the men remounted, we pursued them at full speed for about three miles and a half further, pushing them so closely that they abandoned their loose animals and continued their flight, effecting their escape solely from the fact that our animals had been completely exhausted by the fatiguing pace at which the pursuit had been kept up. As we were gradually overhauling them, one fellow, more persevering than the rest, and who still kept his position in the rear of the loose animals, suddenly dismounted and prepared to fight, and our men, in their eagerness to dispatch him, hurried upon him so quickly that several of his arrows took effect, wounding myself in the chin and chest, also private William Murphy, of Company "D," in the left shoulder, and privates John Tile and Caspar Siddle, of the band, each in the leg, before he fell, by twenty or more shots. . . . By this time the main body of the Indians, who were mounted on their best animals, were at least two miles from us, retiring at a rapid pace, and it being impossible to overtake them, on account of the exhausted condition of our animals, the pursuit was discontinued."

In October, 1860, Major Thomas solicited a leave of absence. It was his only request for such indulgence in twenty years active service. This devotion to duty continued throughout life. There was no political significance in this asked for leave of absence, but Major Thomas came North possessed of the knowledge that General Twiggs and the main body of officers under him were unfriendly, to use the mildest terms, to the government that had so unexpectedly passed to the control of what was considered at the South the abolition party.

Now, although the Southern leaders meant mischief and were loud in their threats, we have to bear in mind that the main body of Southern people were loyal to the old Republic. It was with extreme difficulty that the ordinance of secession was passed through any legislature, and in some this was done fraudulently. There is no question that had the proposed secession been put to a vote before the bombardment of Fort Sumter, it would have been defeated. What changed this condition we will refer to hereafter. But the

impression made upon Major Thomas's mind by General Twiggs's utterances and the vamping talk of officers about head-quarters is scarcely worth remembering.

It was during this leave of absence while journeying from Richmond to Washington by rail that Major Thomas met with an accident that gave color to and was felt through all his subsequent career. In stepping from a railroad train in the dark, he was thrown into a ditch with such violence that his spine was so effected that for months after it appeared as if he was shut out from active life. This must be borne in mind, for it becomes strongly significant in considering George H. Thomas's attitude toward the government when secession was rapidly developing into war.

CHAPTER III.

Thomas Announces His Allegiance to the Government—Loyal from the First—Difference in Temperament that Made His Course the Reverse of that of Lee—Question of the Right to Secede.

The wrath aroused in the Southern mind at so distinguished an officer as this one of Virginia birth remaining steadfast in his loyalty to the Federal Government, found expression in an impugment of his motives. The Southern impulse ran largely on sentiment. That one should coldly reason out his duty and calmly abide by the result, in the face of affection on one side and an abstract political doctrine on the other, was quite beyond the comprehension of the hot-headed men who plunged us into the cruelest war that ever afflicted humanity.

It is generally safe, in considering the conduct of a man, to consult his character as well as career. However conflicting, even to positive inconsistency, may be his conduct, a study of his temperament and intellectual qualities will throw light upon his motives and solve what at first sight seems a profound mystery. We know what Thomas inherited in his Huguenot blood on one side and Welsh-English on the other. Slow to determine, he was steadfast in his resolve. Whatever may have been his intellectual lights, he was guided by them and not by his feelings.

To appreciate this, let us take Robert E. Lee. The disruption of the Union was to this eminent leader very painful to think of. Every drop of his blood came from heroes of the Révolution. He had been reared to the high patriotic regard, born of Virginia soil, for the great Republic that a host of immortal dead had given all their days and many their lives to build above him. A soldier by profession, a patriot by his birth, he had followed the flag of his fathers through all his youth, ready to die fighting for its honor. We know this; no man questions it. He has left proofs strong

as those of Holy Writ of his inner consciousness when the time came to test his patriotism. It was a crucial test. He saw on one side the great Republic that as a soldier he had sworn to defend against all comers in the true spirit of the knights of old, sanctioned by the noblest appreciation of the best men and sanctified by the fame of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Patrick Henry, and a host of heroes Virginia born; and on the other, the dark horde of armed men gathering to strike down all that he held dear. But they were his people. He knew that they were wrong—indeed criminal, but they were his people. He could no more resist this appeal to his heart than he could cease to be Robert E. Lee. This feeling dominated his intellect, and from the kindest motives he, in common with all of such temperaments, moved down the road to sin, for such he regarded a war against the Union, as his letters written at that time clearly prove.

Now let us consider the case of George H. Thomas from the same point of view. To him came home precisely the same call upon his conscience, the same appeal to his feelings. But in his case the mind reigned supreme and held these feelings under strong control. All the sweet associations of youth and manhood, all the sacred ties of home and kin, were tugging at his heart, but these emotions were held under the clear brain and indomitable will of one who could never consent to wrong tainted by dishonor and cloaked under a bastard patriotism that ran its limits along state lines and left out all the fathers had fought for. He knew that the cry that came up to him was not that of his people. It was known to him, as it was patent to the world, that the scheme of secession, from its first inception to its final development, came not from the people, but from the hot-headed, ambitious men chance and slavery had made leaders. The Virginia ordinance of secession was a fraud. It won its way with difficulty through a faithless legislature, that knew that a fair submission to the people would have voted it down by an immense majority.

Geo. H. Thomas could no more have clasped hands with these conspirators than Robert E. Lee could resist their ap-

peals. The one followed his heart into an unholy cause, the other obeyed the dictates of reason and the high call of patriotic duty in remaining firm to the flag of the fathers, a soldier of the cross and a soldier of the great Republic.

There is yet another state of fact bearing on the trial of Thomas in this respect that settles the question beyond doubt. Two letters are published, in which it is claimed that at one time the then Major Thomas hesitated and hung doubtful between the cause of our government and that of the Confederates. We reprint both. The first reads as follows :

“Colonel Francis H. Smith, Supt. Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va.

DEAR SIR: In looking over the files of the *National Intelligencer* this morning, I met with your advertisement for a commandant of cadets and instructor at the institute. If not already filled, I will be under obligations if you will inform me what salary and allowances pertain to the situation, as from present appearances I fear it will soon be necessary for me to be looking up some means of support.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major U. S. Army.*”

The second letter, found not long since, among the stored-away archives at the state capitol, is here given :

“NEW YORK HOTEL, March 12, 1861.

To His Excellency, Gov. John Letcher, Richmond, Va.

DEAR SIR: I received yesterday a letter from Major Gigham, of the Virginia Military Institute, dated the 9th inst., in reference to the position of Chief of Ordnance of the State, in which he informs me that you had requested him to ask me if I would resign from the service, and if so, whether that post would be acceptable to me. As he requested me to make my reply to you direct, I have the honor to state, after expressing my most sincere thanks for your very kind offer, that it is not my wish to leave the service of the United States as long as it is honorable for me to remain in it, and, therefore, as long as my native state (Virginia) remains in

the Union, it is my purpose to remain in the army, unless requested to perform duties alike repulsive to honor and humanity. I am very respectfully your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major United States Army."

This last letter is a complete vindication, if such were needed, to the claimed treachery of the first. On January 18, 1861, Thomas applied for a situation at the Virginia Military Institute, a private school, differing from others only in the fact that the pupils were called cadets instead of students, and were subject to the drill and discipline of private soldiers. How he could join the confederacy through that, confounds the understanding. But let that pass; the officer contemplating a division of the government to take service in the confederacy, and actually, it is said, seeking such service, on the 12th of March of that same year is offered precisely what it is claimed he sought, and he promptly declines.

The later letter settles the reading given the first. If any other evidence were necessary, it is near at hand. It will be remembered that Major Thomas was gravely hurt in alighting from a railroad train at night, and believed for many months that he was shut out from further active service in the army. Being a poor man with a dear wife dependent upon him, he sought employment outside the army, and in the direction his studies and experience had made available.

As for that part of his letter which refers to his remaining in the army so long as Virginia remains in the Union, we must remember that the time had not come for Thomas to make his decision. As well hold Chase, Greeley, and other prominent republicans, to the cry of "Let the erring sisters depart in peace," as to place any grave meaning upon Thomas's reference to secession. At the time this letter was written, not a man could be found in the United States who seriously believed any war would grow out of the political agitation following the election of Abraham Lincoln. At the North it was believed to be a game of bluff indulged in by the democracy; at the South the leaders seriously thought

that when actual war was tendered us, the business habits and timid nature of the northern people would come in aid of the then democracy, and secure a peaceful separation.

The gun at Sumter, fired 12th of April, 1861, caught in its echo a roar that startled the world, and changed the face of all things. Up to that hour, all had been speculations and dreamings. Ninety days after, the land was white with tents, the roll of the drum penetrated the most sequestered glens, and men were arming and falling into line to battle to the death. The movement at the North stimulated the masses at the South, and a people that but a short time before would have voted down the secession ordinance, now sprang to arms to resist invasion. The unexpected war was on, and George H. Thomas was called abruptly to make his decision.

The prompt decision came from him at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the news from Sumter reached him. He immediately telegraphed his wife at New York, and his sisters in Virginia, his resolve to be found true to his flag, and then quietly obeyed the orders from the War Department, at Washington, that led so soon after to the invasion of Virginia.

This question of loyalty and purpose, if any remain, is settled by the great man himself. Colonel A. L. Hough, after the death of General Thomas, gave to the press a statement brought out by a printed assertion over the name of Fitzhugh Lee, to the effect that Thomas had sought a position in the Southern army. We quote from Colonel Hough's letter :

"As a confidential staff officer, one of his aides-de-camp, I had the privilege of having many conversations with General Thomas upon matters relating to the war. The most important of these conversations I made notes of at the time, with his knowledge and consent. Among them is one on the subject of Fitzhugh Lee's letter, which I copy from my note-book. A slander upon the general was often repeated in the Southern papers during and immediately subsequent to the rebellion. It was given upon the authority of prominent rebel officers, and not denied by them. It was to the

effect that he was disappointed in not getting a high command in the rebel army he had sought for, hence his refusal to join the rebellion. In a conversation with him on the subject, the general said: 'This is an entire fabrication, not having an atom of foundation; not a line ever passed between him and the rebel authorities; they had no genuine letter of his, nor was a word spoken by him to any one that could even lead to such an inference. He defied any one to produce any testimony, written or oral, to sustain such an allegation; he never entertained such an idea, for his duty was clear from the beginning. These slanders were caused by men who knew they had done wrong, but were endeavoring to justify themselves by claiming their action to be a virtue which all men should have followed, and by blackening the character of those who had done right. It was evident they were determined that no southern-born man, who had remained true to his country, should bear a reputable character, if continued and repeated abuse could effect a stain upon it.' "

The error into which the friends of this silent, unobtrusive man had fallen is in the hasty conclusion that his resolve to sustain the government under which he had grown to mature manhood was arrived at without much hesitation, anxiety or pain. That there was no question from the start as to his duty we well know, but when it came to performing that duty there is no loss of true manhood to find between his reason and feeling a painful conflict. When secession was mere talk—a talk foreign to Thomas' experience—and ordinances were being passed with the pompous style peculiar to the political South, he could treat the matter with the same indifference that marked the people of the North. As we have said, it was regarded as bluster. It was this same contemptuous indifference that made President Lincoln turn from the voice at the South to consider the hungry demands for office at the North. But when the awful fact presented itself to the world in all its naked deformity, the decision of our great captain was promptly announced and from that out lived up to with all the stern firmness that so strikingly marked his character.

We would do our subject a great injustice were we to assert that when at last he made his resolve as to his course in the emergency so cruelly presented he did so without regret over or worry at the shock he gave his feelings. Masculine and masterful as Thomas was his fine delicate temperament was permeated and moved by the finest sensibility that ever elevated a man. In illustration of this we have the fact recorded in his subsequent career that, although ambitious as such a man was forced to be, believing that he had that in him which, if given a trial, would be of the largest benefit to his cause and country, yet, when tendered the command he longed for, we know that he put the tempting offer calmly to one side because in its acceptance he felt that he would be doing a grave wrong to a brother officer. To measure a man of this sort by the common rule of a military tailor is to shut our eyes to all that is worth knowing.

On the 12th of March, 1861, while ill at the New York Hotel, with war apparently as remote as the farthest fixed star in the heaven, he could well write: "It is not my wish to leave the service of the United States as long as it is honorable for me to remain in it, therefore as long as my native state remains in the Union it is my purpose to remain in the army—unless requested to perform duties alike repulsive to honor and humanity;" and at Harrisburg, on the 13th of April following, telegraph his wife at New York, and his sisters in Virginia, that he would be found thereafter in the military service of his country. In firing on Fort Sumter the South had invaded every loyal state of the Union. Fort Sumter, built to defend our country, was as much the soil of Massachusetts as of South Carolina. The handful of soldiers who saw the works crumble about them as they vainly sought to defend them against the impious shot and shell directed against our flag were as much at home as if they were the defenders of the remotest town upon the northern border of Maine.

There was no appeal to the reason in behalf of this war of secession that did not excite the contempt and indignation of George H. Thomas. Even the weaker mind of Lee

recognized the fallacy and wickedness of this cause. The cry of state sovereignty that carried in it the right to secede, so vehemently urged by the leaders of revolt, was the veriest bosh ever offered sensible men. Of it the Southern people knew little and cared less. They were aroused to fight out a bloody issue to the bitter end, because, as they saw it, their homes were being invaded by armed men. As for the proposition, it is the rottenest ground-rail of a Virginia worm-fence. We have sought to trace this colonial superstition to its birth in the origin of the war. Without considering events so remote, however important, we will look at them from the stand-point taken by George H. Thomas.

State sovereignty was born of a colonial superstition that divided one race into many different peoples, each seeking to be a nation in itself. They were thrown together through the emergencies of the Revolution, very like many people crossing a stream in a ferry-boat. The passage effected, the passengers immediately separate, going each his own gait in his own way. To sustain the proposition that, as they were traveling the same road, they should therefore continue the lately enforced association, is difficult. The various colonies on our continent were not only jealous of each other, but that jealousy was deepened by diverse business interests and religious beliefs. The fierce fanaticisms that drove nearly all from Europe to the wilds of this continent were as varied among themselves as the settlements they made, and were as intensely bitter as the feeling that forced perilous emigration across unknown seas. They who fled, claiming the right to worship God in accordance with the dictates of conscience, scarcely effected a landing before they went to persecuting each other precisely as the Church of Rome and Church of England had persecuted them. This religious fervor was strengthened by that egotism which is born of greed.

There was no sense in these differences, but they had grown up into that second nature that is always more powerful than that which first comes from our born instincts and impulses. There was, however, a layer of common sense in the jealousy, and fear felt by the weaker for the stronger.

colonies. That of Rhode Island, for example, could preach toleration to the Puritans of Massachusetts or the Quakers of Pennsylvania, and yet shrink from a political or trade alliance that would submerge their little community into the larger that then held the one harbor on the Atlantic coast that bade fair to be the gate-way of commerce for a continent.

The framers of our constitution, the fathers of the Union that under the carefully prepared contract in writing knit the old thirteen states together, had the condition above stated to encounter. It is a singular fact that the first convention was made possible not by political but trade necessities. These were stimulated into active life by the claims held by creditors against the old Federation, that had fallen apart like a rope of sand, leaving all its just debts unsettled. The delegates met to harmonize all their trade differences, and ended in a political union that had consequences of which they little dreamed, or the fabric would never have been completed. No impartial student of our constitutional history can doubt for a moment that each state ratified that union under the firm belief that at any time it could withdraw.

We have said that the delegates assembled for one purpose and ended by accomplishing another. This was not the case with all. A small number, whose patriotism extended beyond the limits of their several states, had from the start the political purpose they succeeded in bringing about. Led by Alexander Hamilton, while loudly recognizing the state rights, they adroitly took from the states all that made their independence possible. As sovereignty means that power in a state from which there is no appeal, these framers of our constitution established that power, and carefully took from each separate commonwealth not only the essence, but all and every attribute of sovereignty. All that was left was but thirteen empty shells. So anxious were these early statesmen to consolidate and strengthen their structure, that they gave us, under the name of a republic, a government more powerful and despotic than that of England, which they sought so closely to imitate.

Had it been possible for the old thirteen states to have

remained as they were when the Union was formed, there would be a show of reason in the exercise of a right not yet imposed or effected by the legitimate consequences of the compact. But an immediate change of conditions followed. The general government went to making states. The curious part of the transaction lies in the fact that this had reference more to territory than to the people inhabiting the same. Thus the North-west was devoted, not to the inhabitants that were or would be settled thereon, but to the general government. The true significance of state sovereignty lies in that which goes to make a people. There is not only a community of interest, but those interests which make the community. One, to be a citizen of the soil, must not only be born upon it, but born through many generations, and inherit thereby the feeling that makes the patriot. When Virginia ceded the North-west Territory to the central government, that immediately opened that region, not to Virginians only, but to citizens of other states and the world at large. The citizenship was at once shifted from the locality limited to state lines to the country bounded by the authority of the general government. This was so clearly recognized as to leave no question when we purchased Louisiana from France. In that, the government bought not only the territory, but the people inhabiting that country, and that without their consent. If secession were a right, the people of Louisiana thus purchased would return in their allegiance to the French government.

The same view obtains in the acquisition made in a conquest from Mexico. We not only purchased sovereign states and the people therein, but we conquered and controlled them by bayonets. This in the face of our favorite axiom that all governments derive their only title to rule from the consent of the governed. No one suggested nor dreamed of saying to the people of Louisiana or Mexico: "We have bought you or fought you from under the sovereignty of France or that of Mexico; now we leave you free to select your own government, in accordance with our great axiom."

How completely and entirely the doctrine of states'

rights and that of secession under them disappears before these facts of history.

This, however, is not all. It is not half. As we have said, all compacts carry with them their legitimate consequences. The rights that come into existence as a legitimate result of a contract make, of course, a binding part of the agreement. Thus, for, example, had the Siamese twins formed their union in the ligament that held them together while separate and free to do so through the will of both, that ligament could not be severed if in such operation the life of one or both would be lost in the surgical operation, even if they were not aware when they united themselves that such would be the result. The states formed out of the ceded Virginia territory known as the North-west had their boundary under the Union on the sea. After secession, their boundaries would fall back to state lines, and they would be shut out from the high seas and be dependent on a commerce that involved their staples and, therefore, their prosperity to the good will of alien governments. The great North-west, therefore, gave bond and security by being in existence to keep open the Mississippi river to the gulf. This theory gives place to condition, and what was once a right resolves itself into a wrong so palpable that the weakest mind can not fail to recognize the evil.

Written constitutions are after all only so much legislation built on the past and binding on the present. The body politic is subject to the same changes that effect all earthly bodies, and with those changes come new wants, new losses, and new obligations. We can as well fit the garments of a boy to the wearing of a man as to frame a constitution from the past that is to serve all future generations. The state sovereignty that was so clearly in view to the fathers of the old Republic has given way to home rule, which means the right of all communities to control their local interests in harmony with the sovereignty of the nation, expressed through constitutional powers that are as clearly defined as common safety demands.

The tendency of poor human nature to swing from one extreme to another is, we fear, being illustrated in these

revolutionary times. The same patriotism that incited us to rally to the armed support of the Union that we might save the nation now calls for a like movement in the opposite direction to save the people. While the oppressed communities of Europe are struggling for the recognition of home rule, we are concentrating powers in the central government that must end sooner or later in an intolerable despotism. However, it is with the past and not the future that we are dealing.

CHAPTER IV.

Promoted Through Coloneley to a Brigadier Generalship—Skirmish at Falling Waters—"Stonewall" and "Rock"—First Bull Run—Vindication of General Patterson.

Major Thomas got the startling news from Sumter at Harrisburg while in execution of an order from the War Department. He continued without pause in the line of his duty. The silent, thoughtful man had no confidence with the public. All he may have written to his sisters in Virginia is not known. Nor is such information necessary to the fame of our great soldier. His duty was clear to him and he was the last man to swerve from that, let the consequences to himself or others be what they might. His state had seceded by ordinance that would have been harmless, but for the declaration of war that came in the mouthing roar of Confederate artillery at Sumter. The entire cordon of slave states was eager for the war. Having aroused their people to arms, the leaders were naturally in fear that some proposition would be made by the government at Washington they would be forced to consider if not accept. "Give us a white sheet of paper to write our terms upon," said one of the more distinguished, "and we will return it to you unsoiled by ink."

The resignation of Robert E. Lee gave Thomas his place, and it is strange that these two men, each the greatest of his side in the war that followed, should have held so much in common. They both were natives of Virginia, and represented, one through family and the other from force of character, the better element of the state they adorned. While writing this, amid the roar of cannon, the swell of martial music, and the cheers of thousands, a noble monument to the honor of Robert E. Lee is being unveiled at Richmond. To that monument, a memory in bronze, will come pilgrims from distant lands beyond the sea to lay im-

mortelles at its base in honor of one who lifted a frenzied, senseless revolt to the dignity of a great war, and through the purity of his own character made a people's crime appear a patriotic cause. There can be but one monument of our own, and that remains as yet unbuilt, that will check and hold for our side the admiration of the world. No man knowing our late conflict can pass by the tomb of Thomas to render homage to that of Lee. The one forsook his country for his state; the other forsook his state for his country. In all the traits that make great men dear to us they were blessed alike, and it is only in measurement of intellectual qualities that the soldier of the Union towers above the military leader of revolt. How clearly this is coming to be recognized we learn when a distinguished soldier of England, having claimed for Lee the admiration of the world as the greatest of both sides in our civil war, the man who was as much responsible as any other for the banishment of George Henry Thomas to an unmarked grave, was forced to invoke the memory of his neglected dead in a challenge to the British admirer of Robert E. Lee. The invocation ended the controversy. There is no monument that can be built on this continent as the marble or bronze history of some man made prominent in the late war which will not be saved from the contempt that preceded oblivion by the haunting shadow of this silent hero of a nation's salvation.

The disintegration of the West Point part of the regular army was so extensive that the promotion of Thomas came rapidly. "The Virginian" did not have to "wait." He stood alone. Of all the faithless he was faithful still. And as the old system of promotion had not yet been disturbed by petty intrigues and government demands, Major Thomas got rapid promotion. It is well to bear this in mind. If the government had sought to hold him to his allegiance through tempting favoritism in the way of pay and rank, there might have been ground for doubt. But instead of this, we well know that his adhesion to the Union was so striking as to be without a parallel, for his Southern associates nearly all threw up their commissions and carried

their swords to the side of the Confederacy. This, strangely enough, only made the government more suspicious, and even when he carved his way to confidence a full reward was denied him. The Confederacy did offer him both confidence and a commission, but all that he got from his own government, was gained in hard-won victories upon the field.

On the 1st of June, Colonel Thomas, then at Carlisle Barracks, received orders to report with four companies of the regiment he commanded, and the First City Troop of Philadelphia, to Major-General Robert Patterson, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. He was assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the Army of Pennsylvania. On the 2d of July he marched his brigade over Maryland to Williamsport, crossed the Potomac, and fought the Battle of Falling Waters in Virginia, if we may call such a skirmish by that name. It was significant in the fact that George H. Thomas commanded on one side, and Thomas T. Jackson on the other. "Stonewall" Jackson and the "Rock of Chickamauga" met in that sharp little affair, and gave a short prologue to the mighty drama that was to have them its chief actors. No two men were so much alike in two respects, and so dissimilar in all others. Both had convictions so deep and strong that they controlled their actions, but Jackson's was the emotion of his temperament, while Thomas, as we have seen, got at his conclusions through an exercise of the highest reasoning. Jackson was a fanatic, a Puritan who, through the force of his own fierce personality, appropriated God to himself. It was a God of vengeance, one to worship in war and fear in peace. He escaped West Point with his instincts unimpaired. This narrow, bigoted mind accepted without question the doctrine of blind obedience in a soldier to the powers that be as it took in that of predestination for a religion. The one no more shut out the true religion of our gentle, forgiving Savior than the other closed to him all political information. He never questioned the divine right of slavery any more than he questioned the divine right of hell. God, in his estimation, created both, the first for the comfort of the elect on earth, and the last as a place of punishment for sinners foreordained through all eternity to suf-

fer in everlasting flames. Of a coarse, tough fiber, he was without culture. His manner was as brusque as his sympathies were contracted.

To speak of two such men as having any thing in common seems monstrous. But history will hold, so long as the story of our late war is told, that these two men were alike in being its grandest soldiers. They were commissioned by God to be the leaders of men, and each won his way to recognition through the control he had over the masses he led. "Stonewall" and "Rock" got their significance from the staying power of their men in the hour of deadliest peril. Jackson had from instinct what Thomas gained through thoughtful study. They led to the same end. Stonewall's brigade of "Foot Cavalry," that made such forced marches, and struck such telling blows, were the same sort that stood by Thomas in the outflanked center at Stone River, and again at Chickamauga.

After all, this art of war is a very simple thing to comprehend as an art, and grows difficult, like all art, only in its application. The stupidest man alive can get for example a thorough knowledge of law or medicine, but when the rules come to be applied in practice, mere memory is of no avail, and brain alone is successful. The calculation of chances in war spoken of by Napoleon is predicated not on courage in the force, but upon fear. Courage is an exceptional virtue, fear is common to all. On this account it is the unexpected that tells. To have the foe appear unexpectedly upon one's flank or rear, is to demoralize a far larger force than the one so mysteriously advancing from an unknown quarter. This was the secret of Stonewall's success. It made no difference to him what the superiority of the opposing force might be, provided he could strike him unexpectedly. But he had men with whom to strike. They might fall in the blazing heat of a summer sun, or they might fall from the enemy's bullets, but so long as he led, and they could move, they were with him.

Said General Banks to the writer of this narrative in the Shenandoah Valley: "The only disposition you can make of Stonewall Jackson is to kill him."

What a field of speculation opens upon the suggestion that if it had pleased God to open the eyes of both Federal and Confederate governments to a knowledge of the men so that these two colonels of the skirmish at Falling Waters could have been called to command both armies, what a different war would have gone to record. As it was, but for Lee, Stonewall would have made European recognition, our great fear, a certainty, by putting Jefferson Davis in the White House at Washington. That was the one great objective point of the Confederate army. The capture of our capitol would have brought upon our coast the combined fleet of France, England, Russia and Spain, and ended the war in thirty days. Lee marched his victorious forces in sight of the city; indeed, the thunder of his triumphant guns several times woke echoes along the fretted ceilings of the capitol. He saw the dome, but he could not see what it covered. He was contented to win great victories, but these victories were curses in disguise. The prolonged fierce war exhausted the resources of the Confederacy. The brave men whose uniform was filthy rags, who marched without shoes, slept without tents, fought without food, and when forced at last to fall back retreated on the same sort of victories they ever won and made the march of their foes a highway of human bones. These brave fellows, numbered by the thousands at first, came to be numbered by hundreds at last, while Robert E. Lee fought his great fights and saw after each the thinned ranks close up and the doom of the lost cause loom as the end of all this useless slaughter. Ah! yes, he was a mighty captain, and so was our Grant, and they deserve their monuments, only the material should be changed. Instead of bronze and marble they should be made of half a million skulls in token of the slaughter their stupidity made immortal.

There was a grim, iron-jawed, spectacled man at Washington, with short upper lip continually on the curl, as if to show his teeth—a man a head and shoulders above all his associates save one—who said: “We have no general, but we have men; we can lose five to their one and win, and I will crowd on until we stamp out this cursed treason.”

He saw the South being exhausted, and yet, after the victory of the second Bull Run, after that of Chancellorsville, and that of Fredericksburg, Lee could have marched into Washington and driven that man and his master out, never to return.

Stonewall Jackson would have taken Washington, not because he saw more clearly, or saw at all, but instinctively he would have fought for what the foe evidently considered his most precious possession. The Southern leaders saw the administration risk the Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy rather than uncover Washington, and if they failed to comprehend the significance of its capture they must have recognized the tenacity with which our government clung to its capitol. It was the fate of both sides to have a war of instruction thrown away on generals incapable of being instructed. The fierce fighting qualities of Lee's men were for him all that now make his monument appropriate, while on the other side the million of men under muskets saved us the Union through disasters and defeats.

Colonel Thomas reported to General Patterson and was with that officer until the defeat of the first Bull Run, when public indignation forced the government to withdraw this commander from the field. General McDowell in risking a general engagement with Beauregard on Bull Run, west of Centerville, counted upon Patterson holding the forces under General Joseph E. Johnston in his front. Instead of this being done, the Confederate army under Johnston arrived on the battle field at the moment almost that Beauregard was penning his order to retreat.

The writer of this made one of the armed mob that McDowell manoeuvred, or thought he did, upon that summer Sunday, and well remembers how stationary the hot sun seemed as the promiscuous fights by regiments at intervals and the artillery of both sides all the time went on. It was approaching 3 p. m., of the longest day the writer ever experienced, when the tumult died down, and the stillness was broken by the song of birds recovered from their fright. A group of officers belonging to General Dan Tyler and Schenck's

command were wiping their foreheads and exchanging canteens under the impression that the enemy was in full retreat. We were much in Dogberry's condition when he bade the watch in the rear of a retreating army to "take no note of him, but let him go, and presently call the rest of the watch together and thank God you are rid of a knave." We were together for that identical purpose, when suddenly the silenced batteries of the foe opened again more furious than before. It seemed as if the first round shot given was aimed at our group, for it killed four men directly in our front, and then from right to left swept down the rebel yell, followed by the rattling fire of musketry.

The unexpected had happened. At no time of the day had our army been either confident or eager. The cessation of resistance impressed only a few with the fact of victory, and now the fight was renewed with all its old tumult. Our men retreated before any order could be given to that effect, if any was ever issued. The enemy seemed as willing to let us go and thank God for the riddance as we had been, for there was no pursuit, and in less than an hour the fields and woods of Bull Run again had their silence broken only by the song of birds.

In justice to General McDowell and his motley mob, we must confess that Bull Run was lost to us more through defective arms than the accession of General Joseph E. Johnston and his fresh troops. When the demand for muskets was made by our government in the unexpected opening of the war, certain well known knaves high in the confidence of the War Department bought up in Belgium a vast quantity of condemned muskets, which they sold at an immense profit to our government. They were light pot-metal things, far more dangerous to those handling them than to the enemy fired at. It was an infamous shame that poor fellows should be led into a death struggle with such arms. But Simon Cameron was Secretary of a War Department honey-combed with fraud.

Why General Patterson did not hold the enemy to the front, or, failing in that, follow him to the field at Bull Run, has never been satisfactorily explained to the world. He

had a complete defense, but it was never made public. So soon as General George H. Thomas appeared as Patterson's defender, all inquiry as well as charges ceased. A West Pointer at that time was an oracle in the popular mind, and when Thomas said Patterson was in the right, the confiding public considered judgment entered and the case closed. General Thomas was prompt in appearance when called on to give his verdict. He gave it in his own words, addressed to one of General Patterson's staff.

"CAMP NEAR HYATTSTOWN, MD., *August 25, 1861.*

DEAR COLONEL: Your note has just been handed me. I had a conversation with Newton yesterday on the subject of General Patterson's campaign. He was on the eve of writing to the general, and asked me what he should state was my opinion as to the general's course. I told him that he could say that, if I was situated as he was, I would make a statement of all the facts to the general-in-chief or the Secretary of War, fortifying it with copies of the orders, etc., and demand justice at their hands; and if they were not disposed to give it, I would then demand a court of inquiry.

Yours truly,

GEO. H. THOMAS.

P. S.—I think, however, that time will set the general all right, as I see the papers are much more favorable to him than at first."

Justice was awarded General Patterson by the government, so the court of inquiry was not called. Had it been, the responsibility would have been shifted from Patterson's camp to the cabinet at Washington, or rather, to the headquarters of General Winfield Scott. This elderly officer was one of the most magnificent parade captains ever uniformed. The hero of two wars, he had learned nothing from either but a deportment that made his tall, commanding figure a most impressive affair. He saw more marching of a light sort to less fighting than any other man of his time. His popular title was "fuss and feathers," which did great injustice to his solemn, dignified deportment. But the infirmities

of old age were upon him when the civil war began, and the poor old man, as pure a patriot as ever breathed, was sorely afflicted by the event. He was the author of the proposition to "let the erring sisters depart in peace," that had scarcely gained favorable utterance from certain prominent abolitionists when it was drowned by the popular roar the guns from Sumter awakened. Owing to his infirmities, he was carefully watched at Washington until General McClellan, a younger parade captain, crowded him from power. It is, therefore, scarcely just to hold him responsible for the blunder at Bull Run.

It seems that, when Patterson was ordered into Virginia, General Thomas, who had become his commanding general's confidential adviser, got him to petition Lieutenant-General Scott to order their forces over the Potomac at or near Leesburg. This, Scott, from some unknown reason, refused, and ordered him to cross at Williamsport. General Thomas's ground for the move he suggested was to place Patterson's army and the forces in front of Washington within supporting distance of each other. Scott's order, when executed, left Johnston and Beauregard on an interior line to support each other, and McDowell and Patterson so wide apart that such conjunction was, if not impossible, so difficult as to amount to the same thing. General Scott had in mind a menace to Johnston's communications and the evacuation of Harper's Ferry. But the same result would have followed had the crossing been effected at Leesburg, while the additional advantage would have been gained of enabling Patterson to reach McDowell before Johnston could get to Beauregard.

True it is that Joseph E. Johnston and his army were at Patterson's front, and if resisted in force would have demonstrated this fact. But that would have brought on a general engagement, and that phrase was well known at Washington before McClellan arrived to change it into "Beware of a general engagement." The condition made it easy for General Johnston to leave a light line of pickets behind an army that was led by the roar of the enemy's guns and hastened to the fight. Perhaps it was better as it happened.

Had General Patterson made a demonstration in force, the probability is that we should have had two defeats to mourn instead of one. The inside history of the unhappy affair, however, is of interest, as it shows at this early stage the capacity of our general to recognize the condition with that ability which ever rises to an emergency. He was ever master of the situation. In a letter written long after, vindicating General Patterson, it appears that even after the execution of Scott's blunder, such mistake could have been remedied had General Thomas's advice been followed. We give the letter entire—

“ HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., August 8, 1864.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Your favor of the 16th of July was only received a few days since, owing, doubtless, to the irregularities of the mails to the front. *In the council of war, at Martinsburg, I in substance advised an advance toward Winchester, at least as far as Bunker Hill, and if your information, after the army reached Bunker Hill, led you to believe that Johnston still occupied Winchester in force, then to shift our troops over to Charleston, as that move would place our communications with our depot of supplies in safety, and still threaten and hold Johnston at Winchester, which I understood was all that you were expected or required to do. I should have advised a direct advance on Winchester but for the character of the troops composing your army. They were all, with the exception of a couple of squadrons of the Second U. S. Cavalry and two batteries of the regular artillery, three months men, and their term of service would expire in a few days. Judging of them as of other volunteer troops, had I been their commander, I should not have been willing to risk them in a heavy battle coming off within a few days of the expiration of their service.*

I have always believed, and have frequently so expressed myself, that your management of the three months' campaign was able and judicious, and was to the best interests

of the service, considering the means at your disposal and the nature of the troops under your command.

With much respect and esteem,

I remain, General, very sincerely and truly yours,

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major-General U. S. V.*

MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT PATTERSON, Philadelphia, Pa."

The italics above are our own. They call attention to the ever ready mind of a man who was said to be so slow as to be useless. His tenacity of purpose in executing his plans, taken in connection with the fact that he was slow to leave the field, can scarcely be considered defects. This letter lets light in on General Thomas's estimate of the three months' men. To understand this we must know that the fighting element of a community is but a small part of the entire number. This element is not found among those who organize companies in the hour of peace for mere display. They are soldiers in peace and apt to be citizens in war. With the French, the greatest war power on earth, this fighting element is sifted out and put together after conscription that takes all. In this way certain brigades and regiments are put forward when desperate valor is called for and the great mass left to ordinary service.

When our civil war came on, the South got at its fighting element in the start. Our government did not. The call for seventy-five thousand men for three months brought out an army of roisterers that acted as if they were on a summer excursion, or, as they generally expressed it, on a picnic. At the end of the ninety days these forces melted away—some of the regiments, as McDowell said, "moving to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." They disappeared to give place to the war element, the stalwart men under muskets who saved for us our Union. It is not pleasant to know that the seventy-five thousand are reappearing in great force upon the pension roll. George H. Thomas, who loved the real soldier, saw no material in the peace parade contingent and so was ready to absolve Robert Patterson from all blame.

It is to General Robert Anderson, of Sumter fame, that

we owe the promotion of Thomas to the position of brigadier-general of volunteers. General Anderson, having accepted command of the government forces in Kentucky on condition that he should have the privilege of selecting four brigadier-generals to serve under him, chose W. T. Sherman, Don Carlos Buell, and O. M. Mitchell. He was in doubt as to the fourth, thinking to tender it to the man who it seems had done his best to get Kentucky out of the Union, Governor S. B. Buckner, when his nephew, Lieutenant Thomas M. Anderson, of the Fifth Cavalry, who knew the facts, called his uncle's attention to them and suggested the name of George H. Thomas. "One of the very best officers in the army," exclaimed General Anderson, and the name went in.

This promotion was helped on by no less a personage than Samuel J. Randall, subsequently Speaker of the House of Representatives, and through life an active leader of the Pennsylvania Democracy. His letter of recommendation is valuable from the fact that it comes from one who, without remarkable quality of brain, and with a lack of culture, rose to eminence from sheer force of character, and clear, keen knowledge of human nature. Mr. Randall had three months in which to study the character of the man he recommended. What he said that day of Thomas has since been written in acts more memorable than bronze, which is that he had the capacity to command, and the confidence of the men he commanded. There is George Henry Thomas in one sentence. Samuel J. Randall, possessed of Republican opinions he was pleased to treat as convictions while posing as a Democrat, left little in his political career one cares to remember. In this, however, he has gained the material for a monument. He saw what Lincoln, Stanton, and Chase failed to see in the Virginia colonel, a man worthy the utmost confidence and highest command. We give his letter:

"SANDY HOOK, MD., August 3, 1861.

Friend Scott:

I hear you are the Assistant Secretary of War. Rest assured that no man delights more in your high position than I do. I notice that the government is now considering

the appointment of proper persons to be brigadier-generals. In the name of God, let them be men fully competent to discharge the duties of the positions to which they may be assigned. Inefficiency is the evil of the hour. This opinion is based upon observation of nearly three months. Most of the time, in fact nearly all of the time, we have been under the command of Colonel George H. Thomas, now commanding one of the brigades here. He is thoroughly competent to be a brigadier-general, has the confidence of every man in his command, for the reason that they recognize and appreciate capacity—which to them, in every hour of the day, is so essential to their safety. Now, let me, as a friend of this administration, in so far as the war is concerned, and the preservation of the Union is involved, urge upon General Cameron to select Colonel Thomas as one of the number of proposed brigadiers. This appointment would give renewed vigor and courage to this section of the army. I am, as perhaps you know, a private in the First City Cavalry, of Philadelphia, and I never saw Colonel Thomas until I saw him on parade, and our intercourse has only been such as exists between a colonel and one of his soldiers; hence, you see, my recommendation comes from pure motives, and entirely free from social or political considerations. I speak for and write in behalf of the brave men who, in this hour of our country's peril, are coming forward and endangering their own lives, and, perhaps, leaving those most dear to them without a support. I write warmly, because I think I know the necessity of the case. You will do the country a service by giving my letter a serious consideration. I hope to be in Washington some time about the 1st of September, when I shall try to see you. Will you please present my regards to General Cameron, and if he has time to read this letter, hand it to him? Yours truly,

SAMUEL J. RANDALL."

That President Lincoln distrusted George H. Thomas because of his birth, we can well understand, and this is made more evident from the fact that President Lincoln had seen little and knew less of the man he doubted. Had they

come in contact, Abraham Lincoln, as good a judge of men as the Hon. Samuel J. Randall, would undoubtedly have given his confidence to the dignified and taciturn Virginian from the start. As it was, he acted upon the advice of others, and sent him his commission of brigadier-general, and Lieutenant Anderson carried a letter from his uncle to Colonel Thomas, along with the following order:

“HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, *August 24, 1861.*

The following assignment is made of the general officers of the volunteer service, whose appointment was announced in General Orders No. 62, from the War Department:

To the Department of the Cumberland, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, commanding:

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman.

Brigadier-General George H. Thomas.

By command of Lieutenant-General Scott,

E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.”

CHAPTER V.

Thomas Proposes to Sever the Main Artery of the Confederacy by Taking Chattanooga—Andrew Johnson's Potent Influence—Buell Placed in Command—Battle of Mill Springs.

President Lincoln's administration had many phantoms that went far to mar success. One of these was the apparition of a Napoleon from West Point. Another manifested itself in a conquest of territory instead of armies. Yet another was a solemn belief that in some place unknown in the border states were large bodies of Union men looking earnestly to the old government for recognition and aid. This, comparatively speaking, was a harmless delusion, for, with the exception of Tennessee, no great effort was made to hunt down the mythical Union men. It is singular that such a delusion should have found place in the brain of able men. We well know that before the sacred soil of Virginia was invaded, there was a powerful Union feeling pervading the entire South. But after that, the people of the slave states rose in a great wrath never before shown by the masses. There were but few Union men after that. There yet existed the Union man, a conscientious, thoughtful citizen, found at long intervals, who saw that the war had been plunged into by the South without reason and, of course, without moral justification, and such a man turned in anger from the leaders of their people; but they had no love for the government that had taken up the challenge so promptly and was marching, armed to the teeth, upon their homes. No people ever presented a more solid front or a deeper devotion to their cause. In every other war of record we have traitors. In that of our Revolution, the Tories nearly equaled the patriots in number, and Arnold, one of the bravest and most capable of our officers, gave a synonym to infamy more expressive and significant than the original word. But in the four years of

an awful struggle, not a man was found base enough to barter his honor for his cause.

It would have been better for themselves, and their country, had these thoughtful, conscientious men given expression to their convictions and open action to their faith. That Generals Anderson and Thomas and many others born of the South did so with added luster to their names goes far to prove that it is right to serve the right under all circumstances.

Kentucky was not so promising a field to these searchers for Union men as West Virginia and Tennessee, but it had its claims in that direction, so that in the selection of Anderson and Thomas, two men of Southern birth, it was thought to conciliate the enemy and win the wavering by people of their own blood. A greater error could not have been committed. Anderson and Thomas were hated with an intensity difficult to express because of the very fact that gained their commission. As for Thomas, traveling alone and without escort, he narrowly escaped with his life.

The situation in Kentucky in September, 1861, did not differ much from that in any other border state. When the war came on, the active element among the secessionists, impatient at the delay involved in Ordinances of Secession and eager for the field, hastened to enlist in Richmond under Lee. All that was left to the state made up a sentiment that, while sympathizing with the Southern cause, was of a conservative turn. Although Kentucky had suffered far more from the Abolitionists than South Carolina, her people were better acquainted with the vast resources of the North, had a trade and social intercourse far in excess of the more belligerent states, and so, after the hot heads had left, the leading citizens begun to negotiate for an armed neutrality. They had no stomach for a war that would have its contention about their very homes. The trouble attending such an attitude was its treatment from both sides. Each army marching into Kentucky felt at liberty to live on the country as one belonging to the other side.

On the 12th of September, 1861, having reported to General Robert Anderson at Louisville, Thomas was assigned

to command at Camp Dick Robinson, in place of Lieutenant William Nelson, of Kentucky, a volunteer from our naval service. He arrived at his post on the 15th of September, and found six thousand troops, much disorganized through lack of discipline and equipment. Nothing daunted by the depressing appearances, he went, as was his wont, actively to work. All Kentucky, including the mythical Union men, protested with more profanity than politeness against this organizing a force in the very heart of the state. It was the general opinion that sooner or later there would be a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of negotiating a settlement. The belief, born at military head-quarters on the Potomac, that we were fighting for a boundary and not the conquest of the South, permeated all Kentucky. The leaders of a state that, next to Virginia, had produced more able men in a political way than any other of the Union, had no mind for any move that would throw their dark and bloody ground into a Northern alliance.

While Thomas clearly comprehended all the political bearings of the situation, he treated this talk of fighting for a boundary and an eventual settlement with contempt. "The longer the war goes on," he said, "the wider the difference, and the more intense the feeling. We end the conflict either at Boston or New Orleans—there is no boundary between." An eminent statesman in Europe said during the armed conflict between Russia and the allies, that "war is disorganized diplomacy." Certainly in the appeal to brute force there is no more diplomatic negotiation. The ultimatum of the campaign has more force but less reason than those of the cabinet, and the first makes the last impossible.

Putting all the political considerations away from him, he devoted himself to his military work. The little army under his command called for his immediate attention. His first thought, ever the same throughout the war, was for the proper sustenance and equipment of his men, the next their drill and discipline. He made earnest and incessant appeals to the War Department for clothing, blankets, tents, and all other material necessary to an army in the field. The responses in promises were profuse, but the supplies came

slowly. The truth is, the War Department had been demoralized by its chief, Simon Cameron, the man of whom it was told that when applied to for funds to win a legislature at the polls, responded that it would be cheaper to purchase the legislature. Whether this ever occurred we can not say, but that it was generally believed to have happened, gives the man's reputation and through that his real character. This condition of the department sent as many thieves to the war to plunder as brave men to the front to fight.

In and about the old brick building, from which the war was conducted, thronged a crowd whose faces, fairly enameled in guilt, were saved from the dead blank of brutal outlook by an expression of greed enlivened by cunning. They shouldered and elbowed each other in their eager pursuit of plunder. Enormous fortunes were made through the sale of contracts given political favorites and bartered away to more adroit rogues. While these scoundrels were fattening on their spoils, our poor fellows were marching without shoes, shivering without overcoats, and sleeping under tents that were rotted before they were sent to the field. Had Simon Cameron continued at the head of the War Department, Jefferson Davis would have dictated terms of peace in the old Liberty Hall at Philadelphia.

While thus engaged in duties to his command; General Thomas gave much of his mind to a study of the military condition. He knew that it was a war of resources. Now, while at the North these seemed inexhaustible, and at the South they appeared limited, this very fact told against us. Our abundance made us wanton in our extravagance, while at the South every expenditure was made with the utmost caution, and an enforced economy prevailed to which men and officers submitted with a cheerful content that was without parallel. How to cripple the resources already meager of the enemy was the problem our military men were called upon to solve. In a study of the map, General Thomas found the solution. The war had developed itself in Virginia, and was being fought out to an end between Richmond and Washington. This was on the eastern verge of all the territory under control of the Confederacy, and to supply

the forces thus dispersed, there were two lines of railway, the one running along the Atlantic coast, and the other connecting the northern parts of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and all of Tennessee, with the armies about Richmond. General Thomas elaborated the plan of a campaign through Cumberland Gap, that would enable him to sieze and hold the more northern line of railroad while threatening that upon the coast. This he submitted to the War Department.

The War Department was pleased to accept this bold plan of attack, especially as it was approved by those Union men south, so dear to the heart of the administration. The department accepted promptly the move that had it been executed as Thomas suggested, would have changed the character of the war and shortened the conflict, and handed it over to another officer to execute. He received a letter from Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchel, commanding the department of the Ohio in which General Mitchel said he was informed that the War Department had ordered him to Camp Dick Robinson, to prepare the troops for an advance on Cumberland Gap, and thence into East Tennessee.

To say this treatment of Thomas wounded him deeply, would but feebly express the indignation at such an uncalled-for rebuke. His long and well-tried service in the army had won for him, at least the right to respectful treatment. At head-quarters he stood the peer, if not the superior of the men whom General Scott recognized, and the department intrusted with its confidence. Had any one possessed the courage, or held the familiar intercourse necessary to tell General Thomas that he was distrusted by the government on account of his birth, he would have been better prepared. The blow came without warning. He resented it promptly, and in answer to General Mitchel's letter, wrote as follows:

HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP DICK ROBINSON,
GARRARD Co., KY., *October 11, 1861.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL O. M. MITCHEL,

Commanding Department of the Ohio, Cincinnati, O.

GENERAL: Your communication of the 10th inst. was

received to-day at the hands of Governor Johnston. I have been doing all in my power to prepare the troops for a move on Cumberland Ford and to seize the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and shall continue to do all I can to assist you until your arrival here; but justice to myself requires that I ask to be relieved from duty with these troops, since the Secretary of War thought it necessary to supersede me in command without, as I conceive, any just cause for so doing.

I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General U. S. A. Commanding.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMP DICK ROBINSON,
GARRARD Co., Ky., *October 11, 1861.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland, Louisville, Ky.

GENERAL: I received an official communication to-day from Brigadier-General O. M. Mitchel, informing me that he had been ordered by the Secretary of War to repair to this camp and prepare the troops for a forward movement, first to Cumberland Ford, and eventually to seize upon the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. As I have been doing all in my power to effect this very thing, to have the execution of it taken from me when nearly prepared to take the field, is extremely mortifying. I have, therefore, respectfully to ask to be relieved from duty with the troops on the arrival of General Mitchel.

I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Brigadier-General U. S. A. Commanding.

October 13, 1861.

GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Commanding Camp Dick Robinson.

You are authorized to go on and prepare your com-

mand for active service. General Mitchel is subject to my orders, and I will, if possible, give you the opportunity to complete what you have begun. Of course I would do all I can to carry out your wishes, but feel that the affairs of Kentucky call for the united action of all engaged.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Brigadier-General Commanding Department
of the Cumberland.*

The author of this treatment of an able and patriotic officer was Governor Andrew Johnson. This man, destined to perform so prominent a part subsequently in our national affairs, was loyal to the government, not from any love of the Union, but from an intense hatred of the governing class at the South. Born of the poor white trash and bred a tailor, he grew to manhood without being sufficiently schooled to write his name. That from such a beginning he should struggle up to a national recognition as a prominent leader, would be to his credit were it not marred and tainted by methods that were as low as they were unscrupulous. There had been in Tennessee from its earliest history an element made up of poor whites that was in deadly hostility to the wealthy slave-owners. This would seem to be a natural condition in any part of the South, for the slave-owners had no use for the poor white laborers, but Tennessee was alone in possessing such a class. To this Andrew Johnson appealed and on it he rode into office, reaching the highest honors in the gift of the state. Through all his official career he remained Andrew Johnson. Possessed of a remarkable shrewdness, a volubility of speech and great force of character, he had no breadth nor culture of mind, and would have passed back to the obscurity from which he had arisen but for the opportunity he seized on when secession from the Union came. As he could not accompany the Southern senators in their exodus from the Union, he made a merit of necessity, and from his place in the chamber he uttered a loud denunciation that was more vituperative than logical or severe. The Northern people failing to comprehend that the act was more from a hatred of the masters

than a love of the Union, accepted him at once as a pure, high-toned patriot, and his influence thenceforward at Washington, always mischievous, was ever potent. We say he would have accompanied Jeff. Davis, Robert Tombs, and the other Southern leaders had they permitted such association, but they "scorned to own him as a slave." What he was capable of his subsequent career demonstrated. The only man on earth who could have saved us from the infamy of Mrs. Surratt's execution, he hurried on the cruel death from feeling of fear, for "in the lottery of assassination," he had drawn the highest prize at the hands of his boon companion, the assassin. While mouthing his high resolve to make treason odious, the South came weak, bleeding, and humbled, and he was so delighted to have it in his power to aid this ruined aristocracy which had formerly ridden over him rough shod, that he swung from the extreme North to the extreme South, to the astonishment and disgust of his Union supporters.

An old Scotch proverb tells us "that a mean sinner makes a mean saint." This bit of condensed wisdom of a shrewd race is applicable to other conditions than that of religion. Not only a man may do great acts without himself being great, but his very defects may shine like the phosphorescent glow of decay.

Andrew Johnson instinctively hated a gentleman, and from this feeling alone we find a motive for his subsequent hatred of Don Carlos Buell, whose military career he suddenly terminated, and his immediate hostility to General Thomas.

Thomas, after a close study of the military situation, saw the true objective point. Jefferson Davis, in threatening Washington with the great mass and best organized armies of the Confederacy, made, as we have said, the two railroad lines of vital importance, not only to success, but to subsistence. The Southern States menaced by Thomas's projected move was the belly of the Confederacy and its tenderest part. To strike at this successfully would end the war. Two years after, the capture of Chattanooga and the grave

consequences that followed proved the wisdom of the scheme.

While this military project was being developed, Andrew Johnson had a political scheme based on this same military move. Indeed, it may be well understood that but for Andrew Johnson's eager desire to get at the supposed loyal men of East Tennessee, and between such an element and the army of the United States set up a loyal government at Nashville, Thomas's proposed campaign would never have been considered at Washington. It was a time when every prominent politician at the North took a hand in the conduct of the war. This was done sometimes with the sanction of the administration and sometimes without. There was, of course, a political side to the conflict, and it was by no means an unimportant one. Our able administration saw not only the field of armed conflict in its front, but the great danger of a political loss in the rear, where a sympathy with the South, of old Democratic cultivation, upon which the Confederate leaders had counted, and which, although quiet, yet lived. In a government of parties such as ours, it is difficult to teach the minority that it is treasonable to promulgate any opinion in opposition to the government, which means the party in power. That war involved a new question that had no reference to how the government should be administered, but one of whether we should have the present form of government or not, had no effect on such men as Vallandigham and others more or less outspoken, who, believing the South could not be conquered, awaited the hour when the people, weary of the useless slaughter and heavy taxation, would rise up in an opposition at the polls and drive the Abolitionists, as they were called, from power. Another matter of no less importance was the threatened intervention of European powers. Almost the first acts of a stupid congress, when the South withdrew its members and left the old Whig element in control, were the passage of acts clogging, and in some instances prohibiting, trade under the name of protection. This disturbance in trade, which, accompanied by a loss of the cotton that had been mainly supplied from the United States, brought great embarrassment to capitalists

abroad and positive distress to the laborers. Angered thus by senseless and unpatriotic meanness, we lost all the sympathy we might have counted on as the opponents of slavery. Louis Napoleon was open in his opposition, and, failing to secure the co-operation of England, entered into a secret alliance with Russia that sent a fleet to our shores, while the French army invaded Mexico, to be in striking distance when the hour to strike should arrive.

We state these facts because no history of the war, no biography of a soldier, is complete or comprehensive without them. It was these, to the multitudes unseen, sides of the conflict that gave men like Andrew Johnson such influence at Washington. The administration, as we have said, believed in the mythical loyal men of the South as seriously as did Andrew Johnson, so when he approved heartily of General Thomas's proposed move, it was easy for him to select the officer to lead the command.

It will be observed that Sherman, to whom Thomas appealed, refused to relieve him, and the hurt officer continued his active preparation for what he had so much at heart, although the honors of leadership were given to another. But while preparations were being hastened, another obstacle appeared in the way far more potent than the politicians at Washington. This was the enemy. The authorities at Richmond were not blind to the dangers the gathering of troops under Thomas threatened. To meet this, troops were being pushed forward from Cumberland Ford, Barboursville, and Thompkinsville. To resist this counter movement, General Thomas marched his best troops forward to Rock Castle Hills, with such support as his unprepared condition would admit of. This was accomplished none too soon. While the movements of other Confederate columns left our general in some doubt as to their design, it was clearly developed that the force facing Colonel Garrard's Third Kentucky Infantry at Rock Castle Hills under General Zollicoffer was the one to be met, and General Thomas hurried forward Brigadier-General Schoepf with three regiments and a battery.

Whilst thus engaged, our general had another taste of the

restless and somewhat inebriated Andrew Johnson. Like Sancho Panza, the latter was in search of his, at the time, impossible governorship, and his impatient demands found an echo in certain Tennessee Union soldiers in the camp at Crab Orchard. Andrew Johnson, in common with other civilians, and many of our officers, believed that all that was necessary to a forward movement was an order to make the same. Such order carried in it all that was necessary to success. Horace Greeley's incessant cry of "On to Richmond," was of this sort. Andrew Johnson not only echoed the popular demand in his pursuit of a governorship, but when not promptly responded to, invariably charged the delay to the disloyal condition of the officer in command. General Thomas was not the man to be influenced by any such senseless clamor. From his first campaign to his last, he looked to the means necessary to make his march fortunate. No governor in the beginning, nor commander-in-chief in the end, could affect by impatient demand, this quiet, self-possessed man in the discharge of his duties. It was to this indifference to ignorant interference that he got the reputation of being slow. He was slow to the unnecessary slaughter of his own troops, and left behind him no Cold Harbor atrocity or Kenesaw Mountain murder to make the land shudder and the government ashamed. Heroes of these disasters have left the record that Thomas was too sluggish for a subordinate, and too timid for a separate command. "Judge not lest ye be judged," is a prudent passage of Holy Writ that it would have been well for these commentators to have heeded.

The trouble given General Thomas in his own camp is indicated by the following letter :

"HEAD-QUARTERS, CRAB ORCHARD,

November 7, 1861.

GOVERNOR ANDREW JOHNSON,

London, Ky.

DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 6th instant is at hand. I have done all in my power to get troops and transportation, and means to advance into East Tennessee. I believe Gen-

eral Sherman has done the same. Up to this time, we have been unsuccessful. Have you heard by what authority the troops from London were to fall back? Because I have not, and shall not move any of them back, unless ordered, for if I am not interfered with, I can have them subsisted there as well as here. I am inclined to think the rumor has grown out of the feverish excitement which seems to exist in the minds of some of the regiments, that no further advance is contemplated. I can only say that I am doing the best I can. Our commanding general is doing the same, and using all his influence to equip a force for the rescue of East Tennessee. If the Tennesseans are not content, and must go, then the risk of disaster will remain with them. Some of our troops are not clothed, and it seems impossible to get clothing.

For information respecting the organization of regiments, I send you General Order No. 90, War Department. If the gentlemen you name can raise regiments agreeably to the conditions and instructions contained in said order, the government will accept them, and I hope will have arms to place in their hands in the course of two or three months.

In conclusion I will add that I am here ready to obey orders, and earnestly hope that the troops at London will see the necessity of doing the same.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Brigadier-General U. S. A."

"HEAD-QUARTERS, CRAB ORCHARD,

November 7, 1861.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SCHOEPP,

Commanding Camp Calvert, London, Ky:

GENERAL: I find it necessary to reply to Governor Johnson's letter in the foregoing, which I send to you for your information. It is time that discontented persons should be silent, both in and out of the service. I sympathize most deeply with the East Tennesseans on account of their natural anxiety to relieve their friends and families from the terrible apprehension which they are now suffering. But to make the attempt to rescue them when not half prepared is

culpable, especially when our enemies are perhaps as anxious that we should make the move as the Tennesseans themselves, for it is well known by our commanding general that Buckner has an overwhelming force within striking distance, whenever he can get us at a disadvantage. I hope you will, therefore, see the necessity of dealing decidedly with such people, and you have my authority and orders for doing so. We must learn to abide our time, or we will never be successful. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Brigadier-General U. S. A."

It was not long, however, before Andrew Johnson learned that the obstacle to an immediate advance was not the distrusted Virginian, but no less a personage than General W. T. Sherman. General Sherman was subject to panics, and at a time when the Confederate authorities were straining every resource to present a defensive line to our forces in Kentucky without weakening the army of Richmond, Sherman satisfied himself that there was a heavy force at his front on the eve of a forward movement. He knew from some unknown source that General Albert Sidney Johnston, with an army of forty-five thousand men, was about to advance between Crab Orchard and Nolensville on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, with Louisville and Cincinnati their objective points. Under this delusion he ordered Thomas to hold his force in readiness to fall back of Danville, leaving a part of his troops at Rock Castle Hills. Thomas did not sympathize with his commander in these grave apprehensions. He had been at some labor to collect reliable information from scouts and other sources, and was satisfied in the first place that the Confederates had no such force as Sherman counted at their front, and in the second that the interest of the Confederacy was to be found in the necessity of keeping open their lines of supply, and that this could be better secured by a defensive instead of an aggressive move, looking to the possession of Louisville and the capture of Cincinnati. Lee carried the title of the Confederacy at the bow of his saddle, as Wendell Phillips ex-

pressed it, and so long as that famous Confederate rode at the front, the war hung doubtful. The authorities at Richmond had no men to spare for offensive movements on the Ohio.

However, General Thomas obeyed the order to retreat. It seems that he was as unprepared for this as for an advance. There was in Sherman's impatience a heavy loss of material and a serious loss from sickness. The newspaper correspondents, of course, gave the facts of the deplorable condition to the world, and General Thomas was held, under a storm of abuse, to the responsibility. This silent, self-composed man of destiny paid no heed to this unjust denunciation. It might, however, have relegated him to the rear as it had others, but for a diversion that drew public attention from the subordinate to his commander. It is so ludicrous that history might lay aside her dignity for a laugh while putting it to record were it not that it is a historical event with grave consequences.

General W. T. Sherman, in common with many other military men, had not only contempt for the journalists who sought to plan campaigns and fight battles, which contempt a majority of his brother officers were careful to conceal, but he had a wrath against them which could not be controlled. In a fit of anger he seized upon two of these enterprising wielders of the pen and thrust them from his lines. It would not have added to the ignominy had he drummed them out as camp followers and thieves were. The gentlemen had been guilty of no other wrong than holding Sherman to the responsibility of his own acts.

The mythical bull that in horning a locomotive under full headway is held to be a happy illustration of courage without discretion, was happier than General Sherman, who did not attack one locomotive but all the locomotives of the land. While the press fraternity is given to a wholesome abuse of each other, it presents an unbroken front of porcupine quills to an outsider who tries the same game against any one of them. Sherman was open to assault. Whatever may be the question as to his ability, it was so incrustated with egotism and marred by eccentricity that his warmest

admirer shivers in doubt half the time as to whether this great general was of sound mind. The correspondents were not slow to seize on these defects, and General Sherman was made to assert that a million of men would be needed to invade Tennessee successfully. He was thereupon pronounced insane. This view of the general's condition was so generally entertained that the government relieved Sherman and gave the command to General Don Carlos Buell.

This new commander resembled General Thomas in his silent reserve, but he was like Sherman in his exaggerated belief of the enemy's superiority as to numbers and resources. With fifty thousand men under his command, he was held in check by Albert Sidney Johnston with a command of only fourteen thousand. True, our government, using all its energies and resources to supply and strengthen the army of the Potomac, failed—we can scarcely say neglected—to afford our forces in Kentucky the equipment necessary to an aggressive movement. As General Thomas wrote, it seemed impossible to procure clothing. However, Buell, when compared to Sherman, was, as subsequent events demonstrated, the more capable commander of the two. Don Carlos Buell was the beau ideal of a West Pointer. Small of stature, he was so soldierly of bearing that he seemed of full height while his handsome face and well developed head were impressive, and gave their owner prominence in advance of achievement. He had the courage of his temperament, a manly one of fine but tough fiber that was in strange contrast to the caution of his convictions that amounted almost to cowardice. Never shrinking from responsibility, he did shrink from its use in the calculation of chances. And yet his utter disregard of Sherman's advice to move leisurely in his march to a junction with the Union forces at Shiloh saved our army under Grant from utter annihilation in that inexcusable surprise and unnecessary butchery of our brave men. General Buell's cold, austere manner was extremely unfortunate for him and for us, as his fine abilities were neutralized by this hauteur in his command of volunteers and association with their officers. It is not necessary to success, as the career of

Thomas demonstrates, for a man to ever conciliate adverse feelings, but it is well for him to avoid antagonizing such. The press, that great controller of public opinion and a power at Washington owing to the political condition, accepted and sustained a general the moment he demonstrated his capacity to command. But Buell, as slow to move for the same reasons as Thomas, was more cautious in his movements and permitted the golden opportunity to swing by in which to show that capacity the country was eagerly in search of. He unfortunately not only increased the hostility of Andrew Johnson, but that of one of the most potent of the Northern war governors, Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana.

Buell's accession to command was signalized by a change of plan with which he is discredited. The fact is, the project of marching our fifty thousand men to Nashville as an objective point, instead of through Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga, originated at Washington under the malign influence of Andrew Johnson. General Buell was too clever a soldier to select as an objective point a place that had no strategic significance whatever. To seize Nashville and hold it was of no damage whatever to the Confederacy, and of but little advantage to us. To halt there was to maintain an enormous army at a heavy expense for no practical purpose, and out of this it could be moved, as it eventually was, only by a serious menace in force upon its lines of supplies. Nashville was only a station at which to gather material for a movement on Chattanooga, the key of that theater of operation, as we have asserted and will prove as our story progresses.

Before Buell could get his campaign under way, the enemy concentrated a strong force under Zollicoffer at Mill Springs. Sidney Johnston had sent the latter merely to watch the river at that point, which Johnston intended should be done from the south bank. But Zollicoffer, very like Grant and Sherman at Shiloh, established his camp on the north side of the Cumberland, "with the enemy in front and the river in his rear." General George B. Crittenden, of Kentucky, a graduate of West Point who had seen service in

Mexico, was appointed to the command, with head-quarters at Knoxville. Early in January, Crittenden was sent by Johnston to secure the safety of Zollicoffer's command and get it back to the south side of the river.

General Johnston, still anxious for the safety of his blundering general, sent General Hindman with a division of troops to feel the Federal position and to make a diversion in favor of Zollicoffer. In making the movement, Hindman encountered the troops under Thomas at Columbia, had his advance checked, and so he reported that Thomas's command was intact and Zollicoffer in no danger.

In the reorganization of the army under Buell, Thomas was assigned the command of the first division of the Army of the Ohio, composed of some sixteen regiments of infantry, a regiment and a company of cavalry, with three batteries of artillery. One of the brigades was commanded by General Albin Schoepf, a Hungarian patriot, who was on outpost duty watching Zollicoffer. In the latter part of the year 1861, Buell countermanded his former orders to Thomas, which were not to reinforce Schoepf, and directed Thomas to concentrate his entire command and drive Zollicoffer from the state.

The condition of the country roads in midwinter was such that Thomas was not able to reach the point of concentration—Logan Cross Roads—until the 17th of January. Here he went into camp and awaited the arrival of his entire command. This point was ten miles from the encampment of the enemy.

General Crittenden had been making every exertion to get Zollicoffer across the river, but had been delayed by not having boats to transfer the troops until the 17th, when he heard of the advance of the Union forces under Thomas. Crittenden then determined to take the initiative and force the battle. At midnight of January 18th, in the discomfort of a heavy winter rain, the Confederate army moved out. After six hours' marching through mud and rain, the advance struck our cavalry pickets at six o'clock in the early gray of a winter morning two miles in front of the Federal camp. The cavalry pickets fell slowly back, reporting the

advance of the enemy. The report reaching Thomas, he ordered the infantry advance to hold the Confederates in check until he could place his command in line of battle. This he accomplished in ten minutes, and both sides were soon actively engaged in heavy fighting, which was continued for nearly an hour.

General Thomas then sent a strong force to attack the enemy on the right flank, which caused it to waver. The heavy firing was continued in the center to keep that part engaged. With these dispositions, General Thomas then ordered the Ninth Ohio Infantry to charge the left flank with fixed bayonets, which turned the flank and drove that part of the enemy's line from the field. The entire command then gave way, retreating in disorder to their intrenchments at Beach Grove, where the enemy manned the works and checked the advance of our troops. General Thomas invested the encampment on the land side, keeping up an artillery fire the entire night, in order to prevent escape of the enemy in their boats. During the night, preparations were made by Thomas for a general assault on the works in the morning. The enemy, however, abandoned every thing during the night, and by daylight his entire command was across the river, excepting the wounded and the stores. The boats used in the movement were burned to prevent pursuit. Many prisoners were captured and twelve pieces of canon with caissons filled with ammunition. Over one hundred and fifty wagons, and more than one thousand horses and mules, with a large amount of camp and garrison equipage, were left behind and fell into our hands.

General Thomas had in this engagement eight regiments of infantry with two batteries of artillery, some six thousand troops in all. Opposed to him was a command of over nine thousand of all arms. The enemy made the attack under the delusion the Southern troops cherished at the outbreak of hostilities, that "one Southerner could whip five Yankees." With all the advantages in their favor, the little Southern army suffered a demoralizing defeat, after it had made a gallant attack, splendidly sustained until the disposition of

the forces against it by Thomas drove it in rout from the field.

From the very opening of the engagement to its close, for every movement of the enemy Thomas was fully prepared. There was no surprise on this field of battle for our troops to be slaughtered in. The cavalry pickets met the first advance and gave swift warning to the infantry, and these were able to hold the advance in check until the Federal line of battle was properly formed. The troops under Thomas were veterans only in being thoroughly drilled and disciplined, yet he held them in line under heavy fire until, by the skillful maneuvering of his command, he won the first Federal victory in the West.

While the battle of Mill Springs, in the number engaged, in the killed and wounded, and in its strategic consequences, was of small importance, in another point of view it was an event of grave results. The stunning blow given our ninety days' militia at Bull Run had not only disheartened the people at the North, but had gone far to confirm the superstition at the South that in the one great qualification of the soldier—courage—we were the inferiors. This not only robbed us of the *morale* so necessary to an army, but gave that quality to our foes. This feeling was so strong upon us that our untried young Napoleon, McClellan, was organizing his huge army about Washington, in sight of the Confederate flag at Munson's Hill and so close on rebel guns that their roar disturbed his army reviews, with but one order of not to bring on a general engagement, and the comforting report each morning of "all quiet on the Potomac."

This repose was broken by the victory of Mill Springs. In that engagement the troops of both sides were fairly pitted against each other. To the dash of the Confederates Thomas opposed not only the cool courage and staying quality of our men, but a capacity for handling that enabled him to pass from fights by a regiment or brigade at a time to throwing in the entire force on the weakest point of the enemy. General Thomas organized victory by organizing his force. Recognizing the fact that the larger part of the drill is for mere display, he simplified it to the actual neces-

sities of the service, and so molded the raw recruit into an accomplished soldier in less than sixty days. He was greatly aided in this by the singular adaptability of the American men. These men could not only fall into line, touch elbows, keep step, wheel like a machine, load and fire, but they could repair bridges, open roads, fell trees, and construct fortifications with a dexterity that was both admirable and amazing.

The victory of Mill Springs impressed the South in a more subtle manner than it did the North. It was felt that a new element was being developed that might put a new face on the condition. The more turbulent populations of the seceding states, where every citizen was his own policeman and carried his commission in his hip pocket, took to war more kindly than our peaceful, money getting people at the North. Leaders of the slave states had improved on Napoleon's axiom that "a race of shop keepers made a nation of thieves" by adding "cowards." This decisive victory was a startling revelation. These peaceful mechanics, farmers and tradesmen had not only stood unmoved by the rebel yell, but returned the fire from their center, while the wing swung round upon the enemy's flank with the precision of veterans. This meant war in its highest sense, and bade fair to build up an army of veterans from the raw recruits of the strained emergency. The lesson taught by this sharp fight and brilliant victory that went home to the Southern mind seemed lost upon the great bulk of our own officers. The example set by Thomas was followed by none. McClellan had his head turned by the high place and extraordinary powers conferred upon him, and his organization consisted in a continual call for troops that were thrown into brigades and divisions as rapidly as they arrived and enough capacity of movement got to enable the commander-in-chief to gallop down the lines accompanied by his staff of princes and rich men's sons. The men were splendid in their new uniforms, white gloves and burnished arms, but as a shrewd observer said to the late Colonel Tom Key, "they appear well and march with a precision that is remarkable for raw recruits, but I look in their faces and I do

not see fight." Small wonder when for nearly a year this army was trained to an awe of the unknown that lay beyond Munson's Hill. And the Army of the Potomac never completely recovered from the effect of this training. The writer of this narrative, passing from the Army of the Potomac to that of the Cumberland, was amazed at the difference. He seemed to get another sort of men, and breathed a more tonic atmosphere. After hearing the foe spoken of with bated breath it was refreshing to note the contemptuous indifference of these western men.

The clarion cry of joy rang out north and north-west over this victory and congratulatory orders reached the little six thousand. But none came from the government at Washington. General Buell issued the following:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, *January 23, 1862.*
General Orders, No. 40.

The general commanding has the gratification of announcing the achievement of an important victory on the 19th inst., at Mill Springs, by the troops under General Thomas over the rebel forces some twelve thousand strong under General George B. Crittenden and General Zollicoffer.

The defeat of the enemy was thorough and complete and his loss in killed and wounded was great. Night alone, under cover of which his troops crossed the river from his intrenched camp and dispersed, prevented the capture of his entire force. Fourteen or more pieces of artillery, some fifteen horses and mules, his entire camp equipage with wagons, arms, ammunition and other stores to a large amount, fell into our hands.

The general commanding has been charged by the general-in-chief to convey his thanks to General Thomas and his troops for their brilliant victory. No task could be more grateful to him, seconded as it is by his own cordial approbation of their conduct.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell,

JAMES B. FRY,
A. A. G., Chief of Staff."

The President of the United States also issued a complimentary order:

“HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, *January 26, 1862.*

The President, commander-in-chief of the army and navy, has received information of a brilliant victory achieved by the United States forces over a large body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Springs, in the State of Kentucky.

He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory, and when official reports shall be received, the military skill and personal valor displayed in the battle will be acknowledged and rewarded in a fitting manner.

The courage that encountered and vanquished the greatly superior numbers of the rebel force, pursued and attacked them in their intrenchments, and paused not until the enemy was completely routed, merits and receives commendation.

The purpose of this war is to attack and destroy a rebellious enemy and to deliver the country from the danger menaced by traitors. Alacrity, daring, courageous spirit, and patriotic zeal on all occasions and under all circumstances will be expected from the Army of the United States.

In the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill Springs, the nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United States will rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proved his courage by charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments or in the blaze of the enemy's fire.

By order of the President,

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.”

While the legislature of Ohio could pass a vote of thanks to General Thomas and his men, the President passed the greatest and most capable of all his officers silent as to commendation and only noticed by his one sentence of condemnation, which said, “let the Virginian wait.” Fortun-

ately for President Lincoln and fortunately for the country, George H. Thomas could wait. He could bide his time, but while so doing the great river of blood flowed on from shameful blunders of incompetent generals—defeat for us followed every great battle, and our silenced guns gave way to the cry of mourning in the desolated households of the land and shame to us all. The one competent man was waiting, by order of Abraham Lincoln.

CHAPTER VI.

The Proposed Campaign to Chattanooga, as Viewed in the Light now Given Us—Fremont and the Gunboats he Furnished—Capture of Fort Donelson.

Before entering upon the changed condition of affairs when the plan of campaign elaborated by General Thomas was abandoned, and General Buell marched on Nashville, we will consider the possibilities of that proposed move through Cumberland Gap. Upon leaving Washington for the West, General Thomas had submitted to the President and Secretary of War, his projected campaign. It was thought favorably of, but not approved until Governor Andrew Johnson demanded that it be acted on in behalf of the loyal citizens of East Tennessee. The President and Governor Johnson saw only the patriotic and political side of the proposition, and did not bother themselves as to the military aspect. President Lincoln's practice at that time was to refer all military matters to the military. It was no unusual sight to see the President of the United States and his Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, waiting in the ante-chamber of McClellan's head-quarters for the privilege of an interview. President Lincoln got over the delusion he labored under in the beginning, that his commission could furnish the country with all that was needed for military success, and bringing his capable mind to a common sense view, assumed a quasi command. When, therefore, General Thomas dwelt on the fact that if Chattanooga could be captured and held, Richmond would be untenable—that instead of striking at the head, where the enemy invited attack, because it was stronger there, it was better to assail the belly, where the enemy was vulnerable—the words beat on heedless ears. McClellan had all that under consideration. Looking that far back now we are amazed and irritated at the blindness of the really able

men then in control of our government. Had the proposed campaign through Cumberland Gap been prosecuted under Thomas, a far different history of the war would have gone to record than the one we are called on to write. It is true that General McClellan, urged by the President, suggested that General Buell should consider the project. But General Buell had plans of his own, and incurred the wrath of Andrew Johnson by his brusque treatment of that politician. General Thomas was soon given to know that his grave proposition was abandoned.

Events shortly after occurred to give a show of reason to Buell and Halleck's change of objective.

Before treating of that, we will, with the lights now given us, consider the practicability of General Thomas's proposed campaign. The Army of the Cumberland, then called the Army of Ohio, was being rapidly augmented by the best material ever put under muskets. Within a short time, General Buell found himself at the head of fifty thousand men, and the number on the increase. This large army, accumulated to conquer and hold Tennessee for Andrew Johnson and the loyal men thereof, was receiving better attention from the War Department than had been given the little force of poorly armed and worse clad soldiers General Thomas at first commanded. Although knowing that his scheme of an offensive campaign was neglected, and eventually abandoned, he continued his care of his men, drilling them continuously, and infusing into his force that military spirit without which an army is a mob. He could at any time appointed have selected twenty thousand and marched through Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga.

It is of interest to learn what force the enemy had at that time to resist so grave a movement. For some time before the battle of Mill Springs we had twice the number of men the enemy could have brought into the field. General Johnston, we now know, had but twenty thousand of all arms, of which eight or ten regiments were under Zollicoffer. After the battle that dispersed Zollicoffer's force, the way was as open to an advance as was that of General Sherman when he went through Georgia to a support of the sea. Of course

this condition of the enemy was unknown to our side. If we except General Thomas, there was not a prominent officer in our armies anywhere who did not exaggerate the numbers of the Confederate armies in a way that would be ludicrous were it not so lamentable. General Thomas knew the South thoroughly as to resources and men, and having no fears to consult, was never at a fault. Where McClellan, Sherman, and Buell saw millions of armed men, he looked down thinned ranks of ill-clad thousands. We read a justification of General Thomas's belief in the lately published life of General Albert Sidney Johnston. That brave and brilliant soldier we find, wrote from Columbus, Ky., on the 27th of September, 1861, to the Secretary of War, at Richmond:

"I suppose a change of the plan of operations has been made, and that the force intended for East Tennessee will now be combined with the force on this line, making an aggregate strength of probably more than 50,000 men, to be arrayed against my forces here.

"If the forces of the enemy are maneuvered, as I think they may be, I may be compelled to retire from this place to cover Nashville with the aid of the volunteer forces now being organized, which in that way could be brought into co-operation."

And, on the 8th of December, he wrote from Bowling Green :

"With the addition of Nelson's and Rosecrans' columns, their force on this immediate line I believe ought to be estimated at over 65,000 men. Our returns at this place show a force of between 18,000 and 19,000, of which about 5,000 are sick (about 3,600 at Nashville), and our effective force is under 13,000 men."

And, on December 25th, he wrote :

"The position of General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland holds in check the meditated invasion and hoped-for revolt in East Tennessee, but I can neither order Zollicoffer to join me here, nor withdraw any more force from Columbus, without imperiling our communications with Richmond, or endangering Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley. This I have resolved not to do, but have chosen, on the contrary,

to post my inadequate force in such a manner as to hold the enemy in check, guard the frontier, and hold the Barren until winter terminates the campaign, or if any fault in his movements is committed, or his line exposed where his force is developed, to attack him as opportunity offers."

After his right was broken, he wrote, page 426, Jan. 22d :

"A successful movement of the enemy on my right would carry it with all the consequences which could be expected by the enemy here, if they could break through my defenses. If I had the force to prevent a flank movement, they could be compelled to attack this position, which, we doubt not, can make a successful defense. If force can not be spared from other army corps, the country must now be aroused to make the greatest effort it will be called upon to make during the war. No matter what the sacrifice may be, it must be made and without loss of time. Our people do not comprehend the magnitude of the danger threatened. Let it be impressed upon them."

Our headless armies moved blunderingly along. President Lincoln, with his mind dwelling solely on the political aspects of the field, recommended in a message to Congress the building of a railroad from Kentucky to Knoxville that could have been done by the Army of the Ohio in a few months. This was unheeded by a Congress busy with the schemes of taxation that were dictated by a greed of capital which lost us, as we have shown, the sympathy of Europe by making it known that the money power of the North thought more of filling their individual pockets than the vaults of the treasury. In this we mean that sympathy born of interest. There is none other in a nation that can be counted on. The provincial simplicity, so pronounced in our people, which speaks of this race, of that government being friendly or unfriendly to us, should be relegated to the things that amuse.

There was, of course, a strong anti-slavery feeling in both France and England. This was especially strong in Great Britain, where in the emancipation of slaves in the West Indies a man got a cheap character for philanthropy by freeing another man's slave. But this sentiment rapidly

disappeared from a show for our side when we not only proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports, reinforced by sinking vessels laden with stone in their harbors, but established a like blockade of Northern ports in the form of a high tariff. Such a Congress had no time for the consideration of such measures as the one suggested by President Lincoln, that would probably have brought the one eminently capable military man to the front, shortened the war by two years, saved us the lives of two hundred thousand men and a war debt that the centuries of toil will inherit.

All this is vain speculation, delving idly in the dead past, and only worth recall in the way it shows how the sagacious mind of George H. Thomas saw the situation as it was, and carried from Washington to the West the key that would have opened easy victory to our government. When McClellan's army under Grant won through defeat its capture of Richmond the war ended; not because Richmond had been taken, but that Thomas's scheme of 1862 had at last been made a fact accomplished in the seizure of Chattanooga, and Lee's armies had no country to fall back upon and subsist.

About this time occurred a series of unexpected events that not only changed the current of military affairs, but the minds of military men having control of the Army of the Cumberland, then called the Army of the Ohio. General John Charles Fremont had been quite ostentatiously put in command of our forces in Missouri, with head-quarters in St. Louis. The public mind at the North had instinctively turned to this remarkable man as the one to command our armies in the conflict so suddenly thrust upon us. He had been made the first candidate for the Presidency by the Free Soil organization, subsequently the Union and then the Republican party, because of his prominence as an explorer. He was a picturesque figure, with a tinge of romance in his career that won the popular heart. He failed in his race for the Presidency because of the pro-slavery feeling of the country North and South. He went down, politically, fighting gallantly for a principle, and was, therefore, rather stronger for his defeat. The administration yielded in form to the

popular demand, and gave General Fremont a high command on paper, but denied him the substance that is found in a cordial support. He was a major-general in command of a great department, but without supplies to feed, arm, to equip, or transportation to move his ragged legions. And yet he received almost daily premonitory orders from the War Department to do something. If this something, whatever it was, could have been accomplished by the general and his staff, a great success of some sort could have been counted upon. He had a staff larger and more gorgeous than that of any other general of the army. His staff was kept busy issuing and executing orders. Among those orders was one looking to the immediate emancipation of the slaves.

Now, while President Lincoln at that time left military matters to the military men, he very properly retained all the politics under his own control. He saw that the thousands thronging out to carry arms and offer their lives to their country did so to save the Union and not to free the slaves. All reformers are rendered odious by epithets made offensive through their offensive use. The word abolition had been hurled at the abolitionists until it had become a term of reproach in the popular mind. As well call a man a thief or a murderer. The poor fellow convicted of this philanthropic impulse could be stoned in Boston and hung in South Carolina with popular approval. President Lincoln well knew that if the belief among the people could once obtain that this was a war in behalf of the negroes, recruiting would cease and the administration itself soon feel the effects of lost confidence on the part of the public. General Fremont was publicly censured and not long after relieved of his command in Missouri.

Soon after leaving St. Louis, however, the Pathfinder did a piece of illegal work that eventually made U. S. Grant President of the United States. General Fremont was a thoughtful man given to original views with the striking fact to a thousand vagaries. The fact that had such portentous result found embodiment in iron-clads for Western waters. He conceived the idea that if boats were made shot proof by heavy iron armor, the Confederate country

could be pierced and conquered by every navigable river penetrating the interior. He, therefore, ordered a fleet of these iron-clads. The illegality of the transaction was in the fact that he had no authority from the War or Navy Departments and no appropriation from congress. A number of contractors caught at the work and the boats were soon afloat. These were ordered into the service by General Fremont, and a number of them, under Commodore Foote, aided by a land force, shelled and captured Fort Henry. The infantry and artillery on shore had little to do with their success. The fort was so near the shore of the river that the gunboats found no difficulty in reducing the place.

This victory stimulated the commodore and his allies to make a like attack on Fort Donelson. Putting his men in light marching order, General Grant moved across country, while Foote's gunboats steamed around by water. It was the intent of general and commodore to take Donelson by surprise, but the garrison was on guard, and gave our naval and land forces such a warm reception that it struck the assailants that they were in trouble instead of the Confederates. Commodore Foote saw that the fort was at such an elevation his guns could be of no efficacy, and Grant perceived that to take the place by an assault was out of the question. To invest the place and starve the enemy into submission was not to be considered, for the army had moved in light marching order, the weather had come on to be bitterly cold, and the besiegers were suffering more from the start than the besieged could be made to experience. Under this deplorable condition of affairs, General Grant wrote Commodore Foote an earnest request that he would make another demonstration under which the army could retreat. And then the unexpected happened.

General Floyd, in command of Fort Donelson, was not in a condition of mind to appreciate the situation. Instead of realizing the fact that he was safe from assault, and had only to bide his time when the forces threatening him would vanish in ignoble retreat, he took counsel of his fears. Firmly believing from his acquaintance with Northern feeling, as expressed by the federal press, that if taken prisoner

he would be immediately hanged as a traitor to the government while in President Buchanan's cabinet, and greatly exaggerating our forces about the fort, he resolved with the main body of his army to cut his way out. Leaving General Buckner with a thin line to hold the fortifications, on the morning of February 15th, the sortie in force was made striking with irresistible force the Union troops under command of General McClernand. The assault drove our forces back, and would have made an easy victory but for the intrepidity of General McClernand and his officers in re-forming their lines under fire and fighting stubbornly, although forced to fall back. This unequal conflict continued from early daylight until 5 p. m. of the same day. The other two-thirds of our army at Donelson commanded by Generals Smith and Wallace at first took no part in this conflict, although frequently implored to furnish reinforcements, because General Grant the night before issued orders that no move should be made, except at his command. It was a short winter's day, and yet it seemed interminable to the three subordinates who sent again and again to head-quarters for orders to have their aids return with the astounding information that the general commanding was not at head-quarters, nor could aide or orderly there tell where he was.

The fact is, that some time during the night Grant had gone to Commodore Foote's gunboat and was discussing with that officer the perilous condition in which they found themselves while the desperate fight went on. This council of war was set to the music of musketry and canon that rang in unheeded to the cabin where Grant sat, smoked, drank, and discussed the emergencies of the hour.

At about 5 p. m., when McClernand's little force was nearly exhausted, Generals Smith and Lew Wallace, of their own motion, moved in to the relief of McClernand. The relief came none too soon, but although General Floyd and all his force not killed or wounded escaped, General Smith was met by a proposition to surrender, instead of a deadly resistance. The flag of truce from the fort carried the question, "On what terms may we capitulate?" "Unconditional surren-

der," was the prompt response, "and unless immediately complied with, I will move upon your works."

Before that could be complied with, General Grant arrived upon the field, and General Smith submitted to him an account of the interview under the flag of truce. General Grant not only approved but accepted his gallant subordinate's bold demand as his own. He had unquestionably as much right to the authorship of "unconditional surrender," etc., that carried him to the head of our armies and into the presidency, as he had to the credit for the fight that day and the capture of the fort. This is the true story of Fort Donelson.

After the battle, the War Department could obtain no reports of Grant's strength, though it repeatedly called for them. Halleck, after investigation, telegraphed that Grant had "resumed his old habits," and in reply, was authorized to remove him. Halleck, however, relented, and Grant was saved.

Although General Geo. H. Thomas had no part in the affair, it had a marked effect, not only upon his subsequent career, but upon the war itself. We gained Fort Donelson at a heavy loss to the Union side, and instead of a blessing it proved a grave calamity to our cause in the field. From that out, all thought of Thomas's wise plan to hit the Confederacy where the Confederacy was vulnerable disappeared. Andrew Johnson found himself in possession of the state capitol at Nashville, and the administration soon learned that the loyal sentiment of East Tennessee was of about the same use to it as the supposed sympathy of Russia.

The war went blundering on with the fate of an empire resting on the shoulders of the men of the muskets, who fought and fell by thousands that imbecility under epaulettes might win monuments and a renown that shames us before the world. The administration at Washington was fighting not only a war of arms, as we have said, but a war of opinions in the political field upon which rested its authority. At any time it might be called upon to face an adverse House of Representatives, and with the war ended, to vacate its place. President Lincoln had been not only a minority President,

but he was not popular in the party that elected him. Nominated by a local influence at Chicago, he was elected from necessity. The old Whig party that claimed to be all the decency in the land had no confidence in the vulgar rail-splitter—"the poor white trash spawned in Illinois," as Wendell Phillips called him, while the hot gospellers suspected him of sympathy with the slave-holders, so that he had not only to hold down the copperhead organization of the North, but to conciliate his own party. Aided by the ablest and most patriotic men ever called to a cabinet, his administration grows in renown as its labors and achievements become better known in the dying out of the blaze and glare of the armed conflict. The real heroes of success in holding a nation to its empire of a continent were Lincoln, Stanton, Chase, and Seward. These four we recognize with but one other, whose story we are striving to tell.

President Lincoln was far stronger in the political arena than he was in the battle-field. But we can see at a glance how one was hampered by the other. The President, for example, accepted West Point as the source of all military ability, because the people in their blind ignorance had already indorsed the unhappy little school upon the Hudson. And no man knows better the power of a popular cry. When, therefore, "unconditional surrender" rang out attributed to an unknown U. S. Grant, he was accepted from that out as "Unconditional Surrender Grant," President Lincoln hastened to accept it, although he knew in his grim way that Grant was no more to be credited with the happy combination of words uttered by the gallant dead than was Wellington guilty of crying, "Up, guards, and at 'em!" when the fight hung doubtful at Waterloo, or General Zachary Taylor the man who cried, "A little more grape, Captain Bragg!" when the poor Mexicans were pressing his front. Of all people on earth, we are the most voracious phrase eaters. The fruit from the tree of knowledge has all been canned for us and duly labeled. Our entire political wisdom has resolved itself into a collection of axioms, and we comfort ourselves in repeating them very much as the unlettered sinner of Kentucky had the Lord's Prayer written upon the

head-board of his bed, and went through his devotions on retiring by a rap to call attention and saying solemnly, "Them's my sentiments, O Lord."

"Unconditional surrender" and "move on his works" were more to the administration than all the eloquence of Lincoln, Seward, and Wendell Phillips. The gallant Smith was in his grave, and the man who fell heir to his happy utterance quietly accepted the greatness thrust upon him as the administration seized on that phrase to strengthen itself with the people. Thus were commanders made and campaigns planned by able men brought to naught.

CHAPTER VII.

Nashville the Political Objective Point—Shameful Surprise and Useless Slaughter at Shiloh—Reorganization of the Forces at Corinth—Thomas Given Command of the Right Wing—Asks to be Relieved and Reassigned to His Old Command—Difficulties in the Route from Corinth to Chattanooga—McMinnville—Army of Ohio Moved Back to Louisville—Thomas Appointed to Succeed Buell, but Declines—Second in Command—Perryville.

The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson rendered Nashville untenable by Confederate troops, and General Buell immediately moved on to its occupation. This changed the field of operation of the Army of Ohio from Kentucky to Tennessee. The occupation of this state by Union troops was held at Washington to be of great political and military significance. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, hastened to inform all the European powers that we had wrested another state from the rebels and added thereto his usual formula that in ninety days this impious rebellion against the best government under the sun would be suppressed. This brilliant, stout-hearted statesman presented a bold front to the greatest danger of all, a danger that hung upon our national honor like a wintry cloud from the first opening of the war until the last gun was fired at Nashville. European interferences made a specter that not only haunted the State Department, but hung in gloom about the Executive Mansion distorting and disturbing the view at all quarters. But one man could sleep in quiet with that menace closing the curtains of his bed darker than night, and that man was Abraham Lincoln. The indomitable will of a great mind was well sustained by a temperament made of a tough, coarse fiber that eliminated fear. "I must run the machine as I find it," he said when, on the way to his first inauguration, he was told that it was not probable that he could be sworn in at the capitol. If fate had decreed that the government was to fall, he would have gone down with

it in calm, dignified composure. No man ever felt more positively the philosophy of Lady Macbeth's two words given in response to her husband's query: "If we fail?" "We fail." That is all; we take the risks and can stand the result, let it be what it may. The administration knew that if the weakest war power of Europe took the initiative and recognized the Confederacy, in less than thirty days France would follow and then Russia and England, and before McClellan's huge army could move from the fortifications of Washington, the fleets of all Europe would be upon our shores protecting their commerce that had been so idiotically assailed by our congress. All the painstaking care and sleepless labors of the great men at Washington during the four years of deadly peril to the great Republic which they preserved are lost to the masses who are busy building monuments to epauletted imbecility amid the sneers and jeers of the civilized world.

At the time General Buell turned from Cumberland Gap and marched upon Nashville, General McClellan was being pushed out of Washington by an impatient administration and an irritated public. For nine months he had been gathering about the capitol an immense army. To the living man who saw George B. McClellan's entrance into Washington and subsequent conduct, there is a memory of amazement. The battle of Bull Run was followed not by the defeat of our army, but a total disintegration of an armed mob. The streets, hotels, drinking shops, and other disgraceful resorts were crowded with drunken officers and disorderly men. The few regiments enlisted for the war were demoralized by the bad example of the hundred days men waiting eagerly for the hour then nearly approaching in which they could throw down their muskets and return home to tell of the great battle from which they ran away. Daylight upon the dirty corners and streets was a shame to a civilized community, while the nights were simply hideous. As there were no fortifications and few troops prepared for battle, there was not a day nor a night that the Confederate forces could not have marched in and held the capitol. Why it did not is answered by the fact that West Point was

in command more imperatively on the Southern side than at the North. While McClellan was organizing his anaconda, as the army came to be known, the Southern soldiers, officers, and men, puffed into a belief that they were irresistible, treated the Yankee forces and their occupation of Washington with contempt. In the meantime, the same bitter jealousies, petty intrigues, and selfish shouldering of brutal incapacity were developing at Richmond as at Washington.

The War Department had selected George B. McClellan as the general in command for no reason that one could discover, and the people indorsed the choice because of a little victory achieved by General William Rosecrans in the mountains of West Virginia, but attributed to McClellan. The popular clamor made over the young Napoleon, as we called him, was ludicrous. There was nothing the young man had ever done or said, there was nothing in his appearance, to justify such confidence. He had left the army for work in civil life without making a figure of any prominence, and yet there we were shouting ourselves hoarse over the common place in uniform that was bound to do something startling in the great hereafter.

To do McClellan justice, he certainly accomplished much in immediately calling order out of chaos. The drunken mobs were driven from the streets, camps of instruction established, and the material of a great army accumulated. His more important work was the construction of a circle of fortifications about the capital that served subsequently to secure the city from capture. His more ostentatious work was the creation of a gorgeous staff made up of princes and rich men's sons that goes galloping down the memories of men while great fights about Richmond grow indistinct and remote.

After accomplishing these results our young Napoleon seemed at a loss what to do next. For nine months the army grew and grew with nothing to show but the infamous slaughter of our men under the gallant Baker at Ball's Bluff, with more than sufficient troops within supporting distance to have turned a cruel massacre into victory. The long delay disturbed even the self-possessed President. The Secre-

tary of the Treasury became alarmed at the million a day called for. Mr. Seward saw his ninety days promised Europe become ridiculous, while Edwin M. Stanton, whose appointment General McClellan urged, grew doubtful of his friend's loyalty.

The day passed when President Lincoln and Secretary of War Simon Cameron could be seen awaiting an audience in McClellan's ante-chamber. The brow of the President darkened and his manner grew cold in the presence of this petted warrior. He demanded at last to be shown the plan of campaign, and then he gave positive orders for the army to move on a certain day. McClellan had an ill-concealed contempt for the eminent men who were bearing the heavy burdens their positions had placed upon them. In common with the other military minds he was ignorant of the political condition, and when he drove the Hutchinsons, the Abolition singers, from his camps, he only responded to the West Point prejudice against these low creatures bent on a disorganization of society. And in this he reflected the popular feeling. One reads to-day his orders to subordinates to bear in mind that the object of the war is the restoration of the Union, and not the interference with the domestic institutions of the revolted states. We must remember, however, that he gave expression to the current thought and popular prejudice of the day.

The young general concurred with the administration and the press in regarding Richmond as our objective point. Now, looked at from either a political or a military point, Richmond was of no importance to either side. The rudely formed Confederate Government was in the saddle, and any one town, let it be called capital or not, might be lost or won without affecting the result save and except Washington. The capture of our capital meant to our own people, and the war powers of Europe, a loss to us of our cause. As for the Confederacy, so long as Lee was to the front with the South secured to him in the war the Confederacy was safe. The administration did not nor could McClellan be made to see this. The one frittered away his great power

in many small enterprises while the other seemed to look mainly to a conquest of territory.

It is not good sense, not to say good strategy, to accept the enemy's plan of campaign. The Confederates, threatening Washington, covered Richmond as its base and invited attack upon the best ground for them and the worst for us on the whole continent. This was the head; the belly, upon which it lived and where it was weakest, as we have said, was in Georgia. Had General Thomas's strategy been accepted, and his twenty thousand men marched through Cumberland Gap and Knoxville to Chattanooga, McClellan having force enough to man the fortifications about Washington could have moved with a hundred thousand into the heart of the Confederacy, and whether he ended the strife there as we did subsequently on the very line proposed by General Thomas, he would have shifted the war from the border to the interior and rendered it impossible for the Confederates to triumph in a capture of our capital.

All this seems clear and simple now as seen from the blunders of the past, but it was plain and practicable at the time to one man only, and that was the general who put it to record and who pleaded to have it adopted while preparing his force for the swift, sudden, and brilliant effort. This is the man patronized while damned with faint praise in memoirs of men who felt his superiority and shuddered at the thought of the cold, impartial search of true history uncovering their errors that made disasters, defeat and wholesale death their only claim to eminence. If to build a monument to such we were to gather up the bones of men needlessly slaughtered that monument would amaze the world. These are they who have put aside their swords to wield their pens and write of Thomas, the one author of a great plan of campaign, every move and every battle of which looked to an inevitable conclusion of a deadly contest, that he was a good soldier, but too slow for a subordinate position and too timid for a separate command.

In that pitiful book published by General McClellan's surviving friends and relatives, of 678 pages, the name of George H. Thomas does not appear. Better this than the

miserable misrepresentations of Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Although the very name is ignored, upon page 102 of McClellan's own story, we find the following as part of a memorandum written 2d of August, 1861, and submitted to the President:

"As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement through that state into Eastern Tennessee for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the East. The possession of those roads by us, in connection with the movement on the Mississippi, *would go far toward the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels.*"

The italics are our own. Through the dense fog of this military mind, a ray of light seems to penetrate. But how dim it is we learn when he makes such a move depend upon the cordial support of Kentucky. The condition of the public mind in Kentucky was as unknown to the young Napoleon as was his military future. There was no state acting under or sympathizing with the Confederacy that was so solid in its course determined on at an early day as Kentucky; shrewd, selfish, and self-possessed, the people of Kentucky almost unanimously resolved to be non-committal. They manifested the deepest sympathy for the South, and the liveliest appreciation of their own welfare. In the pursuit of slaves, of which Kentucky lost more probably than South Carolina owned, the people had learned of the resources and temper of their neighbors across the Ohio, and through social intercourse and intermarriage, they had come to feel kindly for a people who really regarded their generous, impulsive friends of the "dark and bloody ground" as part of themselves. There were antagonistic and conflicting motives, but between the two Kentucky remained firm. It was non-committal. The government appealed for aid to the land of the one monument—that of the purest patriot our land ever possessed, Henry Clay, to restore the Union. Clay lived to serve and died almost broken-hearted because he saw it endangered, and our government pleaded in vain. On

the other hand, when Bragg swung from his base of supplies at Chattanooga, and fought his way through to Perryville, expecting to see the state rise in welcome, fill his exhausted ranks, and feed his famished soldiers, not a solitary cry of welcome, not a recruit appeared, not a gun or a ration was given. Indeed, the prominent men who met to consult, very plainly advised him to get out of Kentucky on the double quick.

To wait for such a people under these circumstances "to become cordially united with us," was to prolong the war indefinitely, and we can readily measure the ability of a man capable of such a proposition.

General McClellan had scarcely left his railroad office to assume command of the Ohio militia in the very beginning of the war before he was called on, he tells us in this same book, by Governor Buckner, to arrange terms of strict neutrality on the part of Kentucky. As General Preston, one of Kentucky's most eminent men, said to the writer of this long after the war, "Kentucky had much charming sentiment anent the lost cause, but not enough fanaticism to lift her above a just consideration of fine stock, corn, and tobacco."

In this same memorandum our young Napoleon writes: "The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-ground, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. One is puzzled to comprehend the "propriety" of this conclusion. The enemy had selected their better positions—wherein was it proper for us to accept their chosen arena? Especially is this pertinent in view of the glimmer given that the occupation of East Tennessee with a control of the railroads would go far toward forcing the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. But then it was necessary to wait for Kentucky to be cordially united with us.

While the young Napoleon was dictating to a government taught humility by its defeat by a half-armed mob, and this muddle of its military movement, and rode at the head of a gorgeous staff along streets to the music of cheers from senators, members of the house, cabinet officials, and the mob, when all the armies of the United States were put un-

der his command; when all the vast resources of the country were given to him, the one silent solitary man who saw it all, and could have used all their men and means to an end that would have struck like the hand of fate at the fortunes of the Confederacy, this man far out in Kentucky was slowly but surely, building up an army that was destined to swing its eagles through the smoke of continuous victory to a triumph for the great republic.

General Thomas was in camp at Somerset, Kentucky, after the victory at Mill Springs, when he received orders from General Buell to concentrate his forces and move on Bowling Green, where Albert Sidney Johnston was erecting fortifications. Before any demonstration of this sort could be made, the Confederate general found his fortifications untenable, and so evacuating what had been a strong position, fell back to Nashville. Nashville, however, was found to be as much without military significance or strength as Bowling Green, and was soon in the possession of the army under General Buell. In accord with orders, General Thomas moved his command to Louisville, and thence by boats on the Ohio and Cumberland to Nashville.

Andrew Johnson was solemnly installed governor of Tennessee. Governor in name, his authority was limited to the range of Buell's guns. What might have been the condition of East Tennessee as to loyalty, Central Tennessee had none of that lofty quality. On the contrary, there seemed to be a more bitter feeling of hostility to the government in that state than in any other at war with the Union. We call attention to this, because it throws much light on the mysterious movements of our government. Nashville was of small political and less military importance to us, and yet to gain that place and inaugurate Johnson our forces were deflected from the campaign that military instruction alone would have dictated was of vital importance. The unnecessary prolongation of the war and the many disasters that followed can be attributed to the Johnson infatuation.

About the 15th of March, General Buell received orders to form a junction with the army of General Grant on the Tennessee river at Pittsburg Landing. General Buell

promptly responded. Ordering General O. M. Mitchel to operate with his force against the Confederates guarding the Memphis and Charleston railroads, he moved with the divisions under Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden on the direct road to Savannah, near Pittsburg Landing. The head of his column, under General Nelson, arrived on the memorable 6th of April at the place designated. All that day Buell's forces marched to the roar of artillery that grew louder as the men were urged forward by their officers, all excited and animated by the potent indication of a desperate and unseen conflict. That the nature of it was unknown added to the interest by deepening the mystery. General Buell had the day before heard from General Grant by courier, and the message advised Don Carlos that it was a junction of forces looked for in which there was no hurry, and therefore it was not necessary to fatigue his men. General Buell was not of a nature to be overconfident. His clear brain comprehended the situation, and his soldierly instincts drove him to disregard the advice given. He knew that Grant and Sherman were in great peril, for he knew Grant and Sherman, and to relieve them from danger he urged his columns forward under light marching order, and, as we have said, on the 6th of April the battle itself spoke to him in warning approval of his forced march. The sun had set and the night was gathering in clouds above the field when the head of Buell's army under Nelson reached the bank of the river, and the tired but excited men saw under the further bank from them a mass of men crowded together in a panic, while the thunder of the conflict that filled their ears from early dawn had died down, except in the roar of the gunboats that kept up a continuous fire, throwing shot and shell up on the bank into the unseen and mysteriously silent field beyond.

Grant and Sherman had been shamefully surprised and driven back, with a horrible slaughter of brave men. Throwing their forces in the face of a vigilant enemy with a river in their rear, they had left to every division and almost to every brigade to select its camp to suit the whim or convenience of the subordinate commanding officer. Provision was made, however, for space in the center front for Buell's

forces when they should arrive. This vacancy made it impossible to devise a line of resistance in the awful emergency that followed, even had the other divisions not been left in air. No picket line was thrown out, and no cavalry sent to feel the front and give warning of the swiftly approaching enemy. These commanders of ours seemed to have courted the surprise. We learn since the close of the war that the army of Beauregard moved up unmolested and slept on their arms within sound of the doomed camps where unsuspecting men were cooking their last meal before their murder in the morning. Ere the dawn brightened into day, the sleeping soldiers of our camps were awakened by the rebel yell and the deadly rattle of musketry that killed men as they leaped from their blankets, killed men cooking their early breakfast, killed officers asleep in their tents, and sent through all the camps the wild terror of a fatal surprise.

The wonder is that any battle was fought on that Sunday in April. It was the best illustration of the pluck and sense of our men. It was the soldier's day at Shiloh. They fell into line instinctively and fought in concert from individual impulse. Fortunately for us, on the extreme right of our line, if the sudden and impromptu formation be called such, the key to the situation, as it proved, was held by a strange, eccentric man, known as Colonel Tom Worthington. The son of one of Ohio's most eminent men in its pioneer days, he had been sent in youth to West Point. The restraint of the school was rather irksome to the eccentric man, and he left before he could be graduated into command. There was no element of success in the late cadet. He had the ability to spend his patrimony without purchasing with it any thing worse than a chronic dyspepsia that, added to his natural eccentricity, made men envy him. When, however, the war came so unexpectedly, there was a wild demand for West Pointers. Tom had been one long enough to make him valuable. He was made colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio Infantry. Tom's art of war was learned from Cæsar's Commentaries—a better authority than Jomini or Halleck, by the by—and consisted of fighting all day and fortifying all night. Tom's regiment carried as many picks

and shovels as it did muskets, and if he did not fight all day it was because the prudent generals over him did not approve of Cæsar's Commentaries as interpreted by Colonel Tom Worthington. He could not, however, be restrained from fortifying, and every night on the march his regiment slept behind some sort of a breast-work. This served him and our army a good purpose at Shiloh. When that fatal field was reached, Colonel Tom made an observation. They were, he saw, in the enemy's country, with that enemy undoubtedly at the front, with a river in our rear—a condition that Cæsar's Commentaries expressly warned against. As soon as Colonel Tom's regiment was in camp, he rode over to head-quarters, really for the purpose of expressing his opinion as to the peril of their position, but ostensibly to learn something of the picket line, which he was unable to find, from the simple fact that there was none. Colonel Worthington was not an agreeable man. He was loud of speech and aggressive in manner. He had not got from West Point even its polish. Careless in his attire, he was so common in his ways that on the march it was no unusual event for him to mount behind him some worn out or sick soldier and so furnish a little transportation that was a great offense to his brother officers. He had a contempt for these same officers, who could not read Cæsar's Commentaries in the original that the colonel carried with him and consulted on all occasions.

For these and other reasons Colonel Tom was not welcome at head-quarters, and on this occasion he found Generals Grant and Sherman with several other officers at supper, which the colonel was not invited to join. After fuming and fretting on the outside he returned to his regiment, reporting that he found "one general commanding drunk and the other crazy." These words were used against him when subsequently he was tried, condemned and cashiered for insubordination in saving all that was saved of the doomed army on the Sunday of April 6th. Colonel Tom threw out his own picket line, established his own line of battle, and in the morning was in command of the only regiment probably not taken by surprise. This was most

fortunately placed to form a rallying point, and first regiments and then brigades formed and fought all day, the enemy being unable to disperse this third of an army that saved the other two-thirds from being captured or driven into the river.

It is claimed by the Confederates that the death of Albert Sidney Johnston robbed their army of the fruit of victory. It certainly somewhat equalized conditions. Our army went into the fight without a head, precisely as the Confederates went out. We doubt, however, whether the death of General Johnston had the effect attributed. It caused no cessation of the fierce conflict. What might have happened had daylight been prolonged a few hours we can only conjecture, but when the sun went down its last rays fell upon our men holding our extreme right, and with it a cover to the disorganized mass crowded in under the banks of the river.

With night came Nelson's command of Buell's army, and in the early dawn Buell's column moved in upon the field to resume the fight of the day before. These fresh troops came none too soon. General Buell seeking General Grant on the night of the 5th of April, that he might learn something of the situation, found the general commanding on a boat with his staff, horses and equipage, prepared for flight. It had been the soldier's day at Shiloh on the 5th, it became Buell's day on the 6th, and Buell's victory when the hardy men of the forced march redeemed the shameful disaster that had poured its gloomy roar in their ears all the day before.

General Thomas took no part in this affair, as he and his command did not reach the field in time. The deadly conflict made a deep impression on him. He was one to appreciate the noble qualities of the men under muskets and note how, without a head, they fought even when awakened in their tents by the rebel yell, and were shot down or bayoneted as they hurried half dressed into line. "The noblest soldiers in the world," he was wont to say with a warmth unusual to his undemonstrative manner, "all they need is a little instruction and a capable commander." He not only found appreciation for the men, but a measure

for their generals. This last he never expressed in words, but left unmistakable evidence in acts. He had a high admiration for Buell. The way in which that officer took in the situation when advised to move leisurely in his march to Shiloh and hurried his command forward under light marching orders that he might rescue imbecility from destruction, was of a piece with Thomas's own conduct subsequently at Nashville, when confronted by Hood's army; almost every hour brought him a telegraph order to fight at once, which he treated with contempt, while continuing his preparations. We will find directly his confidence in and admiration of Don Carlos Buell expressed by an act of self-denial that has been a puzzle to the unappreciative ever since.

The battle of Shiloh was followed by a reorganization of the forces designed to move on Corinth. General Halleck assumed command in person. Henry Wager Halleck was the beau ideal of a West Pointer. Of portly presence and soldierly bearing, he had a solemn, dignified manner, that impressed his associates with a belief in a sound intellectual force, which gained him the title of "Old Brains" in the army. He honestly believed that war was an art that could be taught by books, and had produced a volume entitled "Halleck's Art of War." He was surprised to find, however, when he took the field, that his learned effort was about as useful as would have been a treatise on infant baptism. He was, fortunately for our military service, a better judge of men than of military operations, and while of a slow, cautious, conservative turn in speech and acts, he was not only instrumental in having General McClellan relegated to the sphere nature meant he should fill, but he was enabled to have George H. Thomas promoted to positions where the great Virginian could wait for opportunity.

In accordance with the "Art of War" General Halleck made a most elaborate division of his forces. He had five parts under the names of Right Wing, Center, Reserves and Cavalry. The Right Wing, comprising four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee and the First Division of the Army of the Ohio, was given to General Thomas. He secured the promotion of General Thomas to the rank of Major-General.

The center was given to General Buell. The Left Wing, or Army of the Mississippi, was intrusted to General Pope, and the Reserves to General McClernand, while General Gordon Granger had command of the Cavalry. The division commanders were Major-General W. T. Sherman, Brigadier-Generals T. W. Sherman, Davis and McKean.

This immense force moved on in accordance with "Halleck's Art of War," and with a prudent caution that discounted chances. Every day's advance in parallels was marked by heavy fortifications that precluded any attack with the remotest hope of success on the part of the enemy. If McClellan's army at Washington was an anaconda Halleck's was an alligator, and both weakened the morale of their forces in proportion to their security. The men who marched with full reliance on their muskets now found themselves falling back on picks and shovels. The military roads constructed over the soft yielding bottoms of the Tennessee were marvels of engineering, and enabled the huge army to keep abreast, while the enemy played like lightning along the front and flanks in continuous skirmishes, but in vain.

Had this immense and compact army been moving to any point of the slightest importance, it would probably have arrived at its destination some years after the war had ceased. As it was, the value of Corinth in a military view found measure in the fact that it was thus menaced.

Of so little importance was this supposed advantage thus painfully gained, that the General commanding was at a loss to know what next to attempt. Every mile gained by such a force not only increased the cost and difficulty of supply, but the slow cautious advance bade fair to bankrupt the treasury at Washington before any thing could be accomplished. To meet this emergency, the three armies called together to demonstrate the success of Halleck's Art of War were separated and given severally distinct fields and aims; no one of them, save that on Chattanooga, of the slightest importance to our success in the war, and that to Chattanooga was rendered unavailing by its utter impracticability. General Buell was ordered to move east from

Corinth toward Chattanooga. To this end an effort was made to repair the railroad eastward from Eastport, but almost immediately abandoned as not practicable. From this they turned to repairing the two railroads from Nashville to the Tennessee river and connecting at Stevenson, Alabama.

What a contrast is this ill-conceived, circuitous, expensive route to that projected the year before by General Thomas through Cumberland Gap to East Tennessee and Chattanooga. We were drifting in blind ignorance toward the vital point of our enemy's weakness. Had General Thomas's plan of advance been accepted, with President Lincoln's project of a railroad, the people at Richmond in all human probability would have been awakened to the fact that we had the sudden suppression of their revolt in view. The year's delay had changed the aspect of the field, and instead of a huge army concentrated in Georgia to drive our forces where the Confederacy lived, time and opportunity had been given them to meet us in a fatal encounter at Shiloh, send another larger force to the Mississippi, and garrison Chattanooga with an army that threatened all we had gained in Kentucky and Tennessee.

On June the 5th, 1862, General Thomas was given command at Corinth of all the forces there, and in the same month occurred an event strikingly illustrative of General Thomas's character. He asked to be relieved from the command of the right wing of four divisions and returned to his former command, in the Army of the Ohio under General Buell, of two divisions. This restored General Grant to his former command, and it is held even by the friends of Thomas that he was moved to this by a regard for Grant. It is not singular that such a misconception should exist. It seems to be the law of our being never to be content with our heroes. We hasten to conceal them under attributes that are not only foreign to their natures, but antagonistic to what we admire in them. Now, had General Thomas been such a weak sentimentalist as to give up a high command in pity for one whose habits, to say the least, at that

time made command for him a public danger, the title of the Rock of Chickamauga is misplaced.

The truth is that General Thomas was not moved by any such sentimental weakness. He comprehended in all its horror the crime of Shiloh. The thoughtful, reserved man with all his impulses under iron control seldom spoke save in his acts. He asked to be returned to his old command because in that command he was building an army that was to be irresistible through its perfect organization and its confidence in its general. The work he had given himself to do was more important to him and his cause than any temporary honor. "What is the good of a hundred thousand men when you can handle and fight only one thousand?" was what he thought, and the query held in it more than all Halleck's Art of War. And so he gladly turned over his four divisions to the vulgar ambition of any one pleased with such fringe work of command, and returned to the men who from his care of them called him "Pap Thomas," and whose confidence in him won eventually the higher title found in the "Rock of Chickamauga."

In July, 1862, General Halleck was called to Washington and appointed general-in-chief of all the armies of the United States. This was in effect the position held up to that time by General Geo. B. McClellan. But this officer had demonstrated in the field the incapacity that was suspected and feared at Washington, while he was organizing the army he so completely wrecked upon the Chickahominy. The administration, relying upon West Point to conduct the war, had no comprehensive plan, no great objective points, but drifted along in the most confusing and inconclusive manner. All that saved us from a hopeless wreck was that the Confederacy was, if possible, in a worse condition. It had but one great objective point, which was Washington, and this it seemed persistently to ignore. Great masses of men moved to and fro without any definite purpose, and, coming together, bloody battles were fought without other result than that found in the lists of killed, wounded, and missing. It looked, as an experienced French general said, as if we sought to end the war by a slaughter of each other.

Had President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton ignored West Point and taken immediate command, a different management and a different result would undoubtedly have occurred. Any man of common sense can plan a campaign whether he can fight a battle or not. The trouble with the administration was, however, as we have said, that believing West Point held a Napoleon, if he could only be found, and while, of course, deeply concerned about the armed conflict, it left the field to professed military men and devoted its time to foreign and domestic political affairs. Yet President Lincoln was himself an able general. Edwin M. Stanton, while lying upon the sick bed from which he never came alive, repeated a conversation had between President Lincoln and General McClellan, wherein McClellan was urging upon the president the necessity of sending every available man to Yorktown.

"We can not uncover Washington," said the President firmly.

"The safety of Washington is in my success at Richmond," responded the general.

"Why go to find the rebels at a heavy cost and a greater peril, when they are at our door within a day's march?"

McClellan transported his army of a hundred thousand men of all arms to the vicinity of Yorktown, then occupied by General Magruder with only five thousand men. Instead of assaulting the place with his overwhelming numbers, our general proceeded to besiege the place, and from the 5th of April to the 4th of May had all his army in trenches, gradually approaching the enemy. When at last he was about to open fire, the Confederates quietly withdrew. On the 10th of April, Norfolk was occupied by General Wool. After the evacuation of Yorktown, the occupation of Williamsburg was contested, and although the Confederates withdrew, it was after a hot contest that proved virtually a victory to them, for it deepened the caution of our general and further demoralized an army trained through a year to the warning found in a daily order not to bring on a general engagement. The distance from Williamsburg to Richmond is fifty miles, and over this the enemy retreated, fighting as he fell back.

This continued until the Chickahominy was reached, when an obstacle presented itself that checked our advance. This stream, that in dry seasons is a mere brook, in a wet time becomes a river, with low, swampy banks. The rain-storms that sometimes follow heavy cannonading had not only submerged the low, murky flats that made marching difficult, but swelled the little Chickahominy to proportions that made crossing in the presence of the enemy perilous in the extreme. This peril came to McClellan swiftly after the 25th of May. The base of operations for the army was at White House, on the York River Railroad, where that road crosses the Pamunky, twenty-four miles east of Richmond. Fitz John Porter had advanced to Hanover Court House, where he separated to form a junction with the forces under McDowell. But McDowell had been withdrawn to cover Washington, and so Porter returned to his original camp. It will be seen by reference to the map that the Army of the Potomac was nearly equally divided on the two sides of the river. The left wing had four divisions moving along the York River Railroad south of the Chickahominy, while the right wing, consisting of five divisions, marched in the same direction on a parallel line with the Chickahominy, now a fierce, turbulent, impassable stream, roaring on between. There was no bridge promising communication, save one known as Bottom Bridge, and that was in a sorry, uncertain condition. Appreciating this situation, on the 31st of May, the Confederates, under General Joseph E. Johnston, made an attack on McClellan's left. On the 31st, Longstreet and Hill moved in and fought what is known as the battle of Fair Oaks. Our forces were driven back by superior numbers and were about to surrender, when General Sumner, who had his entire corps in column ready to move, hurried Sedgwick's division across the shaky, almost floating Bottom Bridge. This unexpected and impetuous charge upon the exposed flank of the Confederates reversed the situation and drove the late victors back upon Fair Oaks station.

It was so evident to the Confederates that McClellan had the back of his army broken across the Chickahominy, that a desperate effort was continued to force the advantage.

Their attack was resumed on the 2d of June, but owing to some confusion in their own efforts the attack was unsuccessful, and with a loss of 4,233 men to our 5,739, they abandoned their position at Fair Oaks.

While our army was repairing damages and building bridges, the unexpected happened in two directions. Stonewall Jackson suddenly appeared from the Valley on McClellan's right, while General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of fifteen hundred cavalry, swung round the right flank of our army and destroyed nearly all the stores collected for the support of our forces. In the face of these disasters, McClellan determined to retreat to the James, that was then open and afforded easy water transportation and a safer base than that at White House. This retreat was far more hazardous than any advance could have been. He had to move by the flank on one road only, and that open to attack at a dozen points from other roads crossing it. Striving to conceal his move by a false attack and a bold raid by the cavalry, the entire army began its retreat. The enemy were not much behind, and then followed the seven days fighting from the 25th of June to the 1st of July. In this retreat, our men seemed to have regained the lost spirit that nearly a year's training had taken out of them, and fought well—so well, indeed, that had it been an advance instead of a retreat, the Confederates would have fared badly. The seven days fighting ended in the battle of Malvern Hill, when the Confederates were so terribly worsted that, had McClellan marched on to Richmond, he would undoubtedly have driven the Confederate government out with its army. Instead of this, he called a council of war, that proved true to the traditional council that never fights. Instead of taking Richmond, McClellan closed his report to the Secretary of War in the following words, which give the true measure of the man. They read:

“If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”

It was the belief of this brainless bullet-head, that the government at Washington was not only willing, but anxious to sacrifice its only army that it might be rid of its general.

This not only crops out in the closing lines of his extraordinary report, but appears on every page of the book called "*McClellan's Own Story*," published since his death. When one remembers the patriotism, the toil, and anxiety of the eminent men then making our government, one's indignation boils at the insolence of this military imbecile whose blunders nearly lost us our army, and left the field the brave men fought over stained with the useless blood of fifty thousand men.

We read those events to-day under a glare of sunlight given us by "*McClellan's Own Story*," and "*Long's Life of Lee*." "If I save this army." "This army" at that moment numbered nearly a hundred thousand, and had shown in a retreat that seemed planned for its destruction, a fighting capacity that almost equals that of the Army of the Cumberland, and subsequently, when gathered on Malvern Hill, achieved a great victory. It was in fact a victory that opened the road to Richmond had our very little Napoleon possessed the sense to seize on the advantage. In lieu of this, he had the telegraph at Washington vibrating with continuous cries for reinforcements. We now read in the carefully prepared "*Life of Lee*," by Long, that while with 80,000 brave men, our diminutive Napoleon was demanding help, the pious Lee was thanking God every night for another twenty-four hours in which to fortify Richmond, and strengthen his shattered army.

Why President Lincoln did not respond to McClellan's treacherous insolence by arrest and trial for treason, is found in the unwritten history of that troubled time. We have Edwin M. Stanton's word for it, and the strange and contradictory conduct of both president and secretary, leave no doubt that the government dared not arrest him. It dared not even displace him on the James by another general. McClellan had not only surrounded himself by a group of favorite officers in command of his several corps, but he and they had assiduously cultivated in the rank and file a discontent toward the administration of President Lincoln. The men were taught to believe that they were being sacrificed to the abolition selfishness at Washington. This distrust and

discontent had become so general that when, on July 7th, President Lincoln visited the army, orders had to be issued for the men to cheer their chief executive to check what the officers believed would occur in the shape of mob violence and insult.

"We had to get the army back to the fortifications at Washington for fear of a revolt in getting clear of the fellow," said Edwin M. Stanton after the war.

This fact makes clear and consistent President Lincoln's conduct toward George B. McClellan.

This was the condition of the military field when after the capture of Corinth the three armies were separated and given three different lines of operation. Generals Grant and Sherman were sent to the Mississippi, while General Buell was ordered to move eastward with Chattanooga as an objective. We were drifting in the right direction by a most circuitous route, and after a lost opportunity. One man alone saw the situation, but he was not in a position to make his knowledge available. Not in command, he was not of the sort to press persistently his views upon those in authority. He was building his own army and biding his own good time.

The movements of Buell were not lost to the enemy. The people at Richmond had not been slow either in their appreciation of the great gate-way to the South, or in observing that we seemed profoundly ignorant of its importance. Now, however, that a huge army was moving in that direction with an active repair of railroads and an accumulation of stores, active measures were taken to meet the menaced danger. The general movement of our forces under Buell was eastward. Generals Nelson and Wood's forces were employed in repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. They formed a junction with General O. M. Mitchel's division, already engaged in the same work. General McCook's division marched from Corinth, and General Crittenden's from Boonville, and took position at Battle Creek, threatening Chattanooga early in July. As rapidly as roads could be repaired and supplies gathered, the entire army moved in the same direction. General Thomas brought up the rear. He was then ordered on the 5th of August to Decherd, and on

the 19th to McMinnville, in command of all the troops collected there for an aggressive movement.

General Buell's military operations were gravely embarrassed by the political movements inaugurated by Andrew Johnson and enforced by the administration. The phantom of a loyal population in Tennessee yet haunted the brain of the authorities at Washington. Fortunately for us all a like will-o'-the-wisp was misleading the people at Richmond. To offset our loyal Tennesseans they had an immense population of the disloyal in Kentucky, and it was determined that two columns should move into that state and hold Frankfort until an ordinance of secession could be passed and arms given the brave Kentuckians with which to drive the Federals across the Ohio.

To this end, while a column under General Kirby Smith marched through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky; General Bragg, cutting loose from his base of supplies at Chattanooga, marched an army of twenty-five thousand men to form a junction with Smith at or near Louisville. General Buell had twice the number of men and better supplied and equipped of all arms, but owing to his political duties that he dared not neglect, this force was so scattered that it appeared impossible to concentrate them in time to drive Bragg back over the Tennessee, or from his line of operations, which would have been quite as fatal; for Bragg, depending on the country for supplies, had to select the one possessed of the most fertility. This marked his line of march from Chattanooga to Kentucky, in the mind of General Thomas, as if he had read it in an order from Bragg's head-quarters. General Buell did not concur in the view taken by General Thomas. Believing that Bragg had an army of fifty thousand men, he could not be made to believe that such a force under the command of a sane mind would seek to support itself from the country through which it marched. Buell was deceived as to the number of Bragg's army and believed that Nashville was its destination. Thomas was satisfied that Bragg aimed at Kentucky. There was a wide difference in their views and a wider in the results. If Bragg's pur-

pose was to invade Kentucky, he would cross over to the Sequatchie Valley. If, on the other hand, he meant Nashville, it would be necessary to check the move at McMinnville. The two routes were too far apart to hold both, and it was then of vital importance to know as soon as possible which was to be selected. When the crossing of the Tennessee by the Confederates was effected the greatest possible efforts were made to learn of their movements. We gather this from the telegrams that passed between Generals Thomas and Buell. We copy from them as not only throwing light on the events, but giving us a knowledge of the two distinguished officers then in command.

On the day that General Thomas reached McMinnville, General Buell discussed the situation in a lengthy dispatch: "The enemy crossed three hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry at Chattanooga yesterday. This may be for the purpose of foraging in Sequatchie Valley, but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold your command in readiness to march at the shortest notice. . . . You should, by means of spies and scouts, keep yourself thoroughly informed of what is going on between you and Chattanooga. . . . I shall concentrate your division and McCook's at Tracy City, or near there, and send Crittenden up the Sequatchie Valley to about the Anderson road. We must be prepared either to fight in detachments, or concentrate rapidly, according to circumstances."

On the 22d, General Thomas telegraphed to General Buell: "I have believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this direction is to cover the advance of the enemy toward Kentucky. . . . The citizens here think they will advance into Kentucky."

General Buell replied the same day: "From General McCook's information this morning, it seems almost certain that Bragg is marching on McMinnville, his advance was on the top of Walden's Ridge last night. McCown is said to be crossing at Kingston, and Withers at Harrison. Of course they will expect to unite. What sort of ground can we take by concentration at McMinnville? How would it do

to fight at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our artillery?"

General Thomas replied the same day: "By all means concentrate here. The enemy can not reach Nashville by any other route across the mountains unless by Sparta. At Altamont, I am positively informed, that the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage, and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there, or at Althusford across the Caneyfork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta to reach Nashville. . . . I can not think that Bragg is coming here, either by the Hill or Therman road."

In answer Buell said: "I can hardly think that the enemy will attempt to march across to McMinnville, at least not immediately. It appears to me that he will rather endeavor to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance to Altamont, we may thwart him in both and preserve our communications with Decherd and Nashville. What think you?"

General Thomas replied on the same day: "We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be difficult for us to march across the mountains to Sequatchie Valley as for the enemy to come to Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here except for battle or for an advance into East Tennessee. I think our connection with Nashville will be better preserved by holding Decherd with a division to enable us to concentrate either there if threatened or at this place. I also learn that Tupelo, Mississippi, has been abandoned, and most of the enemy at that place sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt to seize North Alabama."

The next day Buell telegraphed: "There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We must concentrate in advance and assume the offensive, or fall back at last to Murfreesboro. I deem the former the surest, and we will act accordingly. I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook, Crittenden, and Schoepf. There must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Walden's

Ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga, night before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to-morrow. That is hardly possible, but they must be met at the earliest possible moment."

A day later he telegraphed: "In advancing to Altamont, take the Hickory creek road, instead of the Therman road. This will put you on a shorter line of retreat on Murfreesboro by way of Manchester, and brings us nearer together. . . . In the event of any reverse which makes it necessary for the whole force to fall back, do so by Manchester and Beech Grove, making a stand to check the enemy whenever it can be done to advantage." On the 24th, General Thomas's scouts returned with intelligence that the enemy would advance on McMinnville by two or three routes, and that forces were at Pikeville and in the Sequatchie valley. He then reported to General Buell that he would move that afternoon in compliance with orders. It is evident, however, from the foregoing quotations, that he was reluctant to move to Altamont, and the issue of that movement proved that his reluctance was well founded.

August 25th, at 5 p. m., Thomas telegraphed to General Buell from Altamont: "The enemy no nearer than Dunlap. It is reported that there is one brigade there and one at Pikeville. . . . Water scarce, only one spring here, and not forage enough in the neighborhood to last for one day. The road up the mountain is almost impassable; General Wood has been from six o'clock until now, and has not succeeded in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it next to impossible to march a large army across the mountains by Altamont, on account of the scarcity of water and forage and the extreme difficulty of passing over the road. I will therefore return to McMinnville and await further orders. As I mentioned in one of my dispatches, I regard McMinnville as the most important point for occupation of any. The occupation of McMinnville, Sparta, and Murfreesboro will, in my opinion, secure the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad."

General Thomas's experience confirmed what he had anticipated as to the condition of Altamont, and without further orders he fell back to McMinnville, where he was

again telegraphed as follows: "Keep your position at McMinnville, but make nothing like a permanent establishment. Be always ready to move at a moment's notice. That Bragg is on that side of the river with a large force is beyond all question. It is hardly probable that it is merely for the purpose of demonstration, and we must be prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course, the passage of so large a force across the mountains is difficult, but not as much so as you would suppose from the road you took. The Therman road is very good and the mountains quite easy of ascent. The descent on this side is easy enough by four roads all diverging from Altamont, the first going by Beersheba to McMinnville, the second by Hickory creek to McMinnville or toward Manchester, the third also to Manchester and to Decherd by Pelham, and the fourth by Cowan. The Beersheba is excellent for a mountain road. The question is, how to meet an advance which may take either of these roads through Altamont? The best position we could take would be McMinnville, Altamont, and on the Therman road just this side of Sequatchie valley. We should not only be able to concentrate against an advance on that road, or the Sparta road, but also to threaten his flanks, if he should attempt to go into North Alabama by Battle creek—a not improbable thing on many accounts. The difficulty of supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I think, the only objection to the disposition I mention."

To this, General Thomas replied on the 28th: "Troops at this place can watch the direct Chattanooga road, the Dunlap, and the Harrison and Pikeville roads, and by the system of expresses established by Smith, I think I can give you intelligence of the enemy before he can cross Sequatchie valley."

We give these telegrams more at length than a mere narrative would warrant, because, as we have said, they throw light on the different views held in advance as to Bragg's movement by Generals Thomas and Buell. Had General Thomas's earnestly urged advice been acted on, the result, as we can now see, would have saved us the mortifying retreat to the Ohio river. Bragg was extremely anxious

to avoid a battle in the mountains, where the Union forces had the advantage of acting on the defensive, and could, therefore, select positions. General Buell overrated the force commanded by Bragg, and he gravely mistook the object of Bragg's men. General Thomas recognized the fact that Bragg, in severing his army from its base of supplies at Chattanooga, was driven to move in light marching order, as the forage was scarce in the country through which he was forced to pass. If he could escape a general engagement and make his connection with Kirby Smith on the Ohio, all Tennessee and much of Kentucky would have to be abandoned by our troops. This, however, was not so much the purpose of this bold maneuver as the belief that Kentucky, relieved of our presence and encouraged by that of a Confederate force, would at once pass the Ordinance of Secession, and so greatly add men and material to the cause. With Kentucky no longer an unarmed neutrality, the menace to the Confederacy at its weakest point would be removed, and Lee's army left to threaten our Capitol and force the fighting on the ground that eminent general might select.

Thomas saw all this, and while Buell was in a maze as to Bragg's intent, our general never for an instant had the slightest doubt. He had to obey orders, and in so doing opened the way for Bragg through the Sequatchie valley, the shorter and better route to Kentucky. The next move upon the board was an order issued 30th August concentrating the army at Murfreesboro. General Thomas was directed to march in the rear of Wood's and Ammen's divisions, to keep a day's march between his force and that of the enemy, and so to avoid a general engagement. On the first of September, he advised with General Thomas by telegram by asking, "Do any circumstances present themselves which would make a change in our movements advisable?"

Thomas replied, "I think as the movement has commenced that it had better be executed."

This maneuver had scarcely been executed before it was abandoned. Neither the movement nor the abandonment

of it was in accord with the views of General Thomas. He did not believe in the beginning that Murfreesboro was the best point at which to concentrate, nor after the concentration that it was well to abandon that line of operation.

At Murfreesboro, General Thomas was surprised by an order from his general commanding to proceed at once by rail to Nashville. The immediate cause of this change of purpose came in General Buell's mistaken impression as to Bragg's force. Had he known that Bragg had really severed his force from his base of supply, and had one of so small a number that he could subsist on a by no means rich line of country with no hope of reinforcement until he reached Kentucky, he would have seen that with the fifty thousand men concentrated at Murfreesboro he could have driven Bragg back on the Tennessee. It is very clear that had General Thomas been in command, a great battle would have been fought and the extraordinary race of two armies from the Tennessee to the Ohio would never have startled the American people.

The movements of these two armies were the most extraordinary of the war. Marching on parallel lines, both generals aimed to keep their forces apart. Buell, believing that Bragg outnumbered him, sought his reinforcements at Louisville, while Bragg, knowing that Buell had two men to his one, found a junction with Kirby Smith a necessity. And so for days the two armies nearly abreast moved on different roads at times almost in sight of each other. General Thomas was sent to the front when a fight was imminent, and then to the rear when the safety of the army called for his care. This recognition of his ability accompanied him through the war. It made no difference what rank he held, he was ever in command so far as the commanding officer was concerned.

At Prewitt's Knob, General Thomas, intercepting Bragg, prepared for a battle that Bragg, of course, declined, by changing his course east from the road to Louisville and marching northward. Our army continued its march to Louisville, where heavy reinforcements awaited its arrival.

The government at Washington was dissatisfied with

General Buell from the beginning of his command. The march from Murfreesboro to Louisville deepened the distrust. The malign political influence of which we have spoken, beginning with Thomas, was continued to Buell. The silent reserve of the Virginia general that so irritated Johnson was a dignified contempt in Don Carlos that maddened to blind wrath the ambitious politician. When it became evident that Bragg had crossed the Tennessee in force, Governor Johnson sent humbly to General Buell for information as to what he, the general commanding, proposed doing. Of course an officer of Buell's military turn was not the man to regard Andrew Johnson's demand with much favor or even polite conversation. As governor of the state honor, he responded in person and clanked with two aids into the governor's office and asked stiffly what his excellency desired.

"Bragg is moving on Nashville," said Johnson fiercely, "and I want to know what is being done to protect the capitol."

"I do not know," said the general calmly and slowly, "that General Bragg threatens Nashville. When the purpose of his crossing the Tennessee is developed, I will be prepared to meet and fight him."

"There is no question but that your *General* Bragg means Nashville." The governor uttered the word general impressively and with a sneer.

"I hardly think you are certain of your conclusion. General Bragg is an old experienced soldier and must know that Nashville is not a place of any military significance."

"And, therefore, you will abandon it."

"I don't say that. The defense of Nashville is at Murfreesboro. If General Bragg is defeated there, then Nashville is safe. If he is not, Nashville can not be held. Is there any thing else you wish of me, governor?"

"No, sir; no, sir; my business is with the government at Washington." And General Buell, with his two aids, clanked out from the office.

There was a fighting parson in the army called Colonel Granville Moody. This evangelist wore epauletts, was a man

six feet in height, well proportioned, and possessed of a vocal organ of such penetrating power that he could address an audience of ten thousand with more ease than the ordinary speaker could entertain a hundred. He preached war from the pulpit dedicated to the unresisting Savior, and to stimulate enlistment volunteered himself. As a colonel of a pious regiment, he prayed much and fought more. He was fond of Andrew Johnson, probably, because the governor, finding the religious element of much service to himself, patronized the fighting parson. This hot gospeler of the sword was present at the interview, and as soon as General Buell was out of hearing, Governor Johnson said to him: "That man's a traitor; his heart is not in the cause. The government should be warned. But I weary of the work. I am met at every turn by treachery. It is most disheartening."

"Governor Johnson," said Colonel Moody solemnly, "let us pray."

Without a word more these men dropped upon their knees, and Colonel Moody addressed God in a long, fervent appeal for strength to meet and foil the disloyal in their treachery to the faithful government. It is safe to say that Andrew Johnson cared little for the petition offered the Almighty, but he did care for the one he was brooding over to President Lincoln asking the removal of Buell. He knew that the Rev. Colonel Moody's name would strengthen his demand, and as he joined the fighting parson in an appeal to the Lord, it was but right the armed evangelist should join the governor in one to the president.

It seems preposterous, looked at now, that great events should turn on causes such as the one here narrated that the Rev. Granville Moody was given to repeating at camp-meetings and revivals in after life. But it is true that a general of high soldierly qualities was dismissed the service, under a cloud, because a demagogue and an armed parson saw fit to demand his sacrifice. All this will be made apparent hereafter.

When General Buell reached Louisville, he was met by an order retiring him from the command of the army, and appointing General Thomas his successor. Thomas promptly

requested a suspension of this order until he could be heard. That Buell had been outmaneuvered and outmarched by Bragg, Thomas well knew, as he subsequently testified before the court of inquiry organized to question the conduct of the general commanding. But it was an error in judgment in a general whose prompt arrival not only without orders, but contrary to orders, on the fatal field of Shiloh, saved the army, and whose capacity to command was unquestioned, for as we shall see directly, he was not removed because the government had any doubt whatever as to his military ability. General Thomas had, through the force of circumstances, been taken into the confidence of Buell, and although, as we have shown, he did not approve of his commander's management of the late campaign, he saw that the error of judgment did not sanction the cruel injustice. Thomas knew, also, that the charges made against his friend and general, were without the slightest foundation, in fact. He made no reference, however, to this last, for the very good reason that he had just cause for declining to supersede Buell, as stated in a telegram to head-quarters, which read :

“General Buell's preparations have been completed to move against the enemy, and I respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very embarrassing. Not being as well informed as I should be as the commander of this army, and on assumption of such responsibility.”

The government acted promptly on the receipt of this dispatch. The order was revoked, and Buell retained in command.

This act of General Thomas was not understood at Washington, nor until lately has it been better comprehended by the public. Among the military it was of course misconstrued. Such a sense of justice, such self-denial, were unknown to men, saturated with selfishness, and rendered dizzy by the despotic power of military position who climbed to place regardless of their self-respect or sense of honor. General Thomas was made of different material. His ambition came solely from his consciousness of capacity,

and while he loved his country with all his heart, he loved his honor more. Even General Buell misunderstood the divine promptings of Thomas's mind in this matter. He attributed his subordinate's act to a personal friendship and admiration of himself, and was, therefore, quite amazed when at the Buell court of inquiry, General Thomas, summoned as a witness, coldly, and with striking imperturbability, gave the errors of his general when he permitted Bragg to march abreast of him from Murfreesboro to the Ohio. Of course the feeble egotism expressed through the burlesque imitations of Cæsar's "Commentaries," and published as "Memoirs," dispose of George H. Thomas in a sentence which may be made to say: "He was a good enough officer, but, unfortunately, too slow for a subordinate, and too timid for a separate command." We have given strength to the sentence by condensing into a few words the atrocious dullness of many pages by men who proved themselves as ignorant of our great captain as they were of the war in which they peopled national cemeteries with uncalled-for dead for coming generations to weep over and honor.

It will be observed that our general did not decline the command. He only asked that it might be suspended and Buell retained, and why? Because, as he said subsequently, "I am not as modest as I have been represented to be. I did not request the retention of General Buell through modesty, but because his removal and my assignment were alike unjust to him and to me. It was unjust to relieve him on the eve of a battle, and unjust to myself to impose upon me the command of an army at such a time." Had the government pressed its order, Thomas would have accepted, for such an act upon the part of the authorities at Washington, relieved him of all responsibility. Had the War Department, on the other hand, attempted to give the command to other than Buell or Thomas, the order would have been greeted by an indignant protest as in September, 1861, and after when he was called upon to serve under General Rosecrans. It is to be remembered that at all times in the mind of General Thomas he regarded a separate command for himself as one which enlarged the force under him, and widened

his field of service. He never lost sight of the men he had trained to know him and the enemy, and whom he had drilled and disciplined under his own eye into veterans long before their baptism of fire.

In the reorganized army at Louisville, numbering over a hundred thousand men, General Thomas was made second in command. This was a high title attached to very little power, and less responsibility. The army was composed of three army corps. Major-General Alexander McDowell McCook being given command of the first; Major-General Crittenden of the second, and Brigadier-General C. C. Gilbert of the third. This arrangement was extremely defective. While Thomas was designated second in command, he had no actual authority as such. His old division was in General Gilbert's corps, but any attempt at actual control put two major-generals in one corps. Had the second general in command been given power to act on his own responsibility in the absence of the general commanding, or in any other emergency, the position would have possessed some significance. As it was, the general carried a decoration only. He did not even have the confidence of his commanding officers. A knowledge of the movements of the army came to him through orders to be transmitted to the corps commander, so that General Thomas was a clerk carrying the high title of second in command.

General Buell was a self-reliant man of not only a reserved habit, but possessed of such a high regard for military discipline that to advise with a subordinate was to abdicate command. In all the exchange of telegrams when Thomas was at the front and Buell in doubt as to Bragg's movements, the object kept in view was intelligence, not advice. It was this condition that forced General Thomas to ask for a suspension of the order relieving Buell in his behalf, and it was a continuation of this condition that brought about a shameful disaster and eventual retirement of an eminent and promising commander.

On the 1st of October, the army moved in the three corps upon their different roads from Louisville to concentrate at Bardstown. The marching was well timed, and,

had the enemy been found at Bardstown, would have been in position to overwhelm the lesser force held under Bragg and Kirby Smith. But the same full knowledge of the situation that had displayed itself in the march from Chattanooga to Kentucky forced Bragg to avoid an engagement when disaster only could be expected. Bragg's army was not at or near Bardstown, and the march was resumed in the direction of Perryville, where it was believed Bragg would make a stand. The order of march that had been so admirably maintained from Louisville to Bardstown was not pressed in this later advance. The three corps were not abreast, and this fact coming to the knowledge of Bragg on the 7th of October, impelled him to make an attack, believing he could repulse the corps in the lead before the others could be brought up to its relief. He was mistaken as to the condition, but strangely successful in his daring attack. To appreciate the audacity of this fight on the part of the Confederates, we have to remember that it was made by three divisions under General Polk against eight divisions of the Union army. It was sudden, unexpected, deadly, and successful. Polk had command of the rear guard of Bragg's army. He was at Perryville when General Gilbert, in command of the center, was preparing to encamp within three miles of that place. In the rear at some distance was McCook on our left, and behind this was Crittenden. The entire force had been distressed in its march that day from a lack of water. Crittenden's command had to be moved far to the right for the purpose of relieving the deadly thirst of the men, and along the entire front there was the confusion that followed the sight of water to thirsty soldiers, thirty thousand of whom were raw recruits.

It was well known that our army was in the presence of the enemy. It was not known, however, although the fact could have been demonstrated by a reconnoissance, that they were almost within gunshot. General Buell determined to fight a great battle that morning, on the 8th, and had ordered his several generals, after getting into line, to report to him in person. This General McCook did, leaving his men a mere mob searching for water. In his absence the

blow was struck, and while reporting that all was quiet upon his front the roar of artillery and rattle of musketry broke upon their ears. General Buell was confined to his tent by a hurt received the day before by his horse falling upon him. Nevertheless, he sprang from his cot and hurried out—

“What is the meaning of that?” he cried.

“Oh, nothing,” responded McCook carelessly, “but a skirmish.”

“A skirmish with such a waste of ammunition—that is the way my orders are obeyed? Go back, sir, and put a stop to that folly.”

General McCook’s return to his command, unlike General Sheridan’s at Winchester, had no poet and actor to immortalize disaster, or perhaps the genial, full-stomached McCook would now be sung as a great captain “twenty miles away.” It is true he had but five miles to ride before he struck the headless confusion and horrible slaughter that came not of his absence but of his inability. Poor McCook! this was the beginning of a series of defeats that we shall be called on to chronicle ere we end our story of the war. The old Grecian and Roman warriors were wont to consult the bowels of birds to get auguries of success or warnings of defeat from the gods. McCook’s full stomach proved such deadly omen wherever presented. He owed his elevation to favoritism, the McCook and Stanton families having been at an early day almost one in their daily intercourse and affiliations. He was of West Point, and had, therefore, graduated acceptably into any position the government might give him.

General McCook galloped upon the field through the dense smoke of which the almost level rays of the setting sun were shining, to find General Jackson’s two brigades of raw troops being pressed back by heavy odds of veterans. There was no question as to General McCook’s courage. After sending an earnest request to General Sheridan, then under General Gilbert’s command, for protection to his right, which entreaty received no response, McCook turned his attention to his left, and had the satisfaction of seeing a repulse of the enemy. It was a bloody affair, however, result-

ing in the deaths of Generals Jackson and Terrill and a fearful mortality of men and subordinate officers. McCook then turned to his right, and none too soon. This fierce appeal for help upon his right was unheard. Between his right and Rosecrans' left, where Gilbert's force should have been, and into the gap, the enemy came, striking McCook's line at right angles.

There was no time during that bloody engagement in which we could not have swung our left into the rear of the enemy and captured or killed the entire force. As if to compel this, the enemy hurried their columns in between McCook and Rousseau, wheeled on their left and actually attacked McCook with their backs to and within sight of five divisions that seemed paralyzed by the audacity of the move. Our brave men engaged in the actual conflict, the bulk of them fresh from their peaceful homes and all unused to war, proved their manhood by grimly fighting while thus engaged for two hours. In all that time not an order was issued from a general commanding. General Thomas, the imaginary second of command, was five miles distant on the extreme right and General Buell the same distance at the rear incapacitated by a hurt. Captain Fisher of General McCook's staff carried a second petition for help to Gilbert, but failing to get any hurried of his own accord to General Buell. It was then too late. Night was enveloping a field from which General Buckner was slowly withdrawing, leaving behind his dead and wounded and a stain upon our military record that can never be removed. General Thomas was upon our extreme right and of course in command of Crittenden's corps. Hearing the battle he could not see, taught him that it was more serious than a skirmish and nothing but the late hour would save them from being involved in a general engagement. He, waiting for orders that he expected every instant which never came, of course he denied General Crittenden's earnest request to lead his troops into a fight that was evidently a desperate one. "No," he said, "I know nothing of General Buell's plan, and I must wait here where he knows I am for orders."

Knowing General Thomas as we do, it is impossible to

conceive his acting other than he did. Had he known the situation he would of course have moved into the fight without orders. But he could not realize that two divisions of Bragg's army had been not only recklessly thrown against eight divisions, but actually wedged in between forces that had they been moved to battle would have annihilated them. In criticising the conduct of General Buell we have to bear these facts in mind. Had the general orders been obeyed the gap between McCook and Rousseau would not have presented the opportunity so readily seized on by the enemy. Then, again, General McCook had reported his front clear of the enemy at the very instant almost of their attack when the roar of their guns gave the lie to his report.

The Confederates continued their retreat from Kentucky unmolested. For three days General Buell was busy maneuvering his force so as to bring the entire front forward for a general engagement. Of course this was soldierly and prudent had the enemy accepted the challenge and gone into the fight. But Bragg's and Kirby Smith's campaign into Kentucky was a ludicrous failure. Instead of meeting an enthusiastic welcome of which they had been assured, they encountered scowls from the many and open abuse from the few. The thoughtful Kentuckians were of no mind to have the armed conflict shifted from the Virginia soil to their own, and let us hope that the memory of Henry Clay yet lived among the fair fields and pleasant homes of a brave people. The danger of dissension had shortened the life of the great leader, and the memory of his dying anguish must have had weight with the people that adored him throughout his illustrious career.

General Buell learned too late that while he was preparing to hurt the enemy in a great battle that enemy was moving swiftly from a state that gave it no welcome, and not even transportation to carry back the arms that had been brought in to equip the expected patriots.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Buell Court of Inquiry—Thomas Shows that had his Suggestion of Concentrating the Army at Sparta been acted on Bragg's Advance would have been Checked.

The disastrous battle of Perryville came to the aid of Governors Johnson, of Tennessee, and Morton, of Indiana, and General Buell was not only deprived of command, but ordered before a court of inquiry. This was a new sort of tribunal unknown to the usages of war or the law, constitutional or statutory, and originated in the fertile mind of the Hon. Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. The court, consisting of Generals Lewis Wallace, Daniel Tyler, N. J. T. Dana, Edward O. C. Ord, Albin Schoepf, and Major Donn Piatt, judge-advocate, was convened to assist the president in an inquiry as to the military conduct of Don Carlos Buell, Major General, lately in command of the Army of the Ohio. When Major Piatt received his orders, he repaired to the War Department to learn, if possible, the line of inquiry from the charges prepared. He found no charges on file, and, on making application to the Secretary of War, found that none had been prepared. On stating that he was at a loss to know how to conduct so blind an investigation, he was told to apply to Andrew Johnson and Oliver P. Morton, who could furnish him with all the charges necessary to the investigation.

The court convened at Cincinnati in midwinter, and the night before its organization the judge-advocate went to Indianapolis to consult Governor Morton, as Governor Johnson was at Nashville. Arriving at Indianapolis at 8 P. M., the officer went in search of the governor. This proved more of a task than he anticipated. The governor could not be found. He was not at his office nor at his house. They who ought to have known of the eminent man's where-

abouts denied such knowledge with an amused expression, the meaning of which never was explained. The search was at last abandoned, and the judge-advocate had retired to his room to snatch an hour's sleep before returning on the early train to Cincinnati when the governor walked in. He offered no explanation of his mysterious absence, but, learning the object of the visit, plunged into business. He and Andrew Johnson had demanded this court to try General Buell not for incapacity or misconduct as an officer, but for being a traitor, and the governor was quite indignant when he learned that "the double-dyed villain," as he phrased it, was not under arrest. The suggestion, however, that a man could not well be arrested when no charges had been made against him, somewhat quieted the governor's indignation, for Oliver P. Morton was not only an able man, but a profound lawyer.

The judge-advocate informed the governor of his instructions from the Secretary of War, and Governor Morton entered upon a recital of acts clearly indicating that General Buell was in treasonable correspondence and even personal communication with General Bragg; that the entire movement from Murfreesboro to the Ohio was planned and conducted for the purpose of giving both Tennessee and Kentucky to the rebels. When the judge-advocate, however, proposed to formulate these charges and place them before the court, the governor demurred. "By no manner of means," he said earnestly, "I give you these only for your own guidance. Johnson and I will furnish the witnesses, and we will appear ourselves at the proper time."

The judge-advocate returned to his court, which he swore to secrecy, an oath General Buell declined taking, and on a demand from that officer for charges, he was informed that the court was one of inquiry only to assist the president in a better knowledge of the late campaign that had ended so disastrously to the government. General Buell protested to this course and claimed that the tribunal had no legal sanction, and, having said so, proceeded quietly with the so-called investigation.

The court sat for six months. When the witnesses prom-

ised by the war governor appeared, the better class of them absolutely knew nothing of the treasonable practices charged, while those who were voluble in their information the law officer of the court was ashamed to put on the stand. They nearly all belonged to that class of mercenary spies known as detectives that one, General Baker, of the War Department, made so numerous and utterly unreliable. While waiting for these witnesses, who never got before the court, the judge-advocate devoted himself of course to an investigation of the campaign. Among the witnesses summoned by both sides appeared George H. Thomas.

General Buell conducted his side of the inquiry with marked ability. Confined as this was to the military operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, he had the advantage not only of better information, but, as the witnesses were subordinates, his very presence embarrassed and at times confused them. General Buell is under the medium height, but he walks erect with a singularly military bearing while his austere manners and the striking seriousness of his handsome face made up a personality that told on the witnesses disposed to criticise his military management. He came into court in full uniform with sword on side to show that he was not under arrest and accompanied by two aids so well drilled and disciplined that they seemed a chorus ready at any moment to break into song. This told on the witnesses and had its effect on the court. The law officer, whose duty kept him impartial, but who really sympathized with a man one out of a thousand in culture and ability who was being imposed on by two scurvy politicians and a stress of untoward circumstances, soon recognized the fact that the defendant had won over half the court before the investigation had half ended. Generals Dana and Ord could not conceal their partiality for Buell, while Generals Tyler and Shoenf were moved to hostility more by Generals Dana's and Ord's support than aught else. General Lew Wallace presided with a dignified impartiality that was admirable. He was helped to this in a good manner by the fact that he had been put under a cloud by charges openly made by General Grant of misconduct at Shiloh, and as General Halleck

had assigned him to this court instead of a command in the field, he was quite willing to find defects, but defects that could be traced to Washington. There is no reflection in this upon a man of genius who has since won through his pen the immortality denied his sword. In conducting the inquiry and in his finding, he proved himself eminently able and just.

This was the situation when General George H. Thomas appeared. His entrance seemed to fetch a new condition, and what had been General Buell's advantage, swung imperceptibly to the other side. The calm, dignified, yet easy bearing of a man who made one feel his presence before he uttered a word, prepared the court for evidence of moment. The commission was not disappointed. Although he confined his testimony strictly to the questions asked, and gave it without the slightest show of partiality, it soon became clear to the military tribunal that Bragg, with an inferior force, had outmaneuvered, outmarched, and outfought General Buell. Beginning with the crossing of the Tennessee river, he told of the confused and uncertain information as to Bragg's movements; how the route through the Sequatchie Valley was left open to the confederates for their march to Kentucky; then came that extraordinary race of two armies nearly abreast to the Ohio, the reorganization and the short campaign that ended in the disastrous fight at Perryville.

No man was ever more amazed than General Buell. He had welcomed the coming of General Thomas as that of a friend, the friend who had declined the command on the ground that he, Buell, better knew the situation than he, Thomas, could, and who had never given other reason than the one found in his response to the War Department. General Buell had naturally attributed this course on the part of his great subordinate to not only a friendly feeling, but to a belief in the generalship that was being questioned. The revelation was stunning, so much so that his cold, calm manner that had so far sustained him, vanished, and it was with difficulty that he could restrain himself until a cross-examination became proper. When the witness was turned over,

General Buell attacked the main point. General Thomas had been asked the question that had been put to every witness for the government, as to whether there was not a point at which our troops could have been concentrated after Bragg crossed the Tennessee where he could have been attacked with fair prospect of driving him back, or forcing him from the line of advance upon which he hoped to get supplies for his army. General Thomas had answered in the affirmative, and pointed upon the map to the place.

"You have said, General Thomas," said Buell, "that at Sparta we could have concentrated our forces with a fair prospect of defeating Bragg?"

"Yes, sir."

"Please tell the court, General," and a slight sneer tinged the question, "whether that opinion has come from a study of the situation since, or whether it suggested itself to your mind at the time?"

"If you will give me your book of telegrams," was the quiet response, "I believe it will answer better than I can."

The book asked for was handed General Thomas, and he slowly turned the leaves until he came to what he was in search of, and then returned it open to General Buell. The color deepened upon the face of Buell as he read that which terminated all cross-examination on that point.

The finding of this extraordinary tribunal was of no consequence. It was virtually an acquittal of General Buell, and a mild censure of General Halleck. The eventual history of the records was as curious as the conduct of the court. Taken down by that accomplished stenographer, Mr. Benn Pitman, they were forwarded to the War Department in a box. Some years after a delver in the dust of worthless things called for these records. They could not be found. Box and all had disappeared. This very disappearance made them valuable. Congress resolved, and the press was about taking up the mystery, when Mr. Benn Pitman informed the department that he could replace the records from his original copy in shorthand. This was done, and immediately all interest in them subsided.

CHAPTER IX.

Treason in the Head-quarters at Alexandria—Preparations for the Removal of McClellan—Pope Put in Command of the Forces Defending Washington—The Shameful Story of the Second Bull Run—The Fitz John Porter Case—Lee's Invasion of Maryland—McClellan Relieved of Command.

Between the 11th of March, 1862, and the 8th of October of the same year, while General Buell was trying conclusions with General Bragg that ended in the disastrous battle of Perryville, the war continued to drift without any progress toward a conclusion on either side. It looked as if the government had agreed with the insurgents to make it a question of endurance. These armies marched without any plan of campaign, and battles were fought with apparently no other object than to kill and wound more on one side than on the other. These bloody encounters were, with but few exceptions, favorable to the South. Had it not been for the navy, that enabled Commodore Dupont to capture Jacksonville, Florida, Commodore Farragut to take New Orleans and force the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Phillips, with the subsequent capture of Natchez, the people at the North might well have despaired of eventual success. There was one uniform story attached to every military event on land, which told of a brave soldiery badly handled. Our men under muskets, blindly obeying incompetent men under epaulettes, left their dead and dying on fields of defeat that would have been of no avail had they been fields of victory.

We have somewhat anticipated in giving General McClellan's disasters before Richmond. On the 10th of August, 1862, our forces were withdrawn from the James before Richmond to the fortifications of Washington that they might be given a new commander. We have already cited the reasons for this extraordinary move. We had won a great victory, no thanks to McClellan, at Malvern Hill, and

if there was any purpose known to man for the capture of Richmond, we were in a position, under a capable commander, to accomplish that event. It was easy to send supplies and reinforcements by the open water ways, and there was no apparent reason for us to abandon that which we had gained at such heavy cost of men and money. The government at Washington, however, had no choice. The fear of the Confederate army had come to be less, as we have said, than a fear of our own forces honeycombed with treasonable discontent by the shallow McClellan and his stupid subordinates.

The government anxiously sought for some one to put in command when the Army of the Potomac should be under the guns of the fortifications at Washington, and to relieve McClellan, when an arrest could be made should a revolt be manifested. The most promising of the West Pointers—of course no other could be selected—in the eyes of the War Department was a young man answering to the name of General John Pope, who, on the 8th of April, 1862, had captured Island No. 10 in the Mississippi. The selection was not faulty. General Pope had not only high soldierly qualities, proud self-confidence, and great force of character, but he possessed a thoughtful mind, enriched by stores of information. He was given command at first of all the forces that had been retained to cover Washington in the absence of the Army of the Potomac. These several divisions were in a bad condition. General McClellan made not only a continuous demand for troops, but one for supplies, that impoverished every other army in the field. Thus, while General Thomas was organizing the nucleus of the force that was destined in the end to win the conflict for the Union, he found it almost impossible to secure blankets for his men, the hundred and fifty thousand men under McClellan were having daily parades in white gloves and polished shoes. There was enough wasted on this favored force to have supplied all the others in the field with comforts at least. The extravagance cultivated in the nine months of inaction before Washington told fearfully against the government when these troops were subject to the privations common to every

campaign. It seemed to the men that they were intentionally neglected, and this gave weight to the openly uttered charge from head-quarters that the Abolitionists at Washington had purposely sacrificed the army because of this hatred of its general. All this appears of record in McClellan's own story to his wife, as presented and published by his widow.

General Pope proceeded at once to organize and equip the thirty-five thousand given him to defend Washington until the Army of the Potomac had been safely lodged behind the fortifications of the capital. Thanks to our young Napoleon, it was a question whether a huge army that ought to have been marched from Malvern Hill to Richmond could be safely got from the James river to the shelter of the guns at Washington.

There was no time to be lost by the newly appointed commander. Lee's victorious army had a short march before them, and any day might appear in full force to battle for its one objective point, the capture of our capital. The transportation of our army in its defeat from before Richmond to Washington under the command of a sullen, disloyal, and brainless commander was not hurried. From the general-in-chief down to the humblest private, it was felt to be a shameful failure. After nine months' costly preparation, after a fearful loss of life, an army of a hundred thousand men had been marched to the sight of the Confederate capital, only to be driven back by an inferior force to the place of beginning. General Pope, with an intelligence and energy that were admirable, gathered up the scattered troops and hastily equipped them for service. He had thirty-five thousand all told, and about thirty thousand capable of immediate service. He was aided in this by capable subordinates of the highest courage and purest patriotism. The administration at Washington seconded to its utmost these heroic efforts. We take no account in our so-called histories of the war, that have eyes for naught but aimless campaigns and battles without results, of the task imposed on the immortal statesmen God seemed to have called to command in our hour of peril. The disastrous retreat from the James

had not only strengthened the disloyal element at the North, but justified the governments of Europe in an immediate recognition of the Confederacy. We did not, could not, know then that we were safer from such European interference while the South was most successful than when the Confederate armies were losing in the field. To our openly avowed enemies abroad, the Confederates, in their hour of triumph, seemed to be winning without that recognition and aid which might have troublesome consequences to the war powers of Europe.

It was to deceive the enemy as to our real weakness that the boastful orders written at the War Department by Secretary Stanton were issued over the name of General Pope. They were unfortunate, for while they deceived no one they placed the new commander in a false position. In common with all capable men General Pope was without noisy self-assertion and went quietly about the work assigned him.

On the 20th of August, 1862, Lee with his entire army appeared before Pope upon the Rapidan, and here occurred on the part of the Confederate general a maneuver that is without a parallel in the annals of intelligent war.

To understand this we must know that when it became evident that the ninety thousand men under McClellan were being withdrawn, a great effort was made to reach Pope and defeat his army before that of McClellan could come to his assistance. General Lee made his point, and with the entire army from about Richmond confronted Pope with only thirty-five thousand. But Pope had withdrawn from the line of the Rapidan and was strongly posted beyond the Rappahannock. The bold Lochinvar from out the west was aided in this by a rise in the river. To attempt a crossing on the part of the Confederates was hazardous, but with the larger force under Lee such an attempt demonstrated at one point and accomplished at another was possible. He declined the attempt. His strategem was to cut his army in half and send one part over the almost forgotten ford of the Rappahannock, far off to the north through Thoroughfare Gap in Bull Run Mountains, into the rear of the Union forces. Of course this was accomplished without opposition. Indeed, had Pope been

taken into advisement he would have strongly advocated the move. It threw forty thousand Confederates in between Pope's and McClellan's armies and entirely beyond aid from the forty thousand left idle under Lee on the Rappahannock.

The army thus entrapped marched under Stonewall Jackson. We do not know that Jackson approved of this extraordinary move. We doubt it. He probably obeyed orders. There was another officer under Lee second only in military ability to Jackson, and that was General Longstreet. He had not been consulted, for it had become a common event to have his views in opposition to his general. This was not agreeable, and on this account probably he had not even been informed of Lee's intent and Jackson's movement. Wondering at an inaction so unaccountable, a delay that lost the Confederate army three days when every hour was fraught with the gravest consequences, he was suddenly summoned to head-quarters where he found his general in an unusual state of anxiety. Longstreet learned to his amazement and consternation what had happened.

"My God, General Lee," he cried, "you have reversed positions; we hurried here to attack Pope and McClellan in their divided condition, and now you have not only cut our army in two, but sent half of it in between Pope and McClellan."

"What do you advise," asked Lee.

"To permit me to take the army here and follow Jackson as rapidly as possible."

This was done and none too soon. Had a force been left by Pope, however small, to defeat the passage at Thoroughfare Gap, Lee and Longstreet would have been too late for the Second Bull Run battle that followed. Pope, fully aware of the extraordinary condition, was so sure of closing in on Jackson and annihilating his inferior army that he concentrated his forces for a swift, deadly blow. In this he counted largely upon the co-operation of McClellan's Army of the Potomac, then being slowly forwarded to the field. It is now history that he relied upon a support that was honey-combed with treachery. McClellan had not yet been relieved

of his command, and through him orders had to pass sending his troops to the aid of Pope. Quartered with his huge staff of princes and rich men at Alexandria, the wire connecting him with the War Department trembled with continuous demands to hurry forward his troops. One reads with amazed indignation the insolent responses to the frantic appeals, and yet more indignantly the story of disobedience. In all the shameful record of imbecility with its continuous account of defeats and disasters, when brave men went down in thousands to bloody graves without cause, the most shameful is this story of the second Bull Run.

General Pope was quick to learn of Stonewall Jackson's unmilitary move; prompt to act upon the information. Jackson was well in the trap Lee had so strangely planned for him. To take advantage of this, it was necessary that the forces from the Army of the Potomac should act promptly. The first evidence that such earnest and honest support, so necessary under the emergency, could not be relied on came in the conduct of General Fitz John Porter. He, with his command of regulars, was at Warrenton Junction on the night of the 27th of August. That evening he received the order from Pope which read: "The major-general commanding directs that you start at *one o'clock to-night, so as to be here by daylight* to-morrow morning." It is said Hooker had been in severe engagement. It indicated an advantage, but not a rout. It repeated: "It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here by daylight."

This positive order was deliberately disobeyed. He did not march at one o'clock. He did not move at daylight. It was seven A. M. before he got under way. The excuse given for this failure to comply with a positive order is that his troops were weary and needed rest—that the night was dark and the road to Bristow was much incumbered by wagon trains.

The night was dark. The writer of this well remembers riding through it in a vain search of his command after a leave of absence. But every troop, division, and brigade of both armies were on the move that fatal night except that of Fitz John Porter. Nor is it true that his troops were

unfit to move on account of excessive marching the day before. His forces had done as little of that as any other brigade in the Federal army.

Instead of moving even at daylight, we find him writing a long letter at six A. M. to General Burnside, and his motive shown by the missive is so disloyal that he could have been condemned on its reading to immediate death; that would have been awarded by the court-martial that tore the epaulets from his shoulders but for the unfounded fear that Lincoln, then regarded as a weak man, would not approve the sentence.

When, after a second order directing him to march at early dawn, obeyed by reluctantly moving at seven A. M., he did follow instructions, the march placed him and his forces upon the flank of Jackson's army. Had he followed the advantage thus given, Jackson's force would have been overwhelmed, for we all know the effect of an attack upon the rear such as Porter could have made. Instead of this, he remained idle all that day, and when late in the afternoon he did move, it was in retreat. All that day he heard the roar of a conflict going on, and this he leaves of record in his own dispatches, although he and his friends have since denied that any battle was in progress.

In the trial of this man, much time was lost in proving or disproving the time when he got orders to attack. It was time thrown away. General Porter knew why he was there and what his duties were. To appreciate this, let the reader suppose for an instant that McClellan had been in command instead of Pope. Would there have been then any hesitation in the mind of this subordinate or any delay in his movements? Porter well knew why he had been hurried into position and what was expected of him.

The defense is simply pitiable. It is that he was satisfied a heavy force was at his front, and to attack was to insure defeat, and he actually claims commendation for his conduct. To accept his own dispatch to McDowell, in which he asks, "How goes the battle? it seems to go to our rear," he heard the roar of the conflict in which his brother soldiers were being driven from the field, and he left them to their cruel

fate. If there was actually no battle, as now claimed, he thought there was, or he would not have so written. He did not move into the fight then going on, and all that day made no effort to communicate with head-quarters or any other part of our army.

The fact is, that no force whatever was at his front. Longstreet's command did not reach Jackson's right wing until noon, nor did his hungry and exhausted troops get into position at all that day. When it was reported that Porter had withdrawn, the men who had been hurried up were permitted to break ranks and seek the rest and food they so much needed. The proof of this rests on testimony which can not be disputed. We have only to turn to the report made by General Robert C. Schenck to settle this. On the morning of the 29th, this gallant and able officer moved from the hills below Bull Run to Young's creek, and occupied what is known as Gibbon's woods, where a skirmish had occurred the day before, and where General Schenck found the killed and wounded, which he cared for. Here he remained until late in the afternoon. Now it was impossible for Longstreet's forces to be at Porter's front with General Schenck's divisions at Gibbon's woods. This is corroborated by General T. L. Rosser, of the Confederate service, who testifies that at ten A. M. he was ordered to gallop his cavalry with bushes fastened to the horses' tails, so that rising clouds of dust might impress our forces under Porter with the belief that the Confederates were being heavily reinforced. This he continued to do for four or five hours, which would have ended the effort at two or three P. M. It certainly was not continued after the arrival of Longstreet's troops.

There is one important fact that seems to have escaped the attention of both courts and which impresses us that Longstreet's half of Lee's army numbered at least forty thousand men. It had but one road along which to march from Thoroughfare Gap to the battle-field. Now, supposing that the head of the column arrived upon the field at 2 P. M., how long did it take to fetch up the entire force so as to put it in position for immediate service. It certainly was not there when General Schenck fell back from Gibbon's

woods between three and four of the afternoon when Rosser was brushing the same road over which Longstreet was to march. The direct and positive testimony is against any such claims as that offered by Porter, while all the circumstantial evidence is in deadly antagonism to such assumption. Against this we have the guessing of Confederate witnesses whose very uncertainty as to time is fatal to their conclusion. We know what guessing is in a time of such intense anxiety. And when we add to this the bond of sympathy toward Porter and his general, McClellan, we can readily see how noon may stretch to three or four o'clock.

There is yet another fact strangely overlooked. It was a physical impossibility for Longstreet's command to march from Thoroughfare Gap to the battle-field in time to form a line on Jackson's right. The distance as a crow flies is twelve miles, but the only road along which it could have moved lengthened the distance into a day's march for the best equipped army. Lee's army was badly provided with transportation and exhausted by the forced march from Gordonsville to Thoroughfare Gap. This he was obliged to approach cautiously, but not in a way to give his men their necessary rest and food. On the night of the 28th, the little Union force left at the gap was brushed aside, and on the morning of the 29th, the march was resumed to the roar of Jackson's artillery attacking Poe's brigade under Heintzelman, that made an attempt to flank the enemy's right. This was after 10 A. M. There can be no mistake as to the hour, for it was entered in Heintzelman's diary. This is confirmed by a memorandum attached to the report of General J. E. B. Stuart. After the fight was over and Poe repulsed, General Stuart reports that he went in search of Longstreet, riding in the rear of Jackson's army along Centerville road. He met Longstreet at the head of his column between Gainsville and Haymarket. Now, counting the time necessary to repulse Poe, for Stuart did not leave the field till that was ended—add to this the ride on exhausted horses, for Stuart was in from one of the most desperate raids ever accomplished by Confederate cavalry in which he had ridden as Cook, General Lee's biographer informs us, "through storm

and shine, through night and day"—we say add such a ride to the time given to the fight, and it must have been 1 P. M. or later when he met the head of Longstreet's force. We learn from General Lee that it took two hours and a half to get the force in line of battle, and that line was the prolongation of Jackson's right nowhere near Porter's front.

Had this creature of McClellan's moved in to the support of our left any time during the 29th, one of two things would have happened. Either he would have demonstrated the presence of Longstreet and so enabled Pope to fall back as was his intent behind Centerville and then wait for the slow moving reinforcements from McClellan's army, or the movement on Jackson's right in the absence of Longstreet would have annihilated Jackson's army. As it was, the frightful disaster of the 30th occurred, and this man, lately restored not only to position and a claim on the treasury, but to public estimation as a loyal officer, has upon his hands the blood of many thousand brave men killed and wounded through his treachery.

We have dwelt at length upon this affair because of the treason developed that so nearly proved fatal to the cause of the government. That the administration was forced to fetch back the army to the fortifications of Washington before it dared displace its general, can be accepted as the truth of history. That this same man willfully refused co-operation with General Pope, all his acts after his return to Alexandria bear witness. The motives that made him retain Franklin's and Sumner's corps after positive orders from the War Department to hurry them to the field, are reflected in the insolent telegrams in which he advises to "*leave Pope to get out of his scrape,*" and in the refusal of Franklin to report to Pope and of Porter to fight. The shame of it all is that the man is now known, since "his own story" is published, to have been such an imbecile. Had he been what his silly followers claimed for him, a Napoleon, the whole affair would have gained in the dignity of crime from what we now shrink from as a sickening folly. We have a strange weakness as a people in our burning desire to have heroes to worship, and, rather than do without, we imitate barbarous

racers in creating them. Not content with the onions and monkeys kindly furnished us by nature, that we might adore as did the Egyptians, we hasten to stuff effigies of men with imaginary qualities, and not only bump our empty skulls upon the floor in their presence, but proceed in wrath to brain any one who attempts to puncture the idols and expose the stuffing.

The defeat of Pope's army drove the administration at Washington to a deeper degradation than it had already suffered. Instead of deposing the incompetent at the head of the army, whose insolence and treachery would have justified arrest and trial, the president was forced to continue him that the men thoroughly permeated with distrust might be reorganized and again put in the field. This was the work of President Lincoln. The man who selected his Secretary of War because of that secretary's ability, in the face of an openly expressed contempt, and the gravest insult one man could offer another, was not one to consult his fears in an awful emergency, such as the one which fell upon the government. Using his own quaint fable that came to be common political property on the stump, he said, "It is no time to swap horses while swimming the stream. We must bear with this fellow a little longer. He was useful in organizing an army in the first instance, and can be of use in reorganizing this."

And so, George B. McClellan continued in command. Lee's foolish invasion of Maryland followed. To one who saw the rout at the Second Bull Run, that was the wildest of the war, and knew of the treason that brooded in the headquarters at Alexandria, and knew that on the night of the fatal 30th, the entire army under Lee could have entered Washington with our panic-stricken mob of unarmed men, for in such a flight no man could be expected to carry his musket, the neglect of the opportunity sounded the death knell of the Confederacy. The invasion of Maryland was not only as hopeless as had been that of Bragg of Kentucky, but it was an acknowledgment of weakness. The broad river and the heavy fortifications were confessed by Lee to be beyond his best effort. He had wrested a great victory from

under the feet of a mighty foe. He saw his enemies flying in wild disorder, and he knew that their head-quarters were rendered useless to their government by a treason that fairly honey-combed the camp. He turned aside and marched into Maryland, leaving on his flank all there was of the Union forces. He gave them time to make up their mean little differences, to reorganize, refit, and reinforce the huge army. He marched into Maryland with a proclamation and a hope. The proclamation invited Maryland to join the Confederate cause, and the hope was that out of the abundance of that prosperous state, supplies might be given to his empty commissary, and fresh recruits to the thinned ranks of his army. Unfortunately, he showed to the Marylanders the army they were to equip and recruit. The ragged, gaunt host of grim veterans were not inviting. Shoeless, and in tatters, their only uniform dirt, they swung by, the ghost of an army, and "My Maryland" saw what proved to be the truth, that victory to such a force was as fatal as defeat. It was manifest that the South had no solid, stalwart sons of toil on which to build, and, of course, no resources to sustain such under arms. Slavery had wasted men as it had impoverished the soil, and it was only a question of time when the crash would come, and the cause of state rights be a lost cause to the continent. Had Lee captured Washington, he would have had no need of a call upon the border states. He would have won recognition from the European governments, and their interference would have soon followed, which had in it a negotiation for peace, and a boundary line that would have put the capitol of our fathers in the keeping of men who made human servitude the corner stone of their social and political fabric.

The danger of the Union was not in that fierce host of terrible fighters, but in the council chambers and kingly cabinets of Europe. The very victories that so wasted the strength of the South, were against them. They lulled our foreign enemies into the belief that the Confederates were quite able to win without embarrassing interference from them. Although relieved by Lee's move into a grave trap of

his own creating, what days of killing anxiety, what night-sweats came to the men at Washington in that dark hour of our peril. The senseless mass that go shouting over the brainless bullet-heads, gold braid and feathers in the blaze and glare of war made great, had better turn their eyes to our real heroes, who, under Lincoln, saved the grand Republic. But we prefer.

The dust o'er gilded, to the gold o'er dusted.

And so build cloud-capped monuments to the heroes of disaster, while slow decay effaces the names of those who have real claims upon a nation's gratitude.

While McClellan slowly moved in at the head of the two armies upon Lee's flank and rear, that aggressive general of the South suddenly fell upon Harper's Ferry and captured fifteen thousand men and enough supplies to relieve his army. It is true that Harper's Ferry, as a military position, meant Loudon and Maryland Heights, and the cowardice of Ford and the treachery of Miles gave these trophies without resistance to the Confederates; yet, had McClellan marched a mile a day more rapidly than he did, such investment of the place as made the seizure of the heights possible would not have been within the power of the Confederates.

While Harper's Ferry was being captured—why an attempt was made to hold the place is a military mystery—McClellan engaged Lee at South Mountain, and the passes were gained after a fierce resistance by Hill and Longstreet's forces. Had McClellan taken advantage of this success, we now see clearly it would have resulted in an utter destruction of the Confederate army. In his eagerness to capture Harper's Ferry, the Confederate general had put the Potomac between almost two halves of his army, and it remained for McClellan to defeat these forces in detail. Our great captain did nothing of the sort. Marching upon his right instead of upon his left, he fought for Turner's Gap long enough to allow Lee to concentrate again. After came the battle of Antietam, when it was demonstrated that "the great organizer," as he is called, could not handle his organization.

The battle was fought by divisions, brigades, and even regiments, and in no instance was the weight of our eighty-seven thousand men felt by the forty thousand which Lee had under him, until Hill's and McLaw's divisions came upon the field late in the day. However, taking Lee's object in view, and that was to get his army over the Potomac, the result of the battle was a victory to our arms, and had McClellan followed it up by a fierce attack in the morning, the remnant of the Confederate force that would have made the crossing might have been counted as missing and scattered for all the evil they could do the Union thereafter. Although reinforced by fourteen thousand fresh troops the night of the battle, our general permitted the Confederates to recross the Potomac, whence they fell back unmolested to the security of Bunker Hill and Winchester. No orders from Washington, however curtly worded, could induce McClellan to renew active hostilities.

"This fellow," said Secretary Stanton to the President, "is settled with his family at Washington, and is there for the winter."

"Has he sent for his wife?"

"His wife is with him."

"And that black and tan terrier?"

"Is one of the family."

"Then he has gone into winter quarters and must be removed." And he was removed.

CHAPTER X.

Rosecrans given Command of the Army of the Cumberland—Thomas protests against his Junior being placed over Him—Takes Command of the Center—Advance upon Chattanooga—Battle of Stone River—Thomas opposes Retreat.

William S. Rosecrans prided himself in deeds that will live in history to be a man of eminent military genius. We use the word genius advisedly, well remembering its proper as well as popular meaning. Genius is to the human mind what the pearl is to the oyster—disease—but a pearl all the same. It is not only a disease, but it is a surprise. General Rosecrans could plan a campaign and fight a battle in a way to amaze the military world, and yet he promised so little that his promotion was accidental and carried with it no prospect of aught but disaster. He was so ignorant of character that he could not distinguish between Alexander McDowell McCook and George H. Thomas. His business capacity was so limited that a department under him was in confusion, and yet from the beginning of his career in the army until its close his record is a brilliant succession of triumphs that are as strange as they are startling. This record begins with the battle of Rich Mountain in July, '61, when McClellan found himself in command of thirty thousand men opposed to Generals Pegram and Garnett with only ten thousand all told. But the Confederates were strongly fortified, the one on Laurel Hill and the other and larger force upon Rich Mountain, West Virginia. While McClellan was hesitating as to what to do General Rosecrans asked permission to lead a brigade by a bridle path to the rear of Pegram. This was granted upon an understanding to the effect that when Rosecrans got in position he was to inform his general commanding, who would immediately second the effort in the rear by an attack on the front. This was based upon the belief that Rosecrans

would surprise the enemy. The force led along the mountain path to the rear created much consternation, but failed as a surprise, and Rosecrans was scarcely in position before he was called on to fight and fought so bravely with muskets alone that unaided he drove Pegram and his men into the mountains. This led to the defeat of Garnett and a capture of the entire force.

McClellan received his notice of Rosecrans' condition in the roar of the conflict that echoed and re-echoed among the mountains as if a million of men were engaged in a death struggle. McClellan having got no word from his gallant subordinate, naturally believed, for McClellan, that he was being defeated, and rested idly in his tent until late in the day when a portion of Rosecrans' command came into camp through Pegram's works with a goodly number of Confederate prisoners.

This brilliant little achievement had two results. With the press and people unacquainted with the details, McClellan received all the praise. At Washington among the military Rosecrans rose as a marked man. Lincoln and Chase, especially, were struck with the audacity and dash of the venture, and after McClellan, Rosecrans was selected for high promotion. It was soon discovered, however, that their favorite had defects, not so fatal to the cause as those of McClellan, but eminently fatal to himself. As we have said, he lacked in business capacity and was character blind. Could he have handled men as he handled masses he never would have made a deadly enemy of Edwin M. Stanton. A blind believer in military training, he regarded civilians in camp or cabinet as obstacles in the way of success and could not therefore see in the great War Secretary any thing beyond the President's clerk, whose impertinent interference was to be rebuked, if not snubbed, by the military generals he annoyed with his orders. In illustration of this we have to record the fact that when a vacancy in the regular army of a major-generalship occurred, Mr. Stanton addressed a circular to all the generals in the field announcing the fact that this position was to be awarded to the commander who achieved the first great victory. All save Rosecrans re-

ceived this with thanks. Our impulsive general seized his pen and administered a scathing rebuke in return. He advised the indignant War Secretary that he, Rosecrans, was in arms, not for the sake of personal reward, but from patriotic impulse, and that such an offer was ill-advised and ill-timed. We have no access to the response that Mr. Stanton did not make of record other than in a nature that was strangely bitter, vindictive and tenacious in its memory of insults.

It is a striking fact that of the three members of President Lincoln's cabinet most necessary to the successful issue of the conflict, that is of State, War and Finance, each one was greater in his chosen vocation than his President. But no one of them held as much of all as the man God in his mercy called to power in that dark hour of peril to the desperate government. Abraham Lincoln was the great balance-wheel to the machine and held it steadily to its work. Stanton had his faults, and grave faults they were, but he had no weaknesses. The President interfered only when the faults were likely to work wrong to the cause. Had he not exercised his wise control, Stanton, with Pope's army drifting a wreck into Washington and the Army of the Potomac under disloyal generals worked into a condition of insubordination, would have put McClellan under arrest and summoned a drum-head court-martial to try the weak general for insubordination in the face of the enemy. And now, when it becomes necessary to select a general to serve in place of Buell, removed, President Lincoln intervened between Mr. Stanton's vindictive dislike and the public good.

The great War Secretary selected George H. Thomas, not only because of his confidence in the eminent Virginian, but because he was advised that Secretary Chase was about to approach the President in behalf of Rosecrans. The President did listen patiently to both Secretaries, and then said:

"Let the Virginian wait; we will try Rosecrans."

The writer of this happened to be in the office of the War Secretary when Mr. Stanton returned from the executive mansion, bilious with wrath at Secretary Chase's interference and Rosecrans' success. His first words were:

“Well, you have your choice of idiots; now look out for frightful disaster.”

We will see how these ominous words followed and shadowed a pure patriot and a brilliant soldier to the end.

The General Order No. 168, assigning General William S. Rosecrans to command of the army in place of General Buell, was issued the 24th of October, 1862. It was a painful surprise to General Thomas. It will be remembered that, when the position was tendered him at Louisville, he asked, without declining, that it might be suspended. He had every reason to believe that such had been the course taken. Considered worthy the command on the 29th of September, what had occurred since to throw him out of the line of promotion? To those who have been busy in egotistical memoirs, letters, and addresses, damning General Thomas in faint praise by saying that he was a good officer, but too slow for a subordinate and too cautious for an independent command, and that he shrunk from all responsibility, had better read the letter he addressed General Halleck upon that occasion. It is as follows:

“Soon after coming to Kentucky, I urged upon the government to send me twenty thousand men properly equipped to take the field, that I might at least make the attempt to take Knoxville and secure East Tennessee. My suggestions were not listened to, but were even passed by in silence. But, without boasting, I believe I have exhibited at least sufficient energy to show that, if I had been intrusted with that expedition at that time (fall of 1861), I might have conducted it successfully. Before Corinth, I was intrusted with the command of the right wing, or Army of the Tennessee. I feel confident that I did my duty patriotically, and with a reasonable amount of credit to myself. As soon as the emergency was over, I was relieved and returned to the command of my old division. I went to my duties without a murmur, as I am neither ambitious nor have any political aspirations. On the 30th of September, I received an order through your aide, Colonel McKibben, placing me in command of the Department of the Ohio, and directing General Buell to turn over the command of his troops to

me. This order came just as General Buell had by extraordinary efforts prepared his army to pursue and drive the rebels from Kentucky. Feeling that a great injustice would be done him if not permitted to carry out his plans, and that I would be placed in a situation to be disgraced, I requested that he might be retained in command. The order relieving him was suspended, but to-day I find him relieved by General Rosecrans, my junior, although I do not feel conscious that any just cause exists for overslaughing me by placing me under my junior, and I therefore am deeply mortified and grieved at the course taken in this matter."

To this warm yet dignified protest, General Halleck responded as follows:

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, *November 15, 1862.*

GENERAL—Your letter of October 30th is just at hand. I can not better state my appreciation of you than by referring you to the fact that at Pittsburg Landing I urged upon the Secretary of War to secure your appointment as major-general, in order that I might place you in command of the right wing of the army over your superiors. It was through my urgent solicitation that you were commissioned.

When it was determined to remove General Buell, another person was spoken of as his successor; and it was through my solicitation that you were appointed. You having virtually declined the command at that time, it was necessary to appoint another, and General Rosecrans was selected.

You are mistaken about General Rosecrans being your junior. But this is of little importance, for the law gives the President power to assign without regard to dates, and he has seen fit to exercise it in this case and many others.

Rest assured, General, that I fully appreciate your military capacity, and will do every thing in my power to give you an independent command when opportunity offers. It was not possible to give command after you had declined it.

Yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK,

Commander-in-chief."

In considering this shameful treatment of General Thomas, it is well to remember what we have been at some pains to state, the political influences that were brought to bear upon the mind of Abraham Lincoln. We have seen that General Buell was regarded by all the hot gospelers of abolitionism—and especially by Andrew Johnson and his immediate followers—as disloyal to the cause, and not therefore to be trusted with any command. General Thomas, being by birth a Virginian, was of course suspected, but, when he wisely asked that the order placing him in Buell's position might be suspended, the suspicion in the minds of the fanatics became confirmed distrust. This was brought to bear upon the President. Now, it is extremely doubtful whether President Lincoln shared in their distrust. It is more than probable that he was moved to a selection of Rosecrans because he had not only confidence in him, but knew that, while Rosecrans was not offensive to the abolitionists, he, being a Catholic, had a wide popularity with the true believers of that faith. It was well known that the Catholic clergy at home and abroad had little sympathy with our government in its armed attempt to sustain the Union. The strife from that point of view was regarded as a Yankee war, originating with Puritans, who began with hanging Quakers, and continued such bigoted persecution by denying the Catholics the civil rights and social privileges accorded other sects. It was not a body of people to be neglected or slighted. At that time the Irish contingent of volunteers made a force of brave men, and, to increase that force in the field and win favor in the eyes of the Catholics at home, it was well to advance General Rosecrans, who, after assisting at mass in the morning, felt free to swear his orders through till late at night.

This promotion was not without friction. Not only did Thomas's commission antedate that of General Rosecrans, but also those of Generals McCook and Crittenden. President Lincoln solved the difficulty by quietly moving his pen through the date of Rosecrans' commission, and writing over August 16, 1862, March 21 of the same year. With

this fact known to us, we read General Thomas's reply to General Halleck:

"GALLATIN, TENN., November 21, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,

Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, and to thank you sincerely for the kindness of its tone. I should not have addressed you in the first place, if I had known that General Rosecrans' commission was dated prior to mine. The letter was written, not because I desired the command, but for being superseded by a junior in rank, when I felt that there was no good cause for so treating me.

I have no objection to serving under General Rosecrans, now that I know that his commission dates prior to mine, but I must confess that I should feel deeply mortified should the President place a junior over me without a just cause, although the law authorizes him to do so should he see fit.

I am, General, very truly yours,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. A."

When, some time subsequent to this, General Thomas learned the facts of the forgery, he was extremely indignant, and wrote to General Halleck:

"I have made my last protest while the war lasts. You may hereafter put a stick over me, if you choose to do so. I will take care, however, to so manage my command, whatever it may be, as not to be involved in the mistakes of the stick."

General Rosecrans hastened to tender General Thomas a continuation of his position as second in command, but our hero was weary of a place that had in it honor alone, and asked for a command with well defined duties and individual responsibility. In response to this, he was given the center, with Generals Rousseau, Dumont, Negley, and Fry as his subordinates.

Ever mindful of the grand objective point of the war on our side, General Thomas again brought forward his old plan

of invasion through Cumberland Gap and East Tennessee to Chattanooga. He claimed that a column of twenty thousand men was more available in that direction than a hundred thousand on the line through Nashville. Kentucky had proven herself entirely neutral, while East Tennessee swarmed with citizens who, if not loyal to the Union at heart, were in deadly enmity to the Confederate cause, and had suffered terribly from their open avowal of hostility to the government at Richmond. The line of supply could be more easily maintained, and the army, instead of moving among foes, would receive aid and comfort from friends.

General Rosecrans thought favorably of the plan of campaign. His acute military mind followed Thomas with a clear comprehension of the situation. He saw at a glance that it was a great flank movement on the forces under Lee in Virginia, and if successful, as it promised to be, would force the fighting out of Virginia to the cotton states. Our gallant navy was winning its way along the coast, so that a struggle confined to the cotton states must of necessity be brief. It was a fascinating proposition to General Rosecrans, but there was a lion in the path. The Catholic general had been out of the military service many years, and in that time mixing with the people had picked up some political information. He comprehended clearly the lofty ambition of Andrew Johnson in his desire to be a military governor with an army of a hundred thousand men to hold down the population he was supposed to benefit by governing. General Rosecrans knew that this executive inebriate was sustained by a political power that forced obedience, whenever it failed to command respect. The general commanding remembered that Thomas, the author of the proposed campaign, had been thrust aside by this malign influence, General Mitchell discouraged and threatened, and General Buell driven from his command in disgrace, and so had no care to try conclusions with any such political element.

The newly made commander put the grand plan of a campaign behind him and proceeded with his political work, which meant to defeat and drive Bragg from Tennessee, and once more return to Governor Johnson his conquered terri-

tory. To this end he began the concentration of forces at Nashville. To make this concentration available, it was necessary to open again the line of railroad from Louisville to Nashville and at the last named place accumulate vast supplies. This essential work was given to General Thomas and his command.

To keep open a single line of railroad through a hostile territory for two hundred miles taxed the resources of Thomas's entire command. A guerrilla chief of high courage and audacity known as John Morgan with a mere handful of men put the entire Army of the Cumberland at defiance. Seizing the best horses at command in a region of country long famous for its fast speed and blood in horses, this famous raider could burn a bridge or blow up a tunnel in sight of infantry set to guard one or the other, and be off before even a bullet could be sent after him. Here to-day and gone to-morrow, he puzzled officers and bid defiance to troops, and kept a huge force of men under engineers busily repairing what was so easily destroyed. General Thomas met this exasperating evil by organizing a cavalry that was something more than men on horseback. When the war first began, it was a West Point idea that it was to be fought out without cavalry. When we recovered from this idiotic condition and begun organization, it was based on the worst possible system in accepting men who wanted to ride instead of searching for those who knew how to ride. Volunteers from towns and cities who never had been astride of a horse were fascinated with the idea of owning one, while the country bred, well knowing that not only was riding a labor but the care of the horse a heavy task, fought shy of that arm of the service. The consequence was that the cavalymen were helpless in the saddle, while their horses were starved and ridden to death in thirty days. It was said for nearly two years of our cavalry that one never was killed save by a fall from his horse.

General Thomas organized a corps of mounted riflemen selected from farmers' sons, and directed them not to guard the railroad, but hunt down John Morgan and his men. The result was that the famous raider, finding himself

closely pursued in Kentucky, had the audacity to attempt a raid on Ohio. It began brilliantly enough, but ended in the penitentiary.

The necessary preparations for an advance of our army were punctured continuously by impatient thrusts from the War Department. That Edwin M. Stanton sought to drive Rosecrans from the command, can not now be doubted, and had he not been restrained by President Lincoln and Secretary Chase, he would undoubtedly have succeeded. The reason of this unreasoning enmity could not fail to feel his insecurity, and to placate the irate Secretary, he did that which proved a source of continuous disaster and his ruin in the end. Secretary Stanton, as strong in his friendships as he was in his enmity, had the McCook family as his wards, and his especial pet was Alexander McDowell McCook. General Rosecrans tendered the War Secretary the olive branch by giving this genial gentleman, but utterly incompetent officer, command of the right wing of the army. This was a fatal step and second to that was the weakening of the center by withdrawing a huge force to guard the communication between Louisville and Nashville. This left Thomas only Rousseau's and Negley's divisions with two detached brigades from the rear.

Moving by different roads from Nashville, the army under Rosecrans came abreast at Stone river near Murfreesboro with that of Bragg. It was a cold, cloudy evening of the 29th of December, with the twilight darkening down in advance of sunset, when General Thomas, riding slowly along the lines then going into camp for the night, heard heavy firing to the front and left. There had been more or less of disturbance of this sort in the active march from Nashville, but the annoyance made by the enemy was easily brushed aside. On this occasion, however, the roar was more pronounced.

"What is the meaning of that, General?" asked an aide of General Thomas.

"It means a fight to-morrow on Stone river," was the brief response as the general continued calmly his preparations for the night.

True enough, General Rosecrans, believing the enemy to be in full retreat, had ordered General Crittenden late in the evening to cross Stone river and occupy Murfreesboro. In obeying this command Crittenden found such a decided resistance that he reported the enemy to be in force upon the further side of the river and received in return an order to fall back. Crittenden's report was confirmed by the right in a fierce engagement which McCook's force met from the enemy when our right sought to go into camp for the night. Bragg's entire army of veterans was posted on Stone river to dispute the further march of the forces of the Union.

A night before a great battle in our army of volunteers differed strongly from that of probably any other armed force, especially in Europe. The volunteers, however well drilled and disciplined into a fighting machine, had yet an interest more or less intelligent that they were free to exercise. The bayonets not only thought but felt, and around each camp-fire was an improvised council of war, in which not only the situation was considered, but the character and capacity of officers discussed. This condition strengthens an army, provided the men wearing epaulets possess the entire confidence of those bearing muskets. That the discrimination is apt to be mainly correct and just, a knowledge of public opinion confirms. Men may be misled as to facts and through distorted evidence of such can well be deceived as to leaders they seldom or never encounter personally. But when opportunities are given the eventual verdict can be relied on. On the cold, murky night of the 30th, could one have passed from camp to camp and gathered up the opinions expressed he would have been able to almost outline the successes and failures of the day to come. We must also remember that whether the convictions that prevailed were just or unjust they influenced action on the part of those who made for us victory or defeat. It is a tradition of the Army of the Cumberland that confidence in success was based on the fact that "Pap Thomas" held the center, as the fact proved when the trial came.

All men are brave through association. We mean that the great Republic, having called into the field the fighting

element of its loyal population, had a right to count on a certain amount of courage to make battles and campaigns. But this successful courage depends on reasonable conditions. The men must touch elbows in spirit as well as in person, and, above all, must have confidence in their officers. The bravest body of men ever put under arms and drilled into veterans are subject to panics in the presence of the unexpected. As we have said before, this is the fatal effect which follows successful flank movement or an attack in the rear. To overcome this, there is nothing so potent as the cool, self-possessed conduct of the general in command who possesses the confidence of his men.

No battle came off upon the 30th of December. General Rosecrans, finding the enemy at his front prepared to resist before Murfreesboro his further approach, passed the day in getting his forces in position preparatory to an assault. To this end he massed his troops heavily under Crittenden upon his left for the purpose of flanking an enemy he found strongly posted upon heights well fortified. General Bragg, without regard to Stone river that cut his right at almost right angles, had seized on a line of heights running for over a mile from north to south. To flank this position on Bragg's left called for a march of two miles and a crossing of Stone river in the face of the enemy.

As General Rosecrans did not attack on the 30th, General Bragg determined to take the initiative and open fight on the 31st. While strongly posted, there were conditions that might arise and make his position extremely precarious. He had his army cut, as we have stated, by Stone river. It was midwinter and a stormy one. This same river might in any twelve hours rise to a stage of water that would be fatal to his army. He believed that the Union army greatly outnumbered his and so could not afford to take chances that might augment the difference. Hence, he resolved to end the delay by taking the initiative at daylight on the 31st. Strange to say he determined upon the same maneuver, only reversed, that General Rosecrans had resolved on. He prepared to strike our left. In the evening General Bragg extended his left, made up of McGowan's and Cleburne's

divisions, sustained by Wharton's cavalry, quite a mile beyond our right. At daylight this line made up of two-fifths of Bragg's infantry swung around upon our right in assault that for momentum and dash had probably no parallel in the war. The immediate result was disastrous to the Union army. Our flank made up of three brigades was badly arranged to meet an assault of eight full brigades. General McCook's head-quarters were too far from the scene of the conflict while General Willich next in command on the field was not at his post. While General McCook was shaving and General Willich was off in search of information as to the enemy that he could have had by remaining at the head of his command, our men were left to fight as best they could against overwhelming numbers. General Bragg in his report of the battle claimed he had surprised our forces. This was not true. Skirmish lines had been well thrown out and we had full and fair warning of the approaching storm. The men and their immediate officers were in line and prepared as well as they could be. But their superior officers who should have been at the front or in sight of it to remedy our exposed position by an immediate rally of supports, were surprised. Indeed, the information General Willich went in search of was given him in the shape of a capture, not only of seven hundred of his men, but the curious general himself.

Our brave fellows fought as well as they could, and better than was to be expected. Kirk's and Willich's commands were swept aside. Captain Edgerton, located near the salient angle of the line, was captured with his battery, and the gallant Goodspeed lost three guns posted to the right of Willich's brigade. This exposed General Davis's right flank to the enveloping lines of the enemy, and Colonel Post was forced to change ground perpendicular to the rear, and so repel a flank attack. The 59th Illinois, supporting Pinney's battery, was moved one-fourth of a mile to the right. The 74th and 75th Illinois infantry came up in support, and as the enemy overlapped the 22d Indiana, moved in beyond the battery. In a few seconds the enemy came in upon them, attacking Baldwin and Post upon the flank, and Carlin,

Woodruff, and Sill in the front. The resistance made by troops thus hurriedly called to new and trying positions was so persistent that General Polk, of the Confederate service, was forced to fetch up all his reserves. This was not the only repulse made by our unsupported forces. But the weight and force of the victorious enemy were irresistible, and our right fell back fighting, while the front of Bragg's army swung in as our flank receded. The Confederates were sweeping on to victory, but not without being made to pay dearly for their gain. The losses were so heavy that General Hardee was forced to call earnestly for reinforcements, nor could he arrest the retreat of a single regiment, or prevent the reformation of lines on new conditions as the old gave way.

General Rosecrans, who had ordered Crittenden to advance, as we have stated, upon the enemy's right flank, finding himself anticipated, countermanded his order and hurried Crittenden to the support of his own shattered right. It is not to be supposed that this gallant officer so brilliant upon a field lost either head or heart. He not only pushed forward his forces to remedy the loss, but rode at their head for hours under the deadliest fire ever experienced in battle. Captain Byron Kirby, a brave, capable aide, was shot out of his saddle, and Col. Garesche, General Rosecrans' chief of staff was killed, a round shot taking off his head, and so close to his general that the blood and brains of one of the most promising officer in the service fell in a shower upon Rosecrans, who was so absorbed in his efforts to get up his troops in time that he did not notice even these casualties. As Major Frank S. Bond says when his attention was called to the fact that Garesche was killed, he only glanced at the headless trunk that for a second swayed to and fro upon the flying charger ere it fell, and the general made no response. His heart was wrung with anxiety no words can express, and his eager eyes were on the columns that at the double quick were hurrying to the rescue. He might have been relieved had he known that at the pivotal point, ready at the moment upon which trembled uncertain the fate of a

death struggle, was one who, although prompt and efficient, was cool and calm in the deadly hour of peril, and held in the hollow of his hand a victory snatched from the jaws of defeat.

General Thomas, holding the center, saw the right doubled up, and a victorious foe sweeping on to his rear. It was necessary to change front, and this in the midst of the conflict, and in the face of the foe. This he did with all the precision of a parade. It was done none too soon. The entire army under Bragg, save Breckenridge's division left across the river, was moving victoriously from a defeat of the right wing upon the flank of the center. To designate at a glance the new line, post upon it the troops unengaged, extricate the brigades that, fighting, fell back almost surrounded by the foe, was the task given General George H. Thomas, and it was accomplished in time to check and drive back the enemy at the very moment when victory was in its clasp.

The center, reinforced from the left, held its own against repeated assaults until the short, cold day ended in a cloudy night that enveloped the fatal field in a darkness that seemed impenetrable. When the fighting ceased, the Union army found itself driven back over a mile from its extreme right. The entire army under Bragg except Breckenridge's division was pressing in upon our forces at a point that had been our center when the fight began. In a word, they were in possession of the field, and so admirably posted that a renewal of the battle next morning would be under more promising conditions than those of the fight already ended.

General Thomas mingled, as was his wont, among his troops listening to reports and suggestions of his subordinate officers, and above all, looking to the care of the wounded. A fact was impressed by the unfortunate events of the day upon his thoughtful mind that had been a belief before, and was conviction now. This truth was that the men making up the Army of the Cumberland were not subject to the wild, unreasoning panics that so afflicted the Army of the Potomac. He saw the unexpected happen when the long, heavy column of the enemy swung around the right and ap-

peared almost in the rear of the badly posted brigades, and he saw these brigades give way not in wild disorder, but fighting desperately as they fell back under command of their gallant officers. This fact, pressed upon his mind, gave birth to the oracular saying that, uttered that night saved the Army of the Cumberland from retreat.

General Rosecrans, who had overtaxed his strength in his heroic efforts of the day, called a council of war that night to consider the possibilities of a retreat that would save what was left of his army. He was in no condition of mind or body to give the crisis cool consideration. The council was held in a rough log-cabin, but dimly lit and unwarmed, a weird assembly on that New Year eve. All the brave gentlemen assembled, from Rosecrans, in his old faded uniform yet stiff with the blood and brain of Garesche, down to the colonel the day's casualties had made commander of a brigade, bore marks of the hard fight, not only in the pale, anxious, yet firm faces and disordered dress, but in several instances bloody wounds. General Thomas, moving in his slow, deliberate way through the throng to a corner, found a board, and, improvising a seat, leaned back and fell asleep. As the discussion opened and continued with much heat, Rosecrans often cast his eyes upon the man who had saved his center that day, as if longing for an opinion he had, like other commanders, learned to lean upon. But Thomas slept on.

We are told that a majority of the officers favored not a retreat, but falling back to a better position. Rosecrans was considering a retreat to Nashville. He was possessed of some facts not known to the officers present. Some ugly demonstrations had been made by the enemy on our line of supplies, and Nashville itself was in a feverish state of alarm over an expected assault that would carry the city. The discussion waxed warm. The gallant General Crittenden led the opposition, and was warm in his antagonism to any withdrawal of the army. He maintained that Bragg's army was more crippled and in a worse condition than ours, and to give way would break the spirit and destroy the morale of our army. Near midnight, General Rosecrans

called on Surgeon Eben Swift, the medical director of the department, to know if he had sufficient transportation to remove our wounded. The doctor replied that he believed he had; that there were between five and six thousand wounded, but many of these could walk. General Rosecrans then awakened Thomas and asked him: "Will you protect the rear or retreat to Overall creek?"

General Thomas promptly and emphatically responded in the memorable words, "This army can't retreat," and fell asleep again. And "this army" never did retreat.

It was after midnight when General McCook, at the request of Rosecrans, rode with him to the rear, for the purpose of selecting a new position. The clouds that darkened the fore part of the night cleared away, and the two officers were not only able to see that the proposed position, owing to the low condition of the ground, was untenable, but they saw something else. General D. S. Stanley, under orders, had forbid any fires to be built in the rear, but lawless wagoners and some insubordinate cavalry had disobeyed these orders, and far down on the west of the road the two generals saw a long line of light, mostly torches, moving actively to and fro. Rosecrans exclaimed: "The enemy is in our rear." He not only remembered the reports from his disturbed lines and of the condition of Nashville, but he gave a significance to General Thomas's sententious utterance that was entirely foreign to its utterance. The man who had brought five brigades from out Bragg's army in the midst of a deadly conflict that had for our apparently doomed forces a fire in front, flank, and rear, and had swung his own line round under a cross-fire of artillery and infantry, felt the fiber of a force that might be killed but could not be driven.

General Rosecrans and his amiable but evil genius galloped back to the tent, where most of the council remained, and said: "We must fight or surrender."

The dawn of the New Year's day brought on no fighting, nor yet that of the second. Had Rosecrans known how terribly Bragg's forces had suffered in killed and wounded, he would have renewed the conflict at daylight on the first. We know now, being able to look impartially on both sides,

that such an attack must have resulted in an overwhelming defeat of the Confederates. The dash of the Southern troops that made such brave fighting in the beginning exhausted a race that lacked staying power at all times. Overwhelming as the victories of the South have been, in no one instance was the fruit clearly and fairly gathered. Lee's army, after every triumph on the field, seemed stunned by its own success. Bragg's army formed no exception, and would not probably have resumed the offensive even had it escaped its terrible punishment. Even on the afternoon of the second, we opened the conflict by General Crittenden sending across Stone river, on the right of Bragg, Van Cleve's division and Grose's brigade of Palmer's command. General Bragg, seeing the danger this meant to his right, ordered Breckenridge to repel our forces. This was promptly executed. Van Cleve fell back to the bank of the river, under protection of some fifty guns of Major John Mendenhall, General Crittenden's chief of artillery. At this juncture occurred a dashing event that was unexpected on both sides. Colonel John J. Miller, irritated and disgusted, in common with both men and officers of Negley's command, at the cowardly conduct of their general, took command without orders from Negley and in opposition to those from another general of division, and crossing the river with seven regiments, attacked Breckenridge's forces with such fury that they were forced back in great confusion toward Murfreesboro. General Jeff. C. Davis, with his division, advanced promptly to the support of Miller, and the two seized on, held, and fortified a height that proved the key to the situation. For this gallant deed done without orders, General Negley, who took no part in the affair, was promoted to major-general.

As the position taken and fortified in this impulsive manner exposed Bragg's forces to an enfilading fire of artillery, there was nothing left but immediate retreat. This occurred on the night of the third. The rear guard made itself so annoying to Thomas's front that permission was given for a night attack. The thin line of Confederates was easily pierced, but the result came too late; General Bragg was in full retreat. He saved his material, but left his wounded at Murfreesboro.

CHAPTER XI.

Immediate Effect of the Stone River Victory—Review of the Operations During the Six Months Following the Army of the Potomac—Burnside takes up McClellan's Cry of "On to Richmond"—Disaster of Fredericksburg—Hooker succeeds Burnside—Meade put in Command—Invasion of Pennsylvania and Battle of Gettysburg.

The unexpected victory on Stone river sent a wave of feeling through the North that lifted Rosecrans into high popular favor, and bade fair to make him our foremost military leader. It broke down for a time the personal hostility of the War Department, and, let the Secretary think what he might, he was for a time reduced to silence. This was the more irritating from the fact that Secretary Chase, who was so earnestly involved in a military success that would insure the financial system of the administration that was ever trembling on the verge of collapse, could not refrain boasting of his sagacity in selecting Rosecrans as the successor of Buell. Stanton could ill-brook this interference on the part of Chase, and in this instance it was doubly offensive from his personal dislike of the general.

"You see," said Chase to Stanton, at a cabinet meeting, "my friend has justified all I urged on you in his behalf."

"If you knew as much about Stone river as I do," growled the War Secretary, "you would not feel so cocksure of your friend. But for George H. Thomas, the man I wanted to head that army, Stone river, instead of being a victory, would have been a defeat."

"Come now, Stanton," retorted Chase, "be just. We selected Rosecrans, and Rosecrans had the sagacity to select Thomas. Then, you know, there is nothing so successful as success."

Could General Rosecrans have followed this victory by active operations and continuous fighting, he would unquestionably have won his way to a command of all our armies.

But this he thought to be impossible. The line of advance for the Army of the Cumberland in its march on Chattanooga had by chance been made so difficult that an immediate forward movement was out of the question. With nothing but a single line of railroad reaching from Louisville to Murfreesboro to depend on for supplies, it required time for transportation, even when the road was open; but this same road had not only to be guarded, but reconstructed, continually. The line of advance by the way of Nashville was run through the most disloyal, active, and intelligent people of the Confederate states. Every step forward deepened the hostility. The men kept at home by extreme youth or old age, or other incapacity, armed with squirrel rifles, infested every road, and made every laurel bush an ambuscade for stragglers from our army. The very women hurled epithets at our troops as they marched by their dwellings. It was not only necessary to rebuild the railroad without ceasing, but that same road had to be guarded and heavy fortifications constructed about the depots where arms, munitions of war, food, and clothing were collected.

Six months were given to this work. It met with no approval at Washington. The War Department seemed to shut its eyes willfully to the necessities of the situation. We must in justice, however, say that Secretary Stanton, while grumbling at the delay, lost no time in forwarding the supplies demanded. He was less energetic in the forwarding of men, for he honestly believed they could be more efficiently used elsewhere.

In the meantime, as winter passed to spring and from spring to summer, and the Army of the Cumberland was being reorganized, well equipped, and stores upon which it could depend accumulated, the war in other fields continued to drift with an almost uniform loss to the Union armies.

While the Army of the Cumberland is at Murfreesboro thus reorganizing for an advance, we will turn to the Army of the Potomac, and learn what, during the six months following the battle of Stone river, was being done by that army of defeats.

When, on the 8th of November, 1862, General Ambrose

E. Burnside superseded by order General McClellan, there was consternation, not to say disgust, throughout the Army of the Potomac. It was generally known that the man thus selected to the command of the one army of the Union designated to do the hardest fighting was strikingly incompetent. It is but justice to General Burnside to say that he shared himself in this conclusion, and deepened the dismay by its open avowal. The secret of this strange selection is to be found in the condition of the army as McClellan held and left it. The discontent of the men and the open disloyalty of the corps commanders were so marked that the administration dared not put over them a soldier, however distinguished, not of the McClellan clique or circle. General Burnside, an amiable and loyal gentleman, had the confidence of the government, not because of any ability, but for that he privately criticised McClellan's motives and movements to the President, and he had the favor of the McClellan group for the sympathy he expressed in their behalf. And yet it was well known that at the first Bull Run he refused to lead a regiment, the only one left intact, into the fight, upon the ground that said regiment was made up of the best families of Rhode Island, and, if he got it cut up as the others were, he would not dare to return to that state. At Antietam, when ordered to carry a bridge, the possession of which would have pierced the enemy's center, he delayed for hours, until, indeed, the golden opportunity was past. He had neither physical nor moral courage, and his protest, when called to the responsibility of the high command, was simply pitiable.

The truth is that nearly two years' observation and experience of the eminent men at Washington had given them a contempt of merely military men. It seemed to them that the "bullet heads," as the immortal Hawthorne had designated the military leaders, an expression Secretary Stanton and President Lincoln had adopted, were nearly all the same; that they all blundered into errors the men were expected to rectify by hard fighting. Their capacity, they believed, was exercised not in planning campaigns that had any sense in objective points, but in the production of that

sort of military literature that followed blunders, called battles, and claimed premeditated reason for what in fact were merely casualties. The President and his irritable Secretary of War really wished to put fighting Joe Hooker, as he was called, in command, but firmly believed that such selection would demoralize the entire army.

Of course Burnside took up what McClellan had left and the senseless "on to Richmond" continued the cry of press, people, and administration, although the ground to be marched over gave Lee the strength of a hundred thousand men to his well tried veterans. Every mountain range and river became a fortification, behind which the army on the defense doubled its forces while waiting in grim silence for devoted men to be led to the slaughter. And if successful, with Richmond captured, we would be no nearer the end of the war than before.

As Richmond was to be our military terminal, the simple-minded Burnside took the more direct route. He would go by the way of Fredericksburg. To this end he moved down the north bank of the Rappahannock to a position opposite that insignificant town. He labored under the strange delusion that this movement was unknown to the enemy. He seemed to forget that he was marching through a country where all were hostile spies, and men and women active and intelligent informers. To confirm all that came to Lee's ears in this way, General J. E. B. Stuart, raiding across Warrenton Springs, entered Warrenton just as our rear guard were marching out, and found all the information necessary in reports and papers the red tape of our army carefully collected and as regularly left for the enemy's perusal. Thus officially informed, Lee gathered his army and hastily took position south of Fredericksburg. Nature gave him in this a strange advantage. The Rappahannock, running a southerly direction under bluffs in the east bank, has on its west bank a level space of a mile in width and about five miles in length, extending from Massaponnax creek to where the bluffs abut on the Rappahannock opposite Beck's Island. Lee offered no opposition to Burnside's passage of the river other than an irregular fire of ar-

tillery at the pontoons bearing them across the stream. This was intentionally feeble. Lee easily favored that crossing. With eighty thousand veterans in position on the bluff, and three hundred pieces of artillery to sweep the plain, he laid in wait behind a dead-fall with victory as well secured as if Burnside had surrendered in advance. On that calm, mild Indian summer morning, a hundred thousand of our brave fellows fell into line prepared for slaughter to the music of six hundred guns that on the Confederate side poured round shot and shell in our ranks, while the Union artillery on the bluffs east of the river fell short and had to cease firing, for they were doing more injury to our own troops than to the enemy.

And was the fearful might of these hundred thousand thrown at once upon the enemy? Not at all, for the battle was fought as all the battles of the Potomac army, by brigades and divisions, at times by a regiment only. Franklin, for example, having under his command fifty-five thousand men on our left, remained idle while the battle raged upon his right. Franklin claimed that his order received at 7 A. M. that day was so vaguely worded that he waited for more decisive and clearer instructions. Why his army had been crossed over the river and heavy reinforcements sent to him and all brought face to face with the enemy, he did not seem to consider. However, had the entire hundred thousand been marched up those musket fringed, slippery heights, their hopeless slaughter would have been only the greater. What a frightful massacre it was. The Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Chickasaw Bluff, and Kenesaw Mountain have since come in to parallel that wholesale wanton assassination of brave men at Fredericksburg, but no such sickening idiocy in a commander has overtaken us since that dreadful event. All day long the awful work went on. Our gallant men went in by brigades and came out in remnants, leaving their dead and wounded piled up in front of intrenchments that, rising tier above tier, poured an incessant storm of shot, shell, and musketry upon the storming parties that could only cheer on and fall. When we build, as we are building, lofty monuments to defeat, we should gather the bones of

such dead, and if they fail to out-top in each instance the Obelisk at the national capitol to the memory of George Washington, they will, at least, be significant in their ghastly grim silence of all the monuments left to tell of incompetence bathed in blood.

Our gallant subordinate officers had not learned then, as they eventually did in subsequent campaigns, to send in their men instead of leading them, and the loss of such was fearful.

Night ended the unequal conflict. At least fifteen thousand had been sacrificed in vain. The next day the commissioned idiocy proposed renewing the attack, but there was a revolt along the whole line, and for two days following the Confederate commander contented himself with strengthening his lines, and at last permitted our demoralized forces to recross the river. Had he followed up his victory and poured his veterans on our disorganized masses with a river in their rear, he would have annihilated the Army of the Potomac, and the road to Washington could have been marched along as much unmolested as would have been the triumphant tramp of his thousands along Pennsylvania avenue to a possession of our capitol. Robert E. Lee failed to close the trap Burnside had hurried into, and so the war went on.

It went on, however, without Ambrose E. Burnside. He was promptly relieved and "Fighting Joe Hooker" called to lead a forlorn hope of a hundred thousand men. General Joseph Hooker was a soldierly looking man, six feet in height, well proportioned, with a face that had upon it more the sparkle of high animal spirits than the repose of thought. The fact that he possessed entire belief in himself, with a force of character peculiar to such leaders, secured confidence in him from others, conspicuous among whom were the President and Secretary of War. It is told of Hooker, that when he first appeared at Washington to solicit service, to which he was entitled, of course, being a West Point graduate, certain reports from the Pacific slope of wild dissipation and a demoralized condition preceded and accompanied him. The President and Secretary

Stanton had been warned by the McClellan crowd to beware of Hooker. Failing to get recognition from the general in command or notice from Stanton, Hooker appealed to Lincoln. In two interviews granted him by the President, the applicant found that the amiable, easy mannered chief magistrate could say *no* with a ready facility that was only equaled by the quiet firmness with which he stood by the negative. In the third interview, however, General Hooker, impatient at the opposition that he had discovered, broke into angry denunciation of the McClellan crowd.

"You have put the armies of the Union, Mr. President," he cried, "in the hands of men who have neither ability, courage, nor patriotism. They have no heart for the fight and they crowd out those who have. Good morning, Mr. President; when you need me, let me know. I can wait."

"Hold on, Hooker," responded President Lincoln, who said afterward that he saw tears in the gallant officer's eyes—a fact the fighter repudiated, saying that it was whisky, not water, that the chief magistrate saw—"hold on; I will consult Stanton and McClellan and see what can be done."

"Advise them to give me command of the Army of the Potomac," replied the audacious applicant. "It is bound to come sooner or later, and might as well come now."

"Not so fast, Joseph," replied the President. "We will give you a chance to fight your way up, and that is about all you can ask now."

When McClellan's removal was finally determined, the War Secretary had warmly pressed Hooker for the place. Had he been free to choose, he would have preferred George H. Thomas to any other. President Lincoln had his own views, however, and, for reasons before stated by us, he selected Burnside.

Hooker found the army in a demoralized and disorganized condition. The ninety-day men, called foolishly into the service, were leaving the posts in the rear they were called out to man, their time being at an end, and no amount of persuasion could induce them to remain. Raw recruits, it is true, were pouring in, but desertions of old soldiers and

new soldiers numbered some two hundred a day. While the front was filled with discontent, the rear was crowded with thieving officials and contractors. It was the beginning of a condition that not only continued but grew worse until the end of the war. When the newly commissioned general came to consult the rolls, he was startled to find that no less than 2,922 officers and 80,964 non-commissioned officers and men were absent from their regiments, many of them in hospitals, more on leave or detached duty, and a terrible list of them unaccounted for—in other words, deserters.

This was a deplorable showing, but must be recognized as the legitimate result of blundering disasters and bloody defeats that, beginning with the war, had accompanied the Army of the Potomac for over two years. The volunteers were men of more than ordinary intelligence, and had been strengthened in their habits of assumed responsibility by the absurd system of election of all officers under the grade of brigadiers, that made the rank and file more constituents than soldiers. These men of the Potomac Army had been won to confidence in McClellan by the silent and most insidious means. The lamentable failure of Burnside strengthened this prejudice, and when Hooker was commissioned, the McClellan clique of higher officers became more active and open in their opposition. Nothing daunted by these malign influences and unhappy results, Hooker applied himself vigorously to a reorganization of the army, devoting two months to a better discipline and an attempt to put more heart into the demoralized lines.

On the 27th of April, 1863, Hooker accomplished what Burnside could have more readily done, and that was flanking Lee out of his strong position on the high ground in the rear of Fredericksburg. Leaving General Sedgwick with a column of twenty thousand men to make a demonstration on Lee's front he crossed the bulk of his army over the Rappahannock and occupied Chancellorsville. It was not so strong a position as that of Lee's at Fredericksburg. Having accomplished this strategic move our general fell into a stupendous error. He jumped to the conclusion that, having flanked the Confederates out of their stronghold, Lee

would fall back in retreat toward Richmond. To insure this, as he thought, he had dispatched General George D. Stoneman with nearly all his cavalry in a raid upon Lee's communications. This had an unexpected result. The Confederates had a deserved contempt for the tailors, hatters and shoemakers we had mounted as cavalry, and as Lee had no accumulated stores in his rear to be destroyed he left the feeble attempt of Stoneman and his men to exhaust itself. The absence of the cavalry, such as it was, proved fatal to our self-confident commander. Lee of course evacuated Fredericksburg, but instead of falling back on Richmond he moved silently and swiftly upon Chancellorsville. Suddenly and without warning Stonewall Jackson's column of twenty-five thousand struck Hooker's extreme right. Emerging in lines three deep from a dense wood the veterans of Jackson fell with crushing weight and force upon the Eleventh Corps, entirely unprepared. Nearly all with arms stacked were preparing their supper, shared in, it is said, by what ought to have been a picket line. It was a force made up in large degree from a foreign element stranded upon our sea-ports, too worthless to seek employment in the interior. It was a cruel slaughter and a fearful panic that spread swifter than legs could carry fear.

This disaster to our army had one good result to our arms. Stonewall Jackson fell mortally wounded from the fire of his own men. The great war genius of the South went down and with him the fortunes of the Confederacy. The fatal volley that sent the cruel bullets crushing through his rugged form was a volley fired over the grave of the lost cause. From that out good fortune deserted the Southern side. It went down fighting to the last, but it went down. The grand, simple mannered man of war, who infused his indomitable spirit into his men and was a tower of strength to the cause he fought for, died none too soon nor a day too late. The Confederacy had reached its zenith. Up to that time his prayers to God seemed to have been answered. The rebel yell of triumph rung in his dying ears, and his last glance on life took in our National Capital as yet open to capture. There were elements at work sapping the founda-

tion of his cause that dying he did not see and living he could not avert.

While the army of Richmond was wasting itself in fruitless victories, Thomas and Rosecrans with their veterans were preparing a death blow to the Southern cause in the capture of their citadel, Chattanooga, and Grant with his legions sustained by iron-clads were moving along the Mississippi, destined to make that inland sea of flowing waters an impassable line cutting the Confederacy nearly in halves.

The Army of the Potomac differed from that of the Cumberland, as, indeed, any army made up of North-western men, in that it was subject to paralyzing panics that were unknown elsewhere. The disaster that befell Hooker's right was no greater than that of our right at Stone river, but the panic made all the difference. As Blenker's frightened fugitives fell back they stampeded Deven's command, that, rolling on with the mass, started Schurz's force in advance, and the tide striking Steinwehr's division, bore it along until a mass of forty thousand men were poured into Chancellorsville with the tidings to the startled commander that Lee and his entire army, instead of being on a retreat, were annihilating the Army of the Potomac.

This was not accomplished, however, until after some of the hardest fighting of the war. Sickles' corps, that had been moved out in the direction of Fredericksburg, not only encountered the enemy, but from eight in the morning until six P. M. did such execution that the report of killed and wounded of Lee's army was never made public. This was followed by the engagement on the next day, Sunday, 3d of May, when with our lines more contracted to cover the loss on our right the army of Lee was held in a check that bid fair at one time to be a great victory to our side. The confusion brought on by the disaster to our right was deepened by an accident that befell General Hooker. A round shot that went crashing through the head-quarters, prostrated the side of the room against which the general was leaning and the concussion knocked him senseless. He was thought to be killed and the rumor of such a grave casualty reaching the lines of course did much to discourage the

troops. It was a long period of doubt before he could be restored, and then but partially, to himself. Sick and dazed he could not understand that the fight hung doubtful and that Sickles and Birney were calling in desperation for reinforcements and ammunition. It was a fatal hour. Thirty thousand men stood idle when ten thousand ordered in at the right moment would have insured a victory. Lee learned to his cost that fighting from an intrenched position made almost impregnable by nature was quite another business from that of moving his men in when the chances were equal. He was well prepared and quite willing to permit Hooker to cross his army to the north side of the Rappahannock unmolested. This was done. The Army of the Potomac, less eighteen thousand, again occupied its old position at Falmouth. In addition to the killed, wounded and missing of the Chancellorsville battle, some twenty thousand nine months' and two years' men were mustered out of the service. Of course these were more than replaced by raw recruits, but such new material required time to mold into shape and make serviceable as soldiers. General Hooker addressed himself heartily to this service, and was getting the army into form again when an event occurred that called for immediate action in a distant field. General Lee leaving A. P. Hill's corps to mask his movement invaded Pennsylvania. This was so advisedly executed that but for General Milroy, who in command of ten thousand men at Winchester, got the information he conveyed to the startled administration at Washington from Lee himself, it would have been a complete surprise.

A braver man or more gallant officer than General Milroy never wore sword. Had his judgment equaled his intrepidity, he would have been invaluable, and it is a specimen of how the war was conducted from the Union side that he was permitted to so fortify Winchester as to call for forty thousand men to man the works. Winchester was of no importance as a strategic point. It covered nothing and could be marched around on all sides, and the country surrounding it could be invaded without trouble. In the doubts that beset not only the head-quarters of the Potomac Army, but the War Department, as to Lee's purpose, in the mysterious

movements he was making General Halleck issued an advisory order to General Schenck, at Baltimore, in reference to Milroy. General Schenck sent the writer of this to Winchester with discretionary powers as to Milroy. A day's investigation at Winchester satisfied the chief of staff that Milroy, in any event, had better be in Harper's Ferry, and so ordered him with all his material back to that stronghold. General Schenck, at the urgent entreaty of Milroy, countermanded the order, and three days thereafter Milroy found himself surrounded by Lee's army. The gallant soldier cut his way out with a loss of half his force and all his artillery and stores. He carried to Washington positive information as to Lee's designs, and was ordered under arrest, but never tried, for obeying his general's order to remain at Winchester.

Hooker lost no time in covering Washington that Lee's movement threatened and at the same time put his forces in position to try conclusions with the enemy, should they move on our capital or invade Pennsylvania. As we have said; the Army of the Potomac was much reduced, and General Hooker called earnestly on the government for all the available men within reach. The War Department, however, was weary of "Fighting Joe;" and General Halleck, whose success in life came more from a good digestion and a cold heart than through intellectual processes, undertook to freeze the gallant fellow out in the face of the enemy. To this end he was refused the 11,000 men uselessly quartered at Harper's Ferry. This was such an idiotic act that General Hooker caught at its intent and asked to be relieved. This request was promptly complied with, and General George G. Meade given command.

The invasion of Pennsylvania was a blunder based on the erroneous belief that the many famous victories of Lee's army had made it invincible, and that another such in the home of the Union would so strengthen the anti-war feeling at the North and sicken the Union feeling that it would go far toward ending the war if it did not terminate the armed conflict at once. The truth is that these vaunted victories

were almost as fatal to the Confederacy as defeats would have been. The fighting element at the South was being rapidly exhausted. Slave labor had well nigh eliminated the sturdy bone and sinew that go to make a state, and now in the hour of their utmost need, the leaders looked in vain over their vast territory sparsely settled for armed men to fill up the ranks thinned by victories.

There was another consideration as well as this that made President Davis oppose the projected invasion. A sagacious statesman of wide experience and observation, he saw the difference in morals between fighting for home at home and a struggle in an invasion of an alien land. This feeling in the ignorant poor whites and the bigoted masters had in two years reached a fanaticism so great that martyrdom was acceptable. We had learned in that time that the only disposition we could make of a Southern soldier was to kill him, and in such the life was purchased at a fearful cost, not only of blood, but treasure. Every man killed cost us two lives and a hundred thousand dollars, counting loss from disease as well as loss in battles. Fierce as the feeling was, the wiser people at Richmond feared it would weaken among men transferred from their own soil to the land of the enemy. There was another fact no less potent to be feared that came in on the knowledge, the ragged rank and file of the Confederate army would learn of the dense population and great wealth of the North. Let the reasons be what they may, Lee took the responsibility of marching his army from victories in Virginia to defeat in Pennsylvania.

They who worship at the shrine of the dead Virginian may well shun a closer investigation of his military career, and in that respect imitating the more cunning example of admirers of Grant at the North. And yet a military part that can not bear the light of truth had better be broken up and cast into the limbo of forgotten things, for the day must come when, under the eye of calm, cold history, the sham will be exposed to the shame of its idolators. Had General Lee been what his blind admirers claim, he would have seen that the Mississippi dividing the South in halves was in danger of being lost to the Confederacy from a dash of troops,

and that Chattanooga, the key to the whole situation, was menaced, and, instead of an invasion of Pennsylvania, he would have been moving to the rescue of both river and stronghold. President Davis knew, as did President Lincoln, that the war of the Confederacy was being fought in the cabinets of Europe, and the only hope of eventual success to the South was a recognition that would be followed by interference. After Lee's brilliant victories, it was the better policy of the Confederacy to hold the condition as it was. Sooner or later the longed for recognition must come. Davis, therefore, opposed Lee's bold move, but his general had fought his way to an elevation quite above such control and he marched to his doom.

After General Meade took command, the two armies went blindly groping about Pennsylvania in search of each other. The Battle of Gettysburg was an accident. General Meade, after getting a rather uncertain knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts, but entirely ignorant of the intent, designated a position of considerable natural strength on Pipe creek, some fifteen miles south-east from Gettysburg. All the army corps were moving in that direction. On the 29th of June, General Kilpatrick, marching his cavalry at a leisurely pace in a north-westerly direction through Liberty and Tarrytown, to Hanover, was much astonished at an attack from Stuart's horse, and would have been captured but for the timely arrival of General Custer's command. On the 30th, General Buford, moving upon Gettysburg, encountered the van of Lee's army. Buford was, of course, driven back by the superior force. But General Reynolds' 1st corps, under command of General J. S. Wadsworth, heard in the still hot day of June the roar of artillery, hurried forward, entered Gettysburg, and driving the Confederates out, seized upon and held the heights overlooking the town from the north-west. General John F. Reynolds came up rapidly with the two corps, the 1st and 11th, marching about 22,000 in all, and while making a personal reconnoissance, was killed. General Abner Doubleday, coming forward at the time with the whole of the 11th corps, assumed command. He was forced back to Seminary Ridge, immediately west of Gettys-

burg. General O. O. Howard at this time joined the force on Cemetery Hill, and reaching Doubleday, assumed command, giving the 11th corps to General Schurz. The two corps, although admirably posted, were set upon by nearly all Lee's army in front and flank, were driven back through Gettysburg, and rallied with difficulty on Cemetery Hill, south of the town.

Ewell, Rhodes, and Early, the Confederate commanders, did not press their advantage. They felt the disadvantage of being the invaders. Although Gettysburg is in an old, well-settled region, with an excess of excellent roads, it is surrounded by a rough country with but a small part under cultivation. The greater part is given up to a natural growth of forest trees. The Confederates, swift to avail themselves of such cover in Virginia, and so to conceal their movements, found affairs reversed. The same ignorance that dazed Northern commanders, when shut out from view by dense woods, confused the Southern generals in Pennsylvania, especially in the neighborhood of Gettysburg. It was early in the summer afternoon when the fighting ceased, but it ceased because there was something in the air that portended the unexpected. They were right, the unexpected appeared in the person of General Dan Sickles, with the corps which had reached the field in answer to a summons from General Howard, and in violation of orders from General Meade. These forces, without orders from their commander-in-chief, possessed themselves of positions that proved impregnable in the three days' desperate fighting that followed. This terminated in Pickett's famous assault and defeat, because of the fact that the supports called on to charge for half a mile over open ground, were swept by a murderous artillery fire, fringed with still more deadly musketry. For the second time the Confederates were called upon to do what had been given the brave men of the Union again and again to do on fields wantonly watered with their blood by the brainless bullet-heads we had in command.

Lee's army was gently escorted back to and over the Potomac. Wearied, half starved, and out of ammunition, the ragged veterans waded in the mud unmolested by the vic-

torious armies of the Federal government. Indeed, the old order of McClellan was renewed, and General Sedgwick, with his fresh troops, was warned to so press the rear as not to fetch on a general engagement. A General Kelly, with a force of some thousand men, used in keeping open the Baltimore and Ohio, was on the further side of the Potomac, and could have successfully disputed its passage with Lee, was complimented by General Halleck for his celerity and success in keeping out of the way.

The loss to the two armies in this Pennsylvania campaign could not have been less than forty thousand men. Why they were killed and wounded on either side puzzles the understanding. General Lee disavowed any intent other than having a battle at Gettysburg, when all the odds were against him, and why the same fight might not have secured the same purpose on the Rappahannock, can not be answered. The same may be said of the Union forces. The tenderness shown the Confederates after their defeat is equally without reason.

“These Americans,” said the Paris *Figaro*, “are fighting on a military system inaugurated by the Kilkenny cats. The two armies meet and fight and slaughter each other with the utmost fury. Then they fell back and reorganize for another general massacre. Positively, the war will end when the last man is killed.”

CHAPTER XII.

The Campaign at the West—Grant and Sherman Prepare for the Descent Upon Vicksburg—Three Months Lost in Getting Rid of a "Political General"—Washburne's Support of Grant—Sherman's Forces Landed at the Mouth of the Yazoo—Defenses of Chickasaw Bluff.

While upon the one side of the central Army of the Cumberland that of the Potomac was being steadily defeated until the battle of Gettysburg, upon the other a huge army under Grant was operating upon the Mississippi. Having given in brief narrative the history of the first, we now turn to the forces on the right.

It will be remembered, when the old soldier, Winfield Scott, was called upon for an opinion as to how better to conduct the war upon the Union side, he condemned the "On to Richmond" project as ill advised. This not only because of the well known axiom that it is not wise to let your adversary select your ground of campaign, but for that he knew every inch of ground between Washington and Richmond, and from its nature every march along it presented difficulties almost impossible to overcome. In lieu of this, he proposed a column of fifty thousand men to descend and open the Mississippi. Of course, the possession and control of the Mississippi was of importance second only to the capture of Chattanooga. Such success cut the Confederacy in a way that paralyzed one-half the territory the government at Richmond looked to for men and supplies. Could this have been accomplished early in the war, it would have gone far toward terminating the armed conflict. But, at the time when General Scott offered this as an objective point, it was as far beyond our reach as military talent seemed to be. Our hastily constructed navy, inland and at sea, had not yet been developed, and the possibility of running past forts, and so rendering them unavailable, had not been tried.

In suggesting the descent of a column of fifty thousand

men down the Mississippi at the time, General Scott showed an ignorance of that mighty river, and the country through which it flows, hard to recognize in a man of average information and intelligence. In ordinary stages of water, the Mississippi flows through swamps on one side and bluffs upon the other, and when flooded, an event that happens every year, the mighty river sweeping away all barriers, becomes a great inland sea. To attack from the interior, and descend with an army, presented obstacles far more fatal than any between Washington and Richmond. To attempt this with transports, was to have sunk such by batteries at Columbus, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson, on one side or the other, and to march by land was equally fatal, because of the utter impossibility of finding lines bearing upon the river that could be relied on in a campaign. We have a clearer statement of the condition in the memoirs of General J. H. Wilson, of the engineers, who writes:

“All the way from Cairo to New Orleans the Mississippi meanders through a vast alluvial region, the whole of which is annually overflowed, except where levees have afforded a partial barrier. This great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and extends on the east to the upland plains of Tennessee and Mississippi, while on the west it is bounded by the lesser elevation of drift alone. The bluffs that form the escarpment of the eastern plains are usually quite steep and thickly overgrown with timber, underbrush, and vines. At various points in its course, the river touches one extremity or the other of the bottom land, washing the base of the bluffs and often cutting deep into the soft strata. Columbus, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson are points of this kind, and rise from eighty to two hundred feet above the freshets.

“The alluvial region throughout its entire extent is higher near the banks of the river, and falls off gradually till it reaches the line of the bluff; the drainage is therefore toward the hills, and is the source of the intricate net-work of bayous for which the basin is remarkable. The Cold-water, the Tallahatchie, the Yazoo, the Washita, the Red

and Atchafalaya rivers, besides numerous other creeks and smaller streams, are accordingly nothing more than huge side drains. During freshets the water that breaks over the Mississippi banks or through the crevasses flows through cypress swamps and a labyrinth of bayous till it reaches the bluffs, and is again forced back into the parent stream.

“ Besides the bayous, crescent-shaped lakes, the sole remains of the ancient meanderings of the river, abound on both sides, often at considerable distance from the present channel. The forests of the alluvial region are extremely luxuriant and dense; cottonwood, tulip, sweet gum, magnolia, sycamore, and ash are found, with an almost impenetrable jungle of cane and vine. The cypress swamps that occupy the lower portions of the bottom are nearly always under water, and this, with the slimy character of the soil and the treacherous beds and slippery steep banks of the bayous, renders the country almost impassable in summer, and entirely so, except by boats, in winter.”

When to these topographical obstacles we add that of climate, so injurious to the native born and fatal to Northern men, we can well believe that the Confederates were quite willing to have the government at Washington try conclusions upon the Mississippi. The capture of New Orleans and the fall of Memphis shortened the line of river to be seized and held, but did not lessen the difficulties of such a conquest. It fell to the lot of General U. S. Grant to make this wild and desperate endeavor. Admitting that in the end he did achieve a questionable triumph in this direction, one, after a careful study of the facts, is forced to the uncomplimentary conclusion that, had he possessed more sense, he would have been less successful. Of all the generals who achieved notoriety during the civil war, he is the one whose career as a soldier will bear the least scrutiny. Of a coarse fiber, no culture, and of limited intelligence, his memory serves to illustrate either that his fame rests on newspaper fiction, fostered by political partisanship, or that, to be a successful military man, a marked lack of intellectual qualities is a necessity. We have seen how at Shiloh he suffered a surprise and merciless slaughter in the enemy's

country; how at Fort Henry he failed to have his forces on hand to reap the fruits of Commodore Foote's victory; how at Fort Donelson he absented himself mysteriously from the field at the critical moment when the Confederates, cutting their way out, could have been captured to a man. History now tells us that in the combined operation against Price and Van Dorn, he failed to co-operate and enabled Price to march off three miles and fall with his full weight of overwhelming numbers upon Rosecrans, who subsequently defeated Van Dorn at Corinth without Grant's aid, although the Confederates had double the force that our general of real military genius had under him. It is strange that so unsuccessful a general should be able to retain the confidence of the War Department at Washington, that must have known of his blunders and habits.

There is a solution to this mystery found in the name and career of Elihu Benjamin Washburne, a remarkable man of Maine birth and parentage and New England training and culture, if that word can be applied to a coarse, strong man, who made up in cunning all that he lost in brain. From early life to the close of his public career, he was a most successful politician. To great strength of character he added a purity of motive as rare as it was admirable in the time when frauds in public office began to organize for plunder upon a helpless people, exhausted and dazed by one of the bloodiest wars that ever poor humanity suffered. A lawyer by profession, Washburne soon passed to the more congenial pursuit of politics, and in Illinois, where he opened a law office, soon grew to be a noted and influential leader. He was returned to Congress so frequently that he came to be the father of the House, and was widely noted for his jealous guardianship of the public treasury.

The Hon. Elihu B. Washburne had little interest in and less knowledge of war. But, in common with many, he was well aware that out of that war, if successful, would come a military leader to claim the recognition of the people he had served, and Elihu resolved to be the patron and friend of that man. He selected Grant, and his choice was as strange as his faithful support was without parallel. Here was a

man forced from the old army because of his habits, who had risen only to the rank of captain in the service, and an utter failure in all that he attempted as a means of subsistence in civil life. Through all his early military career, as a small farmer near St. Louis, as a clerk at Galena, he not only gave no evidence of ability of any sort, but no one of his associates or family ever suspected him of aught beyond the dullest common place; and yet, through good and evil report, the Hon. Elihu stood by his protege. It was a powerful support. Not only the President, but the Secretary of War, regarded Washburne as a man of sterling integrity, as well as a politician whose following among the people was so earnest that he was a power at Washington not to be neglected or slighted. Every promotion gained by Grant was really given by Washburne. Once only he faltered, and that was when he learned that, after a frightful assault on Vicksburg, Grant left his dead to rot and his wounded to writhe in agony on the outer slopes of the enemy's works for three days, under the hot summer sun of that horrible climate. Washburne sought Lincoln with the pitiable tale. He would carry the responsibility no longer.

"Elihu," said the President, much moved, as he put his hand on the politician's shoulder, "it is a bad business, but we must try the man a little longer. He seems a pushing fellow, with all his faults."

It takes one woman and several men to make a celebrity, and Grant had in Washington a host. We will find, as we progress with the story of Vicksburg, that it was lucky for General Grant that telegraphic facilities were so incomplete between the War Department and the fields in the Mississippi, that the people at Washington knew as little of operations about Vicksburg as the public knows to-day. Had the frightful blunders, the fearful mortality, reached the administration, Grant would have been superseded in the first month of his campaign. But of this hereafter.

The fall of Forts Henry and Donelson with the subsequent evacuation of Nashville, the credit for all of which was given Grant, restored the rough soldier to confidence and

made Washburne's efforts in his behalf more easy. We must also bear in mind that Halleck, the military adviser of the President, co-operated with Washburne in the promotion of Grant, not from any confidence he had in the man or love for him personally, but merely because he found the President and Secretary of War so inclined. It was the force of discipline that made the superior officer infallible and all-powerful. Therefore, in July, when Halleck was ordered to Washington, he restored Grant to command of his former troops with head-quarters at Corinth. From this place Grant wrote Halleck, proposing an advance along the Mississippi Central Railroad with Vicksburg as an objective point. That meant an attack upon an army of thirty thousand men, the defeat of which made Vicksburg untenable. On 2d November, 1862, Grant informed Halleck that he had commenced a movement on Grand Junction with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar, and that he would leave the next day and take command in person. If found practicable he would go to Holly Springs and perhaps to Grenada, completing railroads as he marched.

To this Halleck replied: "I approve your plan of advancing on the enemy as soon as you are strong enough for that purpose." On 4th November, Grant, having marched to Grand Junction, ordered Sherman to co-operate by moving two divisions from Memphis, but on the 8th he informed Sherman that he estimated Pemberton's force at thirty thousand, and that he felt "strong enough to handle that number without gloves." Therefore, he countermanded the march from Memphis.

Although his plan of advance along the Mississippi Central Railroad had been approved at Washington, and he had taken the initiative in that direction, there came a sudden halt. An obstacle appeared so potent that it at once arrested all movements. General Adam Badeau in his military history of General Grant, with a *naivete* that is charming, plausibly tells us that this potent obstacle to the movement of a hundred thousand men came in the form of what General Badeau is pleased to call a "political general." John A. McClernand had entered the service from civil life. This

was objectionable, but when he exhibited a natural turn for soldiering, governed by an abundance of common sense, the objection became fatal, and Grant, Sherman and Halleck united in not only condemnation, but in a most astonishing manner they all sought to baffle and cold-shoulder the ambitious civilian from the service. While moving his army as he had outlined to Halleck he learned through the public journals that General John A. McClernand had been authorized to organize a column to open the Mississippi river. This was precisely what Grant and Sherman had on hand. The two West Pointers learned to their dismay that this was President Lincoln's project, and although Halleck disapproved, the obstinate commander-in-chief of all our naval and military forces persisted. He would have the Mississippi opened by his friend from Illinois, and nobody else, and in his friend's own time and way.

Grant saw with consternation that if he continued and defeated Pemberton, and thus made Vicksburg untenable, this political general would sweep down the Mississippi unmolested, and not only occupy Vicksburg, but grasp the glory reserved for himself. It is a monstrous proposition, and one could well doubt it, were it not told in the very volume prepared by Badeau and approved by Grant, and from this unquestionable source we learn that the objective point shifted from Pemberton and his Confederate army to McClernand, and the President's column organized to open the Mississippi. Immediately all movements looking to the proposed march along the Mississippi Central Railroad came to a halt.

The descent of the Mississippi and an attack from the river upon Vicksburg was an idiotic project, lifted into a horror by the loss of ninety thousand brave men needlessly sacrificed. The plan of campaign made by Grant was not only admirable, but in fact the only one that had a show of reason. The Confederate War Department, believing that Vicksburg could be attacked only from the river, had failed to furnish either a general or an army for successful operation in the field. Thirty thousand men under Pemberton might possibly have been augmented to forty thousand, and

with Pemberton superseded by Joseph E. Johnston a general would be had capable of resistance. .

As the political general loomed more clearly into sight the movement along the Mississippi Central Railroad not only came to a halt, but Grant's objective point shifted from Pemberton to McClernand. In this he was encouraged by Halleck. Indeed, all West Point officers put aside their personal differences and united heartily in opposing and if possible sacrificing any one from civil life who presumed to an independent command. It was to give Grant a hint that, on the 5th of November, Halleck telegraphed: "Had not troops sent to reinforce you better go to Memphis hereafter? I hope to give twenty thousand additional men in a few days." To this Grant responded in a tentative manner: "Reinforcements are arriving very slowly. If they don't come in more rapidly I will attack as I am."

This sounds strange in the presence of the fact that only the day before he had sent Sherman back to Memphis with two divisions, informing his lieutenant that he could handle Pemberton with the troops he had. The next day, growing unhappy over McClernand, and more uneasy about him than Pemberton, he telegraphed Halleck: "Am I to understand that I lie here while an expedition is fitted out for Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to leave Sherman subject to my orders, or is he and his force reserved for some especial service?"

It will be remembered that Grant had volunteered to move south along the railroad and handle Pemberton. To this project the War Department assented and expected, of course, the handling to begin. Halleck promptly responded: "You have command of all the troops sent to your department, and have permission to fight the enemy when you please." At this Grant concluded he had disposed of the "political general," and on the 14th informed Sherman: "I have now complete control of my department." His department was precisely the same as before, less McClernand. He continues, "Move with two divisions of twelve full regiments each, and, if possible, with three divisions, to Oxford and Tallahatchie as soon as possible. I am ready to move

from here (La Grange) any day, and only wait your movements."

Thus, with the pestiferous "political general" outmaneuvered, Grant turned his attention to the enemy. The strange delay caused by thus moving on Washington, instead of Vicksburg, had awakened the Confederates to their danger. An army of a hundred thousand men moving along the Central Railroad could not well be met by a force under Pemberton of only eight thousand men. Had Grant clung to this plan of a campaign, it would have been as bloodless as was Sherman's subsequent march through Georgia to the sea with the army of ninety thousand men saved from the doom of graves in swamps and bayous about Vicksburg.

The movement began. The forces at Helena were ordered by Halleck to co-operate by crossing the Mississippi at Helena and cutting the Central Railroad in Pemberton's rear. The campaign from the interior was well under way when the ghost of the "political general" appeared to startle Grant. "On the 25th, Halleck again," says Badeau approved by Grant, "broached that dismal river expedition, doubtless urged on by President Lincoln. He inquired how many men Grant had in his department, and what force could be sent down the river to Vicksburg." Grant replied that he had "in all 72,000 men, of whom 18,000 were at Memphis, and 16,000 of these could be spared for the river expedition." Halleck followed this information by telegraphing to Grant that he had given orders for the advance of all the forces under his command, that he had written Steele in Arkansas to threaten Grenada, and had asked Admiral Porter to send boats to co-operate at the mouth of the Yazoo. He concluded by asking, "Shall I countermand the order for this move?" Of course Halleck responded, "No." This expedition of McClernand, except that Grant had been called on for men to make it practicable, had nothing to do with Grant's proposed campaign in the mind of the administration at Washington. The army did move. It accomplished a march of twenty-five miles in twenty-three days, but its commander had lost all interest in the movement. While the Confederate government, alarmed at the

menacing danger, was straining every resource to put in the field another army equal to the emergency, the admirably planned campaign was abandoned, and the high resolve died out. On the 5th December, we find him telegraphing to Halleck: "How far south would you like me to go?" About the same time, to indicate his entire abandonment of his original plan, he suggested to Halleck that "if the Helena troops were at my command, I think it would be practicable to send Sherman to take them and the Memphis forces south of the Yazoo river, and thus to secure Vicksburg and the state of Mississippi." This meant to turn his back on Pemberton. Halleck, good easy Halleck, sharing in Grant's horror of a political general, acquiesced, and so Grant marched Sherman back to Memphis to command an expedition that would reduce Vicksburg from the river. Grant promised co-operation. How, one is at a loss to comprehend, and as it was not given, we can well believe Grant did not comprehend himself. He said to Sherman: "Proceed to reduce Vicksburg, assisted by the gun-boats, and I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy make necessary."

It seems so monstrous now, looking back upon the events, to attribute such a motive to General Grant as that found in the presence and purpose of General McClernand, that we would hesitate even an intimation of it were it not that Badeau, General Grant's accepted historian, in a work that was submitted by the author to the general himself and by him indorsed, tells us:

"Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should obtain the command of the river expedition, and, therefore, had hurried Sherman to Memphis on the very day that he secured the authority, so that, if possible, the latter might start before McClernand could arrive. Halleck, too, sent the permission without that deliberation which he sometimes displayed."

Thus it is put to historical record, and sanction by General Grant, that all the halts, hesitation, and eventual abandonment of a wise campaign for one that proved the most

disastrous of the war, had their origin in the jealousy of a brother officer and the desperate resolve to defeat his ambitious designs, let the cost be what it might. Grant was correct in his surmise. Had he persisted in his campaign through the interior of Mississippi, his success would have been the evacuation of Vicksburg and the triumphant occupation of it by his rival.

To appreciate the pitiful meanness of this conspiracy, to use the mildest term, where a hundred thousand lives were involved and a loss of at least ten millions to the government threatened, one has only to suppose George H. Thomas in the place of Grant. What a remonstrance would have gone to Washington against any river expedition until after the occupation of the field in Mississippi had at least divided the Confederate armies, and if this were persisted in, what haste would have been given in hearty co-operation to make the desperate river expedition a success. The man whose high sense of honor held his ambition under calm control, whose lofty patriotism annihilated self, and, above all, whose tender love of the men whose lives were in his keeping made him strike only when he knew his blow would be fatal, towers like the eagle in his pride of place above the mousing owls our poor country's misfortune had given command.

On the 20th of December, a most disgraceful disaster was seized on by Grant as a justification of his change of plans. On that day, Van Dorn's cavalry made an expected descent on Holly Springs, and destroyed all the supplies for the army collected at that place. The value in money amounted to over two millions; in the loss to the army, it was incalculable. We say the attack was expected, for Grant's defense, in Badeau's Confessions, is based on the warning he sent to the miserable Colonel Murphy, who surrendered his little force without a blow to overwhelming numbers.

One readily learns the strength of the Washburne influence at Washington from this event. Had any other general in the army been guilty of such a shameful disaster, he would have found himself at least relegated to the rear, if he es-

escaped a court of inquiry. While the War Department was growling and grumbling over Rosecrans because of his delay in repairing railroads and fortifying Nashville and Murfreesboro for the better security for his stores, General Grant is permitted to waste a like time in meaningless marches, and end by having his depot of supplies swept away, and his campaign, approved of by the government, rendered of no avail for at least two months to come. He was not even reprimanded, the War Department finding relief in cashiering the cowardly Murphy for not dying in defense of supplies his general had left unprotected.

After this, Grant abandoned his proposed campaign along the line of the Central Mississippi Railroad, contemplated at the best season of the year, for the roads were good, and took up the river expedition, that he might wrest it from the hands of the political general. To appreciate this, we must remember that the plan of campaign did not at first include the river expedition. Sherman, with two divisions, was put in the field to co-operate with his general. These movements, we have seen, were closed up when McClernand appeared. Sherman, with these divisions, had joined Grant south of the Tallahatchie, and then he was suddenly marched back, as Badeau informs us, to take the river expedition from McClernand. This was defeated by special orders from President Lincoln putting McClernand in command. Nothing would defeat this but a return to Memphis by Grant. "Since Sherman was not to command it, he was anxious to do it himself." To this end the entire army, with all the supplies left to it, marched back to Memphis. He got there in time to send Sherman down the Mississippi before the hated and dreaded McClernand could put in an appearance. This expedition was composed of 42,000 men in 58 steamboats, and Commodore Porter's fleet of gunboats carrying 280 guns and 800 men.

We learn from Sherman's Memoirs that the preparations were hasty. Of course they were. The dreadful McClernand was expected daily with the order of the President in his pocket. General Sherman says:

"The preparations were necessarily hasty in the extreme, but this was the essence of the whole plan, viz., to reach Vicksburg, as it were, by surprise, while General Grant held in check Pemberton's army at Grenada, leaving me to contend with the smaller garrison at Vicksburg and its well known strong batteries and defenses."

The phrase of "as it were" is good, but not so suggestive as "its well known strong batteries and defenses." The Confederates at Richmond, as well as at Vicksburg, were surprised that any such insane and murderous attempt would be made. The grand Sherman combination descended the river unmolested. In his memoirs, the hero of defeat says that the sight was grand. The continuous roar of the high-pressure steamboats, fifth-eight in number, sounded like so many monsters breathing defiance to the foe. Crowded with brave men being led to the slaughter, the many bands on each boat made the air vibrate under the bass of the steamboats' bellow and the dash of wheels, and composed a symphony of death long to be remembered by those who survived.

The Shermans that are more full of go without the necessary ballast of brain, who mistake the confidence of conceit for the confidences of genius, are common to all armies. The governments, however, are not many that are willing to trust such with the lives of brave men and the destinies of empires. It remains for us to be remarkable as the only people found willing to elevate such into heroes, and build monuments to their memories above the graves of the wantonly slaughtered thousands on thousands.

Sherman's army was landed on an island at the mouth of the Yazoo. We may well suppose the martial strains of military music died out in the awful presence of the work before them. The island that received the doomed men is formed by the Yazoo, the Mississippi, and bayous, and lies opposite to the place known as Chickasaw Bluffs. The Chickasaw range, further up, changes its name to Haine's Bluff, close under which the Yazoo in two places runs in twelve and twenty miles above Vicksburg, so that Haine's Bluff closed the Yazoo from our gun-boats. The winding

Yazoo forms the boundary of the island on the north. A deep bayou, the Chickasaw, serves the same purpose on the north-east, a deep, sluggish stream running from the Yazoo toward Chickasaw Bluffs to what is known as Old river, which runs between the island and the bluffs to the Mississippi at Vicksburg. The island is scarred with bayous and dotted with lagoons and swamps. Nearly all of it is ten feet under water during floods. The only part of this dismal swamp of death that presented a possible approach to the enemy's works, was below Chickasaw bayou, fronting Chickasaw Bluffs, and that by narrow causeways over Old river, each swept by concentrated fire. On the side next the bluffs was a levee to keep Old river from a strip of land between it and the hills. This was an imposing parapet, well lined with infantry. This levee was not only a fortification, but it served to cover the road that ran parallel to and under it so that troops could be marched without exposure from end to end. On the face of the bluff rising tier upon tier were rifle trenches until the crest was reached, and there artillery was planted so as to sweep with round shot and shell all the spaces in front. The best artillery from Krupp's works in Germany crowned their heights. For nearly a year the slaves of Vicksburg had been worked under intelligent supervision, it being well known that these defenses held the Mississippi. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the War Department at Richmond felt relieved when it learned that instead of a sensible campaign in the rear that would have turned Vicksburg, the front had been selected, where, owing to the natural and artificial defenses, ten thousand men were as effective as ten hundred thousand; in a word, that the place was as impregnable as Gibraltar, as in the end, under Grant, it was found to be.

To save ourselves from the charge of exaggeration, we quote from Sherman's Report. He says:

"Immediately in our front was a bayou, passable only at two points, on a narrow levee or sandbar, which was perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of bench or table land, on which were con-

structed a series of rifle pits and batteries, and behind that a high, abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle trenches, and the crowns of the principal hills presented heavy batteries.

"The country road leading from Vicksburg to Yazoo City runs along the foot of these hills, and answered an admirable purpose to the enemy as a covered way, along which he moved his artillery and infantry, promptly to meet us at any point at which we attempted to pass this difficult bayou. Nevertheless, that bayou, with its levee parapets, backed by the line of rifle pits, batteries, and frowning hills, had to be passed before we could reach *terra firma*, and meet our enemy on any thing like fair terms."

To demonstrate after the bloody event that to carry these bluffs by assault was an impossibility Sherman gives us a condition that he must have known in advance. Unfortunately for the army the brave men under his command were not veterans, or they would have thrown down their muskets, as they subsequently did at Cold Harbor, and told their officers that if they wished to assault, to do so themselves. The noble fellows of the rank and file were new to war, and never for an instant believed their general commanding would send them in to death without hope of success, as he did since, to shield himself from censure—in cold words, he tells the world that the place could not be taken by assault.

We are not called on to give the sickening details of the horrible slaughter. Sherman would not be Sherman did he not seek to shield his own stupidity under cover of blame to others. Although in his own report he shows the place to have been impregnable, this censure he launches at the heads of Generals George W. Morgan and DeCourcy for not having accomplished the impossible. After indulging in his gratuitous fling at two brave and efficient officers, our general says generously :

"I assume all the responsibility, and attach fault to no one, and am generally satisfied with the high spirit manifested by all. . . . I attribute our failure to the strength

of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial, and not to his superior fighting."

This general satisfaction must have been extremely comforting to the desolate households of the land where the precious dead were mourned and the cripples tenderly cared for. It is difficult to say which is the more exasperating, the imbecility that ordered the assault, or the sublime conceit that seeks to make his approbation a salve for death and dishonor.

This great man, whose smile was salvation, re-embarked all but the two thousand slaughtered at the foot of the Chickasaw Bluffs, and, comforted by his satisfaction, steamed up the river to Milliken's Bend, where he learned something.

Before taking up the thread of events, let us turn to Badeau's work—ever bearing in mind that it is the work approved of by Grant as his military history—and learn why Grant did not co-operate with Sherman, for the belief was prevalent throughout the land that the assault on Chickasaw Bluff was a failure because of that absence of co-operation. Turning to that valuable autobiography, for such it is, we find the following points made and italicized so that the most simple may not escape their meaning. It says:

1. Grant "meant, if he could, to hold Pemberton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman to enter Vicksburg without any material opposition."

2. But if he had so held *Pemberton*, it would have made no difference to *Sherman*; for "the strength of the works at Vicksburg was not fully appreciated when this arrangement was made; they were so strong that had Grant been able to keep *Pemberton's* entire force in his own front, there would have been no different result to Sherman's endeavor."

3. Sherman "never could have anticipated a tactical co-operation from Grant; for Grant had neither promised nor suggested it;" therefore, when at Oxford he laid out the plan of concerted movements and his part in the interior, he said in his letter of instructions to *Sherman*—"I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such

manner as the movements of the enemy make necessary"—he meant not tactical, but moral co-operation.

4. *Sherman*, in his report of the assault, shows that he was not looking for Grant's tactical co-operation in it, for he says: "Not one word could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be *pushing south*." "I proposed . . . to attack the enemy's right, which, if successful, would give us substantial possession of the Yazoo river, and *place us in communication with General Grant*." The italics and gaps are *Badeau's*.

5. Sherman could not have expected "tactical co-operation" from Grant, nor even moral co-operation, in his assault; for this remark in *Sherman's* report of the assault shows that he had before heard that Grant was falling back: "The rumor of General Grant having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie became confirmed by my receiving no intelligence from him."

6. Sherman himself declared that his failure was owing to "the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial." As one sufficient cause is in logic sufficient, therefore his failure was not owing to Grant.

7. *Sherman's* own report shows that the enemy's forces at Vicksburg were so large that, without regard to Grant, success was impossible, for he says: "I suppose their (the rebel) organized forces to amount to about 15,000, which could be reinforced at the rate of about 5,000 a day, *provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada*." The italics in all these citations are *Badeau's*.

8. *Sherman's* general letter of information of the campaign to the division commanders, which *Badeau* cites as "before the attack"—in fact, December 23d, while coming down the river—told the plan of co-operation as "to act in concert with General Grant against *Pemberton's* forces, supposed to have *Jackson, Miss., as a point of concentration*." Also: "It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Haine's Bluff, so as to enable the gunboats and lighter transports to ascend the Yazoo and *communicate with General Grant*."

Also: *Grant's left and center were at last accounts approaching the Yallabusha near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear by which he drew supplies was reported to be seriously damaged. This may disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line of operations.*" Again: *"At the Yallabusha, General Grant may encounter the army of General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified, but he (Pemberton) will hardly have time to fortify the Yallabusha, and in that event General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying between the Big Black and the Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on the Yazoo."*

These appear as Sherman's expectations.

9. This same romantic letter of general intelligence by Sherman to the general officers, issued while the grand flotilla was descending the Mississippi, showed that he contemplated, among other things, landing above Vicksburg and marching into the interior to attack Vicksburg from the east on the line of the railroad from that place to Jackson, Miss. "I propose to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and then reach the point where the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the Big Black, after which to attack Vicksburg by land whilst the gunboats assail it by water."

10. Sherman himself absolves Grant from blame for lack of "tactical co-operation" in this assault in his general absolution in his report, when he says: "The effort was necessary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combinations were the best possible under the circumstances. I assume all the responsibility, and attach the blame to no one."

Grant, through Badeau, in this cold showing, so satisfactory to himself, that Sherman could not have expected him to co-operate either tactically or otherwise, is not unmindful of the fact that his and Sherman's glory are held together by the same ligament, and that it is necessary to let his lieutenant down gently, hence he says: "Sherman deserves all praise for his determination to attempt the assault when he knew not only that Grant never intended to support him in its tactical execution, but that he was probably

unable to render even the strategical support to the movement which had been originally planned." And then he adds as a solace: "Indeed, when Grant threw both his armies on the Mississippi, success still fled before him coyly as in the interior."

We are inclined to attribute the last half of the above sentence, so poetically referring to the subsequent slaughter of men, to Adam Badeau, whose playful fancy is as sparkling as his imagination is acute when dealing with history. But our Chickasaw hero does not rest easy under this showing. In his memoirs, that quiver and palpitate with valued information, he gives us Grant's letter calling him to confer at Oxford on the new plan, in which Grant says: "My notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis and fix upon a day when they should effect a landing and press from here with this command at the proper time to co-operate." He also asserts that Grant's letter meant practical co-operation. "Inform me of the earliest practical day when you will embark and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary."

He also quotes a letter dated December 14th gotten by him, Sherman, at Memphis, which he says: "Completes all instructions received by me governing the first movement against Vicksburg." And this as to co-operation. "The enemy are as yet on the Yallabusha. I am pushing them down slowly, but so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. . . . My head-quarters will probably be at Coffeeville one week hence. . . . It would be well if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may be necessary for us to look to that base of supplies before we get through." General Sherman follows this up with the assurance that it was clearly understood that he was to have co-operation of some sort, and that it called on him to make the immediate assault on Vicksburg, "as necessary to the successful accomplishment of my orders." He adds: "Up to that moment I had not heard a word from General Grant since leaving Memphis, and most assuredly I

had listened for days for the sound of his guns in the direction of Yazoo City."

The picture of the general listening for guns that never spoke, but were in fact at Memphis, is extremely pathetic, and reminds one of Lady Percy's heartfelt appeal to her father:

"O yet, for God's sake, go not to those wars,
The time was, father, when you broke your word,
When you were more endeared to it than now;
When your own Percy, when my heart's dear Harry
Threw many a northward look to see his father
Lead his forces up; but he did long in vain."

The pathos is somewhat marred by the fact that such was Sherman's conceit that it was quite impossible for him to feel any anxiety. Had he known the vital importance of Grant's co-operation, he would have delayed the wanton and cruel assault until he heard the roar of Grant's guns, which he tells us he was wishing for. He had no anxiety in advance, no remorse for the two thousand gallant men killed and crippled as he steamed back. "It was all right," he said, complacently, "a most spirited affair."

The controversy between these rivals in disaster appears very mild. They could not afford to quarrel. Facts developed in such a contention would have relegated both to the rear, saved us ninety thousand men and the patriotic North the shame of such a slaughter. It was gentle and forgiving, for the two soon found that the government at Washington, immersed in grave troubles nearer home, had less thought of miseries on the Mississippi, while Elihu B. Washburne and his immediate followers continued their applause in behalf of the tanner of Galena, who developed through retreats the high capacity of a commander.

CHAPTER XIII.

Assault of Vicksburg from the River given up as Hopeless—"Employment for Superfluous Troops" in a Campaign against the vexatious Waters of the Mississippi—Details of Four Thousand kept constantly at work in an attempt to change the River's Current—The Laborers exposed to Fevers, Dysentery, Malaria, and a deadly Artillery Fire from the Enemy—Deaths by Thousands in the Ditches—The Project a Failure—Lake Providence Canal Scheme Tried and Abandoned—Co-operation with Banks.

General Sherman went away from the point of Chickasaw Bluff with two thousand men less, that number having been killed or crippled in the bloody assault on an impregnable position. This was on the 1st of January, 1863. On the 2d, he learned that the dreadful political general was at the mouth of the Yazoo. "He was there with orders from the War Department to command the expeditionary force on the Mississippi." This was simply atrocious. Two thousand brave men had been sacrificed to prevent this result, and yet the ghost of a political general would not down. General Sherman, however, informed the detested commander of his attempt on Vicksburg, and gave as a reason for not continuing the wanton slaughter of his men that Pemberton's army was pouring into the place, which fact convinced him, Sherman, that Grant must be near. McClelland quite assured the hero of defeats that Grant was having a good time at Memphis and entertained no thought of moving; that his depot of supplies had been dislodged by Van Horn, and that Grant had withdrawn his forces from Coffeeville and Oxford to Holly Springs and La Grange; and further that Quimby's division of Grant's army was actually at Memphis for stores when he, McClelland, passed down.

As this condition made any attempt on Vicksburg from the river utterly hopeless, all came out of the Yazoo and organized at Milliken's Bend.

What next to do puzzled these warriors. As a steamer

having two barges in tow laden with ammunition for Sherman's army had been captured and carried up the Arkansas river forty miles to a place called Fort Hindman, Sherman proposed that he should proceed up the Arkansas, reduce the fort, and retake the vessels. The result was that McClernand, having senior commission, went in command, and after a bloody fight took the place. Badeau, the historian, tells us that Grant, before he learned the result, was quite indignant at the side issue thus gotten up—his indignation passed to disgust when he found that success had crowned McClernand's effort. However, it would not do for the political general to win victories—something then unknown to Grant's army. To avoid this Grant hurried to the army that he found afloat at Napoleon. From Sherman's memoirs we learn that Grant, on the 18th day of January, ordered McClernand with his own and my own corps to return to Vicksburg, to disembark on the west bank, and to resume work on a canal across a peninsula, which had been begun by General Thomas Williams the summer before, the object being to turn the Mississippi at that point so as to circumvent the Confederates at Vicksburg.

From facts developed since the close of the war, we learn that President Lincoln had more confidence in General McClernand as a military possibility than he had in Grant, and as Edwin M. Stanton shared in this, it is evident that the political general would have superseded the West Point incompetent had it not been for Washburne, who saw in McClernand other possibilities in the political arena. Thus were affairs complicated at Washington by considerations foreign to a mere military review of the situation. As President Lincoln could not well offend the Washburne combination, he sought to compromise by leaving Grant in command of the department and especially designating a subordinate to command the expedition down the Mississippi. Halleck, Grant, and Sherman saw no objection to this, for they well knew that it was possible to make the subordinate's position so uncomfortable as to force a resignation. Had the three melancholy warriors possessed the wisdom now attributed to them, they would have had McClernand follow the fate of

Sherman, and waste his forces in front of impregnable bluffs that stand guard about Vicksburg. Instead of this Grant took command and proceeded to make himself more offensive to McClernand than to the Confederates. In a fierce order to his subordinate, he said, "this expedition must not fail," and he might have added, as it failed under Sherman. And so he set the particularly selected general to digging an impossible canal to divert the channel of the Mississippi and leave Vicksburg and its bluffs six miles from this inland sea, which it vexed according to President Lincoln.

The Father of Waters is strangely sinuous in its course ; why it should be so, has never been and probably never will be accounted for. Of course, it is subject to certain forces that make it so snake-like in its course, but what they are we can not blame Grant for not knowing. One of these eccentric bends is at Vicksburg. Looking at the map, one can see that the river makes a short bend to the north-east and runs five miles to the Vicksburg bluffs, and then turns yet shorter and runs back south-west, creating a peninsula that for five miles is nowhere more than two miles wide. It struck Grant that if the fact were demonstrated to the Mississippi that a short cut of two miles would save over ten miles, the river would at once accept the shorter route, and so leave Vicksburg with all its natural defenses useless to the Confederates. The project was not original with Grant. As we have seen, the canal that was to have been the opening suggestion to the mighty river was commenced the year before. Grant, however, adopted it heartily, and, being his own engineer, assumed all the responsibility. The attempted change of the Mississippi was popular with the people who knew nothing of the obstacles that proved in the end impossibilities. Details of four thousand men were relieving each other in a toil that continued from daylight until dark. They uprooted huge trees, dug, plowed, scraped, and shoveled with dams and levees to protect them from the waters of a river that was supposed to be only too willing to avail itself of the new channel. In this hopeless task, the northern men brought in contact with the wet lowlands of this malarial region were seized with fevers, and soon the trans-

ports, converted into hospitals, were crowded with the sick and dying. This was bad enough, but a worse condition was soon demonstrated in the fact that the enemy's guns swept the space devoted to the canal, and the men of the detailed four thousand who escaped the malaria were exposed to the shot and shell from batteries that could not be silenced or even troubled by a reply. The Confederates practiced this artillery fire on the poor men who had volunteered to fight, and were condemned to die under fire and malaria as fatal as the round shot or shell of the enemy. And the task was hopeless. In indication of his sagacity, Grant says, through Badeau, that, "on the 4th of February, he reported to Halleck that he had lost all faith in the practicability of the scheme. The canal, he said, is at right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and both ends are in an eddy—the lower coming out under bluffs completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is capable of as strong defenses as Vicksburg, and the enemy, seeing us at work, have turned their attention to that point."

That discovery of these plain facts deferred to so late a day as the 4th of February is brought forward as an indication of his sagacity, is somewhat amusing. And, having made this discovery, why did he continue the dreadful work? The answer is simple and plain enough. He did not know what else to do. He could not imitate the disastrous example of Sherman, and hurl his army against the impregnable bluffs. One wonders he did not. This heartless butcher of his own men was much given to that sort of warfare. But this was too hopeless, and what to do next he did not know. To re-embark his army and steam up the Mississippi as Sherman had done, would be in effect to force the War Department to find another commander. He could not get by Vicksburg, and so the four thousand went on digging and dying by the hundreds, while the Confederate gunners steadily practiced throwing in round shot and shell upon them. This attempt at changing the channel of the Mississippi amused the Confederates. They were perfectly willing that one-third of our forces in the field of war should remain idle

where they especially wanted them, and, if our general employed his time fighting malaria and the Mississippi under fire from their guns, he was quite welcome. The War Department at Richmond, under the circumstances, counted Pemberton's eighteen thousand men equal to Grant's hundred thousand, and greatly strengthened Bragg and Lee with volunteers from west of the Mississippi.

Now that we have access to the real facts developed by the government records of both sides, we have some strange revelations. One of them is found in the treatment given General Rosecrans while making preparation for the grandest campaign of the war, and that awarded Grant. The complaint was made by not only Halleck but Grant that Rosecrans' delay was giving the Confederates the opportunity to withdraw men from behind the Army of the Cumberland to threaten Grant. We now learn from the records that it was Grant who was so completely in a hole that he could neither fight nor fly, and his "bottled condition," to use the words he subsequently applied to General Ben. Butler, enabled the Confederates to leave the bluffs, malaria, and Mississippi to fight Grant, and actually to send their forces to strengthen Bragg. Instead of there being any just complaint against Rosecrans, it was Grant who could not march, and so threatened the general move of the two other armies.

There is another strange revelation to be found in the fact that while Rosecrans was snubbed in nearly all his appeals for arms and men, Grant, although hopelessly swamped before Vicksburg, was favored in a way that indicated softening of the brain at Washington. The transports that carried the army down the Mississippi were needed by the War Department. But Grant informed the President that the marks on the trees about there indicated floods that would cover the peninsula to the depth of ten feet, so the transports were left to save the army from drowning. Grant, and nearly all the officers from generals down to colonels, made these transports their head-quarters, and to deprive them of such luxuries would have been extremely unpleasant.

Meanwhile the digging and the dying went on. The detail of four thousand continued while the hospitals on

transports became crowded and graves multiplied. It has been said that each railroad tie of the Panama railroad represented and was a grave-mark of fifty men. In like manner, if the dead from fever could have been gathered that Grant's canal struck down, enough bodies would have been obtained to build a levee against the rising waters of a river that had its surface above their heads, while a hundred and twenty feet below the great world of water swept down at the rate of six miles an hour. Grant, through Badeau, informs us that this "plan of turning a mighty river from its course attracted the attention of the civilized world; that the rebels loudly predicted failure, and the jibes of those who opposed the war at the North were incessant."

Still Grant toiled on. Four thousand soldiers were constantly employed on the work, besides negroes, who were of comparatively little use. But this work became more difficult and dangerous. Badeau informs us: "The troops who were engaged for two months on the canal were encamped immediately on its west bank, and protected from possible inundation by a levee, but the continuing rise in the river made a large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of the camps and canal."

The innocence of confession in Grant as given by Badeau is amazing. While four thousand men kept at work in an effort to change the channel of the river, another four thousand were busy building a dam to keep the other detail from drowning. He continues: . . . "The work was tedious and difficult, and seemed interminable; and toward the last it became dangerous, for the enemy threw shells all over the peninsula, and, as Grant had predicted, erected batteries which commanded the lower end of the canal."

And yet this hopeless work with its terrible cost in life and treasure was persisted in simply because the general commanding did not know what else to do. The bristling heights from which the Confederates, unmolested, practiced their artillery, were before him as they were before Sherman on that fatal day when he sent his thousands up to die, but he dared not attack, and so he went on in a work in which he acknowledges in Badeau he had almost from the begin-

ning no confidence. We are told, however, that he was, nevertheless, on the edge of success when the unexpected happened. Here it is in the general's own words, or rather the general's account run through Badeau, is told as follows :

"But at last there seemed some prospect of success, the dredge-boats worked to a charm, the laborers reached a sufficient depth in the soil, the wing was ready to connect with the main artery, and the undertaking was apparently all but completed when, on the 8th of March, an additional and rapid rise in the river, and the consequent increase of pressure caused the dam near the upper end of the canal to give way, and every attempt to keep the rush of water out proved abortive.

"The torrent thus admitted struggled for a while with the obstacles that sought to stay its course, but finally, instead of coming out below, broke the levee of the canal itself, and spread rapidly across the peninsula, overwhelming every barrier, and separating the northern and southern shores as effectually as if the Mississippi itself flowed between them. It swept far and wide into the interior, submerging the camps and spreading itself into the bayous even to the Tensas and Lower Red. The troops were obliged to flee for their lives, horses were drowned, implements were broken and borne away by the current, and all the labor of many weeks was lost."

While prosecuting this hopeless task of turning the bed of the Mississippi, the general commanding had in mind a project equally hopeless of getting away from Vicksburg. He could, of course, re-embark his army and return to Memphis, as we have said, but this would be an acknowledgment of defeat, and an immediate return to tanning hides at Galena. To avoid this he sought to free himself of Vicksburg. To this end he conceived the plan of cutting a canal from the river to lake Providence, a crescent-shaped body of water supposed to be a former bed of the Mississippi. It is six miles in length, and measured by an air line is forty miles above Vicksburg. From this lake it was supposed that, through a partly defined channel, called Bayou Baxter,

Bayou Macon could be reached. This would take the army to a point opposite Vicksburg, about forty miles from the river. Then following the Tensas river, the army could be got, after a tortuous course of six hundred miles into the Mississippi, some two hundred miles below Vicksburg. The object of all this Grant, through Badeau, informs us: "Through these various channels, it was thought possible to open a route by which transports of light draught might reach the Mississippi again below, and thus enable Grant to re-enforce Banks (then either on the Red river or the Atchafalaya), and to co-operate with him against Port Hudson."

We do not find in any of the chronicles that this remarkable engineer foretold the utter impossibility of opening and using this succession of narrow waterways through the enemy's country. These bayous were almost impassable in their natural state, and could readily be obstructed by felling trees. Badeau, speaking for Grant, tells us all about it. He says:

"The levee was cut and a canal opened between the river and the lake, through which the water passed rapidly; but peculiar difficulties were encountered in clearing Bayou Baxter of the overhanging forests and fallen timber with which it was obstructed. The land from Lake Providence, and also from Bayou Baxter, receded until the lowest interval between the two widens out into a cypress swamp, where the Bayou Baxter is lost. This flat was filled with water to the depth of several feet, and the work of removing the timber that choked the bayou for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles was, in consequence, exceedingly difficult and slow. But if this could have been accomplished, the channel in high water would have been continuous, though intricate and circuitous to a remarkable degree.

"So McPherson's corps was engaged in the undertaking for many weeks. The impossibility of obtaining the requisite number of light draught steamers, however, would have rendered this route useless, even had it been thoroughly opened. But no steamer ever passed through the tortuous channel, which served only to employ the superfluous troops

and to demonstrate the fertility and variety of devices developed during this anomalous campaign."

The last sentence in this extraordinary statement awakens an indignation that no words can express. "*But no steamer ever passed through the tortuous channel, which served only to employ the superfluous troops.*" This amazing confession of heartless imbecility is reinforced by another passage on the same subject. It says: "The project exacted attention and speculation." Well it might. He continues to say that many thought it would divert the Mississippi to this route from Vicksburg and all the lower towns. But he, Grant, did not entertain this wild belief. "He believed that Vicksburg was only to be won by hard fighting," and meanwhile he was "*simply affording occupation for his men.*"

No fighting was being done. None could be done, and while the general commanding through the weary months was vainly striving to relieve himself and forces from the condition into which he had led them, his wonderful brain found occupation for the men in working out projects that his sagacious mind saw in the beginning of each was impracticable. He had no confidence in the attempted change in the channel by a canal cutting the peninsula, and yet for weeks he continued the work—continued until at last the Mississippi drowned out his men and in one flood swept away the work that was the work of death. He attempted a passage through Lake Providence that would carry his army four hundred miles from Vicksburg, and is careful to put it to record that he had no faith in the project. And the astounding plea in justification is, that it not only illustrated the intellectual superiority of the commander, but gave occupation to his superfluous troops. While the commander of the Army of the Potomac was crying aloud for more men, while General Rosecrans was pleading in vain for reinforcements and supplies, while at every point of the conflict the cry went up that the Confederates outnumbered us, Grant had "his superfluous troops" to dig and die of dysentery and fevers in swamps, when all the work, according to Grant's confession, was utterly useless.

What this occupation was we have told. The brave,

patriotic men of the North, who left their homes and bread-winning for wives and children to fight for their country, were found occupation as laborers in the swamps and bayous of the Mississippi. The detail of four thousand at a time upon a work that was prosecuted day and night under fire of an enemy, could not have been designed as an occupation to preserve health, for they fell by hundreds, stricken down by a malarial fever as fatal as any plague that ever afflicted humanity. The few escaping death were sent north living skeletons, to languish a few years in their desolate homes. One walking through the beautiful national cemetery at Vicksburg sees it crowded with the graves of our gallant dead, and takes no heed of the host sent home to die, whose numbers would make another cemetery of like size. The number of the lost from our forces about Vicksburg have been reduced to 90,000. And why was this vast army, that could have marched victorious from Memphis to New Orleans, rendering Vicksburg and Port Hudson untenable—why was it sacrificed? Grant answers through Badeau, “to give the men occupation,” while the commander, at his gorgeous head-quarters upon one of the transports, feasted, and made merry, while he racked his dull brains to find some way out of the awful dilemma in which he found himself.

For fear our readers may think we exaggerate in chronicling the sad condition of our men under muskets, we turn to Grant himself, when in the accepted biography, by Badeau, he says: “These various attempts and expeditions on both sides of the Mississippi, although unsuccessful in their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial results. The national forces so constantly employed became hardened by exposure, and, of course, improved in spirits and health. They obtained, also, a thorough knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of the country in which they were operating, and were thus better able to encounter those difficulties.”

The story of suffering and death is better told by General Wm. E. Strong, one of the army, in his eloquent address at the dedication of a monument to General McPherson at Clyde, Ohio, 22d July, 1881. He said :

"It was composed of men whose bodies were so inured to hardships that disease could make no impression on them. Each man represented five others who had started with him; the five had succumbed to disease or to the bullets of the enemy; four out of the five were put under the sod that was to be made free soil by their exertions and the exertions of their comrades; the fifth was at home, discharged from the service by reason of disability, broken in health for life or with a leg or arm gone. The sixth man, to whom no swamp could give a fever, to whom wet clothes for a week could not give the rheumatism, to whom no march, however long was a hardship—this culled and selected sixth man was there, robust, healthful, the ruddy glow of health coursing through every thousandth part of a square inch of his body and visible through every pore of the skin, the patent seal and superscription of the Almighty that he was the genuine coin of the realm."

We learn from the approved life of Grant by Badeau that the country taught by the families of the afflicted men the real condition of affairs became clamorous. The press took up the cry. It was at this time the famous letter from M. Halstead was written to Secretary Chase, in which he so severely denounced the general commanding before Vicksburg as a drunken imbecile, and had it been published before Grant became a political quantity it would have been accepted as the truth, for Grant through Badeau says:

"The country, meanwhile, and the government, had become very impatient. Clamors were raised every-where against Grant's slowness; the old rumors about his personal character were revived (for character read habits); his soldiers were said to be dying of swamp fevers and dysentery in the morasses around Vicksburg; he was pronounced utterly destitute of genius or energy; his repeatedly baffled schemes were declared to emanate from a brain unfitted for such trials; his persistency was dogged obstinacy; his patience sluggish dullness."

The project of getting away from Vicksburg by the way of Lake Providence was tried and abandoned as impracticable. And yet no fact was developed in the trial, but must

have been known at head-quarters in the beginning. But the surplus forces had to be employed, if only in sick service at the hospitals and in funeral processions. This bayou pass business seemed to have a fascination for the general. Before he abandoned one we find him seizing on another. The temptation came in the way of the Yazoo Pass. This eccentric waterway is some six miles below Helena, Arkansas, on the east side of the Mississippi; one hundred and sixty miles above Vicksburg by an air-line, and three times that by the waterway that wound in and out like a serpent. This narrow bayou led to Moon lake, from that the waterway turned eastward to Coldwater river or bayou; thence to the Tallahatchie; thence in a crooked course of over a hundred miles united with the Yallabusha to form the Yazoo.

A madder project to destroy an enemy was never devised than the one that had placed that army in the swamps and bayous before Vicksburg from the river from which the general was vainly devising means of extraction. Fortunately a tentative effort of a force under Sherman, sustained by Admiral Porter, not only failed but with reason to thank God that it escaped destruction, demonstrated that a campaign in that direction was not to be attempted.

Grant, through Badeau, sums up the campaign by comparing it to that of Napoleon about Ulm, in which the great Napoleon suffers from the comparison. The text says complacently of the advantages that the famous French general had over our eminent strategist that Grant "instead of moving fresh from a camp like that of Boulogne, the Army of the Tennessee had spent months amid the swamps and fevers of the Mississippi." Had Napoleon at Boulogne quartered his army for months in a fever stricken swamp for no other purpose than to cudgel his brain in a vain hope to find some way out other than the one opened by common sense, to say nothing of common humanity, the comparison might not have helped Grant, but it would have lowered Europe's greatest general to the level of reasonable comparison.

The general commanding with his army in front of Vicksburg, which he dared not assault, was prolific of plans

by which he could extricate himself without a public confession of defeat. This bayou business under Sherman that proved such a ludicrous failure had scarcely ended ere Grant bethought of another project. This consisted of cutting a canal from the Mississippi at Duckport to a narrow bayou known as Walnut bayou, thence through the tortuous windings of the most eccentric waters returned to the Mississippi some eighty miles to New Carthage. Of this bayou move Grant again advises Halleck. He says:

“The dredges are now engaged in cutting a canal from here into these bayous. I am getting all the empty coal-boats and other barges prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to Colonel Allen for some more and also for six tugs to tow them. With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage and any points south of that.”

Through Badeau he informs the curious world that “he proposed to send an army corps to co-operate with Banks. With this increased force Port Hudson could certainly be taken, and then Banks’ entire army might be combined with Grant’s, and moving up from below a co-operative attack be made on Vicksburg.”

Grant had no men to spare for any such wild goose affair as this, and his real object was to get his entire army by this route away from not only the front of Vicksburg, but the pestiferous place itself. He must have known that such was the heavy draft for men made by the then great aggressive armies in the field under Hooker, Rosecrans, and himself, that Banks was allowed only enough to act on the defensive in holding Louisiana. It is true that Halleck, to quiet President Lincoln’s growing impatience, and well believing that Grant was swamped before Vicksburg, kept a continuous demand on the unhappy general to co-operate with Banks in an attack on Port Hudson. Grant denies, however, that he had any intent to move his entire army. We are told that he meant to send or lead 20,000 by the narrow way of winding bayous to Port Hudson, some four hundred miles below, in a wild hope of finding Banks’ army there, and that a siege of Port Hudson would withdraw the

irritated public mind from the failure at Vicksburg. In the meantime, the main body was to remain in the stagnant waters of Grand Gulf where the sick list was increasing as the season advanced.

Had Grant consulted the War Department at Richmond, he could not have devised a plan more favorable to the Confederacy than this. In the first place, he so divided his forces as to enable the enemy to attack in detail and defeat with ease. The small force, for example, left at Milliken's Bend, would be open to attack from Vicksburg. The Vicksburg forces, relieved from any menace of a great army with the interior abandoned, could at any time assume the aggressive with fatal effect. This, while the moving column destined for Port Hudson would depend for its supplies on Milliken's Bend where every transport would have to be accompanied by a small army to save it from destruction. The fact is that Grant, whatever may have been his statements at the time or his literary efforts after, meant to get his entire army from before Vicksburg, let the cost be what it might. This was so evidently the fact that it produced general dismay among the subordinate generals of the army. With the charming simplicity of obtuseness that characterizes all of Grant's literary efforts, he confesses to the truth of the condition, and, through Badeau, says:

"When the idea became known to those in his intimacy to his staff and to his corps commanders, it seemed to them full of danger. To move his army below Vicksburg was to separate it from the North and from all its supplies; to throw what seemed an insurmountable obstacle between himself and his own base; to cut his communications and to place his army exactly where it is the whole object and aim of war to get the enemy."

All the generals were alarmed; Sherman, especially, was excited. "All strove," says the guileless Badeau, "within the limits of soldierly subordination to divert their chief from what they considered a fatal error." He continues:

"Even after the orders for the movement had been issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's head-quarters and pro-

posed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, that the only way to take Vicksburg was from the north, selecting some high ground on the Mississippi for a base. Grant replied that such a plan would require him to go back to Memphis. 'Exactly so,' said Sherman, 'that is what I mean.'"

Sherman followed his verbal protest with a letter to the same end addressed to Grant's chief of staff. Grant read the letter in silence. The man who had moved his army down the Mississippi because of his jealousy of a political general after Sherman had demonstrated that Vicksburg could not be taken at the front from the river, well knew that if, at the end of the terrible loss of men and means, he returned to Memphis, he would be relegated to the obscurity from which he had so recently emerged.

Some move had to be made. Grant, in his military biography edited by Badeau, states the situation fairly in a paragraph written to show that he was in no worse condition than the other generals in command. There is a slight historical inaccuracy in his claiming Corinth and Iuka as his temples and designating Banks' forces as a mammoth expedition, when the fact was that Banks had but thirty thousand men holding the lower Mississippi against a capable active Confederate commander, supplied with troops liberated from Vicksburg by Grant's bottled condition. But these inaccuracies are so trivial in comparison with others that we can well let them pass. He says:

"Indeed, it is not surprising that the government should have urged him on. No substantial victory had cheered the flagging spirits of the North since Grant's own successes at Corinth and Iuka of the preceding autumn. Banks had achieved no military results with his mammoth expedition; Burnside, in December, had suffered the repulse of Fredericksburg; Rosecrans had not got further than Murfreesboro, and the great force of 60,000 or 70,000 men at Grant's disposal had accomplished absolutely nothing during six long, weary months of effort and delay."

We have to remember, however, that the Army of the Potomac, that of the Cumberland, and of Banks at New Orleans, were all organized for practical movements forward,

while the seventy thousand men under Grant⁴ were digging their own graves in a hopeless position his incompetence provided. So hopeless was this, that when his Port Hudson plan was developed, there came a revolt against it from all his subordinate generals.

We have referred to the fact that it was Grant, and not, as generally believed, Rosecrans, whose helpless inactivity relieved the Confederates of one great army. This hero of disaster admits that the army, in the beginning of the canal digging, bayou clearing, and general swamp life, numbered a hundred and thirty thousand men, and at the time the above paragraph referred to was reduced, without fighting, to sixty or seventy thousand. As to liberating Confederates from his front, he writes Halleck, 27th March, that the forces were not to exceed ten thousand in the city (Vicksburg) to-day. Thus, in a masterly movement, that is compared to that of Napoleon at Ulm, he had so arranged as to be with sixty or seventy thousand men fastened to a front manned only by ten thousand, but equal under the circumstances to a hundred thousand. Now, not only were the Confederates relieved, but our armies were drained to continue the supply of fever-stricken and swamp-suffering men under this man so superior to Napoleon at Ulm.

At intervals few and far between, we strike a truth in this singularly erroneous military life prepared by Badeau from material supplied by Grant, such, for instance, as the following, written to Halleck as late as the 4th of April:

"From information from the South by way Corinth, I learn that the enemy in front of Rosecrans have been reinforced from Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicksburg. They have also collected a large cavalry force of 20,000 men. All the bridges eastward from Savannah (Tenn.) and north from Florence are being rapidly repaired. Chalmers is put in command of North Mississippi, and is collecting all the partisan rangers and loose independent companies of cavalry that have been operating in this department. He is now occupying the line of the Tallahatchie. This portends preparations to attack Rosecrans,

and to be able to follow up any success with rapidity. Also, to make a simultaneous raid into West Tennessee, both from Mississippi and by crossing the Tennessee river."

The "few taken from Vicksburg" amounted in number to an army of thirty thousand men.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Port Hudson Plan of Escape from before Vicksburg—Running Steamers Past the Batteries—McClelland Forces the Evacuation of Grand Gulf and Port Gibson—Grant Fails to Follow Up the Advantage, and Moves Off in a Raid on Jackson—Pemberton Moves Out of Vicksburg, Intending to Form a Junction with Johnston and Attack Grant's Rear—Bloody Battle of Champion's Hill—Pemberton Retreats into Vicksburg—The Assaults and Horrible Loss—The Wounded Left to Die and the Dead to Rot—Pemberton Surrenders—Fearful Cost of the Questionable Advantage.

The newspaper historians and the egotistical memoirs of the brainless bullet-heads, as the great Hawthorne designated a majority of our generals, are so occupied with military operations that they take no note of the men at the head of the government upon whom fell the great responsibility of conducting the conflict to a successful issue. The time the stolid and ignorant soldier was advising Halleck of the perilous condition of the Union armies, April 4, 1863, was the darkest period of the war. That ablest of our diplomatic statesmen, William H. Seward, of the State Department, had days of anxiety and nights bereft of sleep over the threatening attitude of Europe toward us. Our war was being carried on in the cabinets abroad. Recognition of the Richmond government was threatened hourly. Its fatal result would have been swift and conclusive. It looked to the French and Russian powers, the most forward and potent against us, that the revolted states would win without their hazardous interference. No less heavy was the task assigned Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury. The fearful outlay of a million a day to keep our armies in the field upon loans from the people, for capital that is ever selfish, timid, and unpatriotic, held aloof, and these loans in the shape of currency, being the credit of an imperiled government, continued to depreciate until, at the time of which we write, the premium on gold reached seventy-two, and bade fair ere long to leave the paper money without value. The government,

of course, was bidding against itself in purchases that an almost worthless currency steadily augmented. Edwin M. Stanton, a strange compound of ill-temper, vindictive prejudices, lofty patriotism, and eminent ability, a man of errors but no weaknesses, had the task of conducting a war in which he had, as he claimed, no generals, but a vast army of men under muskets, the bravest and best God ever gave to a people. Back of, and more fatal, because insiduously sapping the very foundation of popular faith, was a disloyal sentiment at the North that fed and fattened on disaster, and day by day, slowly but surely, honey-combed the faith that held Lincoln's administration at Washington and our armies in the field. These eminent men, with the most eminent at their head, bore the strain of this terrible burden to the end. "The coarse, tough fiber of the greatest man with which our country was ever blessed not only enabled him to live through the heavy responsibility of his task, but lifted him above depression and the fatal effects of panics. It was this condition at Washington that enabled Washburne to keep the most incapable of our commanders at the head of an army being wasted in swamps and bayous. He was from Illinois, Lincoln's own state, and he knew the popular power this sagacious leader held. Then, again, Grant did not seem more unfortunate than the other commanders. Lincoln said, with his usual quaintness, that selecting a general "was like putting one's hand in a sack to get one eel from a dozen snakes."

But popular patience was drawing to a close. Army correspondents for public journals writing from the horrible fever-stricken camps of Grant's army, although petted and winced, could not be controlled. Members of Congress began working their way to the front. The same law-makers, discontented, thronged the executive mansion at Washington, while the mails came laden with letters from people having sons and brothers dead or dying of malaria.

Some sort of a movement became a necessity. This was resolved on in the Port Hudson plan, that meant, if successful, to get the entire army from before Vicksburg down to Banks, at New Orleans. The man who resembled Napoleon

at Ulm persisted. Orders were issued "in the last week of March" for concentration of all the forces at Milliken's Bend. Hurlbut, at Memphis, was stripped of every man that could be spared from the rear; yawls and flatboats were collected from St. Louis and Chicago, and, on the 28th of March, McClernand was sent, by the circuitous roads that lead from Milliken's Bend by way of Richmond and west of Roundaway Bayou, to New Carthage, twenty-seven miles below. McPherson and Sherman were to follow as rapidly as ammunition and rations could be forwarded.

The canal called the Duckport, through the looping Walnut Bayou to Bayou Vidal, had not been completed; supplies were to follow as soon as the canal was opened. The troops moved in light marching order, with only ten days rations in their haversacks. The road, if it could be called such, along which the troops were to march, had to be built of rough logs to keep the horses and wagons from sinking hub deep in the soft mud. In addition to the road bed of logs, over two thousand feet of bridging had to be built, and to get seventy thousand men of all arms, with the necessary transportation of ammunition and food, along such a causeway was so hopeless that Grant relied altogether on the canal he was digging to open water transportation. The canal was at last completed, but not opened, for suddenly a situation presented itself that was more ludicrous than any ever devised for opera-bouffe. McClernand, with twenty thousand men wading through swamps and swimming bayous, was busy constructing the sixty miles of road. Now, this rough causeway was but a few inches above the level of the water, and to open the canal was to pour in on this pioneer corps a flood that would sweep it off in four feet of water. The great engineer had not perceived this until he was about to open the line. He was forced to wait until the high water of the Mississippi subsided, and then he had another ludicrous surprise. There was not enough water in the canal to float a shingle. And so the waterway for easy transportation dropped out, and with it disappeared the Port Hudson project.

Again our commander met face to face the fact that his

only course out of his half-year's vain struggle with the impossible was to confess his failures and return his army to Memphis and himself to Galena. A man of any thing like a sensitive temperament would have long since acknowledged his failure and asked to be relieved. Grant was not of that sort. So long as the political influence at Washington availed him so long would he hold the unfortunate army to death by fevers in front of Vicksburg. The country, however, had to be kept interested in fresh events, and now one presented itself that might with a better hope of success have been tried in the beginning. This project was to run past the batteries at night with gunboats and steamers laden with men and supplies. Such perilous attempts had been made successful by iron-clads, but now it was proposed to use the light built ungarded steamboats of the Mississippi. Three of these were selected and partly protected by bales of cotton and wet hay. These were escorted by one wooden and six iron-clad gunboats. These were to "run past twenty-eight heavy guns that commanded the river for eighteen miles." Illustrating the sort of men in our volunteer ranks the brave fellows turned over to Grant, not as food for powder, but food for fevers, small-pox and measles, we quote from Badeau's Grant, the following :

"Only two of the steamboat masters were willing to encounter the danger; the crew of one transport (barge) also remained aboard, but all others shrank. When, however, it became known in the army that volunteers were wanted for the dangerous task, men enough to man a hundred steamers pressed themselves upon the commanders; pilots, masters, engineers and men all were found in the ranks and among the officers on shore, and from these crews were speedily improvised for the transport fleet."

The Confederates, soon discerning our attempt, lit the river with huge fires, in some instances houses, and poured in upon the passing fleet an incessant fire. The damage inflicted is left in great obscurity. We know that of the three steamboats but one escaped, and as the barges or transports, as they were called, were cut loose from the steamers and gunboats the moment they came under fire they were left to

a current of from five to six miles an hour to float slowly by the death dealing shells of the enemy. Badeau reluctantly admits a little light upon the affair by telling of an old rebel in whose house McClernand made his head-quarters at New Carthage. This aged son of the South was openly rejoicing at the entire destruction of our venturesome fleet. "By daylight, however," writes Badeau, "the wrecks had all passed by and after awhile a gunboat appeared below the line and then a transport; then one after another the whole fleet of iron-clads and army steamers hove in sight from their perilous passage."

As but three steamers had started, and two were destroyed, the use of the plural is as obscure as the sentence which says "the wrecks had all passed by." In Grant's memoirs which supplement Badeau's military life and are evidently by the same hand, we learn that the hideous resolve to remain with his army upon the river front of Vicksburg for nearly half a year without a practical move or a blow in battle came of a patriotic desire to sustain the administration and strengthen the hearts of the people by pretended moves forward "to a great victory." This is queer reading to all who remember that the most desponding event that chilled the North, arrested volunteering and gave political victory to the war opponents was Grant's encamped condition before Vicksburg. This throughout the press was attributed to the commander's incapacity and unfortunate alcoholic habits. Perhaps it was this same motive not to discourage the war sentiment that made him conceal his losses on all occasions. That a greater part of the barges or transports were sunk and the brave men who had volunteered to man them found their graves in the mud of the Mississippi can not be questioned. The loss being carefully concealed Grant reports to Halleck: "Our experiment of running the batteries at Vicksburg, has demonstrated the entire practicability of doing so with but little risk."

As we have said, what was accomplished with a great loss in the end, could have been done almost without loss in the beginning. If one, or at the farthest, two months, of the time spent in hopeless canal digging and bayou explor-

ing had been given to preparing iron-clads, the batteries at Vicksburg could have been run with the same success that attended like attempts elsewhere.

As we have a large number of sensible people, quite intelligent and reasonable when apart from political prejudices, who insist upon it that this hero of fevers, small-pox, and measles, was a clear-brained, thoughtful man, who projected his mind from the complications of the present into the future of success, it is well to turn to his own record, made up in communications to Halleck, at Washington. We have seen that while digging the canal across the peninsula, he claims to have predicted its failure. And yet he continued to dig to the end. Of the attempt by the Duckport canal to cut a waterway to New Carthage, we learn from Grant, as seen through Badeau, that at a very early day he saw and prophesied its failure. This is contradicted by a letter from Grant as late as the 12th of April, when he says that he then believed fully in the waterway, and he gives two reasons for not availing himself of its immediate use. The first is that he has not suitable vessels for the purpose, and second, given after a return from Smith's plantation, to Halleck, dated April 19, is embodied in his statement that "by clearing out the bayous from timber, there will be good navigation from here to New Carthage for tugs and barges, also small stern-wheel steamers. The navigation can be kept good, I think, by using our dredges constantly until there is twenty feet fall." He throws an anchor to the windward by adding: "On this subject, however, I have not taken the opinion of an engineer officer, nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant me in speaking positively."

This was a singular confession from a commander who, at the time, based the entire campaign and the saving of his army upon the very project he had failed to consult competent officers upon, or to investigate himself.

Three days after, however, he seems to have investigated, for he writes Sherman, 24th of April, before he gave the water route a trial, "The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly, out of all proportion to the fall in the river, so that

it is exceedingly doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purpose of navigation."

There does not seem to have been much anxiety to keep the government at Washington advised of the real condition of our army at Vicksburg. Perhaps it was the same patriotic desire to avoid depression that kept the army swamped and dying there rather than by a movement back to Memphis, take up again a sensible campaign abandoned six months before for the sole purpose of heading off a "political general." While Grant kept the War Department at Washington in ignorance of his situation, he seems to have treated himself to a like condition in regard to his front. While McClernand's forces were toiling in the mud, strung along for twenty miles, and not yet provided with means to cross intervening bayous that were overflowed to transport an army and supplies for the purpose of taking Grand Gulf, Grant was pleased to treat himself to the belief that Grand Gulf had fallen, or if not, that such success was only a question of short time. Thus, on the 13th, Grant cautioned McClernand: "It is not desirable that you should move in any direction from Grand Gulf, but remain under protection of the gun-boats."

It seems to have been Job's greatest affliction that brought Grant to a knowledge of his front. Porter wrote him that he could not harmonize with the "political general," and Badeau informs us that his general, although afflicted with boils, rode forty miles to Porter's landing, and then gave McClernand further instruction. The fact is that he rode but twenty miles. This, however, was sufficient for the ride and boils to stimulate his military mind to the necessity he was under to command his army at the front. He found that instead of McClernand taking Grand Gulf, his entire force was strung along between Richmond and New Carthage. Grant also learned that the greater number of the barges he had sent to run the blockade had either been knocked to pieces and sunk, or had floated down to a possession of the enemy, and that even if he had his army on the river he lacked boats to carry it across to an attack on Grand Gulf.

Again the murderous process of sending unprotected boats to run the batteries was tried. Grant dispatched to Halleck the 23d of April:

"Six boats and a number of barges ran the Vicksburg batteries last night. All the boats got by more or less damaged. The *Tigress* sank at 3 A. M., and is a total loss—crew all saved. The *Moderator* was much damaged. I think all the barges went through safely. . . . Casualties, so far as reported, two men mortally wounded and several (number not known) more or less severely wounded. About 500 shots were fired. I look upon this as a great success."

Badeau narrates the affair more succinctly, save that in this place he calls the steamboats transports:

"On the 28th of April, six other transports (steamboats) attempted to run by the Vicksburg batteries; five of them succeeded, although in a damaged condition; one was sunk by being struck in the hull by a solid shot. The crews of all the transports (steamboats), like those of their predecessors, were composed of volunteers for the purpose from the army. Twelve barges, laden with forage and rations, were sent in tow of the last six steamers, and half of them got safely by."

Six of the twelve barges, laden with supplies, went down to form the Mississippi delta, likewise one steamboat, which carried the hospital stores, preparatory to the Grand Gulf action. This was a dear way of supplying a great army, and this was to be the way until the Port Hudson expedition was over. But Uncle Sam was rich and Grant said it was a great success. And none of these steamers or barges could return for another load.

A ship-yard was set up for repairs. In this, again, we have a hint at the quality of these volunteers:

"Mechanics were found in the army to do the work; for it was a striking feature of the volunteer service throughout the war that no mechanical or professional need arose when accomplished adepts could not be found in almost any regiment to perform the duty required."

The following shows that there is no mistake as to the amount of destruction, and also the next move:

"The army craft was soon in a condition to be of use

in moving troops; but the destruction of two transports and six barges reduced the number so that it was found necessary to march them from Perkins' Plantation to Hard Times, twenty-two miles further and a distance of seventy miles from Milliken's Bend."

After running the batteries of Vicksburg at a fearful loss of men and material, as we have seen, it was determined, as a part of the latest plan to get away from Vicksburg, to take the Grand Gulf fortification by storm. Fortunately the initiative in this desperate project was taken by the gunboats under Porter. A few minutes' work demonstrated that Grand Gulf was more impregnable from the river front than Vicksburg itself. Porter's boats were badly battered and had to be hauled off, thankful that they were not sunk. Had this been accompanied by an assault by infantry, two thousand would probably have been killed and crippled as at Chickasaw Bluffs when Sherman tried conclusions with the impossible.

This failure made the latest project of how to get away impracticable, and a new campaign had to be thought of. The future was as desperate as the past was gloomy. The water route being abandoned, the only means of supply to fifty thousand men was by the road from Milliken's Bend built by McClermand's twenty thousand, seventy miles in length, so nearly impassable that the air was heavy with the odor of decaying mules killed in the labor imposed upon them. At this critical moment a bit of information came, Grant claims, to him from an intelligent contraband. McClermand asserts that it was his through right of discovery. It was to the effect that at an obscure village on the east bank of the Mississippi, called Bruninsburg, there was not only a landing, but a road on high ground that led to the rear of Vicksburg. McClermand, in his report, tells how, when road making, he kept on foot a series of explorations that included every part of the river and was accompanied by skirmishes with bodies of Confederates that sought to impede his slow and heavy engineering and explorations. But McClermand was a "political general" of vaulting am-

bition and exasperating conceit, so that it was better to rely on the intelligent but mysterious contraband.

Bruinsburg was seized and the road referred to found to be singularly favorable. The Port Hudson scheme of retreat was abandoned in mind as it had been abandoned in matter. The half year's dismal problem had been solved. Grant was on the east side of the river at last, and the formidable batteries turned. That which might have been done by a campaign along the Mississippi Central nearly half a year before was accomplished, and Grant found himself with at least fifty thousand men against Pemberton's twenty thousand, for such was the force of the enemy hastily called together when it was discerned that the Union forces had run the batteries with enough boats to ferry our army across the river. The Confederates were caught unprepared. The strange fact that the second grand army of the Union had been kept in the swamps and bayous, where ten thousand Confederates were equal to a hundred thousand, misled the authorities at Richmond. They thought the stupidity that inaugurated that strange monstrosity would continue available to the end. They did not fully appreciate tenacity of fool purpose, and the very stupidity on which the Confederates built proved their defeat in the end.

Grant lost no time in seizing on the chance that had so strangely been thrown to him when, utterly bewildered and desperate, McClernand's forces were pushed forward to the interior. About seven miles from Bruinsburg, they encountered a thin line of about a thousand men. In brushing this aside, they met some five thousand under General Bowen. A brisk engagement followed that ended in a victory to the heavier force under McClernand. This success forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, the troops in the two fortifications being called to the support of Pemberton. The unexpected had again happened. That Grant, instead of dying with his thousands on the river front of Vicksburg or retreating up the Mississippi with the forlorn remnant of his army to Memphis, should construct a wretched road from Milliken's Bend nearly seventy miles for his army and supply wagons to march over and then run

enough steam and gunboats by the batteries of Vicksburg to ferry his army across the river, seemed as wildly impossible as his past six months' operation. And now that the way was open to Vicksburg through a defeat of Pemberton, he was attacked with a blindness more amazing than his previous helplessness. The golden moment of a quick, decisive seizure of the chances given him was strangely lost. As we have seen, the Confederate government, relying on the natural and artificial strength of Vicksburg from the river, and satisfied that Grant could release himself only by falling back to Memphis, and that such a move would give them full time to gather an army at his front, left at Vicksburg only enough men to man the works, some ten thousand in number. Now a new phase was put upon the condition, and Pemberton was calling frantically for troops and praying for delay on our part to concentrate his forces for the field.


The prayer offered God was complied with by Grant. Instead of moving on Pemberton, Grant marched from the Confederates in a raid upon Jackson.

We can not better state that cause of delay than by quoting from Mr. Samuel Rockwell Reed's book entitled "The Vicksburg Campaign." On page 58 we find this:

"A distinct idea of the field of operation is essential to the understanding of the strategic movements now to be made. Attention to a few points of outline will enable the reader to carry it in mind as well as if he had the map before him. Hankinson's Ferry, now a bridge on the Big Black river, was Grant's point of departure, and had been the place from which he dated his head-quarters since the 3d.

"From Hankinson's Ferry due north over the upland to Vicksburg is fifteen miles. From Vicksburg due east to Jackson, to which was a railroad, is forty miles. From Hankinson's Ferry east-north-east to Jackson is forty-five miles. This boundary incloses the whole field of Grant's and Pemberton's operations. The outline is that of a long right-angle triangle, the perpendicular side being from Hankinson's to Vicksburg, the base side from Vicksburg to Jackson, the hypotenuse from Jackson to the ferry; or say like a

wedge, supposing the slant to be all on one side, the butt being at the ferry and Vicksburg, and the straight side from Vicksburg to Jackson. The following diagram gives the shape and proportions of the field of operations:



"This is the theater of the war. The main natural feature crossing it is Big Black river, which, coming down south-west, crosses the railroad ten miles east of Vicksburg, and on down to Hankinson's Ferry, and to the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. Five miles east of Big Black, on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad is Edwards' Station, soon to be historical. About seven and a half miles east of this is Champion's Hill, soon to be called by the soldiers "the hill of death;" a little way east of this, Bolton Station; then, nearly nine miles east, Clinton; from there to Jackson is about nine miles. On diverging and converging roads from Hankinson's to Jackson, along the hypotenuse, are Rocky Springs, Utica, Cayuga, Auburn, New Auburn, Raymond and Mississippi Springs. The diagram is on the direct lines. The actual distance from Vicksburg to Jackson by the railroad is forty-four miles; from Hankinson's Ferry to Jackson by the common roads nearly fifty miles. From Hankinson's to Vicksburg, or to the railroad in the rear of Vicksburg, there need not be more than a mile or two variation from the direct line of fifteen miles.

"Grant's immediate base is at Hankinson's Ferry. His objective is Pemberton's army, covering Vicksburg, its line of communication being the railroad to Jackson. A march of fifteen miles from Hankinson's Ferry would bring Grant's army upon this railroad and compel Pemberton to come out to fight a battle for his communications or be shut up in Vicksburg without an effort. Badeau says Grant estimated

Pemberton's forces at thirty thousand. Grant was not subject to the military fault of underrating the number opposed to him. At Pittsburg Landing he sent word to Buell that he was attacked by one hundred thousand men.

"Of this estimated thirty thousand Grant reported that he had engaged eleven thousand at Port Gibson, and had 'entirely routed' and 'thoroughly demoralized' them. The route direct to Vicksburg from Hankinson's Ferry had the line of bluff on the one hand, which, with the wet bottoms beyond, formed a rampart for the left flank and rear, all the way to Vicksburg. On the other hand, the Big Black river offered a natural intrenchment for the right flank and rear all the way. The route would be over a rolling country of plantations and roads, and with no serious natural obstacles.

"The route taking Warrenton by the rear, the Confederates would have to depart therefrom as soon as the march began. At Warrenton, Grant would strike the river a little way below the lower end of this canal across the tongue of land opposite Vicksburg, whereby the wagoning of his supplies from Milliken's Bend and Young's Point would be reduced to three miles, by a road now practicable. Thus a march of ten miles to Warrenton would fetch him back to his base of supplies and re-inforcements. This would relieve all the troops that were guarding the land route of sixty miles, round by way of Richmond to Hard Times, and would add these to his fighting force.

"The defeat of Pemberton in a pitched battle, while covering Vicksburg, might be expected to carry with it the immediate fall of the place, without the dreadful labor and consuming of the army by a siege. Then Grant could turn his army east, scatter the ineffectual force at Jackson, and make that his base of operations. General J. E. Johnston's narrative shows that he expected Grant to do this, and he said that Grant's occupation of Jackson was the loss of the State of Mississippi. It appears that at first Grant contemplated the direct line, for he wrote Sherman, then at Grand Gulf, May 7th: 'If Blair was now up I believe we

could be in Vicksburg in seven days.' Blair had only two brigades, and was on the way from Milliken's Bend.

"To march, however, from Hankinson's Ferry, fifteen miles, upon the communications of Pemberton's army, covering Vicksburg, and deciding the fate of the Confederate army and of Vicksburg in one battle, would be so direct and obvious that it could hardly be called any thing higher than a grand tactical movement. It is what any general would do if he thought he could beat the opposing army. And in general, when a commander enters on an invading campaign, he thinks he can beat the enemy's army.

"It is such a direct and obvious movement as Bonaparte would have made, or Frederick the Great, but it would not be strategic in the highest degree. But to depart from a direct line of fifteen miles, and to march fifty miles to Jackson, lengthening it by zigzag marches to seventy, and then back, leaving the enemy covering Vicksburg—this is high strategy.

"This is that which raised General Grant's military fame to its zenith. In explaining this strategy, Badeau takes the common mind into the uppermost realms of the military art. The general and overruling reason was in Grant's nature, as he has before stated: 'It was his nature in war always to prefer the immediate aggressive.' Therefore, he went to Jackson and back, when the enemy was in his immediate front. But Badeau has also an abundance of particular reasons.

"Badeau concedes the apparent advantages of the direct or tactical line, but he mentions a serious obstacle. 'Apparently, Grant's most natural course was to march direct upon Vicksburg, and at once begin the seige, or at least attack its garrison, should that come out to meet him. He was not more than twelve (ten) miles from Warrenton, and had only one formidable obstacle to encounter, the Big Black river, the line of which would probably be taken by any enemy opposing him.'

"The adage celebrates the short memories of truthful historians. After Adam Badeau has had Grant for several days in possession of the crossing of the Big Black river, and

after McPherson, on the 4th, had made reconnaissance north along the west side of the Big Black to within six miles of Vicksburg, and had found no enemy, he restores the Confederate army to the Big Black river, in front of Grant, as a 'formidable natural obstacle' which Grant would have to encounter, with the Confederate army holding it, if he went by the direct road.

"The statement of this reason by Adam Badeau, approved by Grant, is an indication of the abundance of reasons Grant had for leaving a direct way of fifteen miles, and going around one hundred and fifty miles to avoid the enemy at Vicksburg. The other reason is that General Gregg was 'collecting another force toward the east and north, of whose strength Grant was not well informed.' Therefore, he resolved to go east, 'to drive eastward the weaker one' before the two could unite. Then he would seize Jackson, destroy the railroads there, and thus would have 'Vicksburg and its garrison isolated from the would-be Confederacy.'

"That no force arrived at Jackson or on the east till the 10th, only distinguishes Grant's foresight in making the immediate objective of his plan a reinforcement which might come on the east if he waited for it. That the Confederate forces at Vicksburg and Jackson, having the inner line, could unite by moving half the distance which Grant marched to prevent them, might be a consideration in war as practiced in the old world; but Adam Badeau says that Grant's military methods were original; that 'his mind, indeed, was never much inclined to follow precedents, or to set store by rules; he was not apt to study the means by which other men had succeeded; he seldom discussed the campaigns of great commanders of European wars, and was utterly indifferent to precept or example whenever these seemed to him inapplicable.' And he was 'not apt to study' these; they were always inapplicable."

A more admirable statement of the situation could not be made. There is no profit to be found in following the senseless marches and impotent raids that put the anxious Pemberton on the flank, leaving him the inner line and all the time he could ask to concentrate his forces and take the

field. Grant marched away from Pemberton, and found so few Confederates at Jackson, that his capture of the place could scarcely be called an engagement. Grant's blind movements seemed to puzzle both Pemberton and Johnston. The one in command of some six thousand men, the other with only eighteen thousand, moved on a false scent, striving to determine what the Yankee general was aiming to accomplish. It resembled a skilled fencer fighting with a left-handed opponent, or, rather, one who knew nothing of fence. Grant destroyed the stores at Jackson, and immediately sought by a return to secure what he had so strangely abandoned, some point on the Mississippi that he could make a base of supply. While seeking to accomplish this, he considered it necessary to brush aside an enemy that was not in his way. There was no Confederate force in Mississippi then or at any time thereafter sufficient to cope with the seventy thousand men under Grant. It was the only hope of Pemberton to gather all the troops available, and make a desperate and hopeless resistance to the enemy. It was thus, while the two opposing armies were blindly feeling their way, one full of needless apprehension, the other in despair, that they encountered by chance, and the bloody battle of Champion's Hill went into history as the hill of death.

When Pemberton discovered that Grant had abandoned his base upon the Mississippi, and moved on Jackson, thereby no longer threatening Vicksburg, he came, in common with Johnston, to the conclusion that, instead of a new raid, our general sought to make Jackson his head-quarters, and from there open communication with Memphis. This presented itself to the military mind as a sensible maneuver, only second in importance to Grant's original plan of campaign from Memphis to the interior of Mississippi that was deflected, as we have seen, by the loss of stores at Holly Springs and the presence of McClernand, commissioned by the President to open the Mississippi. Taking this view of the situation, Pemberton concentrated his forces, eighteen thousand in all, and moved out from Vicksburg and the Big Black to form a junction with Johnston and make an attack on Grant's rear. He failed in both. Embarrassed by floods that carried

away bridges, instead of a direct march to where he expected to meet Johnston, he lost valuable time in a retrograde movement in search of bridges. While resting his troops, three and a half miles from Edward's Station, he received the following from Johnston:

"Banton Road, Ten Miles from Jackson, May 18, 1863, 8:30 o'clock A. M.—Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that point with about 6,000. I have no means of estimating the enemy's force at Jackson. The principal officers here differ very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him. Let me hear from you immediately. . . ."

Seeking to comply with this and marching on to Clinton, he came, much to his astonishment, not on Grant's rear, but on the head of his column moving west. Pemberton's amazement was only equaled by Grant's, when he heard the roar of an artillery duel at his front. He claims, through Badeau, to have been aware of Pemberton's movement from the Big Black, but as the disposition of his entire force looked to an attack on his left flank and rear from Johnston, we can well believe that his first notice of Pemberton's presence came from his guns. This apprehension of danger from Johnston, as we shall see, saved Pemberton's entire force from being captured. Pemberton, in his dispatch to Johnston, puts the number of his force at seventeen thousand men. With this little army he had to encounter a force, well in hand, that Grant, through Badeau, puts at forty-five thousand men. As Pemberton's dispatch was to Johnston, we can believe that he states the truth. But, as General Thomas was wont to say, "what is the good of a hundred thousand men when you can fight only a thousand?" Grant had force enough to flank, envelope, and capture Pemberton's little army without firing a gun or losing a man. Pemberton, finding the scrape into which fate had forced him, with an eye of a soldier—and he was every inch of him that—seized on a position which Grant described as follows:

"The enemy was strongly posted with his left on a high

wooded ridge called Champion Hills, over which the road to Edward's Station runs, making a sharp turn to the south as it strikes the hills. This ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surrounding country, and is the highest land for many miles around. The topmost point is bald and gave the rebels a commanding position for their artillery, but the remainder of the crest, as well as a precipitous hillside to the east of the road, is covered by a dense forest and undergrowth and scarred with deep ravines, through whose entanglements troops could pass only with extreme difficulty."

This describes a natural fortress. Further along he narrates that the deep-cut road running along the crest of the ridge, then turning and running across and down to the west, made an intrenchment for the Confederates when driven to and along the top.

"To the north, the timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields in a gentle slope toward Baker's creek, almost a mile away. The rebel lines ran southward along the crest, its center covering the middle road from Raymond, while the extreme right was on the direct or southern road. The whole line was about four miles long."

We have said that Pemberton seized on this natural projection rising above and commanding the level country of roads and ravines on all sides, with the eye of a soldier. He must have known that Champion's Hill covered nothing, and with such a superior force gathering at his front, right, and left, he was in imminent danger of being surrounded and captured. This movement, therefore, was only to give the enemy so serious a check that he could retreat without serious loss. To his amazement and much to his comfort, Grant accepted the challenge given him, instead of engaging the Confederate's attention by an artillery duel, and moving to his rear by a road upon which Logan eventually stumbled and from which he was recalled just in time to permit Pemberton's defeated army to retreat without loss. There was no earthly occasion for an assault on Pemberton's front by infantry. But as Grant informs us, through Badeau, he discovered that "Champion's Hill, on the rebel left, was evi-

dently the key to the whole situation," and, as it was the strongest, the place to attack. Here is the story as told by Grant:

"A vigorous effort on the part of McClernand would have accomplished the defeat by noon. . . . Or, later in the fight, Logan could have kept in their rear, if McClernand had come up in time, and, with all their retreat cut off, the enemy might have been forced to surrender in mass."

This is all very well for an afterthought, but the records are against the statement. Grant was not so much concerned about the attack on Pemberton as he was apprehensive of one on his flank and rear from the southern road by an imaginary army under Johnston. Hovey's division, less in number than Pemberton's so strongly posted, was in position to move up and be slaughtered, as it eventually was, when Grant heard from McClernand. He now tells us, through Badeau and in his memoirs, that "staff officers were sent to him (McClernand) at once to push forward with all rapidity; but by the nearest practicable route of communication he was at least two and a half miles away." The cold, brutal record tells us the sort of "push forward" that was expected of the "political general." At fifteen minutes past 10 A. M., Grant sent him written orders: "From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the army are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey and can support him at any point. Close up your forces as expeditiously as possible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be permitted to get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair and Ransom, do so, and direct them to come up to your support by the most expeditious route."

This written order is conclusive as to Grant's condition of mind at the time, and that while fighting on the defensive, left to the enemy abundance of time to slaughter his weight in Union soldiers, and thus get away from a defeat that in consequences that followed, was equal to a victory. There is other evidence equally conclusive, such for example as that shown in Grant's orders to Ransom's brigade of Arthur's division of McPherson's corps, then coming up from Grand Gulf. Says Grant, through Badeau: "Grant there-

fore directed Ransom to move his command so as to join the forces north of him by the first road leading northward. Enemy are reported as having sent a column to our left and rear. Avoid being cut off."

Grant was on the defensive. In command of forty-five thousand men, with only seventeen thousand at his front, he disposed his forces to repel an imaginary enemy of vast proportions in his rear. The "political general" who, obeying orders to watch his flank and rear, approached as directed, cautiously, and was, therefore, held responsible for the safety of Pemberton's army, did not seem to share in the troubled dream of an impossible enemy. McClernand says in his report, that he rode to Grant's head-quarters early that morning to ask that McPherson support Hovey, "urging among other things, that if his corps should not be needed as a support, it might in the event that I should beat the enemy, fall upon his flank and rear and cut him off. Assurances altogether satisfactory were given by the general, and I felt confident of our superiority on the right. I went forward with the center formed by Osterhaus and Carr."

We can not do better in giving a history of this extraordinary battle than to accept the account and keen analysis of the late Samuel R. Reed, whose disposal of Grant as a capable general on this occasion has been ignored, no man venturing to controvert the facts or question the criticisms. Reed says:

"Thus did Grant order the battle defensively under the belief that he was in danger of being taken in the rear and cut off from a return to Grand Gulf, and thus his attack on the Confederates left at Champion's Hill was to make a diversion from that danger. Badeau now begins the battle against the fortress of Champion's Hill.

"Continuous fighting had been kept up all the morning between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, and by eleven o'clock this grew into a battle. At this time Hovey's division was deployed to move westward against the hill, the two brigades of Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the open field, facing the northern side of the ridge, and only about four hundred yards from the enemy,

Logan's front, and the main front of Hovey's division being nearly at right angles with each other.

“As Hovey advanced his line conformed to the shape of the hill, and became crescent like, the concave toward the hill. McPherson (Logan) now posted two batteries on his extreme right, and well advanced. These poured a destructive enfilading fire upon the enemy, under cover of which the national line began to mount the hill. (No enfilading fire could cover the movement of Hovey's crescent line up the end of the ridge). The enemy at once replied with a murderous discharge of musketry, and the battle soon raged hotly all along the line from Hovey's extreme left to the right of Logan; but Hovey pushed steadily on and drove the rebels back six hundred yards till eleven guns and three hundred prisoners were captured, and the brow of the height was gained.’

“When a division has stormed such a natural fortress, and has taken ‘the key to the whole position,’ by that which was equivalent to carrying strong entrenchments by assault, it might naturally be expected that the commanding general, who was observing this, would have support at hand to carry this forward and make this ‘key’ turn the whole position. But it was otherwise:

“The road here formed a natural fortification which the rebels made haste to use. It was cut through the crest of the ridge at the steepest part, the bank on the upper side commanding all below so that even when the national troops had apparently gained the road the rebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered from every fire, and masters of the whole declivity. Finding himself, however, in spite of this advantage, losing ground on a point so vitally important, the enemy now pushed re-enforcements rapidly, and when these arrived, rallied under cover of the woods, and poured down the road in great numbers on the position occupied by Hovey.

“For awhile Hovey bore the whole brunt of the battle, and after a desperate resistance was compelled to fall back, though slowly and stubbornly, losing several of the guns he had taken an hour before. But Grant was watching the

fight on the first spur of the hill under fire, and seeing that the enemy was getting too strong for Hovey, he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division, which had just arrived.'

"Hovey's report relates the same incident thus:

"'Brigadier-General Quimby's division, commanded by General Crocker, was near at hand, and had not yet been under fire. I sent to them for support, but, being unknown to the officers of that command, considerable delay ensued, and I was compelled to resort to General Grant to procure the order for their aid. Colonel Boomer, commanding Third Brigade of Quimby's division, on receiving the command from General Grant, came gallantly up the hill; Colonel Holmes, with two small regiments—Tenth Missouri and Seventeenth Iowa—soon followed. The entire force sent amounted to about two thousand men.'

"Badeau continues: 'These fresh troops gave Hovey confidence, and the height that had been gained with fearful loss was still retained. The preponderance, however, was even yet in favor of the enemy.' But Hovey's lack was more of battalions than confidence, and he says:

"'My division, in the meantime, had been compelled to yield ground before overwhelming numbers. Slowly and stubbornly they fell back, contesting with death every inch of the field they had won. Colonel Boomer and Colonel Holmes gallantly and heroically rushed with their commands into the conflict, but the enemy had massed his forces and slowly pressed our whole line with reinforcements backward to a point near the brow of the hill. Here a stubborn stand was made.'

"To resume now Badeau's narrative at the point where Grant sent the reinforcement:

"'Meanwhile the rebels had made a desperate attempt on their left to capture the battery in McPherson's corps which was doing them so much damage; they were, however, promptly repelled by Smith's brigade of Logan's division, which drove them back with great slaughter, capturing many prisoners. Discovering now that his own left was nearly turned, the enemy made a determined effort to turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that commander all his

available force; and while Logan was carrying every thing before him, the closely pressed and nearly exhausted troops of Hovey were again compelled to retire. They had been fighting nearly three hours, and were fatigued and out of ammunition; but fell back doggedly, and not far.'

"Outnumbered, fatigued, and out of ammunition, too, is reason enough. Continues Badeau:

"The tide of battle at this point seemed turning against the National forces, and Hovey sent back repeatedly to Grant for support. Grant, however, was momentarily expecting the advance of McClernand's four divisions, and never doubted the result.'

"Still, more battalions to Hovey, outnumbered and out of ammunition might be as useful at the moment as Grant's never doubting the result.

"But was Grant momentarily expecting this? Badeau continues: 'At thirty minutes past twelve he had again dispatched to McClernand: "As soon as your command is all at hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and McPherson, and will see that they co-operate."'

"So he was promising McClernand that he would see that Hovey co-operated; likewise McPherson. And McClernand, after he had got his men well in hand—which they had been since daylight—was to throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and 'if an opportunity occurred' to attack him in force. He was left to wait for his opportunity.

"Considering what was going on where Grant was 'under fire,' his orders to McClernand seem almost too energetic and peremptory, indicating an undue excitement or the glow of battle. Badeau says: 'That commander, however, did not arrive.' But as Grant, in answer to McClernand's inquiry whether McPherson would support Hovey and whether he should bring on the battle, had sent the above order, following another, telling him that the mass of the enemy was in his (McClernand's) front, aiming to turn his left, Grant could hardly expect him 'to arrive.' And now Badeau continues:

“Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, now directed McPherson to move what troops he could by a left flank around to the enemy's right front on the crest of the ridge. The prolongation of Logan to the right had left a gap between him and Hovey, and into this the two remaining brigades of Crocker were thrown. The movement was promptly executed; Boomer's brigade went at and into the fight, and checked the rebel advance till Holmes' brigade came up, when a dashing charge was made, and Hovey and Crocker were engaged for forty minutes, Hovey recapturing five of the guns he had already taken and lost.’

“Badeau by this has made two affairs of the sending of Boomer and Holmes to Hovey's aid, of which Hovey makes but one. The muddle is explained by Crocker's report, which says that two regiments of Colonel Sanborn's brigade were taken from the right to support Colonel Boomer, and that Colonel Holmes came after. Crocker continues: ‘At this critical moment, Colonel Holmes arrived in the field with two regiments . . . and proceeded . . . to the front, relieving Colonel Boomer, who by this time was out of ammunition.’ This situation on the left of Hovey, and nearest to Grant, was that which impressed him that ‘the position was in danger;’ that is to say, that his right wing was in danger of being turned by its left and cut off.

“Badeau continues: ‘But the enemy had massed his forces on this point, and the irregularity of the ground prevented the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though baffled and enraged, he still fought with courage and obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national line was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the position was in danger.’

“This seems a remarkable achievement of generalship, with 45,000 men at hand against 17,000, desiring only to retreat. And now comes another stroke of generalship. Badeau goes on:

“‘At this crisis, Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division was moved forward at a double quick into a piece of wood on the extreme right of the command; the brigade moved parallel with Logan's general line of battle, charged across the ravines, up the hill, and through an open field, driving

the enemy from an important position, where he was about to establish his batteries, capturing seven guns and several hundred prisoners. The main Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile to the point of intersection with the middle or Raymond road, turns almost to the west again, running down hill and across the valley where Logan was now operating in the rear of the enemy.'

"At length the battle, after slaughtering men for hours in assaulting a steep and broken hill, naturally so strong a position that practically it tripled the enemy's force, had stumbled upon a clear way around the head of the ridge by which Pemberton could be turned and captured. Continues Badeau:

"Unconscious of the immense advantage, Logan swept directly across the road, and absolutely cut off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's Station without being aware of it.'

"But at this juncture, the essential part played by the commanding general in this battle is again to be exemplified.

"At this very juncture, Grant, finding that there was no prospect of McClernand reaching the field (McClernand was following Grant's instructions), and that the scales were still balanced at the critical point, thought himself obliged, in order to still further re-inforce Hovey and Crocker in front, to recall Logan from the right, where he was overlapping and outflanking the rebel left.

"Had the national commander been acquainted with the country, he would, of course, have ordered Logan to push on in the rear of the enemy, and thus secure the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army. But the entire region was new to the national troops (to Grant), and this great opportunity was unknown.'

"And now comes a singular incident, reversing the usual effect. When Logan withdrew from this road, to march by a long circuit to Hovey's left, then the Confederates became alarmed for the road, and gave up the fight. Says Badeau: 'As it was, however, the moment Logan left the road, the enemy, alarmed for his line of retreat, finding it, indeed,

not only threatened, but almost gone, at once abandoned his position in front.'

"But there was a coincidence at the front:

"At this crisis a national battery (Badeau is too delicate to say Hovey's division—in fact three batteries) opened from the right a well directed fire, and the victorious troops of Hovey and Crocker pressing on, the enemy once more gave way; the rebel line was driven back for the third time and the battle decided.'

"But before this consummation, an episode had come off which had an important effect:

"Before the effect of the final charge was known, Logan rode eagerly up to Grant declaring that if one more dash could be made in front, he would advance in the rear and complete the capture of the rebel army. Grant at once rode forward in person, and found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for hours withdrawn from their most advanced positions and refilling their cartridge boxes. Explaining to them the position of Logan's forces, he directed them to use all dispatch and push forward as rapidly as possible.'

"By this it appears that Grant was going to send Logan back to the road from which he had withdrawn him to reinforce Hovey's left, and that he passed by commanding officers and mingled with the soldiers and explained the situation to them and directed them to use all dispatch and make another dash at the enemy. Badeau relates that then—

"He proceeded himself in haste to what had been Pemberton's line, expecting every moment to come up with the enemy, but found the rebels had entirely broken and fled from the field. Logan's attack had precipitated the rout, and the battle of Champion's Hill was won. This was between three and four in the afternoon.'"

The attentive reader of this battle narrative must wonder what made the Confederates "break and fly from the field." Badeau's narrative makes out that General Grant had withdrawn Logan from his attack on their flank and rear, and that Hovey's troops had drawn from their most ad-

vanced position, and, as it appears, were not engaged at the time, as they were "refilling their cartridge boxes," and that Grant went among them and explained Logan's position and directed them to make one more assault, and then himself rode in haste toward Pemberton's line.

Such a suppression of the attack and such retiring movement does not usually cause the strongly placed adversary to break and run. The only explanation suggested of the cause of the sudden turn of the battle to victory at this juncture is Grant and staff, including the redoubtable Badeau, riding in haste to Pemberton's line. This would make at least one instance in which the victory was won, according to the battle pictures, by a cunning commanding general riding furiously at the enemy's ranks. Perhaps, however, by going back to the next preceding citation, and adding thereto Hovey's and Crocker's reports and the fact that Logan continued to attack, an idea may be had of the cause of Pemberton's giving up the battle.

By referring back to Hovey's account of what followed when he had been reinforced from Crocker's divisions, it will be seen that, before reinforcements arrived, his division had been forced to give ground, and that this continued thereafter till all had been driven back to the brow of the hill, when a stubborn stand was made. At this point Hovey relates that which was the turning point in this "key to the position:"

"The irregularity of our line had previously prevented me from using artillery in enfilading the enemy's line, but as our forces were compelled to fall back slowly, the lines became marked and distinct and about 2:30 P. M. I could easily perceive by the sound of firearms through the woods the position of the respective armies.

"I at once ordered the First Missouri Battery, commanded by Captain Schofield, and the Sixteenth Ohio Battery, under First Lieutenant Murdock, to take position in an open field beyond a slight mound on my right in advance of and with parallel ranges of their guns with our lines. About the same time, Captain Dillon's Wisconsin Battery was put in position; two sections of the Sixteenth Ohio Battery on

the left, the Wisconsin battery in the center, and Captain Schofield's on the right. Through the rebel ranks these batteries hailed an incessant shower of shot and shell, entirely enfilading the rebel columns.

"The fire was terrific for several minutes, and the cheers from our men on the brow of the hill told of our success. The enemy gave back, and our forces, under General McGinnis, Colonel Stark, Colonel Boomer, and Colonel Holmes, drove them again over the ground which had been hotly contested for a third time during the day, five more of the eleven guns not taken down the hill falling a second time into our possession. . . . Thus ended the battle of Champion's Hill at about 3 P. M."

While this gives a reason for the retreat of the enemy which the common mind can understand, Adam Badeau's account of Grant's action at this crisis can be reconciled with it by taking in Crocker's report, which states that Colonel Holmes' arrival at the point "relieved Colonel Boomer, who by this time was out of ammunition." It is probable, therefore, that it was to Boomer's men, while refilling their cartridge boxes, that General Grant was explaining Logan's situation while the rest of the line was dealing the finishing stroke to the enemy.

At the time Mr. Reed wrote his history of and masterly comment upon the battle of Champion's Hill, the Confederate account was not known to him. We now learn that it was not the fierce fighting under Hovey, nor his artillery fire, that drove the Confederates from their strong position. Pemberton, who was fighting on the defensive for the purpose of retreat under cover of the night, saw in alarm his only road in the rear occupied by Logan's troops. He was completely hemmed in, and while galloping along his line in utter desperation, he saw the enemy strangely disappear, and he was quick to seize the opening offered him. He could not wait for night, and in consequence suffered from a rout his hasty retreat engendered.

According to Grant's account, given through Badeau, the entire fight on our side was made by Hovey and a part of Logan's division, about five thousand men, sent in at the

almost impregnable part of the natural fortification. What the other forty thousand were doing is lost in mystery. "What is the good of a hundred thousand men when you can fight only a thousand?" What is the good of forty-five thousand when you can not fight even the one? When Grant says, through Badeau, "that had he known of that road to the rear of Pemberton's army, he would have availed himself of it, he acknowledges to a dazed condition of mind that can be defended only by sheltering its owner behind that fatal habit that always asserted itself at the most critical moment. While that artillery duel was in progress at 11 A. M., had he swung his right under Logan to the unguarded rear of the Confederates, he would have captured the entire seventeen thousand without the necessary loss of a man. His loss in the assault upon the ridge above aggregated two thousand, six hundred and sixty-two. Considering the number engaged, it was on our side the bloodiest of the war, and, as we now see, a wanton destruction of life.

General Grant, as we learn from Hay and Nicolay's *Life of Lincoln*, was learning the art of war. This was the first battle in which he commanded in person since the miserable fiasco at Belmont. It will be observed that his instructions were written in blood. Of it Mr. Reed says:

"The circumstances, conditions, and ideas of this battle are so well revealed by Adam Badeau's narrative that a simple summing up of these constitutes a complete judgment on the generalship. By taking this, the reviewer can avoid all disputing criticism, and can let the whole question rest on the authority of the commanding general and his authorized biographer. Their history sets forth the following facts and conclusions:

"1. General Grant, up to the morning of the 16th, was ignorant that Pemberton's army had crossed the Big Black river, while in fact it had advanced to Edward's Station on the 13th; therefore, all his railroad destroying and other diffusive operations were in the belief that Pemberton was west of Big Black river, keeping guard over Vicksburg.

"2. General Grant, at five o'clock in the morning of the 16th, was surprised by the intelligence from two railroad la-

borers that Pemberton, with a force which these wonderfully-informed persons estimated at 25,000, was at Edward's Station, and advancing with the 'design to attack his rear' around his left.

"3. General Grant was greatly alarmed by this intelligence, as was shown by the alarming orders he issued to Sherman, McPherson, McClernand, Blair, and Ransom.

"4. General Grant's orders and conduct of the battle, after he had come to the front, was upon his idea that Pemberton's main force was moving south-east into the rear, while in fact Pemberton was trying to retreat to the north. In this persistent delusion, Grant ordered the battle to be defensive, with extreme caution, on the center and left, embracing, Badeau says, 15,000 men, and he ordered the assault on the head of Champion's Hill as a co-operation in the defense of his extreme left and rear.

"5. Through open fields around the head of Champion's Hill, was a clear way or road in the rear of the ridge, which was the road of retreat from the hill, which, had Grant known, he need not have assaulted the hill, but could have 'thus secured the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army.'

"6. General Grant, having reached the front about ten A. M., still holding to his delusion that Pemberton's main force was on the offensive to his (Grant's) left and rear, sent orders to McClernand to make his dispositions accordingly, and then he, without reconnoitering the open country around the north end of the ridge, in ignorance that it could easily be turned, without waiting for Sherman's corps, without waiting even till all of McPherson's had come up, ordered Hovey's division, supported by Logan's, to assault the most difficult point on the ridge."

What puzzles the ordinary understanding is that, while taking Grant's belief that the enemy threatened his flank and rear, his mistake of a murderous assault on the ridge not only fails to prevent such an attempt, but actually would have played into the hands of the enemy. Had Grant been correct in his surmise, he could not have favored Pemberton's design more effectually than he did while holding the

great mass of his army inactive, instead of swinging around to the Confederates' rear, and pouring in, we will say, five thousand to be uselessly slaughtered. He assisted, as far as he possibly could, to co-operate with Pemberton in precisely what he feared.

Pemberton reported a loss of 1,429 killed and 2,196 missing. These last came of disasters during and immediately after the conflict. He had accomplished all that could have been expected of him. He had given a force vastly superior in numbers such a stunning reception that, in its consequences, it was a victory. The force of his blow is shown in the fact that the pursuit was so feeble that it could scarcely be called a pursuit. However, Pemberton had to be thankful for the composed condition of our commander's mind that was yet haunted by a supposed army under Johnston. The Confederacy had no men for Mississippi. Rosecrans and Thomas, at this time, were moving on an objective point of more vital importance than Vicksburg; while the Army of the Potomac, as we have seen, was menacing the forces under Lee in a way that taught the Confederates that no victory, to their side, however decisive in itself, served to effect the great result of the war. Bowen made a stand at Baker's creek, when Loring, with 5,778, moved off on his own motion, leaving eleven guns to fall into our hands. Bowen and Stevenson fell back at night, and covered the Big Black at the railroad bridge, without loss, and here turned to face their pursuers. It was a strong position, and, had they possessed sufficient force, would have been an ugly obstacle to our army. Again, the stand was taken in behalf of the missing Loring, who was on his way to Jackson. In a short and sharp engagement, the force of the Confederates was brushed aside. The road was open for us to Vicksburg, for this was the last effort made to stay the pursuit, and Pemberton's demoralized and disorganized force entered unmolested a place so fortified by nature, and improved on by two years work of slave labor, that ten thousand men immediately grew in effective resistance to fifty thousand. In "A Rebel Narrative of the Siege by H. S. Adams," we learn of the actual condition of the defeated. He writes:

“Late on a Sunday night the main body of the vanquished forces began pouring into the town. Neither order nor discipline had been maintained on the march; the men were scattered for miles along the road, declaring their readiness to desert rather than serve again under Pemberton. The planters and population of the country, fleeing from the presence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and confusion, and the inhabitants of the city awoke in terror to find their streets thronged with fugitives—one vast uproarious mass, in which, with shrinking citizens and timid women and children, were mingled the remnants of Pemberton’s dismayed and disorganized army. And these were the troops that were now the reliance of Vicksburg.”

This was on the night of the 17th. Had the head of Grant’s columns pushed in the rear of this disorganized crowd of fugitives, it would have been impossible for Pemberton to have reorganized in time to man the defenses, and the campaign against Vicksburg would have terminated there and then in a possession of Vicksburg and a capture of the enemy’s entire army. That such energetic pursuit was not made, we learn from the history given us by Grant, and while reading it we remember this commander’s little complaint of Rosecrans, for after that hard fought victory over Van Dorn at Corinth, Rosecrans did not follow and annihilate the enemy. And again, how he earnestly urged Halleck and Stanton not to promote George H. Thomas after his great battle at Nashville, until he, Grant, saw whether Thomas was energetic in the pursuit. Here was an instance of criminal delay in pursuit that held the lives of thousands and vast expenditure of treasure in its result. But then our hero of disaster was learning the art of war—(see Hay and Nicolay’s *Life of Lincoln*)—and had not yet arrived at a knowledge of how to annihilate a defeated and disorganized enemy.

On the 18th the head of Sherman’s corps, that had seen no fighting, struck the Benton road three and a half miles from Vicksburg, and by night of that day nearly all of Grant’s army was in position. An interesting event is told us by the historian, Adam Badeau, indorsed by U. S. Grant,

that gives us the condition of the military mind at that trying period. We are told:

"Grant was with Sherman when his column struck the Walnut Hills. As they rode together up the furthest height, where it looks down on the Yazoo river, and stood upon the very bluffs from which Sherman had been repulsed six months before, the two soldiers gazed for a moment on the long-wished for goal of the campaign—the high, dry ground on the north of Vicksburg, and the base of their supplies. Sherman at last turned abruptly around and exclaimed to Grant: 'Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly until now. But this is a campaign; this is a success if we never take the town.'"

This speech of Sherman's, ending in the exclamation "this is a campaign; this is a success if we do not take the town," is so ludicrous that it would be laughable were it not for the smear of blood over all that makes a horror too deep for ridicule. Poor man, for half a year he had followed his leader, vainly endeavoring to discover what they were driving at. He had seen an immense army wasted away in canal digging and bayou clearing, that his chief condemned in each instance to be in vain, and when at last the army was brought in striking distance of the foe so long sought for—within fifteen miles of Pemberton's small force, startled and demoralized by our army appearing in the interior with a fair base of supplies, the puzzled Sherman saw nearly fifty thousand men led off on a raid. Cutting loose from the base, he saw this same army marched a hundred and seventy miles, when one of fifteen would have carried them over the Big Black, then undefended, and forced Pemberton into Vicksburg, or to battle when Grant's great superiority of numbers would have insured him an easy victory. The unhappy general was so relieved to find himself and corps before Vicksburg, that he said it was a success, even if they did not take the town. Considering that all the loss of life, time, and treasure had been sacrificed for this one objective point, his exclamation was as grotesque as any point in opera bouffe.

But the town was to be taken, and to this end a general assault was ordered. That our readers may comprehend what this order meant, we quote from the report of the engineers :

“ The ground upon which Vicksburg stands, is supposed by some to have been originally a plateau, four or five miles long, and about two miles wide, and 200 or 300 feet above the Mississippi river. This plateau has been gradually washed away by rains and streams, until it is transformed into a labyrinth of sharp ridges and deep, irregular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut vertically by the action of the water, remains in a perpendicular position for years, and smaller and newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is difficult to a footman. The sides of the declivities are thickly wooded, the bottoms of the ravines never level, except when the streams that formed them have been unusually large.

“ At Vicksburg the Mississippi runs a little west of south, and all the streams that enter it from the east run south-west. One of these empties into the river five miles below the city, and the dividing ridge that separates two of its branches, was that in which the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. On the northern side of the town, the line also ran along a dividing ridge between two small streams that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg. These ridges are generally higher than any ground in their immediate vicinity.

“ Leaving the Mississippi on the northern side of Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the river, the line stretched back two miles into the interior, crossed the valley of two small streams, and reached the river again below at a point where the bluff falls back from the Mississippi nearly a mile. Here the works followed the bluff up the river for a mile or more, so as to give fire toward the south on any troops that might attempt an attack from that direction by moving along the bottom land between the bluff and the Mississippi.

“ The whole line was between seven and eight miles long. . . . It consisted of a series of detached works on

prominent and commanding points, connected by a continuous line of trench or rifle-pit. . . . They were placed at distances of from seventy-five to five hundred yards from each other. . . . The ravines were the only ditches, but no others were needed, trees being felled in front of the whole line and forming in many places entanglements which under fire were absolutely impassible. . . . The difficult nature of the ground rendered rapidity of movement and unity of effort in an assault absolutely impossible.

“North of the railroad the hills are higher, the wood denser, and the line naturally stronger, but south of that road, although the ridges were lower and the country cleared, the ground was still rough and entirely unfitted for any united tactical movement, and the artificial works were stronger.

“The whole aspect of the rugged fastness, bristling with bayonets, and crowned with artillery that swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was calculated to inspire new courage in those who came . . . from their succession of disasters in the open field. Here, too, were at least eight thousand fresh troops who as yet had suffered none of the demoralization of defeat.”

The general commanding was not left long in doubt as to the result of a general assault made by one of the three corps—the other two not yet reaching within striking distance. It was most disastrous. No report was ever made of the killed and wounded on our side. General T. Kilby Smith, who gallantly led his brigade, in a private letter written not long after the event says:

“We are just now out of hell. Why we were sent there no man can tell. For two years the rebels have been fortifying their position here that is naturally so strong that little art is called for. Against these we were hurled. Down ravines so steep that if unobstructed no man could make way, but with trees felled into thick *chevaux de frise* the attempt was utterly hopeless. At every turn we found a concentrated fire that wiped off the head of columns as if it had been mowed down. We went in with a rush, and came out some of us in a hurry. We could not have lost less than a thousand men, while I doubt whether a rebel was even wounded.”

Such an experience one would think quite sufficient. But our general commanding was not satisfied it seems, for another murderous attempt on a larger scale was made but four days after.

It is claimed by and in behalf of General Grant by Badeau that a sufficient compensation for the awful loss sustained in the first assault was found in the knowledge gained of "the nature of the enemy's works, and their approaches, the character of the ground and the unusual obstacles by which it was incumbered, together with the policy of the defense." The value of all this information obtained at the cost acknowledged is shown in the fact that the second assault made on the 22d May was precisely the same as the first, except that McPherson's and McClernand's corps were in position before the assault was made. One studies the movement in vain to find wherein is the boasted knowledge bought in blood by the first assault. What had we gained in learning the nature of the enemy's works and their approaches? Was a way found open that our army could take advantage of? Did such awful experience give us knowledge "of the ground" blazoned with blood that would enable our men to do better in a second attempt? What had we gained in being made acquainted with the "unusual obstacles" together with "the policy of defense?" In what respect did the general commanding avail himself of his newly made information to save life or insure success? The answer is a silent one, more eloquent than words.

Our army naturally adapted itself to the situation. Warrenton was made a base of supplies. This is the Warrenton that could have been reached by Grant in a day's march from Hankinson's ferry. Two days were given to fetching up supplies and distributing tents to troops that so far had been marching without shelter.

From Badeau and Grant's Memoirs, but not from his reports, we learn that at the time of the second assault, Vicksburg was not invested. The length of our works was only eight miles. When completely invested this measured twelve miles. Our three corps had a front of about four miles on the 22d. Between McClernand's left and the river

below Vicksburg there was an opening of four miles, a like gap between McPherson's and McClernand's forces. There were no advanced works, nor had we any force in reserve to sustain the thin line thrown around an enemy, that, holding the inner line, could easily concentrate on any point. It was this disposition of his forces that tempted Floyd at Donelson to cut his way out and enabled Pemberton, as we shall see directly, to regain the only point lost by the Confederates. The simultaneous attack ordered at 10 A. M. on the 22d could be had only on these terms. What the general commanding expected to accomplish he has not volunteered to inform either the War Department or the world. The valuable information boasted of furnished no change in the order of attack. The thin line broken into fragments by the nature of the ground and the artificial obstacles, presented groups in spaces where front and flank batteries made killing easy to the sheltered Confederates. A diversion had been attempted by Admiral Porter, who brought his mortar and gunboats down on the 20th, and for forty-eight hours kept up an incessant bombardment that was innocent of any harm done the enemy. The citizens of Vicksburg were driven from their homes into holes, it is true, but they accepted the hardship and danger with cheerful alacrity, and Admiral Porter could as well have dropped his ammunition in the Mississippi river for all the harm he did the enemy. At an early hour on the 22d the artillery fire accompanied by skirmishes began and continued until the assault was made. Neither the skirmish line nor the artillery effected any damage to the enemy. All our guns were field pieces save six thirty-two pound Parrotts in McClernand's corps. The fire on our part was delivered with alacrity, and Vicksburg was girt with a heavy roar, but with the exception of the Parrott guns our batteries were beyond range and as helpless as Admiral Porter, swinging his shells up from the river to drop in the streets of the town.

We quote from Badeau, who gets his information from Sherman and gives that narrative as a sample of all the work done on that fatal day. Sherman approached the graveyard road which ran along an inferior ridge across great

ravines toward the enemy's works, but as it approached the intrenchments, it turned to the left running parallel with them for some distance closely swept by musketry from the parapet. Says Badeau :

" Its general direction was perpendicular to the rebel line, but as it approached the works, it bent to the left, passing along the edge of the ditch of the enemy's bastion and entering at a shoulder of the bastion. The timber on the sides of the ridge and in the ravine had been felled so that an assault at any other point in front of the Fifteenth Corps was almost impossible. The rebel line, rifle trench as well as small works for artillery, was higher than the ground occupied by the national troops, and nowhere between the Jackson road and the Mississippi on the north could it be reached without crossing a ravine a hundred and twenty feet below the level of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity whose natural slope was every-where made more difficult by fallen trees and entanglements of brush and vines.

It would be difficult to conceive of a more impassable front than this. Given a ravine 120 feet deep with sides so steep that in themselves they presented an impregnable defense, these sides further protected by artificial works made up of *chevaux de frise* of fallen trees, tangled vines, and stakes, a single road on an inferior cross-ridge, this road enfiladed by the guns of a bastion, and as it approached the works turning so as to be swept broadside by musketry at short range, and we have a defense to assault which is to send men to certain failure and cruel death. We have learned all this—the valuable knowledge boasted of by General Grant—and of what avail? The assault was ordered and attempted. A forlorn hope of 150 men—men who volunteered to enter these jaws of hell—headed the column of doomed volunteers. They carried boards and poles with which to cross the ditch. After came Ewing's brigade, then Charles Smith's, then that of Kilby Smith's, making Blair's division. The forlorn hope dashed forward on the road, followed by the Thirtieth Ohio, the artillery playing upon the bastion which commanded the road. This fire made no impression on the bastion, and suddenly, when the road was

crowded with our brave fellows, a double line of gray-backs rose coolly above the parapet and poured a concentric fire on the head of the column that seemed to eliminate it from existence.

We quote from General Sherman's report. He says: "It halted, swerved, and sought cover. The rear pressed on, but the fire was so terrific that very soon all sought cover. The head of the column crossed the ditch of the left face of the bastion, and climbed upon the exterior slope where the colors were planted, and *the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from the flank fire.* The leading brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that point, the next brigade of Giles Smith was turned down a ravine, and by a circuit to the left found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet some three hundred yards to the left of the bastion and the brigade of Kilby Smith deployed on the off slope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, they kept up a constant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet."

The italics in this abstract are our own. We call attention to the accuracy of statement generally indulged in by General Sherman. How the men burrowed is left to our imagination. As the brave fellows had boards and poles with which to cross the ditch, we wonder with what instruments they dug holes in the earth. However, as General Sherman did not witness the terrible assault, we may conclude that he was misinformed by some subordinate whose frightened imagination ran away with the facts.

However, the assault was a disastrous failure, and one would suppose that enough had been done to demonstrate the utter impossibility of carrying such a work in this way. But the murderous sacrifice of life was not to cease here. General Sherman continues:

"About 2 p. m. General Blair reported to me that none of his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire encountered by Ewing's, but that Giles Smith had got a position to the left, in connection with General Ransom, of McPherson's corps, and was ready to assault. I ordered a constant fire of artillery to be kept up to occupy

the attention of the enemy in our front. Under these circumstances, Ransom's and Giles Smith's brigades charged up against the parapet, but also met a staggering fire, before which they recoiled under cover of the hillside."

Badeau says of this second attack: "The ground over which they passed is the most difficult about Vicksburg. Three ravines cover the entire distance between the graveyard and Jackson roads, and opening into one still larger, rendered this portion of the line unapproachable, except for individuals. Nowhere between these points could a company march by a flank in any thing like order, so broken is the ground, and so much is it obstructed by the slashing which had been made by felling forest timber and the luxurious vines along the sides of the ravines. . . . The troops pushed on and in the blazing sun sought to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the column of Ewing, they became hopelessly broken up into small parties, and only a few, more daring than the rest, succeeded in getting close enough to give the rebels any serious cause for alarm. But these were met by a staggering fire, and recoiled under cover of the hillside. Many a brave man fell after he had passed through the difficulties of the approach and reached the rebel line. The foremost were soon compelled to crawl behind logs and under the brows of the hill, where they waited for single opportunities to bring down the enemy as he showed himself along the parapet or in the rifle trench."

General Steele's brigade, which was Sherman's right, had a less difficult country to cross, but a cleared valley instead of precipitous ravines exposed his troops "for three-quarters of a mile to a plunging fire from every point of the adjacent rebel line. The distance to pass under fire was not less than four hundred yards, and, though the obstacles to overcome were less, the exposure to fire being greater, made the result here the same as the assault on Sherman's left. By 2 o'clock it was evident that the national forces could not reach the rebel fortifications at any point in Sherman's front in numbers or order sufficient to carry the line, and all further operations were suspended."

The line of works in front of McPherson's corps fol-

lowed the line of the high ridge nearly north and south; "they were strongly constructed and well arranged to sweep the approaches in each direction." The only road to them "was completely swept at many points by direct and cross fires." In Logan's division, Leggett's brigade was on the road, supported by John E. Smith's brigade; Stevenson's brigade in the ravines and on the slopes to the south. At the appointed time all moved forward. Sherman tells the result:

"Their order of battle, however, was weak, from the nature of the ground; columns of regiments not greater than a platoon front, battalions by the flank, in columns of fours, or regiments in a single line of battle, supported by troops in position, and covered by skirmishers.

"Notwithstanding the bravery of the troops, they became broken and disorganized by the difficult nature of the ground and the fire of the enemy from trench and parapet; and they, too, were compelled to seek cover under the brows of the hills along which they had advanced. John E. Smith was thus checked by the cross-fire of artillery commanding the road. . . . Stevenson was somewhat protected by the uneven nature of the ground. . . . His advance was bold, and had nearly reached the top of the slope in his front, but being only in line, and, therefore, without any great weight, unsupported by columns or heavy bodies to give it confidence or momentum, it also failed."

Quimby's division was McPherson's left. Badeau says: "Quimby's troops moved out, but the enemy's line in their front being a strong re-entrant (turning by an angle inward), no great effort was made by them. At this time they were simply useful from the menacing attitude they held." Neither McPherson nor any of his generals made any report of this assault; at least none was forwarded to the War Department. The reason will appear further along.

McClermand's corps held the left of the line—first A. J. Smith's division, then Carr's, then Hovey's. Badeau's description makes the ground of the same difficult character, deeply cut up by ravines, but less incumbered with timber, save in Hovey's front. McClermand's report says:

"Five minutes before 10 o'clock the bugle sounded the charge, and at 10 o'clock my columns of attack moved forward, and within fifteen minutes Lawler's and Landrum's brigades had carried the ditch slope and bastion of a fort. Some of their men rushed into the fort, finding a piece of artillery, and in time to see the men who had been working and supporting it escape behind another defense commanding the interior of the former. All of this daring and heroic party were shot down except one, who, recovering from the stunning effect of a shot, seized his musket and captured and brought away thirteen rebels who had returned and fired their gun."

The actor in this extraordinary affair was Sergeant Joseph Griffith, Twenty-second Iowa, and for his amazing achievement he was promoted to be first lieutenant. This capture of thirteen men by one soldier has a Munchausen look, until we learn that these Confederates were in between two fires, and that a quick surrender was all that saved their lives. As it was, four were killed while in the act of surrendering, and probably by a fire from their own side.

McClermand continues: "The colors of the One Hundred and Thirtieth Illinois were planted upon the counter-scarp of the ditch, while those of the Forty-eighth Ohio and Seventy-seventh Illinois waved over the bastion. Within fifteen minutes after Lawler's and Landrum's success, Benton's and Burbridge's brigades carried the ditch and slope of another earth-work and planted their colors upon the latter. Captain White, of the Chicago Mercantile Battery, carried one of his pieces by hand quite to the ditch, and, double-shotting it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun in it ready to be discharged and scattering death among the rebel cannoneers. A curtain connected the works forming these two points of attack." "There," he says, "for more than eight long hours, they (our troops) maintained their ground with deathlike tenacity." Osterhaus' and Hovey's forces, forming the column of assault on the left, had a longer march over the most difficult ground to pass over. "They pushed forward under a withering fire upon a more extended line until an enfilading fire from a strong redoubt on their

left front and physical exhaustion compelled them to take shelter behind a ridge. Their skirmishers, however, kept up the conflict." Pemberton, alarmed at the success of our troops under McClernand, now massed troops to drive the four brigades from the points they had gained in the works. McClernand, well knowing that sooner or later this would be done, sent to General McArthur, then on the march from Warrenton, urging him to hurry up, and he also advised General Grant of the situation and begged for troops.

The conduct of the general commanding at the time of the assault, and the subsequent controversy between Grant and McClernand, throw such light on the murderous mode of warfare indulged in that both become important. We have seen that a second assault was ordered because the first had given us a knowledge of the enemy's mode of defense, the nature of the ground fortifications, and other unknown circumstances that after became plain to the military mind and of great advantage to the assaulting party. When the bloody encounter occurred again, these supposed advantages seemed in some way to have disappeared. The reports made by the general commanding, and especially by the subordinate generals, tell us of an advance over and among obstacles that seem all of them to be as surprising in their newness as in the first attempt. At ten o'clock A. M., an advance along the entire line was made. At twenty minutes past ten, it was at an end, with two thousand of our gallant fellows dead or wounded outside the enemy's works. Save at one point, the attack was a complete failure, a most disastrous failure. At noon, along the entire line, save that part under McClernand, the fighting ceased. Sherman and McPherson confessed their signal defeat, and asserted that to take Vicksburg by assault was impossible. In face of these facts, fully communicated to General Grant at three P. M., he ordered a renewed assault, and in less than an hour, according to General Grant's report, the dead and wounded were increased to four thousand, and the result, so far as the capture of Vicksburg was concerned, was the same.

These four thousand we now know were wantonly butchered; but, at the time, there was no question as to the last

two thousand. The commanding general might have believed in the first assault of that fatal day there was hope—a forlorn one, perhaps, but yet a hope—of success. But, for the second, acknowledged by him to have doubled his loss, there was demand for explanation. That subtle yet ever present guardian of the people and voice of power, the press, took up the matter, and, after detailing the mad attempt, said, in explanation, that the general commanding was so under the influence of liquor that he had no head, and, of consequence, no mercy on his troops. Of course, the political general, McClernand, is made the scape-goat. McClernand claimed to have captured two forts and so broken the enemy's line. He asked for a vigorous blow by McPherson to make a diversion in his, McClernand's, behalf. Grant, in response, ordered a general assault, and then came the slaughter. McClernand had deceived him. The political general had made no such success.

Let us see. When did the excuse suggest itself to General Grant? Certainly not on the day the assault occurred. On that night Grant wrote Halleck: "We have possession of two of the enemy's forts." This letter is in strange variance with Grant's conduct during the day. At eleven A. M., he received from McClernand this note:

"I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is massing on me from right and left. A vigorous blow from McPherson would make a diversion in my favor."

Grant says that he received this note at twelve noon; his answer, however, bears date 11:50, and reads: "If your advance is weak, strengthen it from your reserves or other parts of the line." We quote this to show the condition of mind in which this terrible affair was conducted. The note sent back to McClernand is not in response to the one received. McClernand had not asked for reinforcements. He knew that the entire army, stretched along a line four miles in extent, had no reserves. But the fighting of all that army save his own had ceased, and, fearing a concentration on his forces fiercely engaged and gaining important advantage, he asked that the fight might be renewed. General Grant affected not to believe this. In his report to Halleck, he says:

"The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the Thirteenth Army Corps (McClermand's) than I believe it possible for the commander to have."

And yet, strange to say, he left this commanding position to go around on foot to Sherman, and then order the assault that he was satisfied was uncalled for.

General Sherman, in his Memoirs, says of this event: "After our men had been fairly beaten back from off the parapet, and had got cover behind the spur of ground close up to the rebel works, General Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left his horse some distance to the rear. I pointed out to him the rebel works, admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the result with McPherson and McClermand was about the same."

In relation to McClermand's claim of having gained a decided advantage, Sherman, in his Memoirs, continues: "General Grant said, 'I don't believe a word of it,' but I reasoned with him that this note was official and must be credited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with new troops. He said he would instantly ride down to McClermand's front, and, if I did not receive orders to the contrary by three o'clock p. m., I might try it again. Mower's fresh brigade was brought up under cover, and some changes were made in Giles Smith's brigade, and punctually at three o'clock p. m., hearing heavy firing down along the line to my left, I ordered the second assault. It was a repetition of the first—equally unsuccessful and bloody. The same thing occurred with McPherson, who lost in this second assault some valuable officers and men, without adequate result."

And the general commanding disappeared from Sherman's front. It appears that he did not return to his commanding position in the rear of McClermand's, but went on foot, we presume, to McPherson's center and showed McClermand's dispatch. Now, McClermand never claimed what Grant asserts. The celebrated note reads as follows:

"We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to

McArthur to reinforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command at this point? P. S.—I have received your dispatch. My troops are all engaged and I can not withdraw any to reinforce others.”

Again, this follows :

“ We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts and the stars and stripes are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all along the line.”

That General Grant had intervals of confidence in McClelland's success is shown by the following dispatches :

“ FROM FIELD SIGNAL STATION.

“ TO GENERAL McCLELLAND :

“ McArthur advanced from Warrenton last night. He is on our left. Concentrate with him and use his forces to the best advantage.”

“ FROM FIELD SIGNAL STATION.

“ TO GENERAL McCLELLAND :

“ Sherman and McPherson are pressing the enemy. If one portion of your troops are pressed reinforce them from another. Sherman has gained some successes.”

The next dispatch reads :

“ General, I have sent a dispatch to you saying that McArthur left Warrenton last night; was about half way about 1 A. M. this morning. Communicate with him and use his forces to the best advantage. McPherson is directed to send Quimby's division to you if he can not effect a lodgment where he is. Quimby is next to your right, and you will be aided as much by his penetrating into the enemy's lines as by having him to support the column you have already got. Sherman is getting on well.”

The vacillating conduct of the commander in going from where he could see the McClelland assault to Sherman and refusing to resume the attack, then seeking McPherson and giving the fatal order referring Quimby to McClelland and then ordering Quimby to his support ; saying to Sherman that

he did not believe a word of McClernand's gain while penning the above dispatches that show he did believe, all go to prove that General Grant was not himself on this trying occasion.

The end of the struggle that had been going on for ten hours is given in McClernand's report. It says: "Colonel Boomer's and Sanborn's brigade of General Quimby's division, much exhausted, came up, but before either of them could be fully applied—indeed, before one of them was entirely formed—night set in and terminated the struggle. Colonel Boomer early fell while leading his men forward, lamented by all. Meanwhile the enemy, seeing Quimby's division moving in the direction of my position, hastened to concentrate additional forces in front of it and made a sortie, which was repelled. About 8 P. M., after ten hour's continuous fighting my men withdrew to the nearest shelter and rested for the night, holding by a strong picket most of the ground they had gained."

The grave question which Grant is permitted to settle against the political general, who was guilty of having at one time won the confidence of President Lincoln, has a reverse finding in history. Grant admits that if McClernand effected a lodgment in the enemy's works so as to break the line and open the road to reserves, supposing he had such, through to Vicksburg, it was the duty of the general commanding to renew the general assault whatever the consequences as to mortality might be and to afford McClernand as many troops as he possibly could use in the way of reinforcements. Grant's letter of that night in which he reports two forts had been taken can be credited to his condition, for at the very time he penned these words night was on them and the advantages were lost. We may question the testimony of McClernand's subordinates, although the bodies of their comrades were lying cold in death within the works they had carried, for the judgment of such witnesses is apt to be dazed by their imaginations. They might have taken works of really no avail, as Grant claimed to see from his coign of vantage, so far as seeing was concerned. But we have since the Confederate records have come into our possession witnesses whose testimony is evidence beyond impeachment.

We have General Pemberton's report, which says: "It was of vital importance to drive them out." From General Stevenson's report we learn: "The work was constructed in such a manner that the ditch was commanded by no part of the line, and the only means by which they could be dislodged was to retake the angle by a desperate charge. . . . A more gallant feat than this charge has not illustrated our arms during the war."

Brigadier-General Lee was in the immediate command of that part of the line, but died without making a report. Colonel Dockery, commanding a brigade of the reserve, says: "While on the way to General Moore's lines, a courier from Brigadier-General Lee to General Green reported that General Lee's line had been broken by the enemy."

Colonel Waul, of the Texas Legion, who organized the force which retook the works, says: "Alive to the importance of the position, General Lee issued and reiterated orders to Colonel Shelly, commanding the Twenty-third Alabama, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pettus, commanding the Forty-sixth Alabama, who occupied the fort, to retake it at all hazards, offering the flags to the commands capturing them. After several vain attempts, they refused to volunteer, nor could the most strenuous efforts of their chivalric commander urge or incite them to the assault.

"General Lee then directed the colonel of the Legion to have the fort taken. He immediately went there, taking with him one battalion of the Legion to aid or support the assailants, if necessary, informing Captain Bradley and Lieutenant Hagan, who respectively commanded the companies that had previously been sent as a support to the garrison. These gallant officers not only willingly agreed, but solicited, the honor of leading those companies to the assault. . . . Three of Colonel Shelly's regiment also volunteered. . . . This feat, considered with the accompanying circumstances, the occupation of the enemy, the narrow pass through which the party had to enter, the enfilading fire of musketry and artillery they had to encounter in the approach, the unwillingness of the garrison, consisting of two regiments, to volunteer, and permitting the flags to float for three hours over

the parapet, the coolness, courage, and intrepidity manifested, deserve highest praise for every officer and man engaged in the hazardous enterprise."

The truth is, however, that whether McClelland effected a lodgment of grave importance or not, the condition was such that gallant service was of no avail. Had McArthur's forces been on the field, as a reserve to McClelland, so as to have troops on hand to take advantage of the break, an assault then, while a general attack was going on, might have ended in the capture of Vicksburg. But this was not the situation. Vicksburg depended on its fortifications. These swelled the strength of eighteen thousand men to at least sixty thousand for holding the river line. Pemberton, giving ten thousand to man the works, could throw a heavy reserve upon any point sorely pressed or fight an engagement in any breach their enemy could make. Grant, in employing his entire army as an assaulting force, without a reserve, was in no condition to avail himself of such a break in the Confederate lines as McClelland gave him. He simply drove his devoted troops like sheep to the slaughter against works he had demonstrated before were impregnable.

We have, however, the grim satisfaction of knowing that, while our general commanding was not himself, the gentleman commanding the Confederates was himself, and was cursed for that by the authorities at Richmond. He was denounced for fighting the battle of Champion's Hill before securing a conjunction with Johnston's six thousand. And after being driven to Vicksburg, he did not take advantage of the latest assault, with its fearful slaughter of our troops, by making a sortie from the part of Vicksburg not then invested, and driving Grant's army into the Mississippi by an attack in its rear.

While poor Pemberton, however, is consigned to an unmarked grave, true history will come in time to rot the garlands and deepen the dust upon the monuments erected to the memory of Grant. We will seek in shame to forget a man whose bloody blunders at Vicksburg were crowned by an act that makes us shudder to know and sicken to remember. This is strong language, but justified by facts. A

frightful loss of over four thousand men had occurred. The mass of these lay where they fell. Badeau, in his Grant-indorsed version of his master's life, says: "The hill-sides were covered with the slain and with unfortunates who lay panting in the heat, crying for water which none could bring them, and writhing in pain that might not be relieved."

For three days the four thousand were left, the dead to rot, and the wounded to writhe in agony under that hot Southern sun, a hideous neglect which was terminated only by the following note sent under flag of truce from Pemberton:

"Two days having elapsed since your dead and wounded have been lying in our front, and as yet no disposition on your part of a desire to remove them being exhibited, in the name of humanity, I have the honor to propose a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours that you may be enabled to remove your dead and dying men. If you can not do this, on notification from you that hostilities will be suspended on your part for the time specified, I will endeavor to have the dead buried and the wounded cared for."

To this Grant replied at 3:30 P. M., and it was agreed that hostilities should cease at 6 P. M., that our dead, for all were dead by this time, might be buried. A flag of truce, asking a suspension of hostilities until the dead were interred and the wounded cared for, might have been at once resorted to from the first, but Grant, who had reported to Halleck and published to the people that the assault was enough of a success to put us in possession of the battlefield, could not thus confess his falsehood by asking a flag of truce. And so the slow torture of wounds under that hot June sun of the fiery south with agonizing thirst, went on, our poor fellows dying slowly by torture that a lie might be palmed off upon the people who had sent their sons and brothers down to die for their country.

Badeau in a foot note makes a feeble effort at a defense against Pemberton's imputations of inhumanity, that the impossibility of relieving those wounded, "was occasioned by Pemberton's troops." He adds, philosophically: "The

wounded suffer frightfully after every battle, and the party which is repelled is always unable to bestow attention on those whom it leaves on the field."

But it will be observed that Grant, in his report to Halleck, and in his publications in the press, denies that our forces were repelled. According to that report, we held the field up to the very trenches of the enemy.

Badeau, the Grant-indorsed biographer, allows no sense of humanity to General Pemberton in his offer of permission to Grant to bury his dead. He asserts that Pemberton sought to escape a pestilence bred by the stench of these dead Union volunteers. He says: "For two days the unburied corpses were left festering between the two armies, when the stench became so intolerable to the garrison that Pemberton was afraid it might breed a pestilence. He therefore proposed an armistice." . . .

General Pemberton had another stratagem in this, and this reveals a fine stratagem on Grant's part. Continues Badeau :

"The offer was promptly accepted, and the rebels also availed themselves of the opportunity to carry off the dead horses and mules that lay in their front, and were becoming very offensive to the besieged. These were the animals that Pemberton had turned loose from the city and driven over the lines from want of forage. They were shot wherever they were seen by the sharpshooters from the besieging army, that the stench arising from their putrefaction might annoy the enemy."

War at best is cruel and barbarous. But in the hands of heartless men it becomes a hell, far beyond the dreams of the fanatic. In its better aspects, under the guidance of humane men, the atrocities are excused because of their necessity. This is terrible, we say, but it is war. But in all the annals of killing, no such infamy as this at Vicksburg appears of record, and it lies outside of plea found in necessity. Then the cool indifference in which we are told that the starving brutes that came staggering from behind the Confederate works were shot down that their stench might breed a pestilence. The proposition was as idiotic as it was.

cruel. Our northern troops poured in to reinforce the lines thinned by sickness, were in a condition to be the first sufferers from this premeditated pestilence. Crowded into fortified camps, digging like moles in the earth, or crowded in open ditches, they sickened and died as they had been dying for half a year. Not satisfied with this, we are told that our able general organized a pestilence by leaving the dead upon the outer slope of the enemy's fortification, and killing the starved animals driven from the beleaguered town. This surpasses even the uncalled-for order to lay waste a wide stretch of fertile country, and so make war on helpless age, or defenseless women and children by fetching such a population face to face with death from starvation. Nor will we walk backward and cover with the blanket of ignorance these awful crimes against God and Christian civilization.

There is official evidence of General Grant's personal habits and condition in these dreadful days. How terrible and sickening the situation must have been, will appear with horrible distinctness from the following letter written a few days after the assaults to Grant by General John Rawlins, his chief-of-staff, and delivered by Rawlins in person. No lapses of ordinary degree would have induced a staff officer to venture upon thus sharply arraigning the commander-in-chief:

“BEFORE VICKSBURG, MISS., *June 6, 1863,* }
1 o'clock A. M. }

DEAR GENERAL: The great solicitude I feel for the safety of this army leads me to mention what I had hoped never again to do—the subject of your drinking. This may surprise you, for I may be (and I trust I am) doing you an injustice by unfounded suspicions, but if an error it better be on the side of his country's safety than in fear of offending a friend. I have heard that Dr. McMillan, at General Sherman's a few days ago, induced you, notwithstanding your pledge to me, to take a glass of wine, and to-day, when I found a box of wine in front of your tent and proposed to move it, which I did, I was told you had forbid its being taken away, for you intended to keep it until you entered Vicksburg, that you might have it for your friends; and to-

night, when you should, because of the condition of your health if nothing else, have been in bed, I find you where the wine bottle has just been emptied, in company with those who drink and urge you to do likewise, and the lack of your usual promptness of decision and clearness in expressing yourself in writing tended to confirm my suspicions.

You have the *full* control of your appetite and can let drinking alone. Had you not pledged me the sincerity of your honor early last March that you would drink no more during the war, and kept that pledge during your recent campaign, you would not to-day have stood first in the world's history as a successful military leader. Your only salvation depends upon your strict adherence to that pledge. You can not succeed in any other way. As I have before stated, I may be wrong in my suspicions, but if one sees that which leads him to suppose a sentinel is falling asleep on his post, it is his duty to arouse him; and if one sees that which leads him to fear the general commanding a great army is being seduced to that step which he knows will bring disgrace upon that general and defeat to his command, if he fails to sound the proper note of warning, the friends, wives, and children of those brave men whose lives he permits to remain thus imperiled will accuse him while he lives and stand swift witnesses of wrath against him in the day when all shall be tried. If my suspicions are unfounded, let my friendship for you and my zeal for my country be my excuse for this letter; and if they are correctly founded, and you determine not to heed the admonitions and the prayers of this hasty note by immediately ceasing to touch a single drop of any kind of liquor, no matter by whom asked or under what circumstances, let my immediate relief from duty in this department be the result. I am, General, your friend,

JOHN A. RAWLINS.

The biography of the lackey and the memoirs of overfed egotism give as a reason for these vain assaults, the continued menace of General Joseph E. Johnston in Grant's rear, and the fear that Bragg would abandon Rosecrans'

front and come to the relief of Pemberton.. We now know that General Johnston, after the most strenuous efforts had collected twenty-eight thousand men of all arms, but these were so deficient in transportation, in supplies of all sorts, in muskets and artillery, that his available forces numbered but eight thousand men. As for Bragg, the authorities at Richmond so recognized the importance of his objective point, Chattanooga, that had they thought it in immediate danger, they would have transferred Lee's army from the Potomac to the Tennessee.

A little of the sagacity given in imagination to General Grant would have relieved his military mind of all fears of interference on the part of either Johnston or Bragg. While Pemberton was almost shrieking to Johnston for aid to raise the siege, Johnston was sending his subordinate officer orders to cut his way out and so join their forces for operations in the interior. Johnston held that Vicksburg was not worth the struggle being made to hold it. As the enemy had, with the exception of Port Hudson, entire control of the Mississippi river, the Confederacy was as much cut in two as it would be had our forces possessed Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

Grant began the siege of Vicksburg with forty thousand men. Through frantic appeals for reinforcements from Grant, this number was doubled from troops that should have gone to the Army of the Cumberland. The general who organized slaughter for his own troops and made such frantic demand for more men ought to have known that with forty thousand men he outnumbered the two armies of the Confederacy, and when this force was augmented to eighty thousand, he could have left enough men to man the works about Vicksburg and marching to the interior have driven Johnston from the field. To have defeated Johnston thus was to have made Vicksburg and Port Hudson untenable to the enemy. Had he six months before marched his huge army, as he at that time contemplated, through the interior of Mississippi along the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, he had a chance of brushing General Pemberton aside, and a campaign of six weeks would, in all human probability,

have brought the evacuation of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, instead of six months' campaign, if it can be called such, and its awful mortality from disease as well as bullets. We have seen how the general commanding came to change his objective point from Pemberton's army to the person of McClernand, and so drifted into the bayous, swamps, and bluffs of the Mississippi.

This history of bloody blunders would be incomplete were we to fail recounting how, on the 18th June, General Grant succeeded in finally capturing his objective found in the political general—the real author of all our woes. It will be observed that, as early as the 6th of May, Grant got from the War Department full authority to dispense with the services of the man who had originated this mad attack on Vicksburg from the river. It was difficult, however, for the general commanding to avail himself of this authority. The camps about Vicksburg fairly swarmed with newspaper correspondents, and while Grant reported to the War Department, these gentlemen of gifted pens reported to the sovereign people, whose sons were in the trenches and rapidly filling cemeteries about the city. General McClernand was guilty of being General McClernand—no more nor less. Now, while this was sufficient in the mind of the general commanding, it was no offense whatever in the eyes of the gifted press men. On the contrary, so far McClernand's military career contrasted favorably with that of either Grant or Sherman. Indeed, looking at the political general from that point of view, his character and military career appear brilliant. We have seen that he carried a fortification by storm long before Vicksburg was assailed—an achievement neither Grant nor Sherman ever accomplished. It was McClernand's corps that made the arduous march from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times, in which, while fighting the enemy he invariably defeated, he built that road for Grant and his army from the Slough of Despond to the blood-stained victory of Disaster. It was McClernand's corps that completed the highway by which Grant hoped to get away from Vicksburg, then by a forced march reached

Port Gibson, and beat the enemy there after a surprise almost as great as that which came to Grant when he discovered that he was on the rear of the enemy, and could change his proposed retreat from Vicksburg to an advance upon that citadel. It was McClernand who shifted from the right to the left so that he might not lead in the raid upon Jackson, came unexpectedly upon Pemberton at Champion's Hill, and, although sent to slaughter, won a victory. Then it was McClernand's corps that came upon the enemy's strong position at Big Black river and carried the same by assault, the most brilliant action of the campaign. Then, again, it was McClernand's troops that gained a grave advantage in the second storming of Vicksburg, that, had it been followed up and sustained, would have given us Vicksburg.

For none of these marked successes had the general commanding a word of commendation or even mention. General McClernand was evidently not a sensitive gentleman, but the melancholy fact stared him in the face that so long as he remained in command the troops under him could get no recognition for their gallant efforts. While achieving unnamed victories, they were rapidly filling unnamed graves. Under this stress, McClernand saw that he would have to be relieved from command, but before this could overtake him, resolved that all Grant neglected in the way of praise he would do in behalf of his brave but badly abused soldiers. One hot June morning, Grant's head-quarters were suddenly invaded by Sherman, shaking with wrath over a newspaper he held in his hand. It was some seconds ere he could gain breath to express his indignation. It had been aroused by "that fellow McClernand," who had dared make a congratulatory report to his corps, not through head-quarters, where it would have been properly suppressed, but through the newspapers. Of course, the fellow, who had ever been a nuisance, must be cashiered for this gross breach of discipline.

Grant had been authorized by a cipher dispatch sent him by Charles A. Dana at an early day to discharge any subordinate whom he found in his way, but until now no opportunity had occurred. The cunning political nuisance

under epaulettes had perversely continued to win successes, and although these were ignored by the general commanding and pooh-poohed by all right-minded West Pointers, the no less troublesome public believed the armed politician could not well be defied. Now, however, the epauletted nuisance was clearly in the wrong, and vengeance was swift and final. General McClernand was brusquely notified that his services were no longer required, and retiring to the shades of private life, could study at his leisure Halleck's Art of War as illustrated by Grant before Vicksburg.

We have no tears to shed over the fall of McClernand. He was really the author of all the woe that befell us at Vicksburg. He first conceived of the fatal expedition down the Mississippi to the bayous and swamps of that dreadful locality. After winning Lincoln over to the idiotic design, he forced, as we have seen, Grant to abandon his campaign through the center of the State of Mississippi and move eighty thousand men to a locality where for six months they remained utterly helpless, dying of malarial fevers and measles, small-pox, and kindred diseases. Without firing a gun, the ten thousand men left under Pemberton to man the fortifications, while thirty thousand were transferred to Bragg's army—without, we say, doing aught but idly looking on as they watched the hopeless canal digging and bayou clearing and listened to the wail of dead marches, the Confederates achieved a victory every hour over these blind leaders of the blind, who sent their brave men down to inglorious death. We are content, therefore, to consign our political general to the obscurity of unrecorded eulogy. It is not well, however, for the man who was neither an able soldier nor a successful politician to look down with much contempt upon the man who made for him all the gain to be gathered from that murderous performance.

What the net-purport and upshot of half a year's operations about Vicksburg were to the government at Washington by an army of never less than sixty thousand men, can be gathered from accounts made on the 4th of July, 1863, when the Confederates surrendered.

We took prisoners something over eighteen thousand men under arms. This would give Pemberton as strong a force when he submitted as when he retreated into Vicksburg. As his ranks were thinned by disease, and to a small extent by casualties in the defense, it is not to be supposed that his force increased or even remained stationary. The general commanding consulted his interest by counting the rations issued to the surrendered. As the city of Vicksburg was in the most sore distress as to food, the starving inhabitants were included in the number provided for, so General Grant, never nice when it came to a question involving credit to himself, was enabled to swell the number of his pensioners to any figure he cared to make.

He gained, let us admit, eighteen thousand men.

For these, we lost, from the time the army under Sherman left Memphis on this fatal Chickasaw slaughter until the surrender on the 4th of July, in casualties of killed and wounded, from men missing and taken prisoners, exclusive of the many thousands who died from disease, 11,289 men.

And when at last, with this fearful showing of loss in money and in life, we took the place, it was of no advantage—no use whatever to our government. All the months that Grant was studying how to get away from Vicksburg save by a return to Memphis, and had his army dying like diseased sheep in digging canals and struggling through impassable bayous, the war went on. It all swept by him. The importance of the Mississippi was lost in the advance of Rosecrans upon Chattanooga, our great objective point of the war.

Looking back now to these strangely unrecorded facts, we feel ashamed to know that victories were so rare with us, that we were willing to accept this capture of eighteen thousand men by eighty thousand, with all the bloody disasters that accompanied the campaign, as a great triumph, and out of its incompetent leader construct a grotesque greatness that would be laughable, were it not such a melancholy disgrace. It is hard for us as a people that the history of the Vicksburg hero can not be left to the political organization

that made of him a political quantity. In that case, we need never fear that the truth might rear its ghastly head and put to record the facts that make one shudder to read. But, unfortunately, this faction that sought to make Grant's life a private, sacred, confidential subject, is but a part of the American people, and at least one-half of our population is not prepared to cover his nakedness as a politician with an imaginary mantle of military glory. The cold, impartial hand of history, inscribing facts for the English speaking world and all the civilized peoples of the earth, will not be influenced in reading the record by the little faction that has an impure motive for its extravagant fictions.

CHAPTER XV.

Preparations for the Advance on Chattanooga—Concentration and Fortification of Supplies—Impatience of the War Department at the Delay—Re-inforcements and Supplies forwarded Reluctantly—Treachery to Rosecrans in his Chief of Staff—Testing the Front of the Enemy—Training Raw Recruits into Veterans.

It is a great relief to turn from the dreary record of disaster found in the half year's burials about Vicksburg to the history of a campaign where the fortunes of the Republic were carried to the front in a succession of victories that had a great objective for a purpose. We pass from petty jealousies, mean ambitions and selfish indulgence to the more elevated plane and purer atmosphere ever found about George H. Thomas and William S. Rosecrans. We left the great leaders after the victory at Stone river making active preparations for a move of a mighty army upon Chattanooga, the rugged gate-way of the South, the possession of which would be the fall of the Confederacy. The most important part of this preparation was to gather at Murfreesboro supplies sufficient to support an army for at least a year. We have seen how Grant, making the same preparations, left his supplies at Holly Springs under guard of a man who had been proven a miserable coward and won death by hanging in his loss of four millions of supplies provided the general placing him in command was promptly cashiered. General Rosecrans took no chances. Strongly posting his army so as to cover all approaches from the enemy, he called a halt first for the purpose of repairing the railroad from Nashville to Murfreesboro, and then to get over such the supplies necessary to justify an advance. While the railway remained unavailable these supplies, barely sufficient to support the army day by day, were wagoned over the wornout turnpikes and country roads. During the delay incident to this condition the depots at Murfreesboro, indeed, the town itself,

was so fortified that comparatively speaking a small force could hold the place in the absence of the army.

All these preparations called for time, and as time wore on the victory at Stone river seemed to lose its significance at Washington, and anon inquiries and complaints from the War Department were impatiently ticked out to headquarters. Rosecrans after consultation with Thomas responded as best he might. The care of the sick and wounded that he reported for awhile seemed to allay irritation, then the difficulties attending the transportation, all given in detail, served a like purpose. Much of this irritation came of Secretary Stanton's personal feeling toward Rosecrans. He had no confidence in the general and this excited and deepened his hostility. Rosecrans would soon have been relieved but for the calm judgment of President Lincoln and the influence of Salmon P. Chase. Again, to every proposition made by the impatient Secretary of War looking to the removal of Rosecrans came the question from the President, "Well, who will we put in command?" There was but one response to this, that came in the name of Thomas. The President's one answer invariably was, "Let the Virginian wait." Lincoln did not know that the Virginian was the only officer in his armies who could afford to wait.

After a time the lack of confidence at Washington, felt especially in the War Department, began to cripple the Army of the Cumberland. While necessary supplies were forwarded grudgingly, the necessary reinforcements, not to fill out the thinned ranks of old regiments which during the entire war was never done, but to keep the force at the number considered necessary for the campaign, were actually denied the general commanding. It seems strange, looking back now at the military events of that day, to see how infatuated the authorities were at Washington. To the armies on the right and left of our center the department actually anticipated demands. Men and supplies were hurried forward without question or complaint. And yet all the efforts of the Potomac were purposeless, ending in blood and with one exception disaster, while the army at Vicksburg was, to use Grant's words in reference to General Butler, "completely

bottled up." The false assertion in the shape of a complaint was made, and it has its echo to-day, that Rosecrans by his inactivity enabled the Confederates to send troops from his front to reinforce Pemberton and Lee. We now know that the reverse was the truth. We have seen that the moment the authorities at Richmond learned that Grant's army was in the swamps before Vicksburg, they withdrew thirty thousand troops from Pemberton's command to strengthen Bragg. They saw that with the Mississippi in possession of our government above Vicksburg and below Port Hudson these two points had lost much if not all their significance. The fate of empire, so far as the South was concerned, rested on the Army of the Cumberland, that if successful would make Virginia untenable. To conquer and hold Chattanooga was to flank the army under Lee and confine all that was left of the war to the cotton states.

The eulogist of Abraham Lincoln, not content with the real greatness all his own, now are claiming for him that he was possessed of the best military mind on the side of our government. How preposterous this claim is a few indisputable facts prove beyond question. When General Thomas proposed his advance into East Tennessee with Chattanooga as the objective point, the military importance of the campaign was lost on him. He only saw the loyal citizens of that region, and sanctioned the movement on their account. All the talk to him of thereby flanking the armed Confederacy and so selecting our own line of advance was as much uncomprehended as if it had been given in Greek or Latin. In his subsequent enterprise with McClellan while urging an approach on Richmond from the interior he could not see that he was accepting the road offered us by the enemy, where the mountain ranges and numerous rivers made so many impregnable fortifications to be carried by assaults. We have seen that he listened to McClernand and sanctioned that descent of the Mississippi which carried with it Grant's army and buried ninety thousand brave men in unhonored graves. The only comment he could give after the capture of Vicksburg in his congratulatory order was that "the Father of Waters now rolled its waves un-

vexed to the sea." The military significance of this political sentence remains to this day a mystery. Why the Father of Waters should be vexed by one side or the other makes a proposition quite beyond solution by the common mind. President Lincoln so far as he was concerned had but one thought and that was the conquest of territory. There was a political significance to this that blinded him to the fact that the title to all the Confederate territory was carried as Wendell Phillips tersely expressed it at the bow of Lee's saddle. Common sense should have taught him that when he conquered the armies of the Confederacy he repossessed himself of all the territory lost. It was this infatuation that opened his ears to Governors Morton and Johnson and drove one of the most capable of our generals, Don Carlos Buell, from the service. The fact is, that President Lincoln knew so little about how to conduct the war that he feebly left the entire business to West Point, when he could as well have given it to an orphan asylum or a medical college. While impregnated as his entire cabinet was with a contempt of the military mind he yet permitted that mind in its feeblest form to dominate the field.

Recognizing these facts, one is not surprised, much as one may be disgusted, to read the correspondence carried on by telegraph and mail between the War Department and headquarters at Murfreesboro during the half year of preparations that preceded the advance on Chattanooga. The ill-concealed contemptuous impatience on one side, the pleadings on the other for reinforcements and supplies that ignore the snubs and insults, make any thing but pleasant reading to a just mind. Nothing but the presence and influence of General Thomas prevented the fiery Rosecrans from throwing his commission in the face of Stanton. In the great work before them Thomas would permit no irritation however just to interfere. "Our government is struggling under a heavy weight that we in the field have no knowledge of," he was wont to say to the writer of this. "We must take it for granted that they are doing all in their power meet our demands."

Again: "The War Department is impatient of this ap-

parent delay on our part. It is to be regretted some one the Secretary and President have confidence in is not sent here to learn and report the actual condition. We can not move from our base of supplies until this place is rendered secure. It would not only be the loss of millions in money, but the loss of our army."

Again: "I am satisfied and they are right at Washington. Bragg has no larger force than we have, but they do not note that he is acting on the defensive and can select his line of defense so as to more than double the effectiveness of his resistance. That stand at Duck river is far better than his on Stone river and we all know what that was."

He believed that Rosecrans was in error when he attributed the neglect under which the Army of the Cumberland suffered to Secretary Stanton's personal prejudice. He could not be made to accept such weakness in a man he recognized as not only a great man but a true and earnest patriot. General Thomas was altogether right in his estimate of the great War Secretary, but he forgot that we have disturbing spots on the sun, and human experience has taught us that errors go with virtues in great characters and have equal strength.

Had General Rosecrans to contend only with the open hostility of the ill-tempered Secretary Stanton, he would have been, however uncomfortable, at least safe. But he suffered from a treachery unknown to him at the time, a treachery that brought misfortune to him in the end, and today makes popular belief which we are pleased to call history. In brief, the history of this infamous affair is as follows: On the death of the gallant Garesche, General Rosecrans' chief of staff, General Garfield, then out of employ and seeking work, got Secretary Chase to solicit Rosecrans to ask for Garfield. One fault with Rosecrans was his anxiety to stand well with the government at Washington. Bitter experience had taught the inconvenience, to use the mildest term, of operating without such confidence. We have seen how he put General McCook in command of his right wing to placate Stanton, and on this suggestion he at once asked for Garfield. He did this against his own judg-

ment, not that he had aught against Garfield personally, but Rosecrans had West Point as a superstition, and Garfield was direct from civil life. However, it was a life-long habit of Garfield to make a study of any pursuit he contemplated adopting, and Rosecrans was delighted to find his new and very entertaining chief of staff well up in all that West Point taught, or rather trained for. Rosecrans was remarkable for the easy way in which he put aside the cares of his occupation and found relief in talks about war, religion, science, literature, and politics. He soon learned that his chief of staff was a most fascinating conversationalist. Without being either deep or original, Garfield had a most suggestive mind, and although brought up on the tow-path of a canal, there was enough of courtier to make him win the confidence of a superior in place by a sympathizing listening to his superior's views. The position of chief of staff gave Garfield the full official confidence of his general. In addition to this, he was soon incited to partake of the personal as well. The consequence of all this was an infamy upon the part of James A. Garfield that one contemplates with deepest grief and horror. General Garfield, when he asked Secretary Chase to intercede in his behalf, knew that Rosecrans had but one active influential friend at Washington, and that friend Garfield sought to poison against him. In the ugliest period of impatient complaint at the War Department, when Secretary Chase was called continually to defend his pet general, Rosecrans, our chief of staff, made such by Chase, volunteered a private, confidential letter, in which he expressed without qualification his lack of confidence in Rosecrans as a military man. Fortunately for Rosecrans, Chase, possessed of little knowledge of human nature, suffered from that complaint common to that class of attributing a selfish motive for every evil deed, and he jumped to the erroneous conclusion that Garfield was anxious to displace Rosecrans so that he might occupy his position. The eminent Secretary read between the lines, as he thought, and saw the mean, selfish face of a snake striking from a cover at an honest, capable man. He refused to accept the letter as true, and not only became more active in his ad-

vocacy of his friend, but he put the letter on file for future use. The use came after his death in its publication. It crumbles the base from beneath the fame of the "Martyr President," and one reads on the face that the hand of Ward sought to idealize the mean, treacherous letter from Garfield to Chase.

To render unto Satan that which is Satan's, we must say that Secretary Chase was in error as to the motive he attributed to Garfield. Garfield was ambitious enough. Painfully full of self-distrust, his inordinate ambition drove him on to positions that when attained he hastened to turn over to others, as when elected President he gave his administration into the hands of Blaine, and himself to death. This was the extent of his martyrdom. He died a victim to his self-distrust. He would not have hesitated accepting the place made vacant by Rosecrans, and he would have turned the army over to Thomas, contenting himself with being its figurehead. But Garfield was no fool. He knew that constituted as the administration was it was impossible for a volunteer officer to vault into such a responsibility. West Point ruled in all promotions and Garfield could as well have asked for the trumpet of the arch-angel as for an independent command.

General Garfield, in joining the Army of the Cumberland, had made an acquaintance who ranked Rosecrans in his love and admiration and that was General George H. Thomas. He knew how Chase and Stanton regarded this strangely silent man, and he was satisfied that to make room for one he so admired it was only necessary to remove Rosecrans. He set about this work in the manner common to his nature. An open attack on his general would only have served to throw the chief of staff out of employ. To some minds there is no warfare worthy of a subtle, intellectual character, but one of strategem based on treachery. A frank, open attack is simply brutal in its simplicity. Garfield reminds one of the Turkish Sultan who being given enough money to liquidate his debts spent it all in bribing his creditors without reducing the indebtedness. Why he should prefer Thomas to Rosecrans is sufficiently clear. He not only

found Thomas a more congenial man in his attainments, depth of thought and originality of views, but he felt assured that under Thomas the army that carried both the fate of the Republic and the fortunes of Garfield would be certain of a glorious success. He sought to be the king-maker, and burrowing under Rosecrans, deposited the dynamite that only exploded years after to his own injury.

The six months' delay at Murfreesboro was utilized by General Thomas in training and disciplining his men. He not only took the supply departments in his own hands, and satisfied the rank and file that their wants were considered with loving care—so much so that he came to be called "Pap" Thomas—but the training was limited to the actual demands of the service.

"Most of these tactics were gotten up for show," he would say, "and are something worse than useless, for we waste time on what are as unnecessary in actual war as a dancing-school would be. By simplifying the movements to the actual demand of the service we have full time to make veterans."

Again: "What splendid material we have for soldiers! The adaptability of the American character is something amazing. It is not that I can order a regiment to build a bridge, repair a locomotive or rebuild a railroad—that comes of the mechanics who sought service—but the rawest recruit becomes an efficient soldier in thirty days."

Again: "The solution of the vexed question as to how we may have an army under a republic, is solved by the French axiom, 'Soldiers on duty, comrades when off.' This is attainable with us because of the good common sense of our men. The trouble, indeed, is not with the men so much as with officers. It is too common with the last to believe that they can maintain discipline and enhance their own dignity by degrading the men. This may do with Europeans, but is not possible with Americans. While stern and exacting in the line of service when on duty the officer can be the comrade when off without any loss to the service or the official dignity. I am naturally reserved and have found it difficult to be on familiar, easy terms with my men. I have envied my

fellow-officers their tact in this respect, but in all the efforts I have made I have never suffered loss from them. We owe this to the intelligence of our Americans. I said to a sergeant, the only man left in command of two guns at Stone river, who, of course, was about getting away, 'I want you to save these pieces, my good fellow.' He reported to me that night that the guns were right where I saw them, only he 'shoved 'em round.' The good fellow did not seem to think he had accomplished any thing extraordinary, for when I made him a lieutenant he hesitated about accepting as he preferred remaining with the boys, but took it on the ground that it would enable him to run home and see the old woman."

General Thomas loved his men, took great delight in studying their nature and was full of anecdotes about their ways and character. It was at Murfreesboro that he had an earnest appeal from a private for a furlough. The man said, as if the saying concluded the argument: "I aint seen my old woman, general, for four months."

"And I," replied Thomas, "have not seen mine for two years—if your general can submit to such privation surely a private can."

"Don't know about that, general, you see me and my wife ain't made that way."

There was nothing more fascinating than the face of General Thomas when it broke into a smile. In this it was winning because of the frank expression that told one that it was more than lip deep and came from the heart. His laugh was of the same sort, not loud but musical in its brief, hearty enjoyment. The rarity of the expression made them in their surprise all the pleasanter. The general's seriousness was ever sweet. His religious nature, although earnest and deep, was not austere. It affected his entire life, however.

"I can not see," he said, "how a man can be an infidel and remain a brave man. Belief in God is like confidence in one's general, it holds us to the front. We feel that the power above has a wise design in making us face the deadly peril. I doubt whether any sane mind ever does positively

disbelieve. One may have painful doubts, for we are brought continually face to face with mysterious and apparent contradictions, but back and above all these, we feel that there is an overruling power ever wise and ever just."

All of the many months of delay at Murfreesboro, while the general commanding was laboring night and day in gathering supplies and rendering the stores safe from raids, General Thomas was as actively and earnestly employed in organizing the center, and not only drilling so continuously that the troops grew into veterans, but seeing that their food, tents, clothes and arms were of the best, so that when the army came to move he had one under his immediate command that was invincible. Elsewhere throughout the war we search in vain for a body of men that never knew defeat; we search in vain for one to whom a victory would not be a casualty. The Army of the Cumberland swung its eagles through the smoke of battle to assured victory, and was the first body of men to teach the veterans under Longstreet that the Rock of Chickamauga was more firm and immovable than the stone-walls that came of Jackson.

General Rosecrans well knew that the day he withdrew his army from along the line of railroad which the troops protected—and this duty called for an army—the Confederate raiders would seize upon and destroy this, the only line of supply. In view of this, these fortifications were made accordingly heavy. They could resist successfully an army of fifty thousand men. No such force tried conclusions with these earthworks, but as we will see they made the advance possible, and not only gave security to the millions worth of stores where collected, but served to keep open the line between Murfreesboro and the advancing army. The contempt openly expressed at the War Department was of course discouraging, and kept the general commanding in hourly expectation of an order relieving him. That such would have greeted him we now know but for the fact that Generals McCook and Thomas earnestly approved of all the preparations made.

By order of the War Department the army was re-organized 9th January, 1863, by a formation into three army

corps, designated as Fourteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-first, and as this corresponded to the old Right, Left and Center, the same commanders were left as they were. In the same month a notable event occurred in transferring General James B. Steedman to Rosecrans' command. On the 25th of January, by order of the War Department, Forts Henry and Donelson were transferred to the Army of the Cumberland. This put the river under immediate control of General Rosecrans, a proper disposal of that stream, as it was one of the two lines of supply afforded his army.

The Confederates learning of the delay and the purpose of our army at Murfreesboro felt at liberty to organize a cavalry raid to our rear. All the cavalry of Wheeler, Forrest and Wharton, under command of General Wheeler, suddenly appeared at Triune. General Wheeler was one of the brightest stars in the galaxy of well-remembered cavalry officers of the South of a force that was so brilliant and so brief. But the South had no more a store of horses to draw upon than it had a population of laborers. Both were soon exhausted. This expedition of Wheeler's was not fortunate. At Triune in our rear he awakened to the fact that a superior body as to numbers of cavalry was in his rear under Generals Davis and Steedman. At Rover, Colonel Minty, of Davis' command, captured a regiment of three hundred and fifty men. Wheeler eluded the infantry and cavalry that at one time seemed to have him surrounded and suddenly appeared before Dover, Tennessee. Colonel A. C. Harding held this fort with seven hundred men, and although amazed at the sudden and unexpected appearance of a large force made such a gallant resistance to Wheeler's repeated attacks that Wheeler was repulsed with a loss of two hundred killed, six hundred wounded and one hundred captured. Colonel Harding lost but thirteen killed, fifty wounded and twenty captured. Wheeler in the face of this disaster intended continuing the attack, but that night several gun-boats conveying transports laden with reinforcements for Rosecrans' army arrived at Fort Donelson and Wheeler withdrew. Every effort was made to intercept and capture this bold

raider, but in vain. He succeeded afterward in riding across Duck river at Centerville.

The force that appeared February 2, 1863, at Donelson and warned off Wheeler called itself the Army of Kentucky, under the general command of Gordon Granger, then at Louisville. From Fort Donelson this force continued by boat to Nashville, where it was augmented by two regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, and numbered when thus increased fourteen thousand men. They were mostly raw recruits, however. All reinforcements to the Union army came, as we have seen, in this form. No recruits were ever forwarded to fill out and make part of regiments decimated by loss in the service. There was official patronage in the less efficient means found in the formation of new regiments. In every regiment thus newly created there was a host of office-seekers, men engaged in enlisting others in the hopes that they, the volunteer agents for recruits, would be elected officers. In this way our army continued hindered to the last in reaping the advantage that came of experience in the service.

It is remembered that this force approaching Nashville by the river struck a chill through the disloyal element of that historic town. The river is narrow, deep and tortuous, so that to those looking on from the banks the crowded transports with the gayly uniformed recruits with their bands filling the air with martial music while silken banners not yet torn by shot nor stained with blood floated in the sunny air, made such a contrast to the half-starved, ragged veterans under Johnston, that had almost doubled-quick from a protection of the town, that the Confederate heart was made sick.

The lesson taught the Confederacy by such exhibits of great resources on the part of the Union was lost on us. The wanton destruction of life and material on our side by a government hopelessly at sea in a knowledge of war and the inflated equaled nonentities we set up as generals very nearly equalized conditions ere the war came to a close. Both of our financial and military systems were trembling

on the verge of utter ruin when the Confederacy suddenly went down from the same causes only a few days in advance. When Richmond was lost and Lee's army surrendered Jefferson Davis pleaded with the leaders with tears in his eyes to continue the struggle, for he knew even in their despair the cause was on the eve of success. He knew how the giant foe had wasted resources, thrown away with reckless extravagance both men and money, until in these respects there was small difference, but while the South was without both, back of the North was a growing discontent of a disloyal class, while in Mexico the army of Napoleon was impatient to move upon us, and the combined fleets of France and Russia were sailing silently to our coast. The lack of body to the South, the absence of a sturdy class of laborers which makes the foundations of a state, was so keenly felt that the great Southern President's earnest pleadings fell on unheeding ears.

Wishing to ascertain the position and force of the enemy at his front, General Rosecrans, on March the 4th, ordered a general reconnoissance. The force employed of all arms numbered about five thousand. A movement was made from Murfreesboro on Rover by General Sheridan with four brigades of infantry and Minty's cavalry. Colonel Minty, being in advance, attacked four hundred of the enemy's cavalry at Rover and drove them back on six hundred at Unionville. He routed the combined forces, capturing fifty-two prisoners. He joined Sheridan at Eaglesville. In the meantime, General Steedman, marching toward Chapel Hill, met and drove back Roddy's cavalry. While these efforts were being successfully made, General Gilbert was organizing a disaster. He sent Colonel John Coburn, of the Thirty-third Indiana, south of Franklin with instructions to form a junction with a column moving from Murfreesboro toward Columbia and to fill a train of eighty wagons with forage. Colonel Coburn had his own regiment, the Eighty-fifth Indiana, the Nineteenth and Twenty-second of Michigan. To this were added six hundred cavalrymen commanded by Colonel Thomas J. Jordon, making in all two thousand, eight hundred and thirty-seven men. Colonel Coburn, in ac-

cordance with his instructions arriving on the 4th at Spring Hill, divided his force, sending one-half to meet the column from Murfreesboro at Rally Hill, and the other half toward Columbia with orders to return that night and form a junction again at Spring Hill, unless the expected column should be met by the force sent in the direction of Rally Hill.

The cavalry, marching in advance of the infantry, came upon the enemy near Franklin. A lively skirmish followed that the enemy found too severe because of the rapid service of Aleshire's guns, and they retreated toward Spring Hill. They rallied, however, at Thompson's Station in a strong position sustained by other forces on their left flank. Dismounting his men, Colonel Jordan charged the enemy to find their first line a mere feint to cover a yet stronger position on the hills beyond; when joined by Coburn, the combined forces were checked by well directed artillery fire from both right and left flanks. It became evident that the retreat of the first line of the enemy was to draw our men into a position where they could be enfiladed from both sides. Coburn had received assuring information the day before and that morning of a superior force to his own at his front, and had so advised General Gilbert. But, as he received no reponse to his report, he determined to move forward as he had been instructed. That discretion we were taught to know by the Fitz John Porter court of extraordinary review, as lodges in a subordinate officer executing an order on a field the general commanding could not see, did not effect the gallant, but imprudent Coburn. He had been ambuscaded, and, suffering wofully from cannon on the right of him and cannon on the left of him, ordered a charge upon the first named. Before this could be executed, the enemy not only disappeared from the front, but developed a large force in the rear. The gallant Indianian did not lose his head, although he did lose his little army. He ordered retreat when too late, and in twenty minutes he was forced to surrender thirteen hundred men. Our loss in killed and wounded numbered forty killed and one hundred and fifty wounded. Our other forces escaped.

The Confederates were commanded by Van Dorn and Wheeler, and it was claimed at the time that their combined forces numbered fifteen thousand men. As this would call for all the cavalry of Bragg's army, and as reconnoissance in force was going on along the entire front of the Confederate army, it is not likely that Coburn and Jordan fought more than their own number. It was a neat strategem planned by Wheeler that drove our little force into a position where success on our part was simply impossible.

While this unhappy skirmish was taking place, General Sheridan occupied the junction of the Chapel Hill and Shelbyville turnpikes, and General Steedman drove the enemy's cavalry under Roddy across Duck river, capturing sixty men and eighty horses. General Granger, receiving news of Colonel Coburn's surrender, ordered General Baird's brigade to occupy Franklin. This force was transported by rail from Nashville and was followed immediately by General Granger in person. March the 6th, Colonels Jones' and Heg's brigades drove the enemy from Middletown, after which both brigades returned to Murfreesboro.

General Granger on the same date brought forward his cavalry under General Smith, with orders from headquarters to make a general co-operative movement against Van Dorn and Wheeler. On the 7th, General Sheridan's brigade reached the front at Franklin, and immediately after a brigade arrived from Nashville. On the arrival of the two regiments, the enemy's cavalry that was said to be six thousand strong fell back to College Grove. On the 7th of March, Colonel Minty marched to Franklin, and on the 9th, General Granger with his own and Sheridan's and Minty's forces drove Van Dorn from Spring Hill. As a part of this movement, General Davis advanced from Salem to Eaglesville to relieve General Steedman's front while General R. S. Granger moved to his support. On the 10th, General Gordon Granger drove Van Dorn across Rutherford's Creek near Columbia. Further demonstration was rendered impracticable by the high water that prevented the passage of infantry and artillery. The main object of this extended and heavy reconnoissance was obtained. The general com-

manding was thereby possessed of the points at which the enemy was posted in force at his front and the space it would be necessary for him to cover for the purpose of flanking Bragg out of a position from which he could not be driven by assault without heavy and useless loss.

We are now dealing with generals whose knowledge of war rose above inhuman slaughter of their troops in the face of impregnable positions. It was a dangerous art of war. We have seen how a most capable general, Don Carlos Buell, was relegated to the rear for steadily refusing to sacrifice his men in hopeless attacks. We have seen that at times General Buell carried this commendable quality to an extreme, but this humane consideration met with no approval at Washington, where Secretary Stanton had resolved on one mode only of ending the war in behalf of the Union, and that was by "attrition," which meant to crowd in troops until the gigantic revolt was stamped out. The proposition to give three men for the enemy's one made the generals of Shiloh, Chickasaw Bluff, Champion's Hill, and the two assaults on Vicksburg acceptable at Washington. Nothing, as we have said, but the approval of Thomas and McCook prevented Rosecrans getting an early dismissal. We must remember in this connection some facts now clear to our comprehension, but once obscured by the glare and blaze of an armed conflict, that our war for the Union was really being fought in the courts of Europe, where the smallest war power once recognizing the Confederacy could have ended the strife against us. Delay was fatal. The longer the war was protracted, and the more evident it became that we could not conquer the revolted states, the more certain the recognition grew. The government then at Washington wanted quick, heavy blows, and, under the circumstances, the brutal butchers who would fight without knowing how to fight were preferred to abler men who knew what preparations were necessary to make fighting available. In addition to this, the authorities at Washington saw our financial and military systems rapidly breaking down. It had come to be a mere question of time when volunteering would cease and the

paper money of the government drop to the same worthless level that had overtaken that of the Confederacy.

We will consider the matter hereafter, when we reach a point in our record where such consideration is more necessary to a clear understanding of our hero's worth and services. But, looking back now, it is strange that Rosecrans was permitted to remain in command. There is a fact not generally known that probably weighed heavy in his favor, and this was that General Rosecrans was a devout Catholic, the brother of Bishop Rosecrans and the warm friend and associate of Archbishop Purcell. Secretary Stanton had a kindly feeling for the Catholic Church, and President Lincoln had the sagacity to see, as did Secretaries Seward and Chase, that through that element much might be accomplished in Europe in behalf of the Union. We well know that Archbishop Hughes was sent abroad by Mr. Seward as a diplomatic agent, while Archbishop Purcell and his able brother, Father Edward, remaining loyal to the Union, were in continuous and close relation with President Lincoln and Messrs. Chase and Stanton, of the cabinet. Whatsoever may have been the influence of this element, it did not save Rosecrans from continual annoyance or from serious loss.

It was a part of General Thomas's system of training to keep the raw volunteer regiments that were continuously poured in under fire as much as possible by skirmishes at the front. This not only inured them to actual war, but dissipated the vague fear of war that paralyses the newly enlisted. One learns from actual experience that the roar is out of all proportion to the danger, that for one man killed there is his weight of lead wasted.

General Thomas seldom indulged in comment—scarcely ever in criticism—of his brother officers; but one night when he returned from head-quarters, where he had solicited in vain permission to make a demonstration at his front, he said, with some feeling: "It is a great error in the government not to supply us with enough horses to enable us to feel daily the enemy at our front. It is the best training to give our men, while it gives us information and the enemy a healthy regard for us. McClellan made a grave mistake in

not skirmishing every day of the nine months he was organizing at Washington. "It was like the poor woman who consented to have her daughter learn to swim, but warned her not to go near the water."

General Rosecrans recognized the weight of General Thomas's wishes, but the enemy had such a heavy force of cavalry at his front that to attempt to skirmish was to invite such a disaster as the gallant Colonel Coburn suffered. General Rosecrans, therefore, asked again and again for horses on which to mount his infantry so as to feel the enemy in force at his front. With nearly all of Pemberton's forces before him, and even Lee refused reinforcement that Bragg's army might be strengthened, he learned from Washington that his extraordinary delay was endangering our army at Vicksburg and the Army of the Potomac.

It would have been well for General Rosecrans had he accepted the situation, and provided energetically for an advance. But the continued success of raids by Confederate cavalry to the rear of our armies provoked imitation. This was stimulated by an event that occurred in the latter part of May. At a dinner given to a member of Congress by General Rosecrans, the law-maker repeated a conversation he had but a short time before with President Lincoln. In this the President said: "I can not understand this difference between rebel and Union soldiers. We are all of the same people, and our men ought to march as far and fast and fight precisely the same as the rebels. They make impudent raids to the rear of our armies, why can we not teach them that two can play at that game? I think the fault is in our generals. As soon as we commission one, he sits down and yells for more men. He won't move, and he will yell."

The President should have been informed that the fault was with him, or rather with his War Department, in not providing our armies in the field with an efficient cavalry. While the enemy had the finest in the world, as long as it lasted, we had the worst. When the arm was forced on it, it was left to volunteers. Country lads born and bred among horses preferred the infantry or artillery, while denizens of towns who knew nothing about riding and management of

horses were eager to enter that arm of the service. The result was that the poor beast was killed by ill-usage in ninety days. There was but one gait known to all the service and that was a gallop, or as frequently a run. As for efficiency, it was said that to brush against one of our mounted men was to knock him off his horse. The officers accepted the situation and the so-called cavalry. Before the war ended the War Department seemed to see the error of its ways, and about the time the Southern cavalry disappeared our cavalry came efficiently to the front.

At the time we write of, while our mounted men consisted of clerks from town, tailors, hatters and shoemakers, who were thrown into the service very much as raw mules were broken into army wagons, without instruction or training, the young men of the South, fond of horses from their birth and possessed of a large body of blooded steeds, fell into line as veterans. The dash that distinguished the Southern character was as fatal to their cavalry as ignorance was to ours. In a brief time of hard service the beautiful and daring horsemen disappeared never to return. The South had neither a store of riders nor horses to draw from. The fact is, the entire people was made up of surface. There was nothing but negroes beneath on which to build the state.

There was another fact greatly affecting the situation that President Lincoln failed to observe. The swift and destructive cavalry raids to our rear were through the enemy's country where every man, woman and child was a spy and an agent of information to help on the bold efforts. This, while our men, making a feeble imitation, had to grope their way through the same land slowly and cautiously where every human-being was a plausible liar and every bush concealed a guerrilla.

Instead of submitting these truths to a sensible President, General Rosecrans undertook to gratify the speculative Chief Secretary's hate. To this end he organized an independent force of seventeen hundred men and assigned Colonel A. D. Streight to its command. The unfortunate colonel was instructed to return to Nashville and march out from that into Alabama and Georgia to sever important lines of rail-

road supply and destroy all property likely to be of service to the enemy. General Rosecrans had no horses with which to mount his independent command, so he gave all the unserviceable mules thrown out from the artillery and transportation service. The men were therefore mounted on the sick, lame and blind refuse of the camp. They were told, however, to seize on all the horses in the enemy's country that came in their way. Colonel Streight was a brave gentleman and did his best to make his forlorn mount a success. He marched to Palmyra, thence to Fort Henry, improving his animals by an exchange of broken-down mules for poor horses of the country. He embarked from Fort Henry for Eastport, Mississippi. Leaving Eastport on the 21st, he reached Tusculum on the 24th, and moved thence on the 28th for Moulton at midnight of the 28th. He left Moulton, and passing through Day's Gap toward Blountsville. He was attacked in the rear while passing the Gap by Forrest's cavalry. He defeated Forrest, but all the same that daring cavalryman continued to harrass his rear, capturing the weary and now helpless men by the dozens, for they had so damaged their ammunition by swimming streams as to render it useless. This sort of progress was made through Blountville and Gadsden. The desperate colonel made an effort to put the Chattahoochie river between his sorely reduced force and the pertinacious Forrest by destroying the bridge at Rome. He failed, of course, and soon found himself and men so surrounded and fatigued that nothing was left but an ignominious surrender. This occurred on the 3d of May. We now learn that from the start every move of the doomed force was known to the enemy and anticipated. For years after the recuperated mules were shown by the natives and laughed at. Instead of being cause for rejoicing at Washington the unhappy result that had to be acknowledged in the loss of seventeen hundred men went far toward strengthening the enemies of General Rosecrans in the War Department.

The fighting along the front continued. On the 9th of April, General Stanley was ordered to the support of General Granger at Franklin. Granger had reported that he

was menaced by about nine thousand cavalry and two regiments of infantry under General Van Dorn. There was not one-half this force threatening Granger, who had about five thousand infantry and two thousand seven hundred cavalry. Our infantry was strongly posted on the south bank of Harpeth river, and from the manner the enemy suffered in its approach to Franklin from one regiment, the Forty-first Ohio, that fought as it fell back, it is very evident we could have assumed the offensive with every prospect of success. General Stanley did cross the river and attack the enemy in flank, but failed to follow up his advantage. As it was, the warm reception given him made General Van Dorn fall back without further demonstration.

The continued employment of new enlisted men in the skirmish line soon began to tell in our favor. On the 20th, General Reynolds, in command of four thousand infantry, and Colonel Wilder's mounted infantry, numbering two thousand six hundred men, made a reconnoissance north-east and south-east from Murfreesboro. This force destroyed the railroad between Manchester and McMinnville, all the mills at the last named place, and one at Liberty. He captured a large amount of supplies, one hundred and eighty prisoners, over six hundred animals, and returned to Murfreesboro with the loss of one man wounded.

On the 27th, Colonel Watkins' cavalry, marching from Franklin, surprised and captured the Texas Legion between Columbia and Carter Creek turnpikes, and this within a mile of General Van Dorn's main forces. One hundred and eighty prisoners, three hundred horses and mules, wagons, and all the camp and garrison equipage were our spoils without the loss of a man. Again, Colonel Campbell, in command of a brigade of cavalry, moved out from Franklin on the 30th and surprised the enemy on the Columbia and Jonesboro turnpikes. The loss to the Confederates was fourteen killed, twenty-five wounded, and thirteen captured.

Again, General Stanley marched from Murfreesboro to attack a force encamped near Middleboro. The general had one regiment of mounted infantry with a portion of General Turchin's cavalry. Lieutenant O'Connell, heading the ad-

vance, charged the enemy with such success that the little conflict was over before our main body came up. General Stanley brought in three hundred horses and seven hundred stand of arms.

We mention these little affairs to show that General Thomas's system of training under fire was bearing fruit. We have given but few of them and the more important, but the fighting along the front was almost continuous, and the entire army learned before it was called on to move as an army that the supposed superiority of the Confederates in the way of fighting was a myth. As our men gained confidence, the Confederates lost, so that the morale so necessary to success in an armed force shifted from the Confederate side to the Union lines, from the fact that allowing largely for an equality of merit as brave men, our superior equipment gave us largely the odds.

One night after a daring exploit of a few men had been reported to General Thomas, he said with a glow on his cheeks and a brighter light in his eyes: "My men are being taught the art of war in the only school of practical instruction, and that is in the field. All the training, however necessary, is as nothing to that training which is done in the face of death. Put a plank six inches wide and twelve feet long five feet from the ground, and a thousand men will walk it easily. Lift that plank five hundred feet from the ground, and one man in a thousand will walk it in safety. It is a question of nerve we have to solve and not of dexterity. It is not how to touch elbows and fire a gun; it is how to touch elbows and fire a gun under fire. We are all cowards in the presence of immediate death. This is the law of our being. It is as necessary to keep the earth inhabited as hunger. We can overcome that fear in war through familiarity. The South came into the field better equipped in this respect than the North, for at the South men were more accustomed to violence and, therefore, more familiar with death. What we have to do is to make veterans. The great error in McClellan's organization was in his avoidance in fighting. He let that force on Ball's Bluff be killed and captured while a heavy support lay idle within

the crack of musketry, for fear of a general engagement. His one congratulatory report was 'All quiet on the Potomac.' The result was a loss of morale. Our troops came to have a mysterious fear of the enemy."

Observing the attention given him, General Thomas seemed called to himself and said hastily: "Well, gentlemen, we will defer bragging until we capture Bragg." This was more of a surprise than his military comments, for, although the general had a keen, yet delicate, sense of humor, he seldom indulged in it, and was never known before or since to indulge in a pun. His staff recognized in it a hasty retreat from what the general thought an improper utterance.

The telegraphic correspondence between Rosecrans and Halleck during the half year of delay affords interesting information, especially when taken in connection with that between Grant and Halleck during the same period. We are taught some of the evils affecting an army organization. In the process through which a mass of men is molded into a machine under control of one mind, the individual, while not entirely lost, is of necessity degraded. When a man becomes a private, he surrenders for the time being and for the purposes of the army his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to his superior officer. With the officer the deprivation of these rights is not so stringent, but the necessities of the service call for a weak submission that in the common mind breeds snobbery. The higher officers are the fountains of honor, and as such become tin gods on wheels to the subordinates. Discipline demands blind obedience, but this blindness is not so complete as to deprive the subordinate of a knowledge where to find the blind side of his commander and play on it for his promotion. This was what troubled General Halleck. He had been called to Washington as the military adviser of the President. He was, did he dare exercise the functions allotted him, the commander in chief of all our armies. But Halleck soon learned that President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton were men who had or thought they had military views much affected by politics, and back of both two of the strongest characters ever molded in human shape. Now, to question these views

on the part of General Halleck was to question his office. He came quickly to the sage conclusion that he was military adviser in name, but really a scape-goat in case of any great disaster. He accepted the situation and immediately set about to learn, not what the service needed, but what the President and Secretary wanted. He knew that both were at fault in nearly all military matters, but he knew that they were shrewd gentlemen, deeply learned in political affairs, of which he, Halleck, was remarkably ignorant, and so he felt his way cautiously along and never gave one opinion until he learned that of his superior officers, and then he was very emphatic in his approval.

The writer of this first learned his lesson in army organization when acting as one of the board of officers organized to investigate the circumstances and cause of the surrender of Harper's Ferry. We had not been in session twenty-four hours before it was understood at the Executive Mansion, and in the War Department it was well known, that the fault was in McClellan. How this came to be the opinion of the board no one could explain. It seemed to pervade the atmosphere. Now we all know, as well as facts could control conviction, that Harper's Ferry was lost, not through any fault of McClellan, but from the treachery, cowardice, and stupidity of the officers left there for the defense. Had not Maryland Heights been abandoned by General Miles and Colonel Ford, the place could easily have been held until McClellan came to the rescue. McClellan was not only a Democrat, but he had forced his political opinions into the army, and instead of fighting the country's battles with some sense and a little success, he had impudently elevated his shallow mind to the post of adviser on political subjects. This was enough to brush aside Miles's treachery and Ford's cowardice. The writer of this, the younger member, was called on to write the opinion of the court. It was not his opinion, and so he embodied in the judgment Halleck's testimony, which said, truly enough, that had McClellan marched an hour more or a mile further a day, he would have reached Harper's Ferry in time to rescue the garrison. The fact was that McClellan, after ad-

vising the evacuation of the place, was feeling his way along in utter ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts or intentions. The finding of the board, so far as McClellan was concerned, is an historical infamy, and so impressed with such a conclusion was he that he inserted a sentence in the finding that rendered the entire judgment a ludicrous absurdity. It read: "By reference to the evidence, it will be seen that, at the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, *his little army was in reality relieved* by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of his position."

Halleck was not only influenced but guided by these conditions in his telegrams to Grant and Rosecrans. He knew that, while Rosecrans, without the loss of a man or a mule, was opening his communications so as to gather supplies, while at the same time he fortified his base for the most important campaign of the war, Grant was wasting an army in bayous and swamps before a place that would be untenable were it approached from the interior—and yet, while his telegrams were highly encouraging to the hopeless canal digger and bayou cleaner, and men and supplies were hurried forward in advance of demands, the messages to Rosecrans were brusque to insult, and it was almost impossible to get reinforcements and supplies. What makes all this the more striking is the fact that Halleck had the highest admiration of George H. Thomas, and knew that he was Rosecrans' one adviser.

NOTE.—Early in June, a strangely romantic event occurred at Franklin, Tennessee. Two young men, in the uniform of colonel and major of the Union army, and well mounted, presented themselves at the tent of Colonel Baird, commander of the post, giving their names and ranks as Colonel Anton and Major Dunlap, and claiming to be authorized by an order from General E. D. Townsend, assistant adjutant-general at Washington, indorsed by General Rosecrans, to inspect our posts. Colonel Baird was at first deceived, and he permitted the two to ride away in the direction of the enemy's lines. A slight suspicion grew to such magnitude that he sent after the supposed colonel and major. There was something about the uniforms that appeared mysterious. They did not fit the wearers. Again, the major, Dunlap, was too young to hold the rank claimed, even in a service where promotions were so rapid. Again, they were without escort and seemed to come up out of the earth to execute their strange mission.

Colonel Baird sent an officer with a corporal's guard to arrest the men. On telegraphing General Rosecrans, he learned that no such duty as claimed had been authorized, nor had he ever heard of Messrs. Anton and Dunlap. Faced with this evidence, the colonel, Anton, confessed that he was no such man, but Colonel Lawrence A. Williams, formerly of the Union army, but asserted that his companion was Lieutenant Dunlap, of the Confederate army. He denied that they were spies and asked clemency. General Rosecrans issued a prompt order calling for a drum-head court-martial.

The court was puzzled to know what these men hoped to gain inside our lines. Every man, woman, and child left at home was a spy, and at Bragg's head-quarters our forces were correctly counted to a man, our works described, our stores enumerated, while contemplated moves were better known than in the War Department.

The order was duly executed in the execution of the unfortunate men. At least such appears of record. There is another story, however, in circulation in the army, that not only solves the mystery, but tells the wildest romance that ever occurred in real life. It is to the effect that the court organized in such haste discovered that the boy, Major Dunlap, was a woman, and from Colonel Williams it was learned that, in an insane love of the Southern cause, and stimulated by the spirit of adventure, this girl had procured this disguise and ridden into our lines as a spy. Colonel Williams, learning the fact and knowing the family, put on a Union officer's uniform that had come into his possession from an officer who had died from wounds in the colonel's tent. He overtook the mad girl, and the two were on their return when arrested.

So far the story is plausible, but what follows and tells how the officer detailed to execute the spies substituted dead bodies to personate the offenders on the gallows scene, draws rather heavy on one's credulity. However, we are reminded that truth is stranger than fiction, and is generally more disagreeable. When we find a story, therefore, that favors our views, we may be well satisfied that it is false.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Tullahoma Campaign—Impatient Orders from Washington for an Immediate Advance—Catholic Influence Sustains Rosecrans—The Natural Defenses of Chattanooga—Bragg Flanked Out—Battle of Chickamauga—Thomas Holds the Center and Saves the Army—Retreat to Rossville—In Possession of the Granite Gateway to the South.

In his retreat from Murfreesboro, after the disastrous engagement at that place, to Duck river, General Bragg exhibited rare judgment in selecting a line of defense. It presented to General Rosecrans' army an irregular curve with a strong force of infantry extending from Shelbyville to Wartrace, and where, from the formation of the ground, a natural defense was given almost as perfect as artificial fortifications. At Shelbyville, where General Polk's corps was stationed, a redan line covered with an abatis guarded the front. Bragg's cavalry was posted at McMinnville, on his right, and was thrown out as far as Guy's Gap. Hoover's, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps were held by General Hardee's corps. While Tullahoma was his great depot of supplies, Chattanooga made, of course, his base.

This was the condition in June, 1863, when General Rosecrans determined to move upon the enemy. To this end, he concentrated the three corps of Generals Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden on the enemy's right, and, to conceal this from Bragg, he made a feint upon his left with the main body of his cavalry and General Granger's corps. On the 23d of June, General Granger was ordered to advance. It was soon developed that Bragg could not be easily disturbed. The approaches to his front were by narrow gaps in a rough country that forced our armies to keep the roads through these narrow openings. To advance along such narrow ways, and then attack the strongly-fortified position at Shelbyville, made a line so hazardous that General Rosecrans abandoned, if he ever entertained the intent of such assault.

He differed, we see, from his associate commander whose sole military movement resulted in finding an impregnable position held by the enemy and attacking the same. General Rosecrans had but one thought, and that was to maneuver the enemy into accepting a battle field of his own selecting instead of one tendered us by the enemy. This is called the art of war, and consists as much in saving our own men and material as in inflicting all the damage possible on the foe. General Rosecrans felt his way along Bragg's front, and declined accepting the slaughter tendered him on a line that would be fiercely fought for and conquered, if conquered at all, at a fearful loss to us, while it left open to the enemy a line of retreat that would rob us of our victory precisely as Grant was served at the bloody fight of Champion's Hill. Arriving at Shelbyville, General Rosecrans proposed turning General Bragg's right, and, forcing him out of his intrenchments, give battle on ground of his own selecting.

The first movement looking to a blinding of the enemy was at Triune—as if a direct attack on Shelbyville was contemplated. General R. B. Mitchell was ordered from Triune to skirmish vigorously at Eagleville, Rover, and Unionville. This was done while cavalry operated on General Rosecrans' left, and an infantry force was sent toward Woodbury. All this was done to blind the enemy as to the real movement. On the 24th, the entire army abandoned camp and took the field. General McCook advanced toward Liberty Gap. The direct march on that point was soon abandoned and turned toward Millersburg, where Sheridan's and Davis's divisions bivouacked at night, while Johnson's advanced to the gap. After some severe skirmishing by the regiment commanded by Colonel Harrison, the Confederates, finding themselves flanked on both sides, fell back, fighting, to the further end of the gap, when our forces, taking possession of the natural gateway, encamped for the night.

During the same day, General Thomas's command, with Reynolds' division in advance, followed by Rousseau's and Negley's division, moved out on the Manchester turnpike. The brigade of mounted infantry of Reynolds' division, un-

der Colonel Wilder, attacked the Confederates at Hoover's Gap, and, after a fierce resistance, drove them back to the southern entrance of the gap, where they held possession until General Reynolds, with two brigades, and General Brannan, with three, came to the rescue, when the Confederates retreated, giving up possession of another defile which Bragg relied on to make his position on Duck river secure.

The several movements of troops that day corresponded with the campaign determined on, and were severally made in time. General Crittenden moved from Murfreesboro to Bradyville; General Granger marched from Salem to Christiana. From Murfreesboro, at the same date, General Stanley marched through Salem to reinforce General Mitchell. The next day, General Crittenden held Holly Springs. General Thomas, as soon as General Brannan joined him, put that officer in command at Hoover's Gap. General Reynolds, having pressed the enemy all day, had General Rousseau close up on his rear for the purpose of attacking the enemy next day. General Stanley concentrated with Generals Granger's and Mitchell's divisions, and Negley's brigade, at Christiana, intending to move on the enemy's right flank. Laboring under the delusion that the main body of our army had to advance through Liberty Gap, Bragg made a desperate effort to dislodge our forces under General Johnson. A fierce encounter followed. The enemy, having assailed the center of Johnson's line, and failed to pierce it, next attempted to turn our flank by an artillery and infantry attack from the hills. This, too, was met and repulsed, after which the enemy abandoned the field with a loss of one hundred killed and seven hundred and fifty to our two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded. The cool, courageous conduct of our troops awakened both surprise and gratification on the part of our officers.

General Thomas, while advancing on the 26th toward Fairfield encountered Confederates in force on the heights north of Garrison creek. From this they were driven by Generals Rousseau and Brannan on their left flank and General Reynolds in the front. With the flank movements successfully executed the heights were untenable. An at-

tempt was made by the enemy to rally on a new position, but no time was given him and he retired, but in good order, behind a heavy rear-guard supported by artillery in the rear and cavalry on the flanks. In executing this retreat the Confederates exhibited in officers and men a courage that was most admirable. It is something for an officer in command to understand the emergency and give orders looking to relief. It is another thing to have those orders executed in a way to make them effective.

The heavy downpour of rain that visited the country on the first movement and continued until long after the last, rendered the roads almost impassable. Bragg relied strongly on this condition to render his defense on Duck river impregnable. It is to be doubted that he ever thought of a flank movement. He had no reason to expect such work up to the 6th of June, 1863. No attempt at such a maneuver had been made by our armies. It had been merely chance encounter and stupid slaughter in which we hoped to win through excess of numbers. Bragg awakened to the startling fact that a force larger than his entire army was on his right flank. His once strong position on Duck river was no longer available to him. He could either march out and fight on ground selected by General Thomas, or he could fall back upon Chattanooga. This last was not done, however, without protest from General Thomas. Without a moment's delay after hearing of General Bragg's defeat he put his army on the pursuit. But the almost impassable roads, the swollen streams, especially the River Elk, so favored Bragg that he crossed the Cumberland Mountains in safety, and occupying Chattanooga left Middle Tennessee to the Union army. This great result was achieved by us with a loss of eighty-five men killed, four hundred and eighty-two wounded and thirteen missing. Bragg's killed and wounded were not reported, but he left as prisoners fifty-nine officers, and one thousand five hundred and seventy-five men and lost eight field pieces and three rifled siege guns, while the destruction of material incident to a hasty retreat was enormous.

This masterly campaign was neither appreciated at Washington nor known to the people. So accustomed were

we to big battles and frightful slaughter that a great victory like this obtained without the useless loss of a man seemed tame and insignificant. It is true that Secretary Seward hastened to make the most of the success, and notified the War Powers of Europe that Tennessee was again in possession of our government. This was not strictly true, for Bragg carried into Chattanooga the title deed to the state, and until he could be defeated or dislodged the mere occupancy of the state amounted to little.

That Bragg had abandoned the aggressive and fallen back upon the rugged gateway of the South left to Rosecrans and Thomas the old employment of repairing railways, rebuilding bridges and gathering supplies before again moving forward. This was, of course, resisted in the War Department at Washington. But the opposition had weakened. Grant's disastrous siege of Vicksburg, the forlorn and almost hopeless condition of the Army of the Potomac, served to impress President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton and the obsequious Halleck that the Army of the Cumberland was after all the only one under command of capable officers who seemed to know what they had in hand and were successful in its accomplishment. One fact made the army under command of Rosecrans comparatively independent of the War Department. In the wide, fertile region thrown open to us there was enough within reach to support our army, and the incessant demand on the Department for supplies became less, indeed almost ceased for a time. When our forces under Buell fell back to the Ohio the farmers of Tennessee and North Alabama were assured by the Confederate authorities that they could rebuild their fences and replant their fields with a certainty that the Yankee forces would never again disturb their crops. The poor deluded people were quick to accept what they wished to believe and had planted and cultivated vast stores for our forces to seize and live upon. Bragg and his army behind the fortress of Chattanooga were forced to rest unmoved by the cries that arose from the state they had so lately occupied.

In this helpless condition, the South was again feeling her great weakness. Had there been a population of sturdy

laborers on which to draw, it would not have been possible for an army to live upon the country as did that of the Cumberland. Every wagon train guarded by cavalry sent out to gather in the harvest would have been waylaid and surrounded by hastily armed but wrathful citizens, and every bushel of wheat or pound of meat would have been dearly paid for in blood. But the soil owners and white bread winners had been already absorbed by the armies, and none left to guard the homes but aged men, boys, and negroes. The negroes were in no wise guardians to be relied on. It can not be truthfully said that they were not discontented with their woful lot of hard, unrequited toil, but if such discontent existed, it was not sufficiently strong to make them take advantage of the conflict going on about them. They humbly tilled the soil for their masters and cared for the households in their masters' absence as if no war were in progress. But this was the end of their service. To put arms in their hands even to protect their own cabins would have caused a fear the North could not create. When Ossawatimie Brown wrote the emancipation proclamation on the mountains of Virginia with a handful of crazy followers, gaunt-eyed fear sat trembling in every household of a state that subsequently sent the bravest of the brave to the field of battle. There was no calamity known to humanity more terrible than a servile insurrection. Grim danger, therefore, sat at every household, and uneasy sleep came to pillows laid on revolvers throughout the South. That the slaves remained faithful to their masters and cared for crops that grew without overseers, has been instanced as evidence of the kind and Christian influences of that crime of all crimes known as slavery. This is erroneous. Had this system of unrequited toil possessed the slightest trait of good, it would have taught even the dumbest intellect of the negro the wrong being done him. Had there been any good whatever in the whip, the South would not so readily have submitted to a return to the Union, after the fierce resistance that stained with blood the pledge of undying hatred in a people. Their every act since the last fight in behalf of the lost cause has

been that of a people not only conscious of having been wrong, but of a wrong they are glad to be relieved of.

In the brief but stormy campaign conceived by Rosecrans but made practicable by Thomas, our hero exhibited those high qualities as a soldier that lifted him head and shoulders above the epauletted crowd on either side. He was making the noble army that he subsequently said made him, and now, putting his men to their first test of excellence, he felt assured that his orders would be executed with promptness and precision, if such lay within the bounds of human possibility. Riding silent at the head of his column, he kept himself in touch with the forces under his command, and every part of the wide and shifting movement was under his immediate control. The entire army moved as a huge but perfect machine at his will, and his mind took in and held every part, and the aides dashing to and from him bringing reports and carrying orders continued without interruption the story of a grand plan being successfully executed. The fact that the extraordinary storm, lasting through a week, in which the very heavens seemed open to the falling rain, rendered, as we have said, the road so nearly impassable that men marched with extreme fatigue, and, for the wagons and artillery, teams had to be doubled in many places to get on at all.

"We have time to accomplish all that is necessary for my boys to do, and the storms that embarrass us keep the enemy from annoying us or discovering our intent," said General Thomas to an officer who feared the entire force would stick in the mud.

This was the first campaign in which the men under Thomas began to appreciate his real strength. From the first, they were impressed with the thoughtful kindness that gained him distinction at an early day; but now, as he rode on through the storm or camped at night in some rude shelter before a camp-fire, never for an instant losing command of the entire army intrusted to him by General Rosecrans, his presence and power were felt through all the masses down to the most obscure private in the ranks. Both officers and men took a pride in executing his orders, and their

highest reward came in his simple approbation, that never got beyond the phrase of "Very well."

It was on this march of driving rains, when the electric artillery of the clouds vied with our guns in the reverberations that seemed to shake the earth, that General Thomas, looking from his tent opening one night at the blinding flashes of lightning, and listening to the crash that followed with little or no space of time between, said, as if speaking to himself:

"We are getting more cold water thrown on our campaign than we deserve."

"General," demanded a young aide, "do you believe in an overruling Providence?"

"Most assuredly," was the reply.

"I would like to know, then, why he is not on our side," continued the young man.

"Are you satisfied such is not the case?" asked General Thomas.

"Why, it looks that way, General, if the Almighty is interfering. We are getting the worst of it all the time. Where God is there is the majority, you know."

All who sat listening expected to see this young man abruptly snubbed, not that they knew the general ever snubbed any one, but the manner was worse than the matter in the question, and, knowing the general's deeply religious nature, they expected to see their impertinent comrade sat upon. Instead of this, the general said in the kindest manner:

"I am not prepared, my young friend, to throw any light upon that matter. I have never made religion a study, and I am not equipped for its discussion. I never was tempted to question what came to me so sweetly, and so full of consolation and comfort, any more than I would doubt and question the love of my mother. I know that it is here, and I know that it is divine because it is good."

"Do you refer in that to natural religion or revealed religion, General?"

"Revealed religion, of course. I fail to comprehend what is meant by natural religion, it is so vague and un-

certain; but revealed religion, that is given us in the teachings and character of Christ, is clear in all things. I never met an infidel who questioned the goodness of Christ or the purity or divinity of his teachings. Whether they will get us into heaven or not after death, there is one thing certain, and that is, to obey them is to make us better and happier on earth. Accepting that, I will chance the rest."

Instead of congratulatory orders over a great victory achieved without loss, the old irritating and unreasonable demands for an immediate advance were received. General Halleck saw nothing in the way of a movement on the enemy south of the Tennessee. It never entered the military mind at Washington that Chattanooga was our objective point and of such importance that were it severely threatened, it would be fought for if such defense called for all Lee's army. It was the key to the whole situation as the gate-way to the South, but one we could easily hold when once possessed with the loyal population of East Tennessee on one side and the Tennessee river on the other. Chattanooga opened the way to the weak point of the Confederacy. "It enabled us to strike at its belly where it lived," as General Thomas was wont to express himself. General Rosecrans fully appreciated not only the fact that to his army had been given the honor of striking the last fatal blow at the alien government in our midst, but that to deal such a blow called for preparation that was unknown or unappreciated at Washington. To Halleck he urged three requisites to an advance. One was the repair of the railroad to the Tennessee river, the second ripe corn in the field, and lastly that he should have force enough on both sides to protect his flanks. Repairing the railroad to the Tennessee was about equal to building a new road. Bragg in his retreat fully appreciated the importance of this highway to our army, and he left no bridges and few rails in his rear. This important work could be hastened, but the ripe corn could not be stimulated, and the tassel does not appear unless the season is unusually favorable until about the 15th of July. For the forces on the flank, the War Department, that had wasted an army of ninety thousand men about

Vicksburg, responded by giving a column to General Burnside, the most inefficient general in the army, to move on Knoxville, and made no effort whatever to protect the right flank of the Army of the Cumberland.

One reads with amazement the telegrams and orders that illustrate the feeling at Washington in reference to this most important movement of the whole war. Why, under the circumstances, as Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck regarded them, the Army of the Cumberland was maintained at all, puzzles the understanding. There was but one reason, and that based upon the conquest of territory. We had annexed Tennessee to the Union, and once more set up Andrew Johnson as military governor at Nashville. This failed to gratify the Abolitionists, for such conquest was not followed by an act of emancipation, and on this account President Lincoln was rapidly losing the confidence and support of the men mainly instrumental in calling him to the Presidency. The only member of the government who made a reasonable use of the otherwise useless conquest was Secretary Seward, who hastened to call attention of the European governments to the fact that two states, Kentucky and Tennessee, had been added to the government, and the rebellion, therefore, was near its collapse.

As the Cumberland river became in summer an uncertain source of supply from the Ohio river to Nashville, the one line of railway from Louisville to the state capital was the only transportation to be relied on. To keep this open and intact called for at least one-fourth of the army of invasion. And then we were not always successful. Nothing but the existence of a dissatisfied minority called Union men scattered at wide intervals served to preserve this road. These men, too timid to avow themselves, were none the less alive to the business of informers, and if any of their neighbors indulged in the luxury of pulling up a rail, such wrongdoers were immediately visited by Union troops and had their houses burned, out-houses and fields laid waste, as not only a punishment but a warning. This illustrates the stern warlike character of General Thomas. Kind and just as he was, he yet recognized the necessities of war, and was the

one to instruct our officers along the line of the railroad that they should select certain secessionists and hold them as hostages. That is, without depriving them of their liberty, or, indeed, interfering with them in their ordinary pursuits, they were to be told that they were to be held responsible for any injury done the railroad. If such injury was done, their possessions were to suffer in consequence. When this order went into execution, and a few examples illustrated its working, that chief of the raiders, John Morgan, found not only his main sources of information gone, but prominent secessionists in whose behalf he appeared begging him to desist, for he was only doing what would prove their immediate ruin. When such persuasions failed, the same men hasten by night to our officers and gave valuable information that they might save themselves.

On the 25th of July, the Elk river bridge had been rebuilt and the railroad so far repaired that trains were running to Bridgeport, Alabama. But General Burnside was as slow moving on Knoxville as the corn was to ripen in July. There were no troops and the promise of none on our right flank, so General Rosecrans, backed by General Thomas, refused positively to move. A crisis in his career seemed to have reached him. On the 5th of August, he received from General Halleck a positive order to march. To disobey this was to court an immediate dismissal. Better that, said both Rosecrans and Thomas, than to jeopardize the army. But although the peremptory order was disobeyed the dismissal did not appear. But it was no military consideration that made the administration hesitate. The cause was purely political. We have seen that the Catholic Church was not in sympathy with our government. The war on the South was looked on at Rome, by the light of events that had justified our War of Independence, as cruel and unjust. If the axiom set up in 1776, that all governments were established by the consent and for the benefit of the governed, what shadow of a right had the Republic at Washington to crowd down the throats of Southern people a form of government they did not recognize or believe in? Secretary Seward and President Lincoln were not slow to

recognize the power of Rome in Europe and the danger of that influence being exercised against us.

Now, as exceptions to the great body of the Catholic clergy in the United States appeared Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati, and his gifted and pious brother the Rev. Edward Purcell. They were patriots of the purest and most active sort. Standing at the head and front of Catholicism, they had won the loving admiration of laymen and priests at home while standing high in the confidence of the Pope at Rome. They were not silent or at all secretive in their faith. They taught what they thought and proved a salutary restraint to the more impetuous Catholics in this country, while their influence abroad saved the Church the scandal and our government the wrong of a political interference from that quarter. When the Archbishop of Baltimore died, Archbishop Purcell invited General Schenck and staff to appear at the imposing ceremonies of the funeral in full uniform. And when a successor was appointed to fill the Archbishopric of Baltimore, the leading See of America, the two Purcells succeeded in securing a prelate in sympathy with our government.

Archbishop and Father Edward Purcell were attached to General Rosecrans. Through the general's brother, Bishop Rosecrans, an estimable and eloquent priest, they learned to believe in as well as love the general. The true nature and importance of the campaign in which General Rosecrans had so much to do in planning and executing came home to their gifted minds, and so this group of eminent Catholic prelates stood between Stanton's wrath and the general's dismissal.

On the 15th of August, General Rosecrans made his initial move. While the fields possessed abundant forage, the protection asked for on his right and left flanks had not appeared, and to partially protect his right he sent Colonel E. M. McCook in command of Brigadier-General R. B. Mitchell's Cavalry Division on the 11th of August from Fayetteville, Tennessee, to Huntsville, Alabama, thence along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to protect that

road and guard the line of the Tennessee river from Vicksburg to Bridgeport.

From Winchester to McMinnville was a line made up of the Fourteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps in readiness to move, while as a reserve was a heavy body of troops in the rear occupying all the country north of Duck river in connection with troops garrisoned at Fort Donelson, Clarksville, Gallatin, Carthage, Nashville, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville and Watrace. The army in advance and the force in reserve were well in hand, and as an advance had been resolved upon there was no reason for a longer delay. General Rosecrans was called on with an inadequate force to flank Lee's army at Richmond and force the abandonment of Virginia for a war in the cotton states. This great work was to be accomplished by the smaller and poorer equipped of the armies in the field. To make the situation yet worse no operations were being made on either Rosecrans' right or left, so there was nothing to prevent a concentration of troops upon his front.

After all, the neglect and disfavor from which he suffered at Washington were in his favor. The authorities at Richmond kept themselves well advised of military affairs at our capital. Washington City, sandwiched between Maryland and Virginia, was, of course, a Southern town, and while the disloyal sentiment was kept under more from force of habit than fear—for this little municipal dependence had so long looked up to and lived upon the government that any thing like independence was regarded as monstrous—such restless discontent found expression in keeping the officials at Richmond well advised as to the condition of our White House and War Department. The President of the Confederacy and his Secretary blessed themselves in the fact that Stanton's hate and Lincoln's ignorance with Halleck's subserviency left their stronghold without menace and their choice for disastrous campaigns to us undisturbed. Had the new government measured its own military men with the same sagacity it did ours it would have been saved many grave blunders. While making no mistake as to McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Grant, it could not see that Stonewall Jackson was their

genius of war beside whom Lee was a gorgeous drum-major. Resting secure in the indifference and contempt of the War Department at Washington, no troops were gathered at Rosecrans' front nor were his flanks threatened. "Let the fool beat his head against the granite rocks of Chattanooga," said Jefferson Davis, "he will find it quite another thing from Duck river."

Nature made Chattanooga a stronghold before which any army, however large and well equipped, might well hesitate. It lies on the east bank of the Tennessee, that here makes an abrupt turn and runs, hemmed in by the mountains, from north to south. Below Chattanooga, this wide, deep, and rapid river encounters a range of mountains that forces it almost due north, when, again driven by rocky barriers, it takes a north-westerly course, then again the mountains give it a sudden turn and it goes winding through lofty ranges to the south. To one approaching Chattanooga on this deep, swift river from the north-east, there is on the right, and generally on the left, a range of impassable mountains. The traveler reaches an open plain, fortified about by frowning heights, and from that down he sweeps by towering palisades that for sixty miles present no gap through which, as it appears below, a bridle-path could be made for a mule. Long before Chattanooga could be reached from East Tennessee, an army would be exhausted, and when gained, to assault it from the front would be as hopeless as Vicksburg was to Grant as he approached from the Mississippi. To get at it from other than the front appeared more hopeless still. So, at least, thought General Bragg and his masters at Richmond, and they had, in consequence, deprived him of an army, leaving only men enough to man the works at the front. Bragg was lamenting his misfortune in being left idly to man an impregnable position, while grand campaigns were to be fought out by men who were his juniors in rank and inferiors in ability. One day, a courier, white with fear and foul from dust and perspiration, dashed in on General Bragg's head-quarters with the startling intelligence that a large force of all arms threatened his communications at Stevenson. His flank was turned.

To tell how this was accomplished, we return to the Army of the Cumberland. Recognizing the fact that it would be madness to assault Chattanooga from the front, General Rosecrans resolved to flank Bragg out. This could not be done on Bragg's right. In addition to the mountain ranges and the river, the line of attack would be over a country so barren and dry that an army would perish in the attempt. So, while making a feint in force upon the enemy's right, Rosecrans moved the main body upon the left. This not only seemed to deceive the enemy, but gave us possession of the railroad directly in our rear, for supplies and reinforcements.

When General Rosecrans submitted his plan of advance to General Thomas, our hero for the first time made positive dissent, and this upon the ground of the peril in the attempt. He called his commanding officer's attention to the fact that our three corps of the army would be separated and the right from the left some thirty miles, leaving each without support from the others. Supposing we were allowed to cross the river unmolested, the Confederates could assault the separated columns and detain and annihilate each in turn. General Rosecrans persisted. He was satisfied that not enough men had been left to Bragg for such a campaign, and, if he could get upon his flank in time, Bragg was the one to suffer annihilation. It was never safe to calculate upon the weakness of the enemy, and Rosecrans hearkened to the wisdom of Thomas's warning when too late. We must remember that Rosecrans was under positive orders to move on the enemy, and the plan favored by Thomas, to flank the fastness by the way of Knoxville, called for more time than the War Department would allow.

At this part of our work, we avail ourself of the masterly account and criticism from the pen of one who not only took part in the campaigns about Chattanooga, but carried from the slopes of Missionary Ridge a decoration in the shape of a wound that, so long as he lives, will bear evidence to his gallant conduct upon the field of battle—General H. V. Boynton. This soldier, author, and gentleman gives luster to our pages in his clear, incisive, and conclusive story

of the campaign and fight that won us Chattanooga. The account to which we give a more permanent form appeared originally in the *Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette*, and reads as follows:

“WASHINGTON, August 3. [*Special.*].—In two preliminary letters about Chickamauga, the attempt was made to describe the field as it appears to-day, and to present some of the scenes of the battle which came rushing back over the plains of memory with a power suggestive of the departed legions that once clothed these farms, forests, and ridges with the terrible magnificence of battle.

“In a sense, to write of Chickamauga, is to try to excite interest in a subject which far too many regard as worn; but to the veterans who fought there it will never be a threadbare story. For that generation which has been born and has come to manhood since Chattanooga was won by the Union arms, there is no campaign which can be studied with greater profit, or which will more richly repay the reader. History has not yet done justice to Chickamauga, but its verdict is sure. Many of the misconceptions of the days following the battle still exist in the popular mind. It may be years before they are cleared away; but eventually the Chickamauga campaign will stand in the history of our war as unequaled in its strategy by any other movement of the contest, and as unsurpassed, and probably not equaled, for the stubbornness and deadliness which marked the splendid fighting of Unionist and rebel alike; and, furthermore, it will stand as a substantial Union victory.

“Just in proportion as the credit due is awarded to those who planned and executed the campaign will well-merited condemnation be meted out to those at Washington who insisted upon forcing the movement without regard to proper and vital preparation, who withheld reinforcements, and who, in spite of public and private warnings which it was criminal not to heed, made rebel concentrations against Rosecrans possible from in front of Washington itself, and from Charleston, Mobile, and Mississippi.

“It will be the purpose of a few letters to go over some

of the well-known ground of this campaign with a view of enforcing the ideas expressed in general terms above, and attempting to present a clear account of this most involved and still seriously misunderstood battle. The strategy—matchless in our war—which compelled Bragg to abandon Chattanooga; the life and death struggle for concentrating the Union army when Rosecrans, against the protests of Washington authorities that it could not be true, found his widely-separated corps confronted with reinforcements from every part of the Confederacy; and, lastly, the great battle in the Chickamauga forests for the possession of Chattanooga, are each most fruitful and interesting themes. The present letter will relate to the first-named subject, the strategy of the Chickamauga campaign.

“Marching from Murfreesboro, on the 23d of June, 1863, General Rosecrans had advanced against Bragg, who was strongly fortified, and whose lines, besides, occupied gaps and ranges of great natural strength. By brilliant strategy, with the loss of only 586 killed and wounded, and thirteen captured or missing, the Army of the Cumberland, with its nine divisions and twenty brigades, operating through sixteen days of continuous rain, maneuvered Bragg, with his seven divisions and twenty-three brigades, out of his natural and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennessee. Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign to equal this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in the one element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So brilliant had been the conception and the execution that all the corps commanders, headed by General Thomas, hastened to call on General Rosecrans and offer the warmest congratulations.

“At the close of the Tullahoma campaign, Bragg occupied Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. Rosecrans’ army lay along the western base of the Cumberland Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at McMinnville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the most vigorous preparations for another campaign for the occupation of Chattanooga. Because the necessities of the



CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN—THE STRATEGY.

case compelled secrecy as one of the main elements of success, there was soon at Washington a manifestation of unreasoning impatience over what was criticized as the inaction of the Union commander; but those who were on the ground know well the unceasing activity and energy with which the work progressed of accumulating sufficient supplies of food, material, and ammunition, preparing the means for crossing the Tennessee and obtaining the necessary knowledge of the mountain passes, roads, and trails by which the army must move. Rosecrans' supplies reached him over a badly equipped line of worn railroad, a hundred and thirteen miles in length, and, as can be readily understood, when the daily wants of a great army preparing for extended movement and battle are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus of supplies was not the task of a day or a week. With every effort the railroad was not prepared until July 25th, and the forward movement began on the 14th of August.

"A glance at the map will disclose the great natural obstacles which lay between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. As his army faced toward the latter point, the Cumberland Mountains, with a general elevation of 2,200 feet, rose before it. The escarpment was every-where precipitous, and destitute of every means of approach except narrow mountain roads and trails, with the one exception that a short railroad ran from Cowan to Tracy City, on the summit of the range. To the eastward this range dropped by like precipitous and difficult slopes into the valley of the Sequatchee River. Beyond that stream rose the equally sharp cliffs of Walden's Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet. This fell off along the eastern and southern edge of the plateau into the valley of the Tennessee, and overlooked it from the mouth of the Sequatchee River to a point far above Chattanooga. It was fifty miles as the crow flies from the lines of Rosecrans' army across this continuous mountain region to the valley of the Tennessee. This river was broad and deep, and presented in itself the most serious natural obstacle which the Union army had encountered since it left the Ohio river. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 1,254 feet

at Caperton, the points where the bridges were subsequently thrown.

“On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chattanooga lying behind the river, and the great ranges to the westward between Rosecrans’ position and his own, might well seem to Bragg impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. First, toward the west, came the Lookout range, rising abruptly from the river to the height of 2,200 feet, and stretching south-westwardly far into Georgia and Alabama. Its western precipices looked down into the narrow valley of Lookout Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipitous cliffs of the Raccoon Mountains, the latter having the same general elevation as the Lookout range.

“The gorge of the Tennessee where it breaks through these mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable to so move an army as to attack it from the front or river side.

“With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, but almost insuperable when found in an enemy’s territory, and while he was bending every energy to complete preparations for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for overcoming them, General Rosecrans was astonished at receiving on August 4th, only ten days after his railroad had been repaired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch from Halleck saying: ‘Your forces must move forward without delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River.’

“To a commander who was building boats, opening mountain roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out material for four thousand feet of bridges, preparing to leave his base carrying provisions for twenty-five days, and ammunition for two battles, and crossing three mountain ranges and a deep and broad river, in an enemy’s country, and in the face of an army, this dispatch was not only astounding, but discouraging and exasperating to the last degree.

“It had become a habit at Washington to sneer at the

slowness of General Rosecrans, as it was later to denounce General Thomas in similar terms at Nashville. There was no more reason or justice in the one case than in the other. The verdict of history has been reached in the case of General Thomas. It is sure to come, and to be the same in this matter, for Rosecrans.

“To this dispatch, which can only be excused on the ground of wholly inexcusable ignorance of the active preparations in progress and the natural difficulties of an advance, General Rosecrans replied with his accustomed clearness and spirit: ‘Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops.’ To this Halleck responded: ‘The orders for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory.’ General Rosecrans immediately wrote the following reply, and, calling his corps commanders together, read the dispatches given above. There was no dissent from the proposition that at that stage of their preparations it was impossible to move. He then read his reply as follows, and all approved and agreed that they would support him:

“‘GENERAL HALLECK: My arrangements for beginning a continuous movement will be completed and the execution begun Monday next. We have information to show that crossing the Tennessee between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary movement of troops for the two cases are very different. It is necessary to have our means of crossing the river completed, and our supplies provided to cross sixty miles of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally would be to push our troops into the mountains on

narrow and difficult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, where they would not be able to maneuver as exigencies may demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the command.'

"On the following day Halleck replied as follows:

"'I have communicated to you the wishes of the government in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective has been stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reaching it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to promptly carry out the wishes of the government, you will not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not interfere.'

"This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as follows:

"'Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move with all dispatch compatible with the successful execution of our work. We are pressing every thing to bring up forage for our animals. The present rolling stock of the road will barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily.'

"This was the last of interference from Washington, but, accustomed as all there were to interfering at will, and directing affairs according to the situation as they saw it, they could not brook such manifestly proper independence as was shown by Rosecrans, and from that time forward there was needed only an excuse to insure his removal.

"Had there been a tithe of the attention given to preventing the rebels from concentrating on his front from every part of the Confederacy—in fact, bringing Longstreet's veterans from the lines under Halleck's own eyes—that there was to the kind of interference which has been noticed, Bragg would have been destroyed in front of Chattanooga. But this subject properly belongs in a succeeding letter.

The dispatches given above are well known, but their reproduction will prove a convenience to readers who may not carry their exact terms in mind.

“Ten days later, namely, on August 14th, the movement to secure Chattanooga began. A glance at the map will reveal its strategy.

“Rosecrans had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicinity of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus compel Bragg to evacuate the place or to come out of it and fight for his line of communications. It is easily seen that if, after crossing the river, the enemy, warned in time, should be found in force on the western slopes of these ranges, further progress in that direction would have been impossible, and a return to the north bank of the river obligatory. It was, therefore, necessary to wholly deceive Bragg as to the points of crossing.

“Burnside was marching from Kentucky into East Tennessee. Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumberland in force in that direction would naturally lead Bragg to believe that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated on his right.

“Every thing being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hillsboro', Manchester, and McMinnville on the 16th of August, he crossed the Cumberland Mountains and occupied the Sequatchee Valley from a point between Jasper and Dunlap to Pikeville. Van Cleve held the latter place, Palmer was established at Dunlap, and Wood at Anderson, between Dunlap and Jasper. All built extensive camp-fires and moved about in such ways as to convey to observers from the heights the impression that the whole army was moving. Meantime Minty's active cavalry had moved through Sparta and driven Dibrell's cavalry eastward through Crossville, on to the Tennessee, and over it, and Dibrell, having come to reconnoiter and see what was going on, naturally got the idea that Rosecrans' army was coming. The crossing of the Cumberlands was but the first step of the imposing diversion. Though the mountain roads were few and very difficult,

Crittenden's movements over them had been completed exactly on time. The advance over Walden's Ridge, equally difficult, though it was not quite so high as the main range, was immediately undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, appeared on the Tennessee more than thirty miles above Blythe's Ferry, where he made most energetic commotion. Hazen reached the river in the vicinity of Dallas. Two brigades were strung out along the edge of the cliffs on the top of Walden's Ridge, where they overlooked Blythe's Ferry, and could be seen from the other side of the river. Minty, with his troopers, swept down the valley of the Tennessee to near Chattanooga. Wilder and Wagner also appeared in the valley. While a show of building boats was made in the small streams about Blythe's Ferry, Wilder, from the heights of Walden's Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, opened fire on the town with artillery. Bragg was thoroughly deceived. Forrest was ordered far up the Tennessee to Kingston to watch for the expected crossing. Buckner was ordered from East Tennessee toward Blythe's Ferry.

"As may be supposed, Wilder's cannonading produced the wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rolling-stock of the railroads was hastened out of reach. The depots of supplies were moved out of the range of the unexpected bombardment. D. H. Hill's corps was hurried off to guard the river above, and other heavy forces were moved in the same direction. Every thing done by Bragg was based upon the idea that Rosecrans was moving in force to points on the river above the city.

"Meantime the real movement was going on quietly sixty to eighty miles in the opposite direction, in the vicinity of Bridgeport and Stevenson. A force of cavalry for the purposes of observation, and to convey the idea by quick movements that Rosecrans was feigning below, while really expecting to cross above the city, was sent as far westward as Decatur. Thus Rosecrans was operating along the river through a hundred miles of mountain region, and fifty miles of low country beyond, and in spite of the natural difficulties, every part of the plan was working with precision.

"Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time with Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, had marched in advance and repaired the roads by way of University, and down the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan followed him, and both were at first kept well out of sight of the river. Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridgeport, and McCook descended back of Stevenson. With the exception of Sheridan, at Bridgeport, all were kept well concealed from the enemy's cavalry on the left bank.

"Sheridan alone made a show of his presence, and openly began the construction of a trestle through the shoal water, in order to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As this was without a decided show of strength, it deepened the impression that the movements on this wing were the feint, and those toward the upper river the real move. In fact, after watching Sheridan's trestle building for a while from the other side of the river, Anderson's brigade of infantry, the only infantry force available to oppose a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to Chattanooga.

"The bridge for Caperton's Ferry was brought down on a train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its transportation through the woods to a point near its destination, where the troops which were to lay it were drilled in their work.

"Early on the 29th, fifty boats, each carrying fifty men, were brought out of the woods near Caperton's, rushed across an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the opposite shore. The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven off, and twenty-five hundred men held the south bank. The bridge was promptly laid. Davis was soon over, and then McCook's entire corps, with cavalry, started promptly for Valley Head, forty miles down the Lookout range. Reynolds collected boats at Shellmound, Brannan had built rafts and cut out canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The long bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before Bragg had recovered from his surprise, in fact, before he had comprehended the extent of the movement, Rose-

crans, with two corps, was over the river and moving on his communications.

"As soon as the crossing was assured, Crittenden marched with celerity by way of the Sequatchee Valley toward the bridges, and was soon across with the main body and advancing on the left of it directly toward Chattanooga.

"This crossing of the Tennessee was a great feat. The bridges were not sufficient for the army. Reynolds gathered small boats and improvised his own means of crossing. Brannan's men had cut out canoes from immense poplars, and launched them in Battle Creek out of sight. Some of them would hold fifty men. They also built rafts, one of them large enough to carry artillery. These, with an abandoned rebel pontoon boat, constituted Brannan's flotilla. When the signal was given, the whole swept out from behind the bushes which concealed the mouth of Battle Creek, and made for the opposite shore. The rebel pickets withdrew, and the crossing was secured. Then all his men who could swim, piling their guns, clothing, and accouterments on a few fence rails, pushed these before them, and thus gained the opposite bank. Later, Wilder swam his mounted brigade across the river and joined Crittenden south of Chattanooga. Halleck must have had this ability for crossing a river in the presence of an enemy in mind when he telegraphed Rosecrans, a few weeks before, to move at once, and keep moving.

"But this crossing, and the grand diversion which made it possible, were only the preliminary, and by no means the formidable parts of the movement. To complete it, Rosecrans was to cut loose from his base, carry twenty-five days' supplies, and sufficient ammunition for two battles, cross two precipitous and difficult mountain ranges, wholly within the enemy's territory, and their passes presumably strengthened and defended, and, after crossing the last range at widely separated points, to descend into the valley in the rear of that enemy's stronghold, prepared for battle or any other contingencies which might arise on this distant and isolated theater of action.

"When Bragg discovered the real point of crossing and

the lines of actual movement it was too late to recall the forces dispatched up the Tennessee or to post columns of sufficient strength on the slopes before Rosecrans to impede his advance in force. How strong the positions thus turned by the Union forces were will appear from the statement that so precipitous and otherwise difficult were the roads over these ranges that at several of them it required a day and a night for a division with its artillery and reduced trains to make the ascent.

“The Union commander had delayed his movement until the corn was ripe in order that it might not be necessary to carry grain for his animals, which would have largely increased his trains—so careful, thoughtful and wise was he in every detail of preparation.

“Bragg’s failure to resist in the vicinity of Rosecrans’ crossings and at the crossing of Raccoon Mountains was due in part to the fact that even after he knew that the heads of columns were over the river he was still inclined to look upon their movements as a feint, and to regard the real point of danger to be above the city. Rosecrans, even after crossing, sought successfully to strengthen such impressions in Bragg’s mind. He directed Wagner’s, Wilder’s, and Minty’s brigades to report to Hazen, and with this force, some 7,000 strong, the latter was ordered to make a conspicuous show of crossing the river far above Chattanooga. This active and efficient officer admirably executed his orders. By extended fires, by marching and countermarchings, by moving his artillery continuously across openings in sight from the opposite bank, by buglers at widely separated points, and other similar devices, he easily created the belief that an army was encamped on the right bank intending to cross.

“With the exception of this force, all of Rosecrans’ army was south of the river on September 4th, and on the move. The right was already well on its way. On the 6th his army had descended from Raccoon Mountain and occupied the valley between that range and the western slope of Lookout from a point seven miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, forty-two miles from the city. The next day McCook and Thomas began to ascend Lookout at points respectively forty-

two and twenty-six miles from Chattanooga. On the 8th McCook's troops were in motion down the eastern slope of the mountain toward Alpine, and Thomas was descending from Steven's and Frick's Gap, both of which were near where the road from Trenton, after running southwardly, is represented as leading over Lookout. Crittenden had pushed small portions of his command up mere mountain trails, and on the 9th these gained position where they could look down upon Chattanooga. They saw no flags, and soon discovered that Bragg had evacuated. The day before, Wagner, still watching from the north bank of the river, had reported to Rosecrans that the enemy was leaving. The news came in the night, and Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to ascertain the situation. His detachments on the mountain had already discovered that the city was deserted. Crittenden was at once ordered to march around the north point of Lookout, and follow Bragg toward Ringgold. At night on the 9th Palmer and Van Cleve's divisions were established at Ross-ville, five miles south of Chattanooga.

"Thus, in three weeks from the time his diversion toward Bragg's right began, and in five days from the time his army was over the river, Rosecrans had repeated the Tullahoma campaign on a far greater scale, and in the face of much more formidable obstacles, and absolutely without fighting, except as Minty's cavalry had been slightly engaged with Dibrell's near Sparta in the outset of the movement, had driven Bragg from the mountain stronghold of Chattanooga, the objective of the campaign. It was well said later by General Meigs, who came from Washington to Chattanooga after its final occupation by the Union army, and spent some days in studying the movements by which it had been secured: 'It is not only the greatest operation in our war, but a great thing when compared with any war.'

"But the occupation of Chattanooga, in a military sense, was not accomplished by sending Crittenden's divisions beyond it and one brigade into it. Bragg had only withdrawn to save his communications and supplies, and to await the reinforcements he knew to be hastening from Virginia, from Mobile, and from Mississippi. The battle for Chatta-

nooga was yet to be fought. Bragg had retired with deliberation. He established his head-quarters at Lafayette, behind Pigeon Mountains, but his rear guard never passed beyond Lee and Gordon's Mills.

"The news that Rosecrans' troops were in Chattanooga, and that he had pushed out after the retreating Bragg, made a tremendous impression upon the North. It was accepted as a capture, and a military occupation of that long-coveted stronghold. It is true it was occupied, but not in a military sense, since the Union army had not been brought into it, or concentrated between it and the enemy.

"Hence arose that misconception, which is widespread still, that the Army of the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga, and thence marching out to attack Bragg, had been defeated by the latter at Chickamauga, and driven back in disorder into Chattanooga.

"But, instead, Chickamauga was the battle for Chattanooga, fought by Rosecrans while on the way to take military possession of it, and while he was concentrating his army between Bragg and that city, the objective of the Union campaign. The battle was not for the Chickamauga woods, but for the passes behind them which controlled the way to Chattanooga. These were secured as the immediate result of the battle, and the successful occupation of Chattanooga in the military sense followed—an occupation which lasted till the close of the war.


"In connection with the fact of Crittenden's unopposed movement into Chattanooga, another point of general misapprehension arose, which, through the years, has formed the basis of unfair and unthinking, if not ignorant, criticism of General Rosecrans' brilliant strategy. Why did not Rosecrans face Thomas and McCook about in the valley west of Lookout, where their movements would have been concealed, and hurry them after Crittenden into Chattanooga? It was simply because with McCook's advance nearly fifty miles from Chattanooga by the roads west of Lookout, and Thomas's head of column already down and over Missionary Ridge, full thirty miles away, to withdraw and send them in succession after Crittenden would have been to have invited

attack in detail from Bragg upon each head of column as it followed Crittenden, with all the chances in favor of Bragg's success. Besides, the shortest and surest, in fact the only practicable line of concentration looking to the safety of the widely-separated corps was through a movement to the left along the eastern bases of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. It was this movement of Rosecrans for concentrating on Crittenden's position south of Rossville that led to the battle of Chickamauga. Bragg, having been heavily re-enforced, started at the same time from Lafayette to interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, the Union objective of the campaign.

"Subsequent letters will follow this exciting concentration, and the desperate contests of each army for position, and the bloody battles which ensued, and by which Chattanooga was finally won."

"WASHINGTON, August 7.—[*Special.*]—In the movements of the Union armies, none, from first to last, presented such brilliant strategy as the two which brought General Rosecrans from Murfreesboro to the rear of Chattanooga. Almost equally wonderful was the successful concentration of his widely scattered corps. This was accomplished in the face of an enemy that had been heavily re-enforced with veteran troops, and largely outnumbered General Rosecrans. The concentration, moreover, united the Army of the Cumberland for battle between this confident enemy and the city which was the objective of the Union forces.

"The story is crowded with brilliant and successful operations of detached corps against greatly superior forces and of minor strategy, which blend harmoniously with the more striking features of the great campaign. It covers a period of intense anxiety for General Rosecrans and his subordinate commanders, of most skillful action, and continued danger to destruction in detail. It culminated in the delivery of a battle, which, though still widely misunderstood, unquestionably ranks for the stubbornness and effectiveness of its fighting and the importance of its results with the most notable battles of the war.



McLEMORE'S COVE.

"A previous letter left the Army of the Cumberland where its strategy had thrown it across three mountain ranges and the Tennessee River, and brought it without loss to the rear of Chattanooga, at the foot of the eastern base of the Lookout Mountains. This had compelled Bragg to withdraw toward Lafayette. The left of the Union army, under General Crittenden, had passed around the north end of Lookout September 9th, marched by Chattanooga after Bragg, and occupied Rossville Gap. General McCook, forty-two miles to the right, had descended to Alpine, while the center, under General Thomas, was at Steven's Gap, directly opposite Bragg's center, at Lafayette.

"Finding that the enemy had withdrawn behind Pigeon Mountains, General Rosecrans, having been assured from Washington that no re-enforcements had been sent from Lee's army, determined to push Bragg vigorously at all points for the purpose of gaining every advantage which a retreat presented, and of inflicting all the damage possible. Beyond question, this put his army in serious peril, since Bragg had only retired to meet re-enforcements promised and actually arriving from all quarters, and was even then concentrated and ready to strike. McCook, on the right, pushed in from Alpine and Summerville with Stanley's cavalry to within seven miles of Lafayette without finding any signs of retreat. He, therefore, wisely kept his trains and main force near the mountain.

"Negley, of Thomas, marched out from Steven's Gap beyond the Chickamauga, and his skirmishers deployed in front of Dug Gap. This advanced position he held during the 10th, and early next morning was supported in it by Baird's division. Here Bragg attempted his initiative, and developed his preparations for advance. Two corps of infantry, Hill's and Walker's, a division from Polk's command, and a division of cavalry, were in the gaps of Pigeon Mountains, or the woods behind them, under orders to advance on Negley. By a fortunate delay their combinations for attack were not completed until Baird had arrived. The bold front displayed by both of these officers still further held back those overwhelming forces of Bragg. When the latter were

ready to move, the skill, sharp fighting, and able maneuvering under fire enabled these Union officers to bring their troops back to the shelter of the mountain with comparatively little loss. It was a thrilling and difficult situation, and the day a most anxious one for Generals Rosecrans and Thomas.

"The disappointment was great to Bragg when he learned that his heavy converging columns from Catlett's Gap on his right, Dug Gap in the center, and Blue Bird Gap on his left, had met on the ground held by Negley and Baird, only to find them retiring with such show of strength and with such well ordered lines as enabled them to elude even serious attack. Both these officers deserve far greater credit than they have ever received for their courage, coolness, and ability. At night they were supported by the arrival of Brannan and Reynolds from the west side of the mountain, and the position of Thomas at Steven's Gap was secure.

"Rosecrans' anxiety and Bragg's attention were instantly turned to the Union left. The discovery on the 11th that the rebel rear-guard under Cheatham had not moved south of Lee and Gordon's mill showed Rosecrans that, whatever Bragg's intention may have been, he was then concentrating for battle. As General Rosecrans himself declares in his official report, the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland became a matter of life and death.

"Crittenden, from the 9th to the 12th, had carried on most vigorous operations. Palmer and Van Cleve had advanced to Ringgold. Wood was close at hand. Hazen, Minty, and Wilder, fresh from their part in the brilliant feint north of the river, had joined Crittenden, and some lively minor battles were the result. The discovery that the rebel rear-guard was still at Lee and Gordon's suddenly stopped these operations, and on the 12th, under an order to concentrate with the utmost celerity north of the Chickamauga, Crittenden established himself along that river near and above Lee and Gordon's.

"On the 13th, Bragg had ordered an attack upon him by Polk, with two corps, and the promise of the support of a third, hoping to overthrow this wing, in continuance of his

plan of defeating the Union corps in detail, before the center or right could afford relief. In the face of such threatening, with McCook over fifty miles away, and Thomas unable to move from the center till McCook should be within supporting distance, Rosecrans undertook the concentration of his army.

"At this point, that justice may be done, it is well to contrast the attitude which the governments at Washington and Richmond had assumed toward this movement on the rebel center.

"For weeks before General Rosecrans had moved forward, he had tried to impress upon the authorities at Washington the importance of giving him strong support. Promising offers to raise veteran mounted troops from several Eastern governors were laid before the War Department and refused with insulting warmth. Two weeks later came the order from Halleck to move at once and keep moving, which is treated of at length in a former letter.

"This gross ignorance at Washington of the gigantic difficulties of the situation was equaled, if not surpassed, by a telegram on September 11th, the very day that Bragg's re-enforced army was moving against Rosecrans' center and organizing for an attack on his left, and while Rosecrans and Thomas and McCook were straining every nerve in a life and death effort to concentrate their army. Said Halleck, by telegraph of this date:

"'After holding the mountain passes on the west and Dalton, or some point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move further South into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here that a part of Bragg's army is re-enforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.'

"This showed that Halleck shared the general and ignorant belief that Rosecrans had occupied Chattanooga in a military sense.

"At this time Longstreet's advance had been gone a week from under Halleck's eyes near Washington, and two divisions of Johnston's troops from Mississippi, and Buck-

ner, from East Tennessee, had already joined Bragg, and others were on the way.

"The failure to give Rosecrans effective flanking supports was inexcusable. The only explanation for it is found in the irritation and dislike which his straightforward and independent dealings had aroused in Washington, and a failure to understand the natural obstacles of the position and the contemplated advance. Meade was in a state of enforced inactivity before Lee. Grant's army was doing nothing to occupy Johnston in Mississippi, and there was no such Union activity in front of Mobile and Charleston as prevented troops being spared to Bragg from those points. And so, while the Washington authorities were finding fault with Rosecrans while he was pushing some of the most brilliant and effectual moves of the war, and were not even lifting a finger to encourage or even to protect him, the Richmond government was neglecting no means to strengthen Bragg to the extent of its powers. As a result, in one week from the date of Halleck's telegram inquiring whether Bragg was reinforcing Lee, Longtreet and Johnston and Walker and Buckner had reached Bragg from the extremes of the Confederacy, and he had moved to attack Rosecrans with 70,000 men.

"In this criminal neglect of Rosecrans the authorities were without excuse. No friends of Stanton's or Halleck's have even yet attempted to explain, much less defend it. These and other high officers, at one time or another, arraigned General Rosecrans as solely responsible for what they chose to designate as the disaster and defeat of Chickamauga. It was the shortest way for some of them to divert attention from the terrible neglect and responsibility which rested on their heads. But even if the favorable chances for the concentration of Confederate forces against Rosecrans had escaped unwilling observation at Washington, the authorities there were without excuse, since the case was very pointedly placed before them in an editorial of the *Cincinnati Commercial*, which excited so much attention that the editor was officially notified that such articles were highly indiscreet. This was as early as September 1st. In view of what oc-

curred a few weeks later, and of the evidence it gives of ample warning, it is interesting to reproduce this editorial of Mr. Halstead, printed on the date named, under a title, a 'Point of Danger.' Said the editor:

"Jeff Davis and his generals are as well informed as we are of the presence of a considerable part of the Army of the Potomac in New York City to enforce the draft, and that consequently an advance on Richmond need not be apprehended for some weeks. They have also heard of the presence of Admiral Farragut in New York, and infer from the circumstance that there is no immediate danger of an attack on Mobile. They know the situation at Charleston, and are not mistaken in the opinion that the advance upon that city must be slow, by process of engineering, digging, and heavy cannonading. They do not need large bodies of troops to make the defense; negro laborers, engineer officers, and gunners being all that are required. General Grant's army, as is well known, is, for the most part, resting from its labors in undisputed possession of an enormous territory. The real aggressive movement of the Federal forces is upon the rebel center; that is to say, East Tennessee, and it is extremely unlikely that the rebels are deficient in information as to the strength and intentions of Generals Rosecrans and Burnside.

"The important question is whether they will improve the opportunity by concentrating upon their center. The reports that General Joe Johnston has joined his forces to those recently under Bragg, and has thus gathered a force almost if not quite equal numerically to those in the hands of General Rosecrans, have in addition the immense advantages of the occupation of mountain passes, and that are to be found in pursuing a defensive system of warfare. General Lee is reported to have sent troops to East Tennessee, and it is probable that he has done so, as, thanks to the New York riots, he has some divisions temporarily to spare from Virginia. If the rebels do give up East Tennessee and Northern Georgia without a struggle, that is to say, if Generals Rosecrans and Burnside complete the operations in which they are engaged without meeting serious resistance,

it may be taken as conclusive evidence of the exhaustion of the rebellion.'

"Several subsequent editorials enforced these ideas, and were even so definite as to point out Johnston, Longstreet, and Buckner as the commands which were likely to re-enforce Bragg.

"General Rosecrans had had these general points of danger in mind, and made them known to the Government nearly a month before he crossed the Tennessee. But his request for more men and flanking supports was refused at the War Department with much warmth and most inconsiderate emphasis. This *Commercial* editorial, therefore, startled him, and his records show that he sent Mr. Halstead a sharp letter intimating that such an editorial was little better than a call to the Jeff Davis government to fall on him. It was, however, the clear common sense of the situation; and if the Washington authorities had heeded it, instead as was their custom, sneering at 'newspaper generals' and newspaper ways of carrying on the war, many lives would have been saved at Chickamauga which were lost because of the unequal contest, and there would never have been any questioning of that costly, but no less decided victory.

"It is further true that General Peck, stationed in North Carolina, sent word to General Rosecrans, under date of September 6, that Longstreet's corps was passing southward over the railroads. Colonel Jacques, of the Seventy-third Illinois, who had come up from the South, tried in vain for ten days to gain admittance in Washington, to communicate this fact of Longstreet's movement to Halleck and Stanton, and then, without accomplishing it, started West, and reached his command in time to fight with his regiment at Chickamauga. There had been time enough, after General Rosecrans' explanations of his proposed plan, to force Burnside, with twenty thousand men, down from East Tennessee, and to have brought all needed strength for the other flank from the Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi. Even when ordered up, after the battle, this latter

at first loitered to a degree that its commander will never be able to satisfactorily explain.

"To return from this digression, Bragg, on the 13th, had ordered an attack by three corps on Crittenden. The latter, by his great activity, and by the bold operations of Van Cleve, Wood, Palmer, and the brigades of Hazen, Minty, and Wilder, had created the impression of much greater strength than they really had, and Polk moved cautiously. Finally, just as Polk was ready to attack, his column on the Lafayette road encountered Van Cleve moving on him with a single brigade of infantry. So vigorously did this officer attack, that he forced Polk's advance back for three miles, and created the impression of a general Union advance. This disconcerted Polk, and instead of ordering his forces forward, he halted, took up a defensive position, and sent to Bragg for reinforcements. Thus, Negley and Baird, by their pluck and skill in front of overwhelming forces, and Palmer and Crittenden's active divisions and attached brigades on the left, by their unhesitating attacks whenever they developed the enemy, and by this last one delivered in the face of an advance of three full corps on one, had made the concentration of the army possible, and had saved it. The next day, Steedman, that lion of battle, had reached Rossville, in immediate support of Crittenden, with two brigades of his own command, and two regiments and two batteries temporarily attached, having marched from Bridgeport, a distance of forty miles, in twenty-eight hours.

"The appearance and wonderful activity of Hazen's, Wilder's, and Minty's brigades on the left of Crittenden, and Steedman's forces of the reserve corps at Rossville, with the fact that McCook was nearing Thomas, and that the latter had extended his left to within near supporting distance of Crittenden, seem to have restrained Bragg from attack in any direction after the failure of his orders to Polk to attack on the 13th until his orders of the night of the 17th for an attack the next day upon Crittenden's left and rear.

"During this period of comparative inaction against the Union front, Rosecrans insured the concentration of his army in time for battle. McCook, not understanding the


roads along the top of the mountain, and not deeming it prudent to consume the time necessary to explore them, had crossed Lookout twice, at the cost of more than a full day, and appeared with his head of column at General Thomas's camps during the 16th. On the 17th the latter closed the heads of his columns toward Crittenden.

"The days of concentration had been a period of the most intense anxiety, of unceasing watchfulness, of unbending determination, of brilliant minor affairs, of unflinching courage, and, withal, of cool calculation and precise execution for every part of the army.

"While, on the morning of the 18th, the three corps of the Union army and its reserve were in position where each could support the other if attacked, its supreme effort for position was to come. Bragg's order for the battle contemplated crossing the Chickamauga some miles below Lee and Gordon's and driving the Union left under Crittenden back on the center and right under Thomas and McCook, and thus, by thrusting his columns between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, recovering that place and forcing the Union army back into the mountains, from which position it is doubtful if it could have extricated itself.

"Bragg's order for attack on the 18th could not be executed. His army was concentrated between Lee and Gordon's and Lafayette. He moved with five infantry and two cavalry corps. Narrow roads, small bridges, difficult fords, and dense forests delayed operations, so that at nightfall of the 18th his troops were not in position to attack. In fact, he was scarcely ready to deliver battle under his plan on the morning of the 19th, when Thomas's unexpected attack, far on the rebel right and rear, deranged Bragg's plan, and forced him to battle several miles from the point where he was about to open it on Crittenden, who he supposed still constituted the Union left.

"It was nothing less than the inversion of the Union army under cover of a night that had thus disconcerted Bragg and enabled Rosecrans to array himself for battle between Bragg and Chattanooga, and across the roads, and in front of the passes which led to that city. It was this night



SATURDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 19TH.

march of two corps which constituted the supreme movement of the concentration, and which at the same time defeated Bragg's purpose to fight with the back of his own army to Chattanooga with a view to its recovery.

"The map given below will make this inversion and final concentration clear, and show the position of the two armies at daylight on the 19th, when the battle began.

"On the 17th General Thomas's corps was in the vicinity of Pond Spring, Negley on the left, and so nearest to a junction with Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's, Baird next to the right, and Brannan next. Reynolds was thrown to the front. The left of McCook had closed on Thomas at Pond Spring.

"During the day Bragg, strongly threatening Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's with two divisions, held him fast, and started the rest of his army down the Chickamauga to cross and sweep in on Crittenden's left and rear, expecting to find him still constituting the left of the Union army, and to double this left back on Thomas and McCook.

"Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Reed's Bridge, driven Wilder nearly to the state road at Viniard's, and bivouacked a mile and a half from Crittenden's left. Walker had also crossed at Lambert's Ford with three divisions and Forrest's cavalry division, and halted for the night about a mile in the rear of Hood. For the most part Bragg's army had the full night for rest.

"On the other hand, the Union columns were alive with motion. That night was to cover the inversion of an army. About 4 o'clock Thomas started his whole corps from Pond Spring toward Crittenden, McCook following him. This was doubtless interpreted by Bragg as a closing in on Crittenden. But it was far more than that.

"As soon as night shut the columns in they were pressed rapidly to the left. Negley, as he drew near to Crittenden, was moved to the Chickamauga in front of Crawfish Springs. This prevented a night attempt to cut the column by occupying the roads intersecting at that point. Meantime Thomas, with his other three divisions, pushed on. It was a long, weary night. Heavy trains of supplies and ammunition occupied the road. The troops moved mostly through the

adjacent fields, both for celerity of marching and as guards to the trains. Heavy flanking forces streamed along parallel to the road, and well out toward the river. There were constant interruptions to continuous movement, causing frequent halts of the infantry. The night was cool, and, as the commands stopped, the men warmed themselves by starting fires in the fences. The result was that toward midnight the trains were every-where driving between two continuous lines of fires, and the men on either side, or in the road, had constant facilities for warming themselves. It was a tedious and most fatiguing night, but at daylight the vitally important task was done. Thomas's head of column, Baird in advance, reached the Kelly farm at daylight, with Brannan well closed up and Reynolds a short distance in the rear. Brannan was on the State or Lafayette road, near the intersection of the road leading into it from Reed's Bridge. McCook had reached a point to the right and rear of Crittenden, near Crawfish Springs. And so at sunrise the Union right, instead of resting far up the Chickamauga from Crittenden's position, as Bragg expected to find it, had become the left of Rosecrans' army and Crittenden was the right. More than this, Rosecrans had established his lines two miles beyond Bragg's right, and between it and Chattanooga. The victory of concentration had been followed by the equally important success of inverting the army and thus thrusting its columns between the enemy and the objective of the campaign. These second stages of the movement deserve to take rank with the matchless strategy with which it was inaugurated.

"But the battle for the firm and final possession of Chattanooga was still to come. It opened suddenly for both sides, and for Bragg in a wholly unexpected quarter. The weary Union troops had scarcely time to cook their coffee after the night march, and some of them no time at all, before the storm broke and the army was summoned to the battle which Thomas had opened."

"WASHINGTON, August 14.—[*Special.*]—The last letter in this series left the Army of the Cumberland on the morning of the 19th of September, concentrated for battle on the field of Chickamauga. By an energetic night march the army

had been thrown forward on its left by inversion into line, and thrust between the enemy and Chattanooga, the objective of the campaign. It was a difficult and dangerous movement, where two armies, intent on battle, were only separated by such a stream as the Chickamauga, which was every-where easily fordable above Lee and Gordon's. But General Thomas, who led this column, is the one commander of a great army of whom it can be said with accuracy that from the first of the war to the close no movement of his miscarried. At daylight of the 19th he held the Lafayette and Chattanooga road at the Kelly farm.


"Bragg's army, though reinforced from all parts of the Confederacy, and though it had been well concentrated between Lafayette and Gordon's mills for several preceding days, had been skillfully foiled by General Rosecrans in the efforts to strike his isolated corps. During the 18th it had been pressed by Bragg down the winding and thickly-wooded valley of the Chickamauga in execution of an order for battle. This order was based upon the idea that Crittenden's corps at Lee and Gordon's was the left of the Union army. While he was to be held there by strong force threatening attack from the other side of the stream, the bulk of Bragg's army was to cross at the various fords and bridges below, and, turning up stream, was then to join in sweeping Crittenden back on Thomas and McCook, whom Bragg supposed still to constitute the Union center and right. In execution of this plan Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Reed's Bridge, and pushed up to within a mile and a half of Lee and Gordon's, and westward to within a mile of the Lafayette road, where night overtook him. Walker's corps had crossed below Alexander's Bridge, and bivouacked after a short advance toward Crittenden. Minty and Wilder, with their mounted brigades, and Dan McCook, with his brigade, had stoutly resisted and greatly delayed these columns. The most of Bragg's army had rested through the night. Two corps of Rosecrans' forces had marched continuously since four o'clock the preceding afternoon. They were about to move into battle without time for breakfast or further rest. Bragg, upon Longstreet's arrival, would have 70,000 men available

for the fight. Rosecrans' strength for battle was not over 56,000.

"At daylight all of Bragg's army, wholly concealed by the forests, was in motion. A considerable portion of it was still crossing the river at the various fords and bridges from Thedford's to Reed's Bridge, and deploying on the other side toward Crittenden, who was still supposed to hold the Union left.

"Suddenly, about 9 o'clock, there came to Bragg's ears the sounds of heavy and unexpected battle far down the Chickamauga and well toward Rossville. Thomas, whose head of column rested at the Kelly farm, for the double purpose of exploring the forests in his front and to test the truth of a report that an isolated brigade of the enemy was on the west side of the river near Reed's Bridge, moved Brannan and Baird directly into the forest on the road toward Reed's Bridge. At this time two-thirds of Bragg's army, concealed by the forests, had crossed the Chickamauga and was directing its columns up that stream toward Crittenden. Just at the time when Bragg expected that his right would have swung across the Lafayette road, and that his center division would have opened on Crittenden's position at Lee and Gordon's, these portentous sounds of battle from Thomas's line astonished and perplexed him. After vainly waiting for them to cease, under the first impression that the affair was a movement of his forces in reconnoissance, and that some Union cavalry had been encountered, he found it so serious as to derange his whole plan of battle, and force him to meet an enemy who had turned his right. To do this he was obliged to move a portion of his troops that had not crossed the river down stream to Reed's. By the circuitous roads which they were obliged to travel, it required a march of six miles to reach the left of Thomas.

"This destruction of the rebel plan was due to Thomas opening the battle with the divisions of Brannan and Baird in the vicinity of Reed's Bridge. At 6:30 o'clock Brannan left Kelly's, and moving north, turned in from the Lafayette road at McDonald's toward Reed's. A quarter of a mile from McDonald's he deployed his division. Van Derveer was on



THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.

the left, and thus became the left of the Union army. Connell's brigade was in the center, and Croxton on the right. In like manner Baird advanced with a front line of two brigades. King, with the regulars, was on the left next to Brannan, and Scribner on the right of King, while Starkweather marched by the flank behind Scribner's right.

"The last disposition was promptly made by Baird upon his discovering that the enemy was in strong force to his right.

"Thus while neither army was aware that the other was in heavy force in the woods which surrounded them, and while Bragg's forces were forming to move up the Chickamauga, and so away from Thomas's line of march, both Brannan and Baird came in force on Bragg's right, in front of Reed's Bridge, at a point near Jay's Mills, and opened the battle of Chickamauga. Croxton struck first with a vigorous attack on Forrest, who, with the two divisions of his corps, was guarding the Confederate right. The cavalymen were forced back to the sawmill, where they rallied, dismounted, and began to fight as infantry. Croxton held his own, and even advanced slightly. Forrest sent for infantry, and Wilson's brigade of Walker's division hurried from near Alexander's and rushed into the fight.

"Meantime re-enforcements were turning from all portions of Bragg's line toward the sound of furious battle. Shortly the advance toward Crittenden ceased, so vigorous had Thomas's battle become. Connell and Van Derveer at first meeting no enemy on their fronts pressed toward the vortex of Croxton's fighting. Forrest, relieved by Walker's infantry, met this advance of Brannan's left with his whole force and fought for the most part on foot. Croxton, out of ammunition, was obliged to retire somewhat before Walker, when Baird pushed King in to support him, while Van Derveer and Connell moved in first on Forrest and next on Ector's brigade of Walker's reserve. The battle became terrific. Forrest hurried in person after infantry supports and for portions of his own command left near Alexander's.

"At 11 o'clock Bragg had become convinced that Rosecrans had forced battle upon him on the extreme rebel right.

With such vigor did Thomas's two divisions fight that Walker was ordered at that hour to go to Forrest with all his force, and Cheatham, of Polk's corps, who had the strongest division of the army, consisting of five brigades, then stationed as the reserve of Bragg's left. Hardly had Cheatham started before Stewart, of Buckner's corps, which was near Thedford's Ford, ready to move toward Crittenden, was also dispatched in haste to the Confederate right, and at 1 o'clock, Cleburne, of Hill's corps, posted near the extreme left of the Confederate line, was ordered to the scene of action before Brannan and Baird. These movements show how Bragg's plan of battle had been wholly overturned, and how fierce the fighting of these two divisions of Thomas must have been to decide Bragg to send four infantry divisions to the assistance of Forrest's corps of two divisions.

"Meantime Walker had moved Govan's brigade obliquely on the right flank of Scribner and forced him back. Simultaneously Walthall's brigade struck King in flank and drove him in disorder over Van Derveer's brigade. Guenther's regular battery, one of the best and most efficient in the service, was captured. We shall see how it was shortly after re-taken by the splendid Ninth Ohio.

"Thus, while Baird's lines were shaken by the overwhelming concentration against them, and Brannan was facing and fighting superior numbers, matters were hot for Thomas, who was slowly moving to and fro along his divisions and closely watching them. Baird was restoring his lines under fire and in the face of a flank attack. Croxton's men, with fresh ammunition, were holding their place. Connell's brigade was immovable, and poured its fire into the very faces of the enemy. Van Derveer, on the left, was busily maneuvering to meet flank attacks, and fighting desperately, but with unvarying success.

"At this moment, when Baird was scarcely able to maintain position, and must have soon yielded to numbers, Johnson, of McCook's corps, came on the field from Crawfish Springs, and was led by Thomas to the right of Baird. Here, with the brigades of Willich and Baldwin on the front

and Dodge in reserve, Johnson, by heavy fighting, relieved the pressure on Baird, restored the line, and checked Bragg's new center.

"Following came Palmer, most opportunely ordered forward by Crittenden from Lee and Gordon's, who saw plainly from the development of furious battle on the Union left that troops would surely be wanted there. Palmer followed Johnson into line, and under the personal direction of Rosecrans, the brigades of Hazen, Cruft, and Grose were formed in echelon and ordered forward, immediately encountering Cheatham's men and becoming fiercely engaged. Hazen on the left fell with great vigor on Walker's left and relieved Starkweather, of Baird, from precarious position. At the same time, Van Derveer was thrown by Brannan on the right of Walker and by terrific fighting checked Wal-thall's line and drove it well back into the forests.

"It was here that the Ninth Ohio, the German Turner regiment of Bob McCook—both regiment and commander of glorious memory—recaptured the regular battery and it was brought into the Union lines. The Ninth had been with the trains during the night march, and it was chafing far in the rear when Van Derveer sent for it. Sore was his need. The repeated attacks of the enemy on his front and flank in the attempt to crush the Union left and reach the Lafayette road in its rear were becoming so frequent and heavy that, in spite of the fact that every man under him was fighting where he stood and yielding no inch of ground, it seemed as if the limit of human endurance even for iron veterans must soon be reached. Then from the near distance came the well-known hurrah of the Ninth advancing from the rear. As all waited to welcome the head of its column, its charging shout was heard to the front of its line of advance, followed at once by rapid musketry, and then their great "hurrah" of victory. The story is brief. Colonel Kammerling at the head of his regiment, coming on at a double-quick, saw to his right and front the captured artillery of the regulars, just taken by Govan. Without orders he halted his line, fronted it, and with the command "Links Schwengket," swung it to the left, faced toward the hill

where the battery stood in the hands of its captors, and, with a sweeping charge, drove the rebels back, bayoneting some among the guns, and rushed with guns and many prisoners back to the Union line. A few minutes after he came in on the run to Van Derveer, just in time to take part in the last and supreme effort of the enemy to crush that unyielding left. Forrest's men had passed beyond Van Derveer's left and formed for assault on his front, and also directly on his flank. But the vigilant skirmishers and prisoners taken by them made known the movement. The left was thrown back in time, and the line presented an obtuse angle opening toward the enemy. Into this, and heavily against the left of it, Forrest hurled his columns, four deep. On came these men in gray in magnificent lines, which showed clearly through the open forest bending their faces before the sleet of the storm, and firing hotly as they advanced. As they came within the range of the oblique fire from Van Derveer's right they halted within forty yards of his left, and for a few moments poured in a destructive fire. A wheel of Smith's regular battery, and of a section of Church's guns which had reported, brought them where they poured a nearly enfilading fire of cannister down those long lines, standing bravely there and fighting almost under the mouths of the guns. Thomas and Brannan and Van Derveer were looking on and encouraging the line. It had seemed almost beyond the probabilities to hold it till those well served batteries opened. An instant later it seemed as if the lines of gray had sunk into the earth. When the smoke lifted from the third round the front was clear of every thing but the heaps of dead and wounded, and the work of the day at that point of the Union left was done.

"The fight still raged bitterly, however, along the lines of Johnson, and of Palmer to the right of him. Brannan and Baird were withdrawn from the front which they had held, the former being sent toward the center to provide against contingencies there, and the latter posted to prevent any movement toward the Lafayette road at McDonald's. Forrest, with cavalry, and Cheatham's brigades of infantry next attacked Johnson (of McCook), who then held the advanced portion

of the Union left. Here the contest soon became furious again, partly on the ground of Baird's morning battle. Maney's splendid brigade rushed to a hand-to-hand fight, but was borne back. Wright, Strahl, Jackson, and Smith, with their brigades, all under Cheatham, each delivered bold and most courageous attacks, but without carrying the Union line. Rosecrans' army, under the successive hammering of the Confederate onslaughts, was fast being solidly formed from left to right. Willich, Baldwin, and Dodge, of Johnson, and Hazen, Cruft, and Grose, of Palmer, were fairly aligned, having fought themselves forward into good positions.

"The battle next fell heavily on the right of Palmer, as Bragg at last had his whole army in rapid motion toward his right. As Palmer's ammunition began to fail, Reynolds moved up to his right and rear, and made most excellent dispositions just east of the Lafayette road. Upon call, he pushed Turchin in on Palmer's left, and the troops of Edward King in on Palmer's right, and at once became hotly engaged. Crittenden sent Van Cleve with Samuel Beatty's and Dick's brigades to the right of Reynolds', leaving Barnes' brigade with General Wood at Lee and Gordon's.

"As fast as the Union line could be extended to the left, it became sorely pressed by Bragg's troops, then well massed west of the Chickamauga. General Davis, from McCook, pressed rapidly to the left, and was sent in near Viniard's. At 3 o'clock Wood was ordered from Lee and Gordon's to the field of the growing fight. As Bragg still had some forces opposite this point, General Lytle's brigade, of Sheridan's division, was directed to relieve Wood and hold the crossing. Thus, in six hours from the time Bragg was directing his army on Crittenden at Lee and Gordon's, a single brigade, posted there only from prudence, served for all demands against Confederate movement from that direction. This indicates how completely Bragg had been driven from his plan.

"Wood and Davis had not been dispatched a moment too soon. Van Cleve, Davis, and Wood, were confronted with solid masses of Bragg's concentrated troops, and the

scenes and splendid fighting of the morning at the left were repeated here by these divisions. Stewart, Johnson, and Preston, of Buckner's corps, and Hindman, of Longstreet's advance, were assaulting these lines. Davis had been ordered to wheel in on the enemy's left flank, and this movement led to one of the bravest and bloodiest contests of the day in front of Viniard's. Wood advanced his lines into the vortex just when Davis was hardest pressed, and, when all seemed about to be compelled to yield, Sheridan appeared on the flank, and Wilder's mounted brigade came up in the rear. Every division of the Union army was in line except the reserve under Granger, which was some miles away toward Ringgold, with orders to hold Red House Bridge.

"The battle along Rosecrans' center and right waxed hotter and fiercer. He seemed every-where present and he was every-where alert. Van Cleve encountered the left of Stewart marching to relieve Cheatham, and a fight muzzle to muzzle took place between Clayton of Stewart's and the two brigades of Van Cleve, Sam Beatty and Dick.

"Reynolds, by magnificent generalship and fighting, restored the broken line in his front, and firmly established himself there. His brigades, under Turchin and Edward King, covered themselves with laurels as they swayed back and forth on the tides of battle which rushed and swirled over all that portion of the field.

"Davis, with the brigades of Carlin and Heg, delivered their fire at short range, and stood their ground long and well, till born back by overwhelming forces. It was just as this slow retrograde movement began that Wood had appeared, having marched rapidly from Lee and Gordon's with Harker's and Buell's brigade of his own division and Barnes's of Van Cleve's. They swept in on the right, and by splendid fighting checked the rebel line and held it on their front in spite of its vigorous and splendid fighting. .

"At this point two exactly opposite movements were in progress along the lines of the armies. Bragg, who seemed determined to push his right between the Union left and Chattanooga, ordered Cleburne from Thedford's Ford to the extreme right, the scene of the morning fighting. At the

same time, General Thomas, convinced that no perilous attack could be delivered at that hour from that extreme point, was bringing Brannan from the left to the support of Reynolds just as the latter was fighting to push the enemy from the Lafayette road. Brannan arrived in time to help, and with Croxton's assistance Reynolds restored the lines on his front and flank, and regained possession of the road. Negley also arrived opportunely from the right and took active part at this point. Wood repulsed Bushrod Johnson's division, though at great cost. Trigg, of Preston's division, entirely fresh, moved in with splendid pluck and movement to restore the line, but Sheridan, from McCook, with Bradley and Laiboldt's brigades, met and checked this advance, and with its recoil the heat of battle on the Union right began to subside.

"About 5 o'clock the field on both sides was still. But Cleburne and Walker were moving again far on the rebel right, in obedience to Bragg's order to again attack the Union left. The Confederate march was over the field of the morning, where the dead of Walker were thickly strewn. It was a depressing advance. Still those veterans formed and moved on without a sign of shrinking, and about six o'clock the hour of silence was broken by a terrific attack in the gathering dusk upon Johnson, near the ground occupied by Baird in the morning. The assault fell also upon Baird further to the left. Cleburne, with a front of a mile, filled by three brigades, had suddenly burst upon Thomas's left. Cleburne had three brigades—Polk, Wood, and Deshler. Walthall and Govan, of Liddell's division, and three brigades of Cheatham—Strahl, Jackson, and Preston Smith—supported him. The assault was tremendous. Night was falling, and the aim of each side was directed by the flashes of the guns.

"Willich, Dodge, and Baldwin, of Johnson, fought their brigades with undaunted pluck and endurance. Baldwin fell on his line. Baird, with Scribner and Starkweather, held his ground, though vigorously attacked. Preston Smith, on the Confederate side, was killed here. Darkness put an end

to the movement and the fighting, and each army sought rest.

"For the commanders of all grades it was a busy night. While the Union line was continuous and measurably compact between the enemy and practicable roads to Chattanooga, there was much realignment to be done to better the position for the morrow. The Union troops obtained only snatches of rest on ground white with frost. No fires were lighted, lest the direction of the lines might be revealed. This made supper a dry meal. But the fact that for most there had been no time for breakfast and none at all for dinner, gave excellent relish even to a dry supper.

"Rosecrans' purpose of establishing his lines between the enemy and Chattanooga had been accomplished. Bragg's plan of thrusting his army between the Union advance and that city had been defeated. At the close of this first day victory rested with Rosecrans. He had found himself largely outnumbered, and had thrown every available man into the fight.

"Bragg had many brigades which were not engaged, and Longstreet, with the greater part of his force, was yet to arrive. The spirit of the Union army had risen to a high pitch under the splendid and most effective fighting which it had done, and it looked forward to the morrow with a confidence born of the consciousness of fighting and staying powers.

"But hard as the work of the day had been, and stubborn and bitter as was the fighting in each army, the coming of Sunday was to witness a battle eclipsing this and surpassing all the war for its pluck and deadliness. While the weary commanders were preparing for this day, and tired sentinels kept faithful watch, the wounded suffered and the armies slept."

"WASHINGTON, August 17.—[*Special.*]—The second and final fight for the possession of Chattanooga opened on Sunday, September 20th. We have seen how through the preceding day, in the white heat of battle, the Union lines had established themselves on the field of Chickamauga, and that



THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.



at nightfall they were still between Bragg and the city for which they were fighting.

"It was a cool and beautiful morning, though heavy fog hung over the lower parts of the field, greatly impeding the preparations of each commander. For an hour or two after daylight there were few indications of the terrific scenes which were to be crowded into that Sabbath-day.

"Both sides had improved the night to rectify and strengthen the alignment. Bragg had received important reinforcements. General Longstreet arrived in the night and was placed in command of the left wing. Polk was assigned to the right wing. With Longstreet came the bulk of his two divisions from Virginia, Hood and McLaws. Three brigades only of the former had taken part with Hood in the first day's fight. Gist's brigade of Walker's corps also arrived from Meridian. The Army of the Tennessee, with all the warnings and requests of Rosecrans to the authorities at Washington had done nothing to prevent a general exodus of rebel forces from Mississippi. Even a portion of Pemberton's paroled men came, and two brigades, relieved by paroled prisoners, were in time for the first day's battle. Bragg re-adjusted his lines during the night. The most important change was to bring Breckinridge from his extreme left, east of the Chickamauga, to the extreme right. Cleburne and Cheatham were both moved close to Breckinridge. Forrest, with two divisions, one to fight on foot, was placed still to the right of Breckinridge, to observe the Lafayette road. With this heavy force, strengthened on its left with Stewart, he intended to attack the Union left at daylight.

"Rosecrans, on the other hand, had no reinforcements with which to relieve or help his lines, and most of his army had marched a night and fought a day without rest and with little food, and every available man had been engaged. Burnside had been for weeks where he could easily have formed a junction. In fact, slowly as he had moved, his infantry had reached Kingston about the time Rosecrans had finished concentrating his army. It was the duty and the business of

Halleck and others at Washington to have had it on the field for the first day's battle.

"It was grim business for this contracted line of Union heroes to face the eleven divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, one of the latter fighting as infantry, which Bragg had before them. Their only advantage was in their shorter lines and the fact that it was necessary for Bragg to attack, while for the most part they could remain on the defensive. They were besides in excellent spirits and confident of their powers.

"A glance at the map will show the rearrangement of the Union line. Beginning on the left, which covered Bragg's objective—namely, the control of the Lafayette road to Chattanooga—Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds were withdrawn slightly from the ground on which they had fought the day before, and placed in strong position east of that road in the edge of the woods which skirted the Kelly farm. Brannan remained near the position to which he had been called to support Reynolds the night before. The divisions of Negley, Wood, Davis, and Sheridan and the brigade of Wilder had all been drawn back of the Lafayette road, their lines being slightly advanced from the road, leading from Crawfish Springs to the Lafayette road at Kelly's farm.

"The order of the Confederate line from its right to a point in front of Brannan's has already been stated. Here Stewart, of Buckner's corps, formed the right of Longstreet, who commanded the left wing, and, counting toward the enemy's left, the succeeding divisions were Bushrod Johnson, with Law and Kershaw in reserve, Hinman, and Preston. Buckner's corps from East Tennessee was present with this wing by the courtesy of Burnside and the Washington authorities, while the latter alone were responsible for the inaction at the East which allowed Longstreet's corps to be present. By the same courtesy Walker's division from Mississippi was present with Hill's corps, and was to fight again, splendidly but unsuccessfully, on Bragg's right, as it had all the day before.

"Under cover of the fog, in the shelter of the woods, and in the painful quiet of that Sabbath morning, the two armies had brought their lines face to face. At 9 o'clock

there was scarcely any point the length of a tiger's spring between them.

"Bragg had 212 regiments, organized into 42 brigades, and these into 7 divisions. There were in all 173 infantry regiments and 11 of cavalry which were dismounted and fought as infantry, 28 cavalry regiments and 50 batteries. Rosecrans had 158 regiments, 33 brigades, 14 divisions, and 5 corps. There were 141 regiments of infantry and 18 of cavalry and 36 batteries.

"Of Bragg's corps two were cavalry—Wheeler and Forrest. One division of Forrest's fought as infantry. Rosecrans had one cavalry corps of two divisions. This tremendous array was pushed close against a Union front of only two miles and a half.

"At 9 o'clock that Sabbath service of all the gods of war began. It broke full-toned with its infernal music over the Union left, and that morning service continued there till noon.

"Let us look a moment at the Union line. John Beatty's brigade had been stretched as a thin line from Baird's left to the Lafayette road and across it. King's regulars formed the left of Baird, Scribner his center, and Starkweather his right. He had no reserve. Johnston's division was on the right of Baird; Dodge and Baldwin, of his brigades, on the front, and Willich in reserve. Next was Palmer, with Cruft and Hazen on the line, and Grose in reserve. Reynolds, on Palmer's right, reached the Lafayette or State road again. He had Turchin in line and King in reserve. The Union line was protected by log barricades: It thus ran around the Kelley farm and was established from fifty to a hundred yards within the woods which skirted the great open space in their rear. This field, which lay along the State road for half a mile and was a quarter of a mile wide, became the scene of almost continuous and ever brilliant fighting. Besides the great battle along the main lines surrounding it, there were during the day five distinct brigade charges over it, one of Stanley, one of Van Derveer, one of Grose, a fourth by Willich, and a fifth by Turchin.

"Bragg's orders were to attack successively by divisions,

from right to left. Breckinridge struck first. He came on in single line, swinging around toward the State road to gain Baird's rear. Adams was on his right, Stovall in the center, and Helm on the left. This latter brigade struck Baird's breastworks, and was instantly shattered there. Helm rode bravely among his troops, enthusiastically urging them forward, and fell dead while thus engaged. Two of his colonels were killed, and two were wounded.

"Stovall pushed in with dauntless pluck against the regulars on the left of Scribner, but King's men fought splendidly. The rebels assaulted bravely but uselessly. Adams had swept in on John Beatty's thin line, and broken it. Still it fought with undaunted courage, yielding doggedly, and by the inch, and finally Adams, retarded by the disaster on his left, was at bay. At this juncture came Stanley's brigade, from Negley, near the center, with deployed lines, and the sun on its banners. It swept over the Kelly field, from near the house, and plunged into the woods in the rear of Beatty. Well might those who were witnessing that threatening move toward the Union rear hold their breaths as Stanley disappeared, and thus wait for his volleys and their effect. In a moment they came, then his rattling line fire, then the cheer of a charge. The first attack of Breckinridge had ended in a sore defeat.

"But Cleburne had in turn advanced. He, like Breckinridge, came in single line. Polk, of Cleburne, assaulted Starkweather's front, while Wood of the same command extended the attack as far as the right of Baldwin. The remnants of Helm, under Colonel Lewis, still assisted against Scribner, but soon Cleburne's division was repelled at every point with terrible loss. The Confederate officers engaged describe the effect of the Union artillery throughout this attack as the most destructive in their experience. Thus Bragg's first attack had wholly failed. The Union forces were exultant, and so strong were their skirmish demonstrations that Hill, who was under orders to organize a second and much stronger attack, paused to first prepare his own lines against assault.

"Walker's reserve corps of two divisions was brought

up, and its five brigades distributed along the shattered points of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's lines. The organizations of rebel divisions being thus destroyed, the attack became largely one of brigades acting independently, each rushing at the Union works. There were ten rebel brigades engaged in the movement from the Union left to Palmer's position, and beyond this point Stewart's division co-operated by assaulting Reynolds' narrow front and Brannan's lines. Wood, of Cleburne, who had previously stormed the angle of the Union works on Johnson's right and been repulsed, assisted by Deshler, of the same division, thinking this angle the flank of the barricades, again struck obliquely and with fury with the idea of turning them. Instead, these dashing Confederates went to pieces on Baldwin's brigade, of Johnson, and on Palmer's front. Walthall assaulted the corresponding angle at Scribner's position, and though he carried his men within pistol range of the crests, he was beaten back with heavy loss. Gist, acting with Helm's (now Lewis') broken line, attacked with power, but in turn was driven back. Colquitt, still further to the right, came upon the regular brigade of King. But his line had missed direction, and was at once exposed to a withering flank fire, and overwhelmed. Colquitt fell. Several of his most prominent officers were killed. Ector and Wilson, of Walker's second division (Liddell's), advanced to help, but without effect. Govan, however, of this same division, was successful, and, by hot fighting and the weight of numbers, he bore back John Beatty's weakened line, and the situation on the Union left became at once most serious. Every thing but this along the line of the second attack by Bragg's right had failed. It began to look as if rebel victory was dawning here, and that the triumph of Bragg's plan of turning the Union left had come.

"For Breckinridge, in the second advance, had swung his lines much further to his right, and by a wide left wheel, had brought his right across the State road, and so between the Union left and Rossville. His left reached and slightly overlapped Beatty's left. Thus formed with lines perpendicular to the State road, he began a march directly toward the Kelley house and the rear of Reynolds, just beyond it.

While the remnants of the left, so badly broken, first under Helm and then under his successor, were entangled with Beatty and Stanley, his two other brigades, Adams on the right and Stovall to the left, burst out of the woods on the north side of the Kelley field, quickly rectified their lines, threw out a heavy skirmish force, and bore rapidly down toward Reynolds. It was half a mile to his position over smooth and open ground. From the start the skirmishers could throw their bullets into Reynolds' rear. It was a movement threatening dire disaster. The moment it developed in the rear of Baird, Walker's corps and Cleburne's brigades reopened their fire on the front of the barricades, while Stewart advanced on Reynolds and Brannan. Thus, taken on flank, front, and full in the rear, and outnumbered at every point, it seemed as if there was no salvation for the Union left. But it came, and at that point where Confederate victory seemed sure, full defeat fell suddenly upon them. Thomas, watching the progress of Breckinridge's flank attack, had sent to Rosecrans for Brannan. At that moment the battle had not extended to the latter. But just as Rosecrans' order to go to Thomas reached Brannan, signs of heavy and immediate attack on his front became apparent. He well used his discretion, and remained on the line until he could report the situation to Rosecrans. But in the meantime, in partial compliance with the order, he sent Fred Van Derveer's brigade, which constituted his reserve, to the help of the left. This brigade deployed, marched rapidly in two lines toward the Kelley house, and came into the field less than two hundred yards in advance of Breckinridge's line. Though presenting its flank to the enemy when he was first discovered, it changed front in the open ground under fire, charged the rebel line, broke it, following it back into the woods, and after an hour's fighting, drove these two brigades with their artillery northward and entirely clear of the Union left. It then returned to a point near the Kelley house.

"Govan, of Walker, next on the left of Breckinridge, had, however, gained a lodgment on the line which Beatty had so stubbornly held. Then came another Union charge over the Kelley field. Palmer, under Thomas's orders, sent

Grose with his reserve brigade to clear Baird's immediate left. Moving from the edge of the woods back into the open field, Grose formed in double lines, moved at double-quick across the rear of Johnson and Baird, and rushed with cheers into the woods on the north side of the field. In a few moments his volleys were pouring into the face of Govan. The latter's troops fought desperately, but their supports on each flank had been previously broken, and soon, after bitter loss, gave way. The Union left was then further strengthened by placing Barnes, of Van Cleve, on the left of Baird. It was then noon. So badly shattered was Bragg's right that it was nearly 5 o'clock before another attack could be organized on this ground. Thenceforth the Union left was safe.

"Simultaneously with the appearance of Breckinridge in the Kelley field, events were hastening to an appalling consummation on the Union center. Stewart, the right of Longstreet's wing, moved to the assault in Reynolds' front. With three brigades he rushed upon Turchin, who formed Reynolds' advance, and Hazen, of Palmer, next on the left, while his left also involved Bannan's left. On his right he also had the co-operation of Woods' and Deshler's brigades, of Cleburne. Deshler was killed as the movement began, and Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, succeeded him.

"As this was the opening of the memorable attack which led to the break in the Union center, it is worthy of close attention. General Stewart, in his report, thus describes it:

"'For several hundred yards, both lines pressed on under the most terrific fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. The enemy retired, and our men, though mowed down at every step, rushed on at double-quick, until at length the brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing him to an enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some fifty to seventy-five yards further, when his two right regiments gave way in disorder and retired to their original position. His center and left, however, followed by the gallant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed on, passing the cornfield in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga

road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments, and passing a battery of four guns, which were afterward taken possession of by a regiment from another division. Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied before the advance.'

"All this was going on in the front of Reynolds and Palmer, while Breckinridge, as already described, was entering the open field from the north in plain sight from their rear. Yet not a single Union soldier left the line. Standing steadfast, they first resisted, as Stewart describes, and then were incited to still greater action by the brilliant fighting of Van Derveer in their rear, which so unexpectedly brought them the much needed relief.

"Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union lines, which is widely misunderstood, and has been most unjustly used to throw discredit on General Rosecrans. Just as Longstreet's attack was developing upon Wood's front, the latter received an order from General Rosecrans to 'close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him.' As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw no other way of executing the order, which he deemed imperative, except to withdraw from line, and pass to the rear of Brannan. This he did, although the attack was just bursting on his front.

"It has been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans' detriment, that in the excitement of the height of battle, he had issued a blundering order. Nothing could be more unjust. The explanation is perfectly simple. General Thomas had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge's flank attack. Stewart's attack had struck Reynolds with force and was rapidly developing on Brannan's front. The latter hastily consulted with Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, and both being clear that to obey the order would open the line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched Van Derveer, his reserve, to the left, in partial compliance with its terms, and then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally important to maintain his line till the commanding

officer could be advised of the situation. He instantly approved Brannan's action. But just before his message arrived, upon the supposition that he had obeyed the order and gone to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the left on Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the attack, rolling along Brannan's front, had reached his own. Had he exercised the same discretion which Brannan had so wisely displayed, all would have been well, and that nearly fatal break in the Union lines would not have occurred. But instantly on reading it, Wood rapidly withdrew his division and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Longstreet, who had waited most impatiently till 11 o'clock before he could move a man to the attack, had solidified his lines before the Union center and left, and at the moment Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust into it the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They were formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they opened on Brannan's right and rear and Davis' left, and greatly widened the gap. Brannan threw back his right, losing something from Connell's brigade on that flank, but, stubbornly resisting Longstreet's advance as he retired that wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass House, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one he had occupied when Longstreet pushed through the gap left by Wood. The latter had pushed rapidly to the rear of Brannan, and, though subjected to heavy attack after passing Brannan's left, he was able to establish his line on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan's new position, and reaching in the direction of Reynolds. The latter officer soon retired his right slightly, and the line was again continuous, except a break between Wood and Reynolds, from Brannan's right to Barnes on Baird's left. Into this vacant space Hazen moved later under orders from Palmer, and then the line on that part of the field was firmly established.

"All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one brigade of his division, which was caught in the gap, had drifted toward Brannan. Here, gathering up much artillery, which he was ordered by Thomas to post on the

crest overlooking the field in front of Baird's left, he took it instead to Brannan's right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked in his strong position, and although he had promised Brannan to hold this, abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him.

"Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Negley had occupied, and there placed his weak force of two brigades across Longstreet's advance. But, after his terrific fighting of the day before, he had only twelve hundred men for action, and though Carlin, and Heg's men under Martin, fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. They were driven in disorder to the right and rear.

"At the same time, Van Cleve, with his two remaining brigades in motion toward Thomas, was thrown into great disorder, though a considerable portion of them rallied with Wood.

"As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, in person led Laibolt's brigade, of Sheridan's division, against Longstreet's advancing columns. The attack was delivered with spirit and power, but it failed in the face of overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was utterly routed. McCook was carried to the rear with it.

"Next came Sheridan, with his two remaining brigades under Lytle and Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing and courage, rallied his columns, and though they were taken at every disadvantage, under the inspiration which he imparted they faced the resistless advance with desperate valor. Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades. His brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who had also fought to the extremity to assist, were all borne to the rear and forced to join the fugitive columns falling off from the Union right toward Rossville. General Rosecrans had just ridden the lines from the left, and had passed in the rear of McCook's position, when the line was severed. Finding the roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns representing all corps of the army, for Negley was there from Thomas, he deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and decide upon a new position in front of the place. General



Crittenden's whole command, that is, three divisions, having been ordered in succession to Thomas before the break, Crittenden himself, being without command, rode into Chattanooga after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan's division was in good order by the time it reached Rossville, and most of the troops which left the field were about that place and McFarland's Gap in fighting condition throughout the afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o'clock were from seven to ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird's left or Brannan's right, as the way to either flank was open. This was proved by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel Gates P. Thurston, and Surgeons Gross and Perkins, the medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his division back to the fighting line, but this is an error. He received a request at McFarland's Gap from General Thomas to return to the field, but decided instead to retire to Rossville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved out on the Lafayette road toward General Thomas, but did not form a junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 P. M. and soon after withdrew to Rossville.

"Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in breaking the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. These were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Preston, of Buckner's corps; Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet's Virginia troops, and Hindman's division of Polk's corps. Eight brigades of this force had first entered the gap left by Wood, and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced and fought with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no resistance on his left, moved to the right to assist Longstreet's center and right, which had been checked by Brannan and Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions together in the vicinity of Horseshoe Ridge.

"Shortly after 2 o'clock Longstreet ordered a general assault by his wing. It was delivered with confidence and tremendous power. To meet these six divisions Brannan on

the right had Croxton's brigade and part of Connell's; Wood, on the left, had Harker's brigade. With these organized commands were a part of John Beatty's, a good part of Stanley's and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell's, all of Negley; parts of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky; Forty-fourth Indiana and Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleave's division, with the fifty-eighth Indiana, of Buell's brigade—in all about 4,000 men.

“Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, Longstreet launched his solid columns. They came on magnificently, wave behind wave. They met sheeted fire from the summits, and yet pressed on to hand encounters, but from these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired to the foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a second attack. It was delivered soon after 3 o'clock. Like the first, it fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But while Hindman assaulted the latter in front he also sent a brigade through the gap to Brannan's right to scale the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and who had promised to stay there, had promptly fled before any attack had reached him and was even then in Rossville. There was absolutely nothing to send against Hindman's left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on the commanding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan's right and rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were exultant, and though their second attack had failed everywhere, except as this lodgment was obtained on the ridge beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines for what they believed would be a final assault leading to sure victory.

“But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men clutched their guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved closer to the lines to encourage and steady them. The color-bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as if to repay such courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of the Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union column appeared, moving with speed across the fields from the direction of the McDaniel house. It was Granger, of the reserve, with two brigades of Steedman's division. Be-

ing stationed four miles away toward Ringgold, Granger, agreeing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the field, had started without orders, and though shelled by Forrest on his flank for two miles of the way, had not allowed his columns to be greatly delayed. And now Steedman was sweeping up to the foot of the hill below the Snodgrass House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from toward the Kelley farm was another well-ordered column. It proved to be Van Derveer returning from the charge upon Breckinridge in the Kelley field. The map shows how he had left Brannan's line just before the break, and hastened with deployed lines toward the left; how thus deployed he had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from Breckinridge's front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst upon the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his brigade to the left, delivered a full volley at pistol range into the enemy's faces, charged into their lines on a run, drove them back on their batteries, and pursued both infantry and artillery to a point beyond the Union left, where Grose, coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work. The dotted line shows Van Derveer's return. He, too, had moved without orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the Snodgrass House. Just as Steedman had hastily formed and assaulted Hindman's forces beyond the right of Brannan, Van Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman's left and moved also to the assault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode with it in his hands to the top. His command was the brigades of those splendid soldiers, John G. Mitchell and Walter C. Whitaker.

"One (Whitaker's) plunged into the gorge through which Hindman's left was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van Derveer on its left, charged for the ridge. In twenty minutes it was carried, and all of Hindman's forces were driven from it and out of the ravine. Whitaker had been wounded, and four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally wounded. One-fifth of Steedman's force had been disabled in the charge. Van Derveer's loss was considerable, but less in proportion, as he was not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. Twice Hindman turned his recoil-

ing troops to recapture the position, but finally abandoned the effort and relinquished the ridge to Steedman. The center and right of Longstreet's third assault was in like manner repelled. In this movement the Fourth Kentucky, Colonel R. M. Kelley, joined Van Derveer and fought with him till night.

"The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It was more than the holding of the right. He brought 100,000 rounds of cartridges and artillery ammunition—far more welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the line had been fighting, even at that early hour, with the bayonet and clubbed muskets. Now, when Longstreet's right came on in aid of the attempt of Hindman to hold his position on the crest, they were received with terrific and continuing fire, and as the lines of gray, with desperate valor, neared the summit, Wood's men and Brannan's rushed at them with the bayonet and broke their ranks, rolled them down the slopes, and on Wood's front, with the help of a direct fire from Aleshire's battery on the left, and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery I, Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan's left, under those splendid young soldiers, Lieutenants Frank G. Smith and George B. Rodney, drove them in disorder beyond their artillery.

"At this time both Confederate wings were calling for reinforcements. Bragg's reply to Longstreet was that the right was so badly shattered that it could not help him.

"When Steedman's coming with four thousand men had so changed the whole current of the battle, what if the seven thousand men under Sheridan and Negley about McFarland's and Rossville, much nearer than Steedman was, had been brought up? How the officers who were there could stay themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sickening to think about.

"Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the ridge to the right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived:

"In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued, at close quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage

worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with determined obstinacy, and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was used, and men were also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets.'

"Of the attack of Steedman's men in the ravine, where they rushed on the Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in among the guns and killed gunners at their posts, Hindman further says: 'I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better.' Of the second attack upon Brannan's position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in Longstreet's troops from Virginia, said: 'This was one of the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point.'

"Up to the time of Steedman's arrival, there had been a break between Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the former in advance of the latter somewhat covered it. Upon this point Longstreet now organized a heavy attack. But the lull on the left, arising from the rebels having been, as Bragg expressed it, 'so badly beaten back' there that they could be of no service on his left, made it practicable to strengthen the Union center. Hazen was found to have ammunition, and was moved with celerity into the gap, and Grose, Johnson's reserve, replaced him. Hazen arrived none too soon. His lines were hardly established before Longstreet's right was upon him, lapping over upon Reynolds' front, and then, from Reynolds to Steedman, there was one continuing hell of battle. Garfield, who had come up with an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after reporting to Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker, of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against all loiterers at the gaps in the rear that every officer and man of them could easily have reached the field.

"Longstreet's columns assaulted at every point as rapidly as his lines rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while these officers had only four unbroken in organization, and fragments of two others. One brigade of Preston, which

assaulted Wood's and Hazen's line, had over 2,000 men in the movement. The successive movements, rather the tremendous dashes of these lines against the hill, was like the advance of breakers with which ocean storms attack the shore. But, as surely, each wave with its crest of steel, its spray of smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and swept back with dead and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was treason, but magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of Thomas saw on the Snodgrass Hill throughout the afternoon till dusk.

"To relieve the left, Polk was ordered at 3 o'clock to attack in force with the whole right wing. But it required much time to organize those battered lines for assault, but when done, it was, indeed, formidable. The second map will make it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was deployed before Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk's brigades lapped over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives his position wrongly, though it is taken from the original official map in the War Department. Ranged further to the right, and crossing the State and Lafayette road at McDaniel's, and thus massed against the Union left, were the divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong's dismounted cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest's artillery. While Gracie's brigade, of Preston, was assaulting Hazen and Wood, this attack on the Union left began. But, as before, the brigades that moved up to the log breastworks were speedily shattered, though this time they took their artillery forward through the thickets with them, pushing it by hand.

"Once more, as the assault was made on Baird's left, there came a Union charge across the Kelley field, the fourth for the day. This time it was Willich, the reserve of Johnson. Withdrawing from line and facing north, he swept along on the run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the woods at the point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and without a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates. King's regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more the immediate left was cleared. The force on the road by the McDaniel house, though unbroken, was not advanced. Later, an assault on Reynolds

and Palmer was ordered, but, naturally, it was feeble after so many repulses at the breastworks. At half-past 5 there was quiet again along the Union left. Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for another hour, though at every point unsuccessful.

At half-after 5, General Thomas, having full discretion, decided to withdraw to occupy the passes in his rear at McFarland's and Rossville, which controlled the roads to Chattanooga. His line was solid at every point. Both wings of the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too much broken to successfully assault the Union left. The Union right, though its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, was becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against assaulting lines, and, in spite of the persistence of Longstreet's men, had begun to feel comfortable in its position. The whole line could have been held until night. But daylight was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward the gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished, the darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the movement. It was because Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign that the army withdrew to Rossville. It was in no sense a military retreat. It was, in fact, an advance.

"If Thomas had not occupied these passes in the night, Bragg could have done so, and the object he had in view would then have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed it, Bragg would have been only to glad to have withdrawn from the field and 'retreated' on Rossville. Thomas did not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won.

"The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement began on the right of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and Baird were to follow in succession, all leaving their skirmishers in their works.

"Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of the Lafayette road, Edward King on the right and Turchin on the left. Thus he advanced northward along the Kelley field toward Rossville. General Thomas followed at the head of

the column. As they passed a short distance beyond the south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly Thomas ordered Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the left, and after thus changing front to 'charge and clear them out.' The line of Turchin's charge is shown on the map. Filing into the woods to the left at double-quick, he faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at a run into the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest and most brilliant, most important and effective charges of the day—the fifth over those Kelley fields. At the same moment King, forcing his way along the road, fell on the flank of Liddell's division and broke it. Dan McCook, who had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, advanced and opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and after short but sharp fighting the formidable array was driven back and the way to Rossville was open.

"Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland's Gap. Baird, Johnson, and Palmer followed over the same roads. They were attacked as they left their works and crossed the Kelley field, but order in their columns was restored as soon as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of the road. Hazen and Wood followed at 7 P. M. without molestation. Steedman withdrew at six o'clock from the extreme right, and Brannan was left alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun was down. The shadows were thickening in the woods before him, and yet Longstreet's men remained on the slopes, and several times appeared in detachments close along his lines. Suddenly a line of Preston's men were found on the slope where Steedman had been. By some strange oversight Brannan had not been notified that his right was unprotected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, which had come round through the gap where Steedman's right had been, and was evidently forming for an assault. The Thirty-fifth Ohio, of Van Derveer's brigade, was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments of five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were given to the commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regi-

ment had one round and one in the guns. This was placed in front. The others, with fixed bayonets, were formed in the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on the line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the near outposts.

"Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line along the ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a silent awaiting results behind its line of bayonets. The volley had scattered the enemy on the ridge, and the force in the rear had withdrawn. These were the last shots on the right. Following them there was absolute quiet every-where on the field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan's officers and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, saw long lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out among the wounded and the dead. It was a sight far more horrible than any of the pictured presentations of Dante's *Inferno*. From this scene, with the low wailings of the sufferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to form the rear guard of Thomas's advance to Rossville. Turchin and Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear guard there; Van Derveer covered the right. At midnight the Army of the Cumberland occupied the passes which made the possession of Chattanooga secure.

"There had been no such disordered rush of the broken portions of the army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken correspondent of an Eastern paper, who gave visions of his own early flight to the country as news, depicted. Only a small part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga. From 7,000 to 10,000 stopped at Rossville, and were fairly organized there. When Thomas's forces arrived the whole army was placed in position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and remained in line of battle at Rossville throughout the whole of the 21st.

"At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga—advanced is the word; the term 'retreated,' so persistently used in regard to this movement has no place in the truthful history of this campaign. The Army of the Cumberland was on its way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to capture. It had halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight for its objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march

for the city. Every foot of it was a march in advance, and not retreat. At sunrise of the 22d Brannan's division, which was the rear guard, reached the city, and the campaign for Chattanooga was at an end. Until that morning broke the great bulk of the Army of the Cumberland had never seen the place.

"Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for battle. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout the two days' battle was not surpassed, and judged by its returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rosecrans had crossed the river in front of the city, and captured it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from Washington, he would have entered it without a battle, since, if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's army would not have been so heavily reinforced, and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field on Sunday was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, and which it has ever since suited several writers of military fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith presented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines at 1 o'clock on Sunday, not a single position was carried and held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which begun soon after 5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an officer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they could have been held throughout till dark.

"The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans' right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and

Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. Barnes' brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds' division were detached and cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and General Charles Grosvenor and Sirwell and Stoughton, of these brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the next day, and until the army moved on in the night to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range, and in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of brave and magnificent assaults.

"General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several

thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis' division, and three regiments of infantry and one battery, being engaged in guarding supply trains.

"In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual and prospective strength are thus stated :

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men ; General Buckner, 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expectations.'

"It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Longstreet's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson's correspondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, reached him the day before the battle.

"A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rosecrans' loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, were 17,804. Thus, the entire loss for each army was over twenty-five per cent of the entire force of each. Hill's corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet's left wing, the loss was 7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. Longstreet's loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per cent of those engaged.

"The casualties in Jackson's brigade of Cleburne's division, which assaulted on Baird's front, was 35 per cent, while the Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent, and the First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. Gregg's brigade, of Buckner's corps, lost 652 out of 1,425. Helm's Ken-

tucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent of its strength. Bate's brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. The losses in Govan's brigade, of Walker's corps, exceeded 50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman's assault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. Brannan's division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer's brigade, of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton's brigade, of the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of Van Derveer's regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent; the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent; the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent, and the Eighty-seventh Indiana about half its number. General Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades.

“ These figures become the more significant when compared with the statement of losses in the world's noted battles. General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry commander, thus vividly presented this question to the gathering of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and Confederates, at Chattanooga, in 1881:

“ ‘ Waterloo was one of the most desperate and bloody fields chronicled in European history and yet Wellington's casualties were less than 12 per cent, his losses being 2,432 killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, one side lost in killed and wounded 9,740 out of 34,000, while their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle of Wagram, Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurzburg the French lost but $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and yet the army gave up the field and retreated to the Rhine. At Recour, Marshal Saxe lost but $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. At Zurich, Massena lost but 8 per cent. At Lagriz, Frederick lost but $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. At Malplaquet, Marlborough lost but 10 per cent, and at Ra-

millies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At Contras, Henry of Navarre was reported as cut to pieces, yet his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi, Napoleon lost $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. At Valmy, Frederick lost but 3 per cent, and and at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than $14\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 per cent. At Linden, General Moreau lost but 4 per cent, and the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent in killed and wounded. Americans can scarcely call this a lively skirmish.

“At Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded forty per cent, and the average of killed and wounded on one side or the other was over thirty per cent.”

“Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent *Century* article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side: ‘A breathing space was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga—the objective point of the campaign—was held. There was no more splendid fighting in 1861, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, 1863. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga—that brilliant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet’s absence was imperiling Lee’s safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay to strike was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an in-

dependent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That "barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy.'

"The authorities at Washington, to cover their own shortcomings and inexcusable neglect, chose to deepen the erroneous impression that the Army of the Cumberland had been routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, it had been only a question of opportunity since the campaign opened. There was only needed the misrepresentations about Chickamauga to furnish this.

"In the meantime, General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterward done, when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially perfected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges completed by October 1st for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge—where Sherman afterward crossed—with a view to a flank attack there. It was, therefore, altogether fitting and proper that the order for his relief should arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, where he intended to throw a bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified Hooker of the plan three days before, and ordered him to be ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce in Rosecrans' removal by accepting the command. It was at Rosecrans' earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this determination. But he did not hesitate to say that the order was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Washington soon after the battle, he immediately charged him to do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be new statements to most, but they are true.

“The survivors of the Army of the Cumberland should awake to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monuments, and its lines accurately preserved for history? There was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown.”

Here ends the true story of the campaign that closed with the capture of Chattanooga. No citizen of the Union with a particle of patriotism and the smallest sense of justice can read what follows without a blush of shame. The blood tingles with indignation at the wanton indignity awarded a brave man after he had accomplished not only the most brilliant achievement of the war, but gained an objective that went far toward ending the conflict in behalf of the Union. We have seen the several orders issued from Washington, each double-barreled in its dictation of an impossibility while carrying an insult. Ordered to march when marching was impossible, ordered to pursue when no enemy was fleeing; and while the Confederacy was concentrating troops upon Rosecrans' front, the authorities at Washington ignored with insolent indifference his demands for troops, and begrudged him even the supplies upon which his army was to live. While carrion crows darkened the horizon about the Army of the Potomac, and the mocking birds around Vicksburg took up and warbled the dead march in Saul that was being played continuously over the unhonored graves of brave men who died as in a pestilence of malarial fevers, dysentery, measles, and small-pox, the Army of the Cumberland was repairing railroads, opening highways, accumulating supplies, while working its way through mountain passes, over rivers, scaling palisades, that it might carry in triumph to the front the fortunes of the great republic. To win Chattanooga made it possible to survive the brutal ignorance of the War Department, Grant's bloody blunders, and Sherman's militia march to the sea. And yet for this service, the brave soldier who alone conceived the campaign,

and if he did not fight the battle, had it fought by one whose ability he was the first to discover—for this gain that will yet go to record as the crowning glory not only of American arms, but of American generalship, was hurriedly dismissed in disgrace from the service. It was infamous.

Rosecrans' quick, secretive temperament would, as we have said, long before have driven him to a tender of his resignation, but for the influence of the one man in whom he confided, General George H. Thomas. General Thomas not only had confidence in the men in control at Washington, but there was another fact that influenced him probably without his being clearly aware of the weight it had upon his conduct. It was that if General Rosecrans were relieved, he would be called upon to assume command. He could not consent to this. In his eyes it would not only be unjust, but treacherous. He felt that he alone was responsible for the condition that the War Department found offensive. Rosecrans, in his proud, impetuous way, would have obeyed the peremptory orders served upon him, but for that. As we have said, the calmer judgment and superior force of character that existed in Thomas had control. To take advantage then of his own acts appeared so dishonorable to him that Rosecrans' relief meant his own retirement. The slightest appeal to this grand soldier's sense of honor was conclusive, and they who seek to appreciate the character and career we are attempting to record, will do well to compare the conduct of these two gentlemen with the low intrigues and mean ambitions that debased the service elsewhere. And yet to this day, we find well meaning but ignorant people insisting that General Thomas had no right to consider either himself or the man he displaced when called to command by his government. We beg leave to differ. The man who is not true to himself can not be of much service to his government. The man of mean ambitions whose record will not bear inspection holds his fame upon the same terms. It is all a fraud. General Thomas loved his country and her cause with all the patriotic devotion of which his high nature was capable, but he loved his honor more. He shrunk as instinctively from a compromise of

that honor as much as he would have shrunk from the commission of any other crime.

In this connection we can not leave the field of Chickamauga without calling attention to the conduct of one general a political organization had seized upon as available property and insists is one of the three immortals who alone fought the successful fight and saved the Union. We refer to General Phil Sheridan. In the midst of General Thomas's desperate resistance against superior numbers, with his right rolled back, so demoralized and confused and with such slaughter that it was almost impossible to rally or reform it, while the left was overlapped and menaced with defeat, Generals Negley, Sheridan, and Davis fell back with their forces in the direction of McFarland's Gap. General Thomas, learning that Sheridan, Davis, and Negley were yet within reach, sent General G. P. Thruston with orders to have their troops brought immediately to the front upon his right. The gallant Thruston galloped back to where he had left Generals Sheridan and Davis to find them gone, and after an hour's search came up with them near McFarland's Gap, falling rapidly back from the sound of the cannon that told of the desperate battle then in progress. Davis promptly obeyed the order to return, but Sheridan refused positively and finally to obey.

General Thruston made a statement, in which that loyal and gallant officer says: "Being adjutant and chief of staff of the Twentieth Corps, to which their (Davis's and Sheridan's) divisions belonged, I reported to them General Thomas's position and situation and requested them to return and take position as directed by him. Davis ordered his men to 'right about' at once and marched back under my guidance, some of Negley's and other troops joining us. General Sheridan said he preferred to go to Rossville and go out on the Lafayette road. I told him that it was getting late and he could scarcely get on the field by that route before night, but he insisted upon going that way, which was several miles around."

Of this affair, General Sheridan reports as follows:

"After crossing the road, my division was again formed on the ridge which overlooked the ground where this sanguinary contest had taken place, the enemy manifesting no disposition to continue the engagement further. I have learned positively what I had before partially seen, *that the division still further on the left had been driven and I was completely cut off.*

"I then determined to connect myself with the troops of General Thomas by moving on the arc of a circle until I struck the Dry Creek Valley road, by which I hoped to form the junction.

"In the meantime, *I was joined by a portion of the division of General Davis*, under command of General Carlin, and a number of stragglers from other divisions.

"On reaching the *Dry Creek Valley road*, I found the enemy had moved parallel to me and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing me joining General Thomas by that route. I then determined to move quickly on Rossville and form a junction with him on his left flank *via Lafayette road*. This was successfully accomplished about 5:30 o'clock P. M."

The italics in above extracts are our own, and they serve to penetrate and expose the fiction the general indulges in to cover his disobedience of orders. It will be observed that he claims to have been cut off from the front then held by General Thomas. That is, he ventures to say that the enemy was in force between his division and General Thomas. This would put the Confederates almost in the rear of General Thomas. This is flatly contradicted by well recognized facts and by the statement of General Thruston. This gentleman had a difficulty in finding General Sheridan, while he, Sheridan, was in full retreat on Rossville, but he had no trouble in riding direct from General Thomas's center to where he found General Sheridan, and returning thence to General Thomas. General Sheridan was in company, says General Thruston, with General Davis, and the last named, on receiving orders from the general commanding, immediately turned about face and, guided by Thruston, marched to the front. "General Sheridan said he preferred

to go to Rossville and go out on the Lafayette road. I told him it was getting late and he could scarcely get on the field by that route before night, but he insisted on going that way, which was several miles around."

This is Thruston's testimony, and it accords with Sheridan's at one point only, and that is in not getting to the front at all. It is well, however, to take the testimony of another witness. General Davis in his report informs us. He says:

"General Negley's division at this time passed to the rear in the direction of Rossville, and, I understood, took position at that place. General Carlin and Colonel Martin had also by this time succeeded in re-forming their troops as far as was possible, and Colonel Ward, commanding the Tenth Ohio Infantry, reported to me with his regiment for duty, and after allowing the men a few minutes for water, ordered them again under arms and moved for the battle field with a view of supporting General Thomas's corps, which was still maintaining its position. It is proper here to add that several detached battalions and commands reported to me and accompanied my command to the battle field, making in all a force of twenty-five hundred to three thousand men.

"While in the act of forming my lines near General Thomas's right, I received information from General Garfield that General Thomas was falling back, and orders to repair to Rossville."

It will be seen by this that General Davis found no difficulty in marching direct to the support of Thomas, and the intervention of Confederate troops to prevent such move is an afterthought of General Sheridan's to cover and excuse not only his failure to obey orders, but his lack of loyalty, as shown by his moving, as we have said, his troops to the rear at the sound of the enemy's cannon. General Thruston, in making his statement, omitted from the writing precisely what General Sheridan did say, and this language the gallant young chief of staff omitted from a mistaken sense of propriety. The fact is, the insubordinate subordinate, in a sen-

tence glaring with profanity, swore he would obey no such orders and take his men into a slaughter organized by fools. He would move on to Rossville, and, if necessary, out the Lafayette road. The day after the battle, it was General Rosecrans' purpose to give General Negley his choice to resign or be tried for cowardice. He finally asked for a court of inquiry, and, though whitewashed, he never regained either military standing or command. And yet his offense was far less than that of Sheridan. Negley took counsel of his fears. His nature proved too much for him. He could plead this weakness. But Sheridan had no such excuse. A braver man never trod the field of danger. His mind was clear and his nerves calm, and he knew that in that roar that rose behind him as he marched away brave men were being done to death, while heroic officers were looking eagerly to the right and left for aid in this hour of death-tainted anxiety. We were outnumbered if not outfought, and the fate of the great republic hung trembling in the balance, when the man whom the nation, for supposed virtues he never possessed and the doing of deeds a drunken poet had dressed in the rainbow tints of brandy-stimulated imagination, has delighted to honor, deliberately marched his men from the field of battle.

One is the more impressed with this dastardly conduct when one remembers the cruel punishment awarded the gallant Warren by this same officer, who, for failing to accomplish an impossible order, was disgraced in the presence of his troops and sent broken-hearted to a dishonored grave. The spirit of the gallant Warren animates the heart of every honest man in dealing condemnation to this, the smallest member of a trinity of false gods, whose only claim to memory is in the bloody disasters that came near wrecking an empire.

Night came to cover in the two armies, equally hurt but unequally stunned, as the Confederates suffered in this respect more than we. Thomas, under orders from Rosecrans, fell quietly back to Rossville upon the line designated by the general commanding. He retired unmolested. One regrets that our great military leader withdrew from a field he had

so brilliantly held. We now know that Bragg was in no condition to renew the fight and did not follow Thomas, and had our army assumed the offensive, a hurried retreat would have followed on the part of the Confederates. Hastily called together from Richmond, Mobile, Georgia, and Mississippi, they were badly supplied even with ammunition, to say nothing of food and shelter. We are taught from Confederate records that their army was in a more perilous condition than ours. It was a great relief, then, when Bragg learned that Rosecrans, instead of pursuing, had fallen back upon Rossville, where a new and stronger line of defense was being occupied. Bragg changed his retrograde movement and felt cautiously his ugly enemy.

In making these reflections on what seems an unfortunate resolve on the part of General Thomas, who, being on the ground, knew the situation as Rosecrans could not know it, we are forced to remember that he could not know at the time how badly the enemy had been damaged, and in this ignorance it was wise to consider the situation from a prudent point of view. That we had been outnumbered, General Thomas well knew, but he could not know to what extent, and he was in ignorance as to what reserves the enemy might have upon the field or what reinforcements might be upon the railroads hurrying to the rescue of a place of such vital importance. It was well known at Richmond what could not be known with the supposed military heads at Washington, that Chattanooga was the key to the whole situation, and that its capture by our army made Virginia untenable. Almost frantic appeals had been made by General Rosecrans for at least mounted infantry to protect his flanks, and made in vain, although the inaction on the Potomac and on the Mississippi of the Confederates enabled them to concentrate from their inner lines their best troops in the field. As General Thomas sat by his camp-fire the night of that awful day and studied the maps for roads upon which he could move against the enemy, he realized the fact that Chattanooga, which he had held in mind for three long years of hard marching and bloody fights, was now within reach, and slowly and reluctantly he moved from the hastily-constructed

defense of the horse-shoe line of battle he and his men rendered immortal, to sleep for the night on hills and valleys to the right and left of Rossville. And here, after all, rather than at Chickamauga, were the passes which controlled the way to Chattanooga.

Had Rosecrans gone to the front from his shattered right, instead of hurrying back to repair the disaster after ordering Garfield to Thomas, it is more than probable he would, recognizing the condition, have brought forward his reserves the frightened Negley had led from the field, and with his impetuous nature assumed the offensive. At least he would, with a view of assaulting the enemy that had again and again been repulsed, remained upon the field so gallantly won. What the effect of this would have been one can surmise by reading Bragg's cautious dispatch made at the time to the authorities at Richmond. It runs as follows:

"CHICKAMAUGA RIVER, Sept. 20, via RINGGOLD, Sept. 21.

Major-General Cooper, Adjutant-General:

After two days hard fighting, we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field, but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially of our officers. We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some 2,800 prisoners.

BRAGG."

The withdrawal of his part of the army in good order, and without the loss of a man, told of the success of Thomas in making veterans of his raw recruits.

The importance of Chattanooga was recognized at Richmond, and, as soon as the authorities there could recover from their amazement at Rosecrans' successful flanking movements, reinforcements were hurried to Bragg, and enough concentrated, it was believed, to destroy the Army of the Cumberland and retake their Gibraltar. The Confederacy failed of its purpose. They claimed a victory at Chickamauga, but it was barren of good result to them. It had been better to have transported Lee and his entire army

to the Chickamauga than to permit our army to take and hold Chattanooga. It was not only that the loss to the Confederates was terrible, amounting to thirty-six per cent upon the last day, but, admitting their claim to victory on the field, they suffered defeat in our success in taking and holding the great objective of the entire war. The loss inflicted on us was fearful. We had sixteen thousand three hundred and thirty-six, including one hundred and thirty-two officers, killed, five hundred and ninety-two wounded, and two hundred and seventy missing; fifteen hundred and fifty-five enlisted men killed, eight thousand eight hundred and twenty wounded, and four thousand nine hundred and eighty-five missing. As many of the reported missing were among the slain, the number of the killed exceeded two thousand. The loss in material was immense; thirty-six guns, fifteen thousand small arms, wagons and ambulances in great numbers, with ammunition and stores in large quantities. If, in addition to this destruction of men and material, the Army of the Cumberland could have been driven over the river and Chattanooga recaptured, it would have paid the Confederate government to have shifted the seat of war from the Potomac to the Tennessee.

The army under the immediate command of General Thomas fell back without being molested to Rossville. On the morning of the 21st, the Confederates seemed to awake from their stupor and made a demonstration upon Thomas's front. It was a feeble affair, easily repulsed, but General Thomas, fearing that the enemy might flank him on the right and so get between us and Chattanooga, advised General Rosecrans to fall back upon that place. This was done with ready precision and without loss. Indeed there was no molestation upon which to base even a skirmish. The reason given for this peaceful proceeding on the part of the Confederate commander was that his own army was less than half as strong and greatly exhausted. According to this the claimed victory of Chickamauga was so barren of fruit that it might as well be considered a Confederate defeat. General Bragg, after the accession of Longstreet's corps, outnumbered the Army of the Cumberland by one-fourth at

least. The two days' fighting, according to General Bragg, had reduced this to one-half and that one-half so demoralized that it could not be brought to attack a foe in retreat, for this is what they designated our move on Chattanooga.

We were in possession of the mountain gate-way to the South. We have seen how General Thomas, early in the spring of 1861, traced upon the maps of Kentucky and Tennessee the fine strategical campaign, that beginning on the Ohio ended at Chattanooga, and asked for a column of twenty thousand men that he might demonstrate its importance. We have seen how the force asked for first given was then taken from him and given to General Mitchel. From General Mitchel it passed to Don Carlos Buell and from Buell to General Rosecrans, and, near three years after, the campaign ends in the capture of Chattanooga and virtually the end of the war. Our hero, who alone saw the way to a final overthrow of a brave and skillful enemy and a preservation of the Union through force of arms, clung with the tenacity of an indomitable will to the prosecution of that campaign. No neglect, no slights, none of the insolence of office at Washington, where stolid ignorance fed military conceit, could swerve him from his purpose, and on the 22d of September, nearly three years after his pointing out to the President the great objective, he saw his veterans swing into Chattanooga, after an engagement where the fighting fell upon the men he had developed as soldiers under his immediate command, where through the force of circumstances he passed from a subordinate to the general commanding. He and General Rosecrans changed places when the fate of our empire hung upon that one day's fighting, and two days after he saw the column he had asked for in 1861 marching under his command into the great stronghold of the enemy.

CHAPTER XVII.

Edwin M. Stanton; his Character and Temperament—His Intense Dislike for Rosecrans and its Causes—A Manly Remonstrance that amounted to Insult—Bragg Changes his Intended Assault on Chattanooga into a Siege—Rosecrans Relieved and Thomas put in Command.

Students in the true history of our late civil war will find one name more frequently mentioned than any other of the statesmen and soldiers of that stormy period. While they will find it difficult to say whether that name excites more approval than indignation as they read, they will be certain of one conviction in themselves and that is admiration, for the honest, frank, faithful manner in which he executed his great trust. Edwin M. Stanton had many faults, but more virtues. Possessed of a strong, broad, thoughtful mind, he had enriched that mind by vast stores of information. As an advocate before the highest tribunals of the country he had developed and trained the best powers of a combatant. A state of nature had become to him a state of war. This left little of the judicial character in him. He could see but one side and had no patience with the advocates of the other. Of all the members of the cabinet with the exception of Seward he had the finest fiber in his temperament. Yet he shows to the worst advantage. Chase for example was born coarse and got his refinement of thought and manner by early training and a life-long association with the cultured. Stanton, a man naturally of refinement, had been rendered coarse in manner by lack of training and ruffianly surroundings. The gladiator of the bar he came in time to be an Ishmaelite among men and a cynical disturber of the peace with all. To these unhappy combinations was added ill-health. His opponent at the bar learned that every case was a personal contest and that each attempt to get the better of an argument was treated as an insult. When he was called much to his astonishment to the War Department by a Presi-

dent he had grossly insulted and always spoke of with contempt, his disordered nerves made that Department a hell to the subordinates and an insult to all having business with its chief. Strange to relate this condition while resented, of course, was never resisted. The Secretary had such a clear head for not only the wide field of thoughtful control, but the multitudinous details in which he was intrusted that his insults of impatience were overlooked in the gratification of having one's business promptly dispatched. That absurd but common excuse used to save one's self-esteem, found in "it is only his way," came in to save Mr. Stanton from even reproach.

It is difficult to make those who knew Secretary Stanton personally, see that under all his rough exterior there existed as kind a heart as ever beat in human breast. Yet he has left the memory of a brute. This, while the great man, who, recognizing his eminent fitness for the place to be filled, called him into his cabinet in face of personal difference and insult, will be regarded through all time as one who marred his usefulness through an excess of kind feeling. The belief that because Abraham Lincoln was amiable in his ways he was kind in his nature is a common error. The man who thus pads his person, covering with cotton, as it were, his angular points and nervous sensibilities, does so to protect himself. He will do little favors to conciliate and encourage kind favors in return. But one sooner or later learns that all this covering is not for the better preservation of a heart—but only for the protection of a stomach. The man of a really kind nature comes to be, in time, ugly, impatient and combative in seeking to relieve others, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred he finds an oppressor on the ground, and in fighting that, learns in time to be combative. Secretary Stanton's personal enmity was, at times, malignant. There was in it, so far as the military subordinates were concerned, a self-deception that went far to extenuate his injustice. He professed to hate McClellan and Rosecrans, for example, because of their—to him—intense stupidity. His favorites were McDowell, Hooker, McCook, Pope and Thomas, whom he claimed to love because of their patriotism and ability. To tell the whole truth, Stanton

shared with Lincoln, and indeed the entire cabinet, a contempt for the military leaders. Unable or at least unwilling to take upon themselves the necessary information to enable them to plan campaigns—declining indeed to even interfere, save to cover and protect the capital—they saw the sort selected by West Point to do that work achieving naught but bloody disasters. Personal intercourse did not create even ordinary respect not to say admiration. To this sweep of condemnation, Thomas alone made an exception. He extorted, in his mere presence, the highest respect. Stanton once said to General Schenck; “I feel before him as if I were in the presence of George Washington.” The most unfortunate, in this respect, was the kind-hearted, impulsive “Old Rosey,” as his men called him. A man of high military genius it might be said of him as it was sung of Goldsmith: “He wrote like an angel and talked like poor Poll.” Regarding the war as the property of West Point, he looked upon Edwin M. Stanton as a mere clerk of the president, rather in the way of the army than a help to it, and when the obtrusive clerk issued a circular announcing that a vacant brigadier-general’s commission in the regular army awaited the volunteer-general, who would achieve the first decisive victory, General Rosecrans was the only officer who ventured to remonstrate. This remonstrance was, in fact, an insult and would have quickened the resentment of a less sensitive man than Edwin M. Stanton. To say that Secretary Stanton was blind in his rage but feebly expresses the paroxysm of wrath that settled into hate known only to a nature rendered morbid by disease. How intense this was we may gather from the way it blinded the great Secretary’s better judgment. Possessed of a patriotism that permeated his entire being, he yet actually begrudged the soldiers of the Cumberland their supplies and refused their general the necessary reinforcements upon the ground, that under such a general as Rosecrans an increased army would only have increased slaughter and a greater national disaster.

We have dwelt at some length on this part of our narrative from a desire to save ourselves from a supposed unjust censure of the great War Secretary. So far as the war was

concerned he stood head and shoulders above his associates of the administration. He was the successor of Simon Cameron who was given the portfolio of the War Department because he had been before the convention that nominated Lincoln, a candidate himself, and by throwing the vote of Pennsylvania in behalf of the successful applicant secured his selection. He took possession of the War Department, and all the rogues in the country came to the front. A conjugation of the verb to steal became the short text of the department. It ran from "I steal, thou stealest, he, she or it steals," into the potential mood of "Steal thou and let him steal." Shoddy was born, fixed ammunition of colored sawdust was contracted for, and our men were sent to the field armed with condemned Belgian muskets, more fatal to the men who tried to use them than to the enemy they sought to kill. The Hon. Simon Cameron and his pals were jingling the stolen, blood-stained coin in their pockets when the approaching roar of Confederate artillery told of the stunning defeat of Bull Run that Cameron and his companions rascally had served to bring about. The rot of political patronage stole into the army, and promotions were given for services at the polls in lieu of services in camp, and it is amazing that the Confederates did not end the war in the beginning by the seizure of our Capitol. The condition under the Pennsylvanian got to be such at last that both Senate and House, through delegations, waited on the President with the peremptory demand for the dismissal of his War Secretary. The mission to Russia was given to Cameron and the War Department to Edwin M. Stanton.

In justice to President Lincoln we must remember that he made Simon Cameron Secretary of War at a time when, clear-headed as Abraham Lincoln was, he could not be made to believe that war was imminent. "No people," he was wont to say in his clear, terse style, "will get up and go at each other's throats on an abstract political proposition." He was right enough in that, for the war did not originate in any abstract political proposition. The war had been brewing through two centuries in the hearts and minds of the two peoples that eventually went to killing each other. No war

ever has a reasonable origin, and one is not especially called upon to find any reason for one. If one is curious enough to delve in a dim past for this senseless quarrel, such curious student will find that one-half of the quarrel came over the sea and landed at Plymouth in the Mayflower; the other half came over the seas to Virginia in vessels holding godless adventures. One-half were Puritans and the other half pirates. The lack of moral sense in the one was counter-balanced by a perverted moral sense in the other. The old habit of crowding dogmas down broke out at intervals, while a sense of being in the wrong made all the South sensitive and uneasy. Whatsoever may have been the origin of the difference between the two sections, it had grown to such proportions that the armed conflict was as bitter, bloody, and unforgiving as if the contestants were different races.

Edwin M. Stanton illustrated this. Born of a Quaker family, he inherited a hatred of slavery from his parents, who were abolitionists, but early training under Judge Ely Tappan, of Steubenville, Ohio, made him a Democrat. Such was his ardent temperament that his political faith took on all the fanaticism of a religious belief. Opposed to slavery, he yet detested abolition, and regarded the Abolitionists as criminal disturbers of the peace because they had no regard for the sacred democratic guarantees of the Constitution. When the South, however, took up arms against the Union he found himself not only an ally of his old enemies, but was from start to finish more bitter than they.

His appearance in the War Department was the signal for reforms in every direction. For a time he seemed to shift the war from the South to a war on the rogues. The panic-stricken scoundrels who had been robbing the government within hearing of the enemy's guns found themselves heading toward the penitentiary, and fled from sight. Order and honesty came in together, and within thirty days the very atmosphere of a polluted department became pure. The heretofore neglected soldiers found themselves furnished with the best arms, comfortable clothing, and shelter. Having swiftly and promptly arrested fraud, he turned to the army. For months our young Napoleon by the grace of popular bap-

tism and press anthems had been gathering a huge army about the Capital and holding grand reviews to the music of Confederate artillery and in sight of the rebel flag on Munson's Hill. Among the first orders issued was one informing General McClellan and his military world that the general's head-quarters until the army took the field would be at the War Department Building. Two small rooms were devoted to an establishment that in itself could have filled and occupied the building. At a reception given to the officers of the army by Secretary Stanton, General McClellan, quite indignant, stalked in, followed by his staff of princes and millionaires. Having stiffly bowed to the Secretary, the young Napoleon was about to withdraw, when Secretary Stanton, with his peculiar smile, that left one in doubt as to whether it was an angry gleam of white teeth from under his short upper lip or the expression of a pleasant emotion, said softly, "Please wait a moment, General." Then lifting his voice so as to fill the room, he continues: "I have called you together, gentlemen, in a social way that we may become better acquainted. In a few days such social intercourse will not be possible, for we will, if you please, have some fighting. We are at the end of our preparations and at the end of public patience. It is my duty to furnish you men and material, and see that the fighting goes on. It is for you to say how. With that I have nothing to do. I think it better before we separate that we should clearly understand each other."

This mutual recognition of each other did not avail much. McClellan had positive orders to move, but his long-cherished and closely concealed plan of campaign was extremely unsatisfactory. It was putting in shape the popular cry of "On to Richmond" by water ways. McClellan had to admit that Richmond, looked at from a military point, was not of any strategic importance. President Lincoln truly told him that the place had no political significance. "If we defeat the Confederate army of Richmond," said the President, "we get Richmond, let its importance be what it may. If this is the object in view, why go to the trouble and expense of sailing an army around by water to Richmond when

the army of Richmond can be met here in sight of Washington?"

We again refer to this business at Washington for the purpose of finding in it cause for the treatment awarded the general commanding the Army of the Cumberland. The fact is the nearer an acquaintance with the military mind developed at Washington went, the profounder grew the contempt for it held by Lincoln and cabinet. Said Secretary Chase to the writer of this: "I have been studying the art of war. I can find nothing in it but a calculation of chances and a quick eye for topography. Were I not so near-sighted I would be tempted to resign my place as Secretary for a command in the field."

And yet in spite of this derision for the regular army officers this same administration persisted in not only leaving the conduct of the war to the few forced to the highest command, but it held them responsible. This was much complicated and rendered worse by unexpected and uncalled for interference. Mr. Seward wished to call the attention of the war powers of Europe to the territory we were conquering. Mr. Chase wanted two bayonets given every Union man at the South. We have seen President Lincoln authorizing a subordinate officer of Grant to fit out in Grant's department, independent of that officer, an expedition down the Mississippi to attack Vicksburg. Had these able men given a little study to what we are pleased to call the art of war they would have learned that in it, as in all other pursuits of life, education may develop but that it never creates, and that the man best fitted to command our armies was the man commissioned by his Maker, and not of necessity the graduate of West Point. With such information guiding the search it would not have been long ere George H. Thomas would have been called to command our armies and, putting an end to the brutal and senseless objective found in mere slaughter, would have led our brave men to where victory meant an end to the armed conflict.

With all his faults of impulse born of blind prejudice and bitter personal antagonisms the presence of Edwin M. Stanton in the War Department brought life and hope, honor

and energy to our cause in the field where that cause was being fought. The huge anaconda, as McClellan's army was called, that lay coiled in stupor about Washington suddenly uncoiled and moved into the enemy's country. The roar of battles heard about our Capital receded in the distance, and although we met nothing but disasters, and our armies that we sent out fully equipped came drifting back in wild disorder, blame rested on the generals commanding while the confidence of the people remained in the man whose strong personality was felt throughout the war-disturbed communities.

The Army of the Cumberland occupied Chattanooga and no time was lost in strengthening the defenses nature afforded us. General Rosecrans made no effort to hold Lookout Mountain or the railroad and the river below the town. He felt that with his army inferior to that of Bragg, while Bragg could and would undoubtedly be reinforced, he could have no reasonable hope of help from the War Department, and must therefore husband his forces so as to present strong lines to the enemy and at the same time to make safe his bridges and secure the roads along which supplies were to come. For forty-eight hours Bragg threatened an attack, but perceiving Rosecrans' perilous condition as to supplies changed his intended assault to a siege. General Longstreet, the better soldier, was earnestly opposed to the siege. This subordinate held that long before want was felt in the town reinforcements would arrive and raising the siege reverse positions. Longstreet's plan was to cross the river above Chattanooga and make themselves felt in the rear of Rosecrans to such extent as to force Rosecrans to evacuate Chattanooga. To cut his line of supplies would as effectually starve his army as if they occupied the intrenchments about the town. Their army would then be in a position to meet and defeat in detail forces sent to the relief of Rosecrans. He maintained that Rosecrans would be forced to evacuate and fall back to Nashville, and that they could follow the railroad to Knoxville and overwhelm Burnside, and from there threaten Rosecrans' communications in the rear of Nashville. General Bragg had that sort of a mind that in-

instinctively rejects all suggestions from others. With such, difficulties are always impossibilities. Of this sort was the lack of transportation given by Bragg. He would be forced to abandon his base of supplies with inadequate means to carry with him the necessary stores. It will be seen directly that this did not prevent Longstreet attacking Burnside at Knoxville, and in a great emergency, such as came in the loss of Chattanooga, grave chances should have been taken. Without sufficient force to besiege Chattanooga he had enough of an army to destroy Rosecrans' slender line of supply over a land where the people were in deadly hostility to our government.

The Army of the Cumberland, nevertheless, was in great peril. Bragg's lines extended from Lookout Mountain across Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge, and along its base and summit to the Tennessee River. This left to our Army but one road, some sixty miles in length, over the mountains for supplies. Had this been unmolested, it yet would have proved inadequate. There was no part of our Army in any field so badly supplied and so wretchedly managed as that of transportation by mules and horses, and that of cavalry. In all cases wherever we had an army in the field it was half paralyzed for want of mules and horses. In a brief period the sixty miles of mountain road to Bridgeport became a highway of dead animals that had fallen exhausted and starved at their work. But the route was menaced by Bragg's cavalry commanded by the intrepid Wheeler. Bragg was well aware of the condition, and knew that if he could hold the river and the shorter roads to Bridgeport the surrender of our army was only a question of time. He placed Longstreet in command of this part of his operations, and ferried all of his cavalry across the river under Wheeler, subject to Longstreet's immediate command. Wheeler crossed on the 1st of October, and moved in the direction of our line of supply. General Rosecrans learning of this, ordered General Crook to pursue. Heavy skirmishing extended back as far as Murfreesboro. This continued from the 1st of October until the 12th with varying successes to one side then another. But Wheeler failed of his purpose, and recrossed the river

with a severe loss of men and materials, and the unhappy consciousness that he had failed of his purpose.

It was not necessary for Wheeler to have succeeded. The long route of sixty miles killed in two weeks all the available horses and mules. Hunger was upon our men, and starvation stared the commanders in the face. In this emergency the suggestive mind of our brilliant commander conceived of a plan that was extremely simple, and promised to succeed because it was unexpected. All there is of war that addresses itself to the intellectual faculties is to be found in the study of the unexpected. To comprehend the plan projected by Rosecrans one will see that the Tennessee River, sweeping from north to south past Chattanooga, forms a sudden bend at Ross Tow Island, and then flows in a northerly direction back opposite Chattanooga, forming a peninsula with a narrow neck at what is called Brown's Ferry. To secure this ferry so as to throw across the stream at that point a pontoon bridge, and hold the same, would shorten our line of supplies by giving us possession of the river from Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport. At this last named place an old steamboat was being repaired and a new one built. To carry this project into success the movements of three different bodies were necessary. The first was to have General Hooker move forward from Bridgeport; thence to Rankins' Ferry, and after to Brown's Ferry; secondly, General Turchin, with artillery and a sufficient force, was to march across the peninsula, and thirdly, a pontoon bridge had to be floated at midnight from Chattanooga nine miles to the place for its use under command of the brave and brainy Hazen.

This scheme was promptly perfected, but on the 19th occurred an event which gave into other hands its execution. The fate awarded a great soldier by the War Department under Stanton and Halleck was approaching their victim not without noise, but without warning. On the morning of the 19th came the order relieving General Rosecrans, and giving command of the Army of the Cumberland to General Thomas. Both of these eminent men were amazed at what they regarded as a cruel injustice that is now held to be the crowning infamy of the war. General Thomas at once indignantly

refused to accept a promotion that came of such brutal disregard of right; but General Rosecrans urged General Thomas to accept. To decline would be no relief to him (Rosecrans), and it would subject their noble Army of the Cumberland to the probable abuse of a commander who could have no just conception of its worth. General Thomas, so earnestly urged to accept, gave way, and his former chief, turning over the command, rode out with his staff into the cold night that was not so chilling and dark as the clouds that calumny, treachery, ingratitude, and deep, malignant enmity had cast about him. As he rode along that foggy, freezing night he could say, with bitter truth, what the immortal poet sang before him :

“Blow, blow, thou winter wind,
Thou art not so unkind
As man’s ingratitude.”

All the days of labor and nights of sleepless anxiety—all the heavy responsibility and grand success achieved by his own masterly abilities—all, all forgotten; and more bitter than aught else was the fact that he who had held high command from the first, ever in the front, and in all the battles he had fought never shamed by defeat, had really to give place to Grant, a man incapable of planning a successful campaign, who never knew aught but defeat and disaster—the Christopher Sly of our military annals, who went to his grave mightily puzzled as to whether the public who insisted upon kissing his feet understood him better than he did himself.

Understanding the character of Edwin M. Stanton, one has not far to go to find the offense by him committed that brought upon his head the punishment so savagely awarded. Some time in the latter part of May, 1863, Halleck issued, as we have said, an order to the effect that a vacant major-generalship in the regular army awaited the officer who should first achieve a great victory over the rebels. This went out to all the generals in the field. Only one replied. This one, already in disfavor at the War Department, and involved in an ugly controversy as to his delays, seized his

pen—more fatal to him than the enemy's sword—and, in hot indignation, penned the following :

“ HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
MURFREESBORO, TENN., *March 6, 1863.*

Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL—Yours of the 1st instant, announcing the offer of a vacant major-generalship to the general in the field who first wins an important and decisive victory, is received. As an officer and a citizen, I feel degraded to see such auctioneering of honor. Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit, when he would not for honor and the country? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by my men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to chances? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve most.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*”

These are noble sentiments, and thrill the patriotic heart. But, putting away the sentimental side, this rebuke from a subordinate to his superior officer has in it a tinge, to use the mildest term, of insubordination quite foreign to the rules and regulations that go to make an army. The blind obedience so necessary to the machine called an army is in deadly hostility to such an act. General Rosecrans would have punished with appropriate severity any subordinate of his who would dare rebuke him through an insult such as he had administered to General Halleck—or, rather, Secretary Stanton, who was in fact the author of the objectionable circular.

Again: it is not clear that Rosecrans' exceptions were well taken. To work for and long to possess a major-general's commission was a laudable ambition, and, while one was ready to die for one's country, to die under double-starred epaulettes did not detract from the purity of the patriotism or the dignity of the death.

Again: was not Stanton's judgment of the men in the army, such as he and President Lincoln and his cabinet came

to know personally, of a clearer sort and more correct than Rosecrans'? We have seen the mean jealousies, the low, selfish intrigues animating the majority of their officers, and Stanton took their measure when he held before them the glittering bait of a major-generalship in the regular army.

However, let all this be as it might have been; when Rosecrans wrote his name to that rebuke, he signed his death warrant. In Stanton's estimation, he had added insult to incapacity, and, when the time came for Rosecrans' displacement, the punishment would be made the more humiliating by insult in return. This was all very wrong in a really great man. It was beneath him, but the sun has its spots, and we can only regret these errors in one we love for the nobility of his nature and admire for the splendid qualities of his intellect. We must remember that neither Edwin M. Stanton, nor President Lincoln, nor any officer outside of Thomas, Rosecrans, and Buell, understood or appreciated the importance of the Army of the Cumberland. Lincoln and Stanton, having no time to study the so-called art of war, gave over the entire military to West Point, save when politics intervened or a sentimental impulse prevailed to police a territory where Union citizens were supposed to exist. Of this sort, in all eyes, was the mission given the Army of the Cumberland. McClellan had adopted the popular cry of "On to Richmond" as if that incorporated idleness where the long, dreary past seemed resolved into a decayed town had, any more than a thousand others scattered through the South, any political importance or military significance.

"Why do you go to Richmond to fight when the enemy is here?" asked Lincoln of McClellan. He should have asked: "Why go to Richmond at all?"

It was well for us probably that the government at Washington, including Halleck and West Point, was in such profound ignorance of the situation. Had they wakened to the fact that the Army of the Cumberland carried the fortunes of the great Republic at its front, and that every mile marched brought it nearer to the unprotected belly of the Confederacy where victory would be death to the dark cause, both Thomas and Rosecrans would have been displaced to

give way to some noted bullet-head, such as Halleck, and frightful disasters would have followed shameful defeat.

Out into the cold foggy night rode the gifted general whose genius gave us not only the one campaign—the one from Nashville to Chattanooga—of which we can justly be proud, but won for this war the only military achievement that will go into history as worthy the world's admiration. "All the great monuments of earth are built to the memory of solemn asses;" but the world moves and in the spreading light of better intelligence the time is not distant when these neglected monuments will furnish material for asylums to the care of the feeble-minded while thoughtful men go in search of the humble graves of our truly great.

As General Rosecrans—the dear "Old Rosy" of the Cumberland Army—rode in the dark over the pontoon bridge from his great triumph into the unmerited obscurity awarded him by a mean and ungrateful government, he passes from our pages of history. Thenceforth the story is alone of one greater than he—greater than any of the crowd who thronged the camp claiming to be leaders.

We have seen that before he left he had advised the scheme by which the siege of Chattanooga could be raised. Of the plan and its author General George H. Thomas said: "Before he was relieved of the command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to the means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport."

Of this same plan General U. S. Grant says, with a sneer: "On the morning of the 21st we took the train from the front reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was then on his way North. He came into my car and we held a brief interview in which he described very clearly the condition of Chattanooga, and made some excel-

lent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out."*

Having thus introduced the subject he proceeds to eliminate General Rosecrans and take to himself the credit of devising the plan that Rosecrans was about to put in operation the very day on which he was relieved. It is true he gives General W. F. Smith faint praise for his successful cooperation.

When monuments are robbed to build great Cathedrals we can condone the crime, but when the material is stolen to enrich a mean structure indignation has full sway.

The War Department seemed to have at last awakened to the importance of reinforcements for the Army of the Cumberland. To Secretary Stanton probably came the sting of conscience with the thought that through his blind passion and prejudice a great army was in peril. He hurried West after telegraphing an order to Grant to meet him at Louisville. Grant gives in his memoirs a confused account of this, his first meeting with the great War Secretary. He says, on page 28, vol. 2:

"On receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests at the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About 11 o'clock I returned to the hotel and on my way when near the house every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown, saying that the retreat must be prevented."

One searches in vain through the records to find the Dana dispatch, or any dispatch, looking to a proposed retreat of the Cumberland Army to which Grant refers. He labors not only to show that Rosecrans contemplated a retreat, and goes so far in his memoirs as to say that he was shown the map with the red and blue lines drawn upon it indicating the route of re-

* Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.

treat. This is a falsehood upon the part of General Grant by implication. The truth is that both Rosecrans and Thomas, finding their army in a perilous condition as to supplies, considered it their duty to study the means of extricating themselves in case of necessity. Hence the council of officers as to the better means. The panic was in a room of the Galt House, Louisville. The brave men in command at Chattanooga looked the dark future full in the face and calmly took measures of relief. When Grant therefore telegraphed Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, Thomas was surprised, for neither he nor his illustrious predecessor contemplated such surrender.

He therefore responded: "We will hold the town until we starve."

The meeting of Stanton and Grant at Louisville is a private affair concerning the two men interested and no third. On this account we would pass the event in silence, but General Grant, who never lost an opportunity to sneer at Secretary Stanton, drags this affair into history. He was prompted by a double motive. He wished, in the first place, to speak of Stanton's nerveless condition, and, in the second place, to head off an account of the affair that came from Stanton and others personally acquainted with the transaction. It will be observed that Grant begins in the middle of the story and ends it without working back to the beginning. It begins, we remember, "On receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me." Now, one is left in the dark as to what dispatch of Dana's he refers to, also where he was when Stanton sent for him. The fact is, as told by Stanton and others, that Stanton and Grant met in the morning after their arrival at Louisville, and the morning was spent in discussing the condition at Chattanooga. This condition was as well known to both men before the interview as it was after. No dispatch was necessary to deepen the gloom upon the mind of Stanton, or to rouse the dull apathy of the coarse soldier. Maps were consulted, reports studied, and how to relieve the army cooped up in Chattanooga through Stanton's crime was discussed. Both officials feared that the next news would be of a disastrous retreat, and when-

ever the door was opened to admit any one Stanton would start as if the evil were suddenly shot in on him. Late in the afternoon the two separated for needed rest and food. It was understood that they were to meet in Stanton's room at 7 P. M. The Secretary was prompt, as usual, in filling his engagement, but the General did not appear. Stanton was at first impatient at the delay, then furious at the insult or neglect. Then began the inquiries and the creation of messengers in the guests of the hotel. General Grant was not in the hotel, nor was he at any place of amusement, nor at any hotel. All were searched in vain. Hours wore away until at midnight the General was found where and in what condition we leave to the imagination of our readers.

That day, October 18, 1863, General Grant assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi that included Tennessee and, of course, Chattanooga. General Rosecrans was removed and General George H. Thomas given command of the Army of the Cumberland.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Siege of Chattanooga—Terrible Suffering from Lack of Supplies—Thomas Opens up a Route Affording Relief—A Brave Order Meant only for Effect at Washington—Thomas Commissioned Brigadier-General, U. S. A.—Burnside's Movements at Knoxville—Sherman and his Forces Join Grant and Thomas—The Plan of Battle—Attack Postponed from Day to Day—Thomas's Troops Take and Hold the Enemy's Works on Orchard Knob—Hooker Captures Lookout Mountain—Army of the Cumberland Takes the Heights of Missionary Ridge—The Gross Injustice done Thomas in Lying Memoirs.

The Army of the Cumberland was in a wretched plight many days before General Rosecrans turned the command over to General Thomas. The attempt to haul supplies over a rough mountain road by animals already exhausted proved a failure from the beginning. The poor horses and mules were without strength to carry themselves, aside from dragging heavy wagons heavily laden. There is one memory of this war that records an infamy upon the hearts of all true men who were witnesses of the cruelty. We refer to the treatment of the animals. Christians are cruel to animals at best. As practiced theirs is the only religion of all the earth that fails to teach consideration and kindness to the dumb creatures so dependent upon us for their comfort. The rural life so much praised by poets is a continual torture to animals, while our great cities are fed through an agonized abuse that chills the blood of right feeling men. This is so terrible that one clings to his belief in a hell hereafter that one may have the consolation of knowing that man, who boasts of having murdered his God and found his religion in the assassination, may find punishment of the most exquisite sort for the uncalled for and wanton cruelty to animals.

This is the condition in the hour of peace; it is augmented to something fiendish in the time of war. Of course we could not expect men threatened with starvation to feed horses and mules. But these poor creatures were reduced

to a condition but one remove from death before the siege began. It is true that so far as the North was concerned the war turned on a question of transportation. The invasion of the South enforced upon us long lines of supplies that had to be kept open, and vast droves of horses and mules were exhausted in supplying the cavalry, artillery, and the thousands and thousands of wagons. One could suppose this would have enforced the best care, to say the least, of the animals upon the service of which armies were so dependent. But economy of even human life was not thought of, and our Christian training gives to animals no share of the charity and love we retain to ourselves for our necessary betterment ere we assume harps and robes before our Father who is in heaven, and not supposed to know of the cruelty to his creatures for a time left to our control.

The road to Bridgeport was the road to death and, worse yet, the road to torture. One saw the wretched animals, regardless of blows, fall exhausted to die, biting at the very stones in their agony of starvation.

The lack of transportation told immediately upon the army. The men had been on half rations during the latter end of the forced marches that had flanked Bragg's forces out of Chattanooga, and, worn out, they were quick to realize the lack of food. It seemed to General Bragg and his subordinate officers that it was but a question of time, and brief time at that, when all this gallant army that had outmaneuvered, outmarched, and outfought them would ignominiously surrender to hunger.

The impression is sought to be conveyed in Badeau's *Life of Grant*, and Grant's own memoirs, that Grant arrested a fatal retreat by telegraph, and that on his arrival he immediately succeeded in relieving the Army of the Cumberland. Our readers will observe that no such retreat was proposed at any time, and that the means of relief had been perfected before he arrived at Chattanooga. He sneers at the plan that he was forced to approve, and when through it the siege was raised, he eulogized in his report General W. F. Smith, the engineer who executed what Rosecrans projected, without a

word for the author of the bold undertaking. The fact is, Grant was in no hurry to assume command. The order relieving Rosecrans and the order forming the new department were issued on the 18th; on the 20th, two days thereafter, he left Louisville for Nashville, where he remained all night. On the 20th he went as far as Stevenson. The next day at dark he reached Bridgeport; from thence he made Chattanooga, getting in on the 23d about dark. His excuse was an injury got from a fall of his horse at New Orleans. We are willing in all charity to concede this much, although such crippled condition does not figure in that midnight affair at Louisville. The lame back was aided by the problem presented to the hero of Vicksburg of how to extricate the Army of the Cumberland from its perilous position. We can well imagine, therefore, his own relief when General W. F. Smith laid before him Rosecrans' plan. He adopted that plan with a mental reservation to give Smith all the credit that he did not retain for himself. The sanctioned plan was immediately put in execution. Hooker was ordered to move up from Bridgeport, and on the morning of the 26th began his march. Hazen, in command of the men manning the pontoons, floated out from Chattanooga at 3 A. M. on the 27th. General Turchin, with his brigade and artillery, and accompanied by General Smith, marched across to Brown's Ferry.

The most delicate part of this bold maneuver was given to General Hazen, who commanded eighteen hundred men. It was their part to float the sixty pontoons down the swift stream for nine miles, in sight of the watch-fires of the Confederate picket-line that were burning at the edge of the water. Their only exertion was to steer close into the shadow of the bank opposite that occupied by the enemy. This daring undertaking was eminently successful. Hazen and his men reached Brown's Ferry about 5 A. M., and the brainy and gallant young officer led the attacking party that surprised and captured a picket holding a knob immediately above the ferry. Turchin's force was immediately ferried over, and the two forces held the position until the arrival of Hooker, who had come up, strange to say, unmolested.

The ugly problem was solved. The shorter line secured in this way brought water transportation within easy distance, and from that out Bragg's army became one of observation, and the siege was raised.

The strangest feature of this exploit was the indifference of General Bragg to what was being done. Of course, he could not divine the plan so admirably made and successfully executed, but he must have known that Hooker's force was the vanguard of great armies to the relief of our besieged force; and if he meant to secure the fruits of his success, Hooker's division should have been fought every inch of the way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.

It will be observed in the official reports that Grant does not venture to claim the merit of solving the problem of supplies. He does this by implication in his memoirs, and makes the falsehood the more shameful, for it betrays his consciousness of the offense. It will be remembered that Grant tells us in these same shambling memoirs that he met Rosecrans at Stevenson, Alabama. He writes: "He came into my car, and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. *My only wonder was that he had not carried them out.*" The italics are ours, and in them one may read the kick given the sick lion. One would never guess of one's self that in these excellent suggestions was the one for raising the siege in the securing of supplies which this man can not bring himself to admitting that it originated with Rosecrans.

In his dispatches, made at the time, he gives the credit to General Thomas. On October 26th, he telegraphed as follows:

HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, October 26, 1863.

Major-General Halleck, Washington:

. . . General Thomas had also set on foot before my arrival a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport. If successful, and I think it will be, the question of supplies will be fully settled. . . .

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

The motive of this paragraph is evident to any one given to a study of the military mind under responsibility. If a plan succeeded the general commanding could take the credit of such achievement as he eventually did, in his rambling and unreliable memoirs. If, on the contrary, it not only failed, but in its failure brought on a disastrous engagement to our arms he could wash his hands of the affair. The literature of military reports is full of such maneuvering. If there is a striking success the general commanding gives his subordinates scant praise for gallantry and obedience. If, on the contrary, the result is disastrous the blame falls upon the cowardly, slow, or stupid underlings.

Hold now, good sir, for I would even up
What in its desperation courts defeat;
Full well we know success will crown but one,
While failure hangs her hundreds as of course;
So it must be agreed that in the end
We share alike the gallows or the crown.

One of the more alarming features of the situation came in on the fact that the army of occupation was short of ammunition. Food took precedence of all else in the long haul of sixty miles. There was also a lack of animals. Ten thousand horses and mules had perished, and as Grant said: "What was left could scarcely carry themselves." Had Hooker been attacked in his march to Brown's Ferry, or indeed for a month after, by the overwhelming force Bragg could have brought to bear the result might have been disastrous. But Bragg and his entire army had been fought into a respect for the Army of the Cumberland that in its caution approached fear. In all the efforts of the Confederates that followed our occupation of Chattanooga, this lack of morale is the only solution we can find to an otherwise professed mystery.

Two days after Grant telegraphs the following :

CHATTANOOGA, October 28, 1863.

Major-General Halleck, Washington :

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south-side road hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently success-

ful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time *I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away*, and preparations may soon commence for offensive operations.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

On comparing these dispatches with the account of the same affair in Badeau's History, approved by Grant and Grant's subsequent memoirs, we may learn the indifferent and careless way, to say the least, in which these wielders of the sword trace facts. General Thomas puts in operation the plan conceived and elaborated by Rosecrans, and Grant begins by ignoring the author; then gives credit to the executor, and ends by taking all that credit to himself.

We call attention to the above telegram by italicizing part of a sentence that throws a flood of light upon the condition of a military mind that died without discovering the fact that on the 28th of October he held the key to the whole situation. He had his hand on that which gave us not only the territory of Tennessee, but every foot of ground held by the Confederacy. In Chattanooga he found, without knowing it, the title deeds to all the territory held by the authorities at Washington. Had General Thomas been in command, and enjoyed the same confidence given General Grant, he would have advised the administration at Washington to relieve enough of the Army of the Potomac to man the fortifications of the Capital, and send the bulk of that army through Cumberland Gap and Knoxville to Chattanooga. In less than thirty days Virginia would have been abandoned by Lee and his gaunt veterans for Georgia to make a losing fight for a lost cause. But while our government was dreaming of conquered territory, strangely ignorant of the conquest made, the Hon. Jefferson Davis, almost equally infatuated, directed Bragg to send Longstreet's corps to Knoxville for the purpose of overwhelming Burnside's little army of twenty thousand men. This move proved in the end the destruction of an army. Bragg had reported the loss of two-fifths of his forces that fought at Chickamauga. He did not, however, report the loss of morale that followed the fierce fight-

ing of those two bloody days. Probably he did not recognize this fact to its fullest extent. Be that as it may, the natural advantages he held in Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain were immense, but no ordinary army could man them. The Union forces holding the Union lines could mass with ease to attack any point that the general commanding would find impossible to reinforce immediately. This is what happened, and President Davis learned the same lesson taught our people at Washington that it was folly to attempt the command of armies at such a distance.

Life at Chattanooga, in November, 1863, was not cheerful. Life in camp is not of that sort at any time, but shut in as we were by the enemy, who found amusement in throwing round shot at unexpected intervals from their heights among our tents, added to the stormy weather and general prevalence of mud, made for us a dreary existence. "The soldier's life is ever gay," in song or upon the mimic stage, but in real life it is to the last extent dull and depressing. The army had to be refitted and fed, and those were matters to which our general gave personal attention. He had no time to spend at head-quarters of the general commanding, had he been moved thereto by inclination, which was not the fact. This knowledge of inclination came to those of the staff more from what the general left unsaid than from any expression. He was on familiar terms with them through the thousand and one little things of manner rather than expression. He was mild, patient, and familiar with all, but there was one topic on which he had a silence that was a command, and that was military affairs that involved comment or criticism on the acts of others. Of course, his opinion of and feeling for General Grant could only be inferred. It was known, but known, could not be traced to any reasonable source. The fact is known that our Creator has given every creature an instinct through which it knows its enemy. Thomas and Grant felt this. We should not wonder at this. The one was a coarse, tough-fibered man, with more boiler than machinery in his make up, that one saw at a glance in his dull, weak intellectual outlook from his eyes, sustained by a full, heavy neck and bull-dog jaw. If one

doubts this, let one look at the two heads illustrating the first and second volumes of "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant." The first is that of the soldier when a young man; the second is from the easel of that most remarkable genius for portraits, William S. Marshall. If in this young or old man's face the Creator meant to write greatness of any sort, the writing is illegible.

It is unnecessary for us to repeat again what we have so often written of the commanding yet winning presence of our hero. It was observed from the first, and the observation was common talk among the staff, that General Grant was uneasy in the company of General Thomas. What Stanton meant, when he said he felt before Thomas as if he were in the presence of Washington, Grant also felt without probably comprehending it. To a dull, commonplace, coarse man, there is no deeper and more unforgivable insult than the presence of a quiet, capable, and yet refined man.

Under this state of fact, the intercourse between headquarters was limited to official orders carried to and fro by orderlies. There was an atmosphere about each that, while not positively chilling to each other, was far from warm and familiar. One can well understand the astonishment of General Thomas when the following order was given him:

"HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., November 7, 1863.

Major-General Thomas, Commanding Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL—News just received from Major-General Burnside, taken in connection with information given by a deserter just in, whose statement you have, is of such a nature that it becomes an imperative duty for your forces to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. Already the enemy have attacked Burnside's most easterly garrison of two regiments and a battery, capturing the battery and about half of the forces. This corroborates the statement of the Georgia lieutenant as to the designs and present movements of the enemy.

I deem the best movement to attract the enemy to be an

attack on the northern end of Missionary Ridge with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and, when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communications between Dalton and Cleveland.

Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession, rations to be carried in haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances, or, if necessary, officers dismounted and their horses taken.

In view of so many troops having been taken from this valley and from Lookout, Howard's corps, of Hooker's command, can be used in this movement.

Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made one moment later than to-morrow morning.

You having been over this country, and having a better opportunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

General Thomas read without comment this extraordinary paper. Having read the order, he sat for a minute or more in thought, and then quietly sent for General W. F. Smith, his engineer. The result of that conference is given in a letter from General Smith to Thomas B. Van Horne, and is published in his life of Thomas, on page 161. It reads:

"General Thomas said that, taking into account his numbers and condition, and the numbers and situation of the enemy, the carrying out of the order meant disaster to us, and that I must endeavor to get the order countermanded, and wait for Sherman's army to arrive.

"After a somewhat protracted conversation, I suggested to him that he should go up on the right bank of the river with me opposite to the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and make an examination, to which he assented, and we went up as far as the mouth of Chickamauga creek.

“From there we made a scrutiny of the ground and the position of the right of the enemy on the ridge, as marked by their works and smokes, and it was evident that General Thomas, with his command, could not turn the right of Bragg’s army without uncovering Chattanooga. We then returned, and I went to the head-quarters of General Grant, and reported the result of the reconnoissance, and told him, in my judgment, it was absolutely necessary to wait for the arrival of Sherman’s army before attempting any movement.

“The order was at once countermanded.”

Of course the order was countermanded. We have called attention to some acts of this one great general of the war in popular estimation that indicate slightly a lack of judgment and an absence of feeling in regard to human life on the Union side, but we have nothing to reveal so utterly senseless as this proposed attack. The fact is, it never was intended to be executed. The brave order was meant for home consumption at Washington. The President, Secretary of War, and general-in-chief directing military movements in Tennessee from the Capital found their forces in an ugly condition and themselves in a panic. Burnside, with an army of twenty thousand men of all arms, had been pushed through Cumberland Gap to Knoxville not so much for the purpose of co-operating with Rosecrans, so as to protect his left flank, but to protect East Tennessee in behalf of the military governor, Andrew Johnson. Burnside seemed to comprehend this purpose of his command, for he made no effort to aid Rosecrans; and so far as his left flank was concerned, the little army under the Rhode Island epauletted incapable might as well have been at Narraganset. And now that our forces were held at Chattanooga, Burnside and the administration were calling frantically for aid. To satisfy this demand the order was elaborated, issued, and, before a man could be called out or a gun fired, revoked. It had served a purpose. The trinity of meddlers in the administration was satisfied that it had at Chattanooga a man of great spirit and enterprise. In Grant’s official report he says: “Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of

Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's communications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November.

"After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman should get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside for the present to contend against the superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation."

On November 21st, General Grant, in a dispatch to General Halleck, spoke of his order in the following terms: "I ordered an attack here two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move artillery. Now, Thomas's chief of staff says that he has to borrow teams from Sherman to move a part of his artillery to where it is to be used. Sherman has used almost superhuman efforts to get up even at this time, and his force is really the only one that I can move. Thomas can take about one gun to each battery, and go as far with his infantry as his men can carry rations to keep them and bring them back. I have never felt such restlessness before as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland. The quartermaster states that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand."

Again, we gather from Professor Coppee, in his volume of Grant and his campaigns, gotten doubtlessly from headquarters at the time, General Grant's intent. The professor says, page 220:

"His (Grant's) idea was to attack Missionary Ridge without delay, and of this plan he informed Burnside, telling him to hold Knoxville to the last extremity, but sober second thought suggested by that calm prudence which is one of his best characteristics, prompted him to await the arrival of Sherman and his army, and thus by skill and carefulness to leave little to chance."

This is the view taken of the affair at the time by the chief actor and promoter of the wild project. But the order, made to serve a dishonest purpose, is not permitted to rest as stated in the report. Badeau, in that unpleasant picture called the Military History of U. S. Grant, approved by its hero, finds another use for the order, and that is in an attack on General Thomas. On pages 463 and 464, vol. 1, he says:

“But Thomas announced that he had no horses to move his artillery, and declared himself entirely and absolutely unable to move until Sherman should arrive to co-operate.

Nevertheless, Thomas's delay was a great disappointment. A prompt movement on the part of that commander would undoubtedly have had the effect to recall Longstreet; but now it was possible that the troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in overthrowing the occupation which was so important.”

Not content with this falsehood, the dishonest writer of dull fiction called history returns to this view of the affair in his so-called account of operations about Nashville. He then says, in the same work, vol. 3, pp. 279, 280: “Grant knew all this well. The same traits which were exhibited in the Nashville campaign he had seen evinced at Chattanooga a year before. The same provoking, obstinate delay before the battle, the same splendid, victorious, irresistible energy afterward. He believed, indeed, in Thomas, more than Thomas did in himself. The subordinate always shrank from responsibility.”

Not content with this falsifying history and damning the illustrious dead with faint praise he further quotes from a letter written him by Sherman in which that gentleman thus disposes of the man who saved the lofty military critic from lasting disgrace as we will show hereafter. The quotation states: “Thomas always shrunk from supreme command and consequent responsibility.”

The only comment we have to offer is that thus speaks a general who never planned a campaign or won a battle of a general whose military genius made high strategy possible and who never lost one in the great battles he fought, or sacrificed a man unnecessarily. General Sherman lived to

be ashamed of this sentence. When disputing Lord Wolseley's assertion that General Robert E. Lee was the one general of the war, Sherman at first put forward Grant, but as if not satisfied with his example of military ability on the Union side, he soon dropped the ex-President and fell into a guarded eulogy of Thomas. He was wont to say years before his death that he owed all he possessed of military reputation to George H. Thomas; that had it not been for Thomas's success at Nashville in annihilating Hood's army the march to the sea would have been one of the most atrocious disasters ever suffered by a general. We may not quote the general's exact words accurately, but we give the meaning with pleasure, for it shows that this pet of the press and theaters had sane intervals.

The reckless audacity of Adam Badeau's falsehood appears in the comment, in which he says, "Nevertheless Thomas's delay was a great disappointment. A prompt movement on the part of that commander would undoubtedly have had the effect of recalling Longstreet." This specimen of bad grammar was penned in connection with the history of Sherman's assault, November 25th, on the same part of the Ridge that Grant designated to Thomas on November 7th, and although the same state of affairs continued to exist the assault did not force a recall of Longstreet or even an order to that effect.

Adam Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant" is so utterly worthless, that it would be a waste of time to notice it but for the fact, that as we have said before, it carries the indorsement of Grant, and we are assured that every page was carefully read in proof by the man whose military career and character the narrative purports to give. Badeau wrote and Grant revised. This order seems to have been reversed in the "Personal Memoirs;" those rambling, inaccurate and unsatisfactory memoirs of a dying man, in which Grant is claimed to have written and Badeau revised. The student who seeks to sift fact from fancy in the hurried and confused course of events where even telegrams from the front are almost as unreliable as if every telegraph pole had a head and opinions of its own, must be guarded

against accepting the construction of such events put upon them by the men personally interested in the record. General Adam Badeau was selected to be the historian of Grant's military career. That he might pursue this great work unmolested by the care of business incident to making a living, he was appointed U. S. Consul at London. He had not only free access to all the papers of the War Department, but he was actually permitted to carry with him to London the more important documents of the public archives. We are of course left in doubt as to the number and importance of those returned. This painful condition of doubt is dispersed by the character given the historian by his illustrious patron when such opinion of character carries with it all the solemnity of a dying utterance.

There is nothing to be gained by showing what might have been the result of the movement proposed in an order that never was intended to be executed. The only argument one can use in favor of an intended move is that it is about such as Grant was capable of making. The force under Thomas was not only nearer the enemy on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, but equally distant from the point designated for the assault. Not a corporal's guard could have been moved from Chattanooga to the foot of the Ridge near the tunnel without the cognizance of the Confederates, and to mass enough troops to make the assault serious would have been to evacuate the stronghold we had gained at such expenditure of blood and treasure, under the very eyes of the enemy. Bragg was slow, vascillating and uncertain, but the very troops in line would have charged down those slopes without command as our men charged up the same declivity without orders, as they did a few days later. It is customary to defend Grant's conduct at the expense of his head. He goes acquit, for example, of complicity in Grant and Ward's supposed dealing in navy and army contracts by the assertion that although an old army officer and for eight years President of the United States, he was ignorant of what army and navy contracts were. This may have been possible—we hope it was—but we draw the line on the order issued at Chatta-

nooga to General Thomas on the 7th of November, 1863. No sane or sober man could have issued such with the intent of its execution.

The expected reinforcements under General Sherman approached slowly. This was no fault of the general commanding the coming army. The rains that followed our forces rendered the roads almost impassable, and this, to armies operating in Tennessee, was an obstacle that at times became the impossible. In the mean time General Thomas pushed forward with indomitable will the task of re-equipping his grand Army of the Cumberland. He was among the first to detect the "shoddy" and other frauds that dishonest contractors, in collusion with dishonorable officials, were putting upon the government and imposing on the men. We had thousands of overcoats and blankets that fell apart after a little wear, hats that melted in a hard rain, while shoes of split bottom went to pieces as if they were pasted together instead of being pegged or sewed. Had it not been for the presence of Edwin M. Stanton in the War Department our government would have fallen from the frauds that honey-combed its very foundations. We were probably in no worse condition than any government engaged in a great conflict of arms, save in the fact that we were without experience in war, and also, being a republic, we were without despotic power that puts aside the law's delays in its dealings with the dishonest. We have on this account more law and less order than any civilized people on earth—so that when war came upon us even our great and good President had to shut his eyes with the painfulest expression on his rugged face at gigantic frauds clearly exposed lest the administration lose the vote of Pennsylvania.

Whilst engaged in preparations for offensive movements General Thomas received the commission of Brigadier-General of the United States Army. This was a cold recognition of right to promotion under the rules and regulations of the regular army, and not the reward of the War Department for gallant and brilliant services in the field. The Virginian had to wait for that promotion that recognizes services. He

quietly accepted without comment his commission and continued his work.

General Burnside grew in importance as a perilous condition and the panic felt at Washington reached the headquarters of the Army of the Mississippi, at Chattanooga. The commander-in-chief became yet more "restless" as the time slowly wore on, as

"He gave many a Northward look
To see his Sherman lead his forces up,
And looked in vain."

Never, in any war, did a more absurd military maneuver control grave events. On the 28th of June, General Burnside marched out of Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Kentucky, in command of twenty thousand men. He was expecting his old corps, as he was pleased to call it, from the east, and moved without that addition. In light marching order, his men mounted on horses denied Rosecrans, and with all his supplies packed on mules, he made his way without serious molestation to Knoxville. The conquest was so rapid and easy, the Confederates so uniformly retreated from strong positions in mountain gaps and on rivers that General Burnside jumped to the conclusion that the Confederacy had collapsed. He did not know, as he subsequently learned to his sorrow, that all the forces under Buckner were being gathered in to strengthen Bragg in his death struggle at Chattanooga. This erroneous idea of General Burnside strengthened his belief in his original orders that he was at Knoxville to police East Tennessee in behalf of Andrew Johnson's military government at Nashville. To this end, instead of connecting with the Army of the Cumberland, and so protecting its left wing, he immediately proceeded to spread his forces from Kingston to Cumberland Gap. The great population of Union men in East Tennessee had certainly suffered fearfully for two years, and vengeance was sweet to them. General Burnside, with his amiable temperament and conservative ways, would not have suited them on trial. The appearance of our troops brought a cry of joy and a Union flag that had been long hidden from nearly

every house at Knoxville; and the next move in order was to destroy the property of their late oppressors and now flying secessionists. This last was shocking to the mild and benevolent Burnside. He had no time to try conclusions in this direction, however, for the unexpected appearance of Longstreet's forces put our police under bayonets on the defensive. To get them together for that purpose was the first and most difficult duty of their general.

Burnside was never ordered to report to Rosecrans for orders. That would have been to add twenty thousand men to the Cumberland army, then under command of the man Stanton pronounced incompetent. Halleck's latest order to Burnside was one of those indefinite commands that throws the whole responsibility upon the subordinate. This order directed Burnside to concentrate his army on the Tennessee River westward from Loudon so as to connect with Rosecrans, who had just reached Chattanooga, and that "it was hoped that there would be no further delay in effecting a junction between the two armies as had previously been ordered." Halleck, after the mischief had been done, claimed that as Rosecrans ranked Burnside the obedience of his order would have been what the situation called for. Burnside evidently did not so construe Halleck's directions, but went on distributing his forces, unmindful of the fighting at Chattanooga and the peril of the Army of the Cumberland, until the 20th of October, when the little out-lying post of Philadelphia, held by Colonel F. T. Wolford, was attacked. Wolford had two thousand men and he found himself surrounded by Longstreet's entire corps. The gallant colonel fought fiercely in hopes that the sound of his guns would fetch him relief from Loudon. But rumor preceeded the roar of artillery, and the fact of Longstreet's advance was known at Loudon in time to put the forces there in full retreat. Colonel Wolford cut his way through, saving his command but losing all his wagons and battery. General Burnside hastened from Knoxville and took command in person. Fortunately he was joined by his old 9th corps and had then a force superior in numbers to that of Longstreet.

He fell back fighting until behind the intrenchments of Knoxville.

General Burnside was not the man to try conclusions with Longstreet in the open field. The blind confidence that had once marched brave men to where they might be mowed down by the thousands in an utterly hopeless assault had swung over to the other extreme. With a force superior in numbers to his foe, he hid behind his intrenchments, and reported to Washington that he would hold his own until Rosecrans could come to his relief. This relief came in a way to astonish not only the over cautious Burnside, but the whole country North and South. One is puzzled to find a reason for this move of Longstreet against Burnside. It is said to have originated with President Jefferson Davis. If so, it was a strange blunder for so able a man to make. He must have known that the siege had been broken, and supplies were pouring in to the hungry and naked Union troops. The fact that Hooker was on hand with forces from the Army of the Potomac, and that Sherman was hurrying forward with the Army of the Mississippi, should have admonished him that, whether the War Department at Washington appreciated the importance of Chattanooga, or not, gigantic efforts were being made to hold it permanently as our own. Had Bragg, immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, followed Longstreet's advice, and marched his entire army against Burnside, we can now see that such a campaign, vigorously prosecuted, would have rendered Chattanooga untenable to the Union army. But in dividing his army he sent a force to Knoxville too weak for a quick, grand blow, while an insufficient number was retained to man the fortifications about Chattanooga.

General Hooker, in command of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, numbering in all twenty thousand men, had been dispatched by rail to Chattanooga, which he reached on October 29th. General Sherman, with the Army of the Mississippi, reached Bridgeport on November 15th. Sherman hastened forward to consult Grant as to the next move against the enemy. Generals Grant, Thomas, Sherman, and Smith made a reconnoissance

of the locality Grant had resolved on as the one to be attacked. Bragg would have joined in the recommendation to assail this especially strong fortification. It will be observed by this time that this pet of the Illinois politicians had a peculiar turn for finding the enemy's ugliest positions to attack. There was one advantage, however, in the fact that the roads north of the river leading to the crest Grant proposed assaulting were so concealed by trees that the enemy might well be in doubt as to whether the moving columns were destined for Knoxville or a demonstration against Missionary Ridge. Had the movement been promptly made, it is more than probable that Bragg would have been taken at a disadvantage. This, however, was not to be.

After his careful but cautious reconnoissance, Grant was yet deplorably ignorant, for, while he got reliable information as to the roads, he was deceived as to Bragg's position. Instead of the Confederate right flank resting upon the summit General Grant saw and thought weakly defended, the line was on an eminence further to the south, of great natural strength, as Sherman lived to demonstrate.

As there has been a wide conflict of narrative and a yet wider conflict of opinion as to the battles that followed the arrival of Sherman, we give the order addressed to Generals Thomas and Sherman, which contains all there is of a plan of action. It reads:

“HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 18, 1863.

*Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Commanding Department and
Army of the Cumberland.*

GENERAL—All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday morning at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain, and other places, such definite instructions can not be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with his force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; his cross-

ing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to carry the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate a force against him.

You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and the center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the north end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary.

All the troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in their haversacks and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier.

Special care should be taken by all the officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineering department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for crossing your infantry and artillery over Citico creek.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT."

The at one time proposed attack of Hooker upon the enemy posted on Lookout Mountain, that if successful would

render the fortifications in the valley untenable, had, after a careful reconnoissance been abandoned. Why this important change was made General Grant explains in his official report, in which he says: "Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all forces possible against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the northern end of it, it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose; and on the 18th the following instructions were given to Thomas:"

Now we learn, from the order above quoted, and the explanation found in Grant's official report, that the plan of attack meant putting in Sherman's forces at the extremity of Missionary Ridge, with those of Thomas so massed as to second and support Sherman's initial assault. The general had but one idea, and that centered about Sherman, who was to dislodge the enemy and cut him off from his communications. We are at some pains to make this clear on account of misrepresentations made by Grant himself, that not only disturb real history but have been used to detract from the just merit belonging to others. It was the acts and influence of Thomas that subsequently controlled the form of battle and won the victory.

The strategy found in the secret movements of troops came to naught through the delay incident to Sherman's marches through stormy weather and over muddy roads. To add to the trouble the high water carried away the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry, leaving one division of Sherman's army in Lookout Valley. The attack ordered on the 20th was, therefore, postponed from day to day. In the meantime Bragg had learned of the impending assault and quietly massed his troops to meet the emergency. The delay struck General Thomas as peculiarly unfortunate, and the man criticised by Grant and Sherman as too cautious for a commander, and too slow for a good subordinate, on this occasion was in advance of both Grant and Sherman. He appreciated the evil consequences of Bragg being permitted to prepare for an assault at the point designated. General

Thomas had promptly moved up his forces in accordance with orders. General Wood was put in command of the movable column. General Jeff. C. Davis had reported his division to General Sherman. General Howard's force was put in between the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry and the one at Chattanooga. The artillery had been planted on the heights north of the river, and all the cavalry, at least all that could be mounted, under General Long, sought to protect Sherman's left flank, and was so posted as to attack the enemy's connections with Knoxville should the emergency arise. This was all in accord with Grant's plan, but when the third postponement occurred, General Thomas sought the General commanding to urge a change of movement. Fearing that in this delay Bragg, enlightened by the marching of troops in the direction of Knoxville, that did not continue in that direction, would have time to collect a heavy force to defend what General Thomas believed to be a strong position, he urged upon General Grant that Howard's division should report to General Sherman instead of his, Thomas's two divisions in Lookout Valley, and that these divisions, with Hooker's corps, should attack Bragg's left flank at the same time that Sherman moved against the right on Missionary Ridge.

At the time when Thomas was urging this upon Grant (22d November), Bragg's extreme right rested on Missionary Ridge, opposite our extreme left. The Confederate general had disposed his reduced forces to the best advantage considering the natural strength of defense along his front. Of course he gave fewer men and a thinner line to positions that promised the most from their natural advantages. But the truth was, that after his loss at Chickamauga, and the withdrawal of Longstreet's corps, he was without a sufficient number to hold the long line of fortifications that nature had been so liberal in constructing. His hope, therefore, rested on his anticipating any attack from his enemy and massing his forces for its defense. One division under Stevenson held the summit of Lookout Mountain, while two divisions under Cheatham and Walker guarded the front slope. While General Thomas's reticence stood in the way of his volunteering

any suggestions earnestly to the general commanding, he discussed freely with his staff the situation, and now that the condition of both sides are known it is remarkable to note how clear and accurate his knowledge of the Confederate forces was. He did not share with Grant and Sherman that strange infatuation as to the superiority in numbers of the Confederate forces. He knew how heavily the sparse population of the South had been drawn on, and no one was better posted as to the condition South after two years of such a destructive war. "You may rely upon it," he said, "that Vicksburg would not have been abandoned and this place, the most important of all, would not now be in our hands if the government at Richmond could have furnished men enough to save either or both places. Longstreet's move is a raid upon our line of supplies. Burnside, at this moment, has three men to Longstreet's one. We greatly outnumber Bragg's army, and if in our attack we can bring the crushing weight of our full force to bear, we are sure to win."

General Thomas made his suggestion in reference to General Hooker and an attack on Bragg's left, resting on Lookout Mountain on the 22d, and General Grant acted on it only in part. That is, he allowed only enough force for a demonstration, which he hoped would deter Bragg from sending reinforcements from his extreme left to the threatened right. We see from this condition that we had left to chance what should have been a preconcerted plan to push the weight of our superior numbers to bear upon the enemy. It was by the merest casualty that the movements on the 23d assumed the shape and significance Thomas sought to give them. It seems that in shifting his forces to meet the emergency of an assault on Missionary Ridge near the tunnel, Bragg had impressed his own troops with the belief that he was about to withdraw. This information was brought to our headquarters by deserters, and went far to confirming Generals Grant and Sherman in the correctness of their reading of a brief letter Bragg had sent in the day before, advising General Grant to move the non-combatants from Chattanooga. To learn positively whether Bragg was retreating, General Thomas was ordered to make a reconnoissance of the center.

As to General Thomas was left all the details of this movement, he organized a demonstration that called for five divisions of his army, and so directed as to force, if possible, a general engagement, should such become necessary to save the advance from disaster. The field of operation was one well fitted for a display, before both armies, of the disciplined drill upon which General Thomas so prided himself. The wide plain extending from the Tennessee to Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge formed an amphitheater that offered a fair view to not only the Confederates leaning on their guns and looking down upon our camps and lines of fortifications, but to our own army occupying various elevations from the plain. Directly in front of our fortified line that extended in a circular sweep around Chattanooga was the enemy's picket-line, covering a like circle of the Confederate works, that was something more than half-way between our line and Missionary Ridge. The more conspicuous feature in this huge amphitheater was an abrupt elevation, called Orchard Knob, in possession of the enemy, and about half-way between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge. Along the rocky height of this mound ran the fortified line of the Confederate works that, covering a like elevation, called Indian Hill, took advantage of the foot-hills at the base of Missionary Ridge. Along this base was yet another line of rifle-pits and log and stone defenses.

It is seldom an order to advance upon an enemy meets such ready acquiescence as this sent along the line of the five divisions making the main body of the Army of the Cumberland. The gross misrepresentations that had enabled the Secretary of War to send Rosecrans in disgrace to the rear, had extended its malign influence to the army he had commanded. Chickamauga was regarded as a bloody disaster, and Generals Grant and Sherman made no secret of their belief that the Army of the Cumberland had been so demoralized by defeats that it could not be relied on in an emergency, and on this account it was not called on to take the initiative in the attack on Bragg, and held the center, where the general commanding believed little active service would be required. Head-quarters opinions soon spread in

an American army, and the brave men under muskets who had never yet met acknowledged defeat as the Army of the Cumberland, chafed under his calumny, and of their resentment was born a resolve to teach their maligners a lesson on the first favorable opportunity. It came in this reconnoissance that meant so little, and yet accomplished so much.

When, therefore, Wood's division, with Sheridan's on its right, moved out, it was with an élan that was quite common to the Confederates, but rare among our troops. This force swept away the picket-line and assaulted the works on Orchard Knob so suddenly and with such force that they were taken almost before the Confederates could realize they had been attacked. Thomas, seeing our flag on Orchard Knob and the adjoining elevations, signaled Wood: "You have gained too much to withdraw; hold your position, and I will support you." Immediately Howard was ordered forward abreast of Wood's left, and Baird to advance his division to Sheridan's right. At 3 P. M. General Grant telegraphed to Halleck as follows:

"CHATTANOOGA, November 23, 1863.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, *Commander-in-Chief*:

"General Thomas's troops attacked the enemy's left (*sic*) at 2 P. M. to-day, and carried his first lines of rifle-pits, running over the knoll one thousand two hundred yards in front of Wood's fort and low ridge to the right of it, taking about two hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded. Our loss small. The troops moved under fire with all the precision of veterans on parade. Thomas's troops will entrench themselves and hold their position until daylight, when Sherman will join the attack from the mouth of South Chickamauga, and a decisive battle will be fought.

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General*."

That Grant was astonished at the cool gallantry of these lately despised troops is not all that can be read in the above dispatch. We see as yet the old plan of battle. Thomas's troops were to intrench and await the one movement that carried in it all that Grant had projected. It is necessary to have these facts in mind, for a new light seems to have fallen

on the general commanding, for when he comes subsequently to make his official report we find the following extraordinary statement: "Thomas having done on the 23d with his troops in Chattanooga Valley what was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his advanced positions during the day and pushed the Eleventh Corps forward along the south bank of the Tennesse river across Citico creek, one brigade of which, with Howard in person, reached Sherman just as he completed the crossing of the river."

How it was possible for Thomas to do on the 23d what was intended for the 24th puzzles the comprehension. We have seen that he was at once to make a reconnoissance to ascertain if Bragg was in retreat. The official report is not in accord with this nor does it harmonize with Thomas's instructions directing him to mass his forces well toward the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge so as to form a junction with Sherman. We see the first divergence from the truth that widened as it went until Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland were made to appear as mere puppets in the hands of this great general. The original design, that contemplated a conjunction with Sherman, was rendered impossible by Thomas's late move which Grant says in his November 23d telegram to Halleck was accepted and the men ordered "to intrench and hold their position until daylight when Sherman," etc.

Now a glance at the map reveals that it was impossible for the Army of the Cumberland to intrench and hold their position in the direction they were and form a junction with Sherman. To lie like a bulletin is an old proverb that had birth in the great Napoleon's imaginary flight after a battle. But the little Corsican remembered that when a man begins lying he has a choice of lies, and can so handle them as to make the fiction harmonious. Our general—and we are assured that he is the greatest ever given humanity—leaves his feeble inventions where they are forced to fight each other.

Events were shaping themselves in accord with General Thomas's plan of battle. General Grant must have known that he could not leave the center in its advanced position

and yet fetch Thomas into a support of Sherman. The result was that while Sherman's assault was not yet resolved on, the center was left where its gallantry had carried it.

In the meantime Bragg was not idle. Awakened to the fact that our left overlapped his right and thereby endangered his supplies at Chickamauga station he transferred Walker's division from the northern slope of Lookout Mountain to his extreme right on Missionary Ridge. He thus paved the way for General Hooker's subsequent brilliant achievement. This gallant commander of the Eleventh Corps had been, as we perceive, quite eliminated from the plan of operations conceived on the 18th by General Grant. This fact came home to him on reading General Grant's instructions to Thomas. He immediately proffered a request that he be permitted to attack with the troops he then had in hand. This included the Osterhaus division that was designed to aid Sherman if it could be got to Sherman's command. This proved not to be possible, so that when the discretionary power was given General Hooker to attack or to act upon the defensive he immediately proceeded to the assault of the enemy holding Lookout Mountain. This move began the morning of the 24th. A dense fog had settled upon the valley and through it the roar of artillery and the incessant play of musketry fell upon the ears of both armies. Had the conflict occurred upon a plain one could have gathered from the sound, as it approached or receded, the fortunes of the day. But the fight was on the sides of a mountain, and in all its fury seemed fixed to one locality. This went on till the dark fog deepened into night, and at a late hour the uproar died down and the Union army in the valley slept in doubt. It was by the day's dawning light that the proud old flag of the Union was seen waving from the uppermost height of Lookout Mountain. Cheers from sixty thousand throats went up in greeting from the camps of the valley while along Missionary Ridge there was an ominous silence.

General Hooker's success came more from strategy than hard fighting, but there was enough of both to justify the wild eulogies that rung through the country, and again put the

unfortunate general of Chancellorsville in popular favor. This continued until the time when sneers from a military junto discouraged praise and made Hooker's "fight above the clouds" a play for questioning sarcasm. Had the trinity of military incompetents possessed General Joe Hooker's ability there would not have been any necessity to build on the achievement of others, nor would there be now such a sensitive shrinking from historical investigation of fictitious narratives. General Hooker had succeeded in crossing his slender column over Lookout Creek, without the knowledge of the enemy and by the dash with which he carried works supposed to be impregnable, impressed the Confederates that an overwhelming force was climbing the mountain on all sides to pour over under bayonets through their scantily-manned fortifications.

General Hooker's success rendered Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge utterly untenable, and common sense—to say nothing of military intelligence—directed an immediate retreat to a stronger position. The loss of Lookout Mountain and consequent shortening of his line to Missionary Ridge opened the way to the flank and resulted in the defeat of his entire force. However, Bragg was not more ignorant of his danger than Grant was of his gain. The latter ordered Hooker forward, but Hooker's force was too light for the grave work that opened before them. The force given Sherman to do slaughter before a position well manned and naturally strong should swiftly have been transferred to Hooker. As it was, the general commanding looked eagerly to see Sherman accomplish with great slaughter on Bragg's right precisely what Hooker had done with little loss on the enemy's left. But Sherman was repulsed with heavy loss, and Hooker was arrested by the lack of a bridge over Chattanooga Creek. Sherman made preparation for another assault, and Hooker proceeded to rebuild an old bridge. Had Sherman tried again he would have been left in defeat to count his dead and wounded; and had Hooker succeeded in crossing Chattanooga Creek he would have encountered a heavier force than his own as well posted for defense as Bragg's right.

This was the condition when the unexpected happened, and the hard proposition presented the Union army was suddenly and easily solved. The forces in the center under Thomas that had been marched over the enemy's fortifications upon Orchard Knob, and held there by their immediate command, were suddenly called on by Grant to make another demonstration, and so relieve Sherman of the forces massed against him. Running along the base of Missionary Ridge were rifle-pits connected by log and stone breastworks, and against these the four divisions already noted for their dash and staying power were ordered to advance.

With banners waving and drums beating the men moved out and formed in lines as if on parade. The day was beautifully clear and cool, while the field to be marched over for the assault was bare and enough open to make a splendid spectacle. Nearly a hundred thousand men were spectators of this imposing military movement. Along the brow of Missionary Ridge men crowded to the front as officers leaped upon guns, and all gazed in silence upon "the long line that came gleaming on," while the rifle-pits and breastworks waited in grim silence for the coming foe. For twenty minutes there was the stillness of a cemetery, broken suddenly by the roar of artillery from Orchard Knob and other heights throwing their missiles into the rifle-pits. Immediately forty guns on Missionary Ridge responded, and the usual roar incident to an artillery duel was augmented by the echoes that sounded as if every mountain height had its battery. Generals Grant and Thomas, each with his numerous staff, on Orchard Knob, and indeed the entire Union army, soon lost sight of the combatants because of the smoke that rolled in and over where a deadly conflict was being fought. To the experienced ears of veterans it was soon evident that the conflict at the rifle-pits had come to an end, but whether for or against our arms was unknown until, the smoke lifting, there could be seen along the steep sides of Missionary Ridge, from end to end, the enemy climbing unarmed, and the entire line surging up in pursuit.

"Who gave that order?" demanded Grant, turning fiercely to Thomas.

"I know of no one giving such orders," quietly responded General Thomas, a flush of pride mounting his face at the gallant action of his men.

"Well, it will be investigated," added the general commanding, and as he spoke, along the line of the ridge, at six different points, our troops were seen pouring over the breastworks of the enemy. Almost immediately it was learned from the irregular report of artillery along this same ridge so lately in possession of the Confederates that their guns were being used against their late owners.

There was a sudden breaking up of the generals assembled on Orchard Knob. The battle had been won. The insolent enemy so long in possession of what they thought an impregnable position—"one," as Bragg wrote in his official report, "that ought to have been held by a skirmish-line"—had been driven out, and had General Thomas's suggestions been acted upon in their full significance, the army under Bragg would have been annihilated. General Hooker was in the rear, but with an insufficient force to hold the enemy in check. Had one-fourth the care been taken to strengthen Hooker that there had been to make Sherman formidable, the two wings of the Union army would have met to dictate terms of surrender to a helpless army. As it was, the retreat that on the center proved disorderly, on the enemy's right under Cleburne, was conducted after nightfall slowly and in order, the enemy falling back with guns, flags, and material.

The cause of this result is to be found, first in the fact that Grant not only knew nothing of strategy, but openly expressed his contempt for any thing savoring of such use of the intellectual process. This art of war was summed up in the sentence uttered by the general commanding the national forces of the Grand Duchess, who said he must go out and find the enemy and fight him. The second reason was the haunting fears of both Grant and Sherman that magnified the numbers of the enemy. Nothing could make either believe that Bragg's army after the departure of Longstreet was one-fourth less than the forces gathered in under Grant.

Subsequent events developed another haunting fear that disturbed the repose of our popular, epauletted pets, and this

was, that if the facts were once made known of the fighting about Chattanooga, the smoke-wreathed halos about their heroic heads would not only disappear, but gather about the brow of the silent, solitary man who accomplished all and claimed nothing. Worried with this thought from the last echo of the last Confederate gun at Chattanooga, these two began the misrepresentations that were to rob the "Rock of Chickamauga" of all credit due him for the victory he had made it possible for his men to win. There is no question, now that we have all the orders and reports from both sides, that to General Thomas's order to General Hooker to attack the enemy's left on Lookout Mountain, and that general's amazing success, we owe the victory won by the gallant center. That center, having captured the rifle-pits, went up under bayonets to the summit because, having gained their first advantage, they found themselves forced to decide for themselves either to fall back or charge to the front. They had no time to deliberate. Sixty pieces of artillery were belching grape down upon them, while the rattle of musketry was from the keys of death, sung of by Longfellow. Twenty minutes of that exposure was sufficient to annihilate the entire force. Grant said subsequently, with that charming indifference to fact so peculiar to him, that he expected the men to re-form in the captured rifle-pits and await further movement until ordered. A most appropriate place that to re-form and await orders. We know well that the forward dash was safer than a retreat. The nearer the base, the less they had of the artillery fire, for the guns could not be sufficiently depressed to be effective, while in the inequalities of surface, broken as the face of the acclivity was, in gullies, huge rocks, and trees, there was some shelter from musketry. Then, again, came the comforting fact that, in firing down, the men, as usual in such cases, shot over the heads of the attacking forces. The truth is, that the Confederate rifle-pits were located so as to take the enemy as they emerged from the declivity, and to fire upon them as they ascended it was necessary to fight in front of these carefully constructed works. The charge up that mountain side was a splendid

illustration of the drill and discipline General Thomas had given the Army of the Cumberland.

The direct cause of victory and defeat was a shifting of morale from the Confederate to the Union side. Encamped on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, the men who charged in overwhelming numbers upon the center at Chickamauga only to fall back in the face of the deadly fire, saw beneath them on the Chickamauga plain a vast army of the same sort of men, while across the several pontoon bridges they watched the great columns marching to swell the number. Those men at the guns and in the rifle-pits, who were expected to hold that ridge against all comers, saw above Lookout Mountain the old flag of the Union floating brightly in the sunlight, and but a few hour before the attack the word went whispered down the line that the Yankees who had taken Lookout Mountain were on their rear.

It would have been better for the reputations of both Grant and Sherman to have left the record of events untouched by misrepresentations. As it pleased Divine Providence to permit these men to be on horseback and in command when the Confederacy fell from sheer exhaustion, and as such fact captivated, the common ignorant mind and made them military heroes, they should have been content with their honors. Grant felt uneasy and ashamed in the presence of Thomas, and both Grant and Sherman were troubled with the thought that truth and justice would award to their subordinate in office the higher position on the roll of honor. They began instinctively then to mutilate the record to the injury of one whose bare suggestions, badly acted upon, gave them victory. This misrepresentation began at once in their official reports. We have seen that the general commanding had but one purpose in his offensive movement against the enemy, and that was Sherman's assault on the northern end of Missionary Ridge near the tunnel. The action of Hooker that swept Lookout Mountain and doubled the enemy in on Missionary Ridge, thereby opening a road to his rear, came from Thomas. The successful movement on the center was not in the plan, and grew out of menace meant to relieve Sherman. Now, with these facts

in mind, let us read the official report of the general commanding, and we will learn that as early as the 25th began this distortion of history and the wrong to Thomas. It reads:

“Early in the morning of the 25th, the remainder of Howard’s corps reported to Sherman, and constituted a part of his forces during that day’s battle and the pursuit and subsequent advance for the relief of Knoxville.

“Sherman’s position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge across Chickamauga Creek, his rear and stores at Chickamauga station. This caused the enemy to move heavily against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knob, Baird’s division of the Fourteenth Corps was ordered to Sherman’s support, but, receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas’s left.

“The appearance of Hooker’s column was at this time anxiously looked for and momentarily expected, moving north on the ridge with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in the center with strong columns, but the length of time necessarily consumed in the construction of a bridge over Chattanooga Creek detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being satisfied from the latest information from him that he must by this time be on his way from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his center on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops constituting our center—Baird’s division (Fourteenth Corps), Wood’s and Sheridan’s division (Fourth Corps), and Johnson’s division (Fourteenth Corps), with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and, when carried, to reform his lines with a view of carrying the top of the ridge.

“These troops were moved forward, drove the enemy

from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive; stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from nearly thirty pieces of artillery and musketry from still well filled rifle-pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men; their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession."

That neither Grant nor Sherman had these "brave men" in view when planning the attack on natural fortifications before them, is proven by the words of Sherman, who says of them in his *Memoirs*, vol. 1, pages 361-2, as follows: "General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary Ridge, where General Bragg's head-quarters were known to be. He also explained the situation of affairs generally: that the mules and horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions were so scarce that the men, in hunger, stole the few grains of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; that Bragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up in East Tennessee to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or, at least, to force him to recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had been so long in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up and take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the Cumberland army would fight well."

The knowledge of these "brave men" came from their disobedience of orders and forcing themselves into a battle from the plan of which they had been eliminated because of their believed lack of morale. And yet in the official report we are coolly informed that this assault upon the center by the supposed demoralized men made part of the original plan of attack.

"Well, it will be investigated," said Grant, on Orchard Knob, when the charge of the men of the Cumberland was being made. It is being investigated much to the general's discredit.

But, if the official report moves enough from the truth to convey error through implication, when the general comes to pen his memoirs, or probably adopt what some one penned for him, he boldly swings from any recognition of fact. He begins his fiction by saying:

"At twelve o'clock at night (24th), when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Wilcox to encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat, if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me."

Now, one has only to test this narrative by the orders actually given and the events that occurred on the 24th and 25th. The plan of battle, as we have seen, referred only to Sherman's assault on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. Men were taken from Hooker for the purpose of strengthening Sherman, and the men under Thomas were held for the same purpose. Believing from rumors that Bragg might be in full retreat, Hooker was ordered to intercept the enemy at Rossville. But what occurred on the 25th was as far from the thought of the general commanding as any local event in China. After giving in some detail the unsuccessful attempts of Sherman to carry the ridge before him, he continues his fanciful narrative. He says, page 78, volume 2d:

"The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would."

At what hour he had such expectations is not given. It was evidently not in time to take advantage of Hooker's success. As the Confederates had left an opening on his left through which he could be flanked without a fight, it is

most extraordinary that our general commanding should neglect such an opportunity while crowding troops in on Bragg's right to be slaughtered in vain. The truth is—and it is the only explanation that saves General Grant from a charge of utter imbecility—he did not expect Hooker, with his weakened force, to make any attack, and so the withdrawal of Bragg's forces from Lookout Valley and Hooker's advance were as much a surprise to Grant as it was to all of us. And had Hooker been left in command of the troops that were of no use to Sherman, Bragg's entire army would have been so hemmed in as to be forced to surrender. The author of "Personal Memoirs" continues:

"In crossing the valley he (the enemy) burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault on the ridge. But Sherman's position was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer."

Of course the impression meant here to be conveyed is, that the unexpected assault on the ridge, directly in front, was, in fact, a preconceived movement. The trouble about so considering it is that the only order given Thomas was to so mass his troops as to move in support of Sherman, and under Sherman's command. He would as soon have given orders for the infantry and artillery to take wings and fly over the ridge as to command a force so weakened to help Sherman to make the assault that followed. He continues:

"Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the moment the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once."

Now, had this Julius Cæsar of pen and sword, said that "I now directed Thomas to make demonstration at once," he would have come in striking distance of the truth. The previous plan looked to nothing but a support of Sherman.

It was intended that Thomas's left should touch on Sherman's right, and the attack made at the ridge near the tunnel should extend south so as to envelope all of the center. But when this demonstration was made Sherman was idle. He had demonstrated that the works before him could not be taken by assault. The fact is that he and Grant were laboring under the strange delusion that Bragg would assume the offensive and overwhelm Sherman. Hence the order for a demonstration to keep Bragg busy until Sherman could be further reinforced. To make his version of the affair consistent, he adds a foot note to page 78, Second Vol., which reads:

"In this order authority was given for the troops to re-form after taking the first line of rifle-pits, preparatory to carrying the ridge."

A most remarkable place this to be selected for troops to re-form. The place was open at the rear and sixty pieces of artillery along the heights above were pouring down grape as rapidly as their pieces could be served, while twenty thousand veterans under musket were sending their more deadly hail into the exposed ranks. As well might the officer who blundered in giving the order to the doomed six hundred immortalized by Tennyson, have modified the charge by directing that when the cavalry had drawn fire from the front, right and left, they halt and re-form before making the final assault. But here follows the most amusing statement:

"Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given (what signal?) I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once. I watched to see the effect and became impatient at last, that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening point. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders, who was to make the charge standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the

first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day at a moment's notice; I told him to make the charge at once."

This imaginary order was a verbal one, and, of course, no research among the records can help us. It is a little strange that one who formed a part of that group on the day in question, at the summit of Orchard Knob, heard no such order. This includes General Thomas and Wood, the last named there for orders.

He writes of a signal, and we are put in pursuit of that, for it was not an order, verbal or otherwise, that should initiate the movement, so we want to get that signal. On page 78, of same volume, we are informed "His (Hooker's) reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it, was to be the signal for Thomas's assault on the ridge." We were then on Orchard Knob waiting for this signal—and as the signal never came, no order was given to charge.

There is, however a written order of record that Grant gives us himself on page 80 of same volume, and it effectually and finally puts an end to an order that reflects greatly upon General Thomas, whose promptness in executing orders was proverbial in the army. Here is his vindication:

CHATTANOOGA, Nov. 24, 1863.

Major-General Thomas, Chattanooga:

General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the mountain can not be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the most practical road.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

One is amazed to learn that with this order of record that the general commanding would pen such a narrative as that which appears to the damage of Thomas in his memoirs. This order convicts him of the grossest ignorance of the situation. Sherman had not carried the ridge to the tunnel. His right was not at the tunnel and on the top of the hill. How Thomas was to co-operate then with the condition supposed by Grant but not established is a mystery. A deeper mystery rests upon the evident lack of information. Sherman's head-quarters were within easy reach at night and in sight from Orchard Knob. Why, then, when this order was given, the general commanding was not better informed puzzles the student of history. It is also clear that on the night of the 24th General Grant had no thought of using General Hooker's forces against Missionary Ridge, as claimed in his memoirs. He could not, for he was as much in ignorance of what Hooker had accomplished as the American people are of the true history of the war.

Now, will Grant's official report sustain the assertion that he premeditated an assault by the center upon Missionary Ridge? In this report he says: "Thus matters stood about 3 p. m. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheater of Chattanooga lay in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas early in the day."

As General Thomas was at Grant's elbow all that morning (25th) (see Grant's Memoirs) it was his duty to give the order for the charge; he claims that he did so, but that Thomas neglected to obey for an hour after its issue. This is far from being "early in the day" till afternoon.

The fact is that the three sentences above quoted refer to Thomas's co-operation with Sherman, who was to carry the ridge and turn the enemy's flank before Thomas came in to his support. He was not waiting then for Thomas to attack but for Sherman to do that which the general never accomplished, that is, win a victory. When it was found that Sherman, as usual, was being disastrously defeated, a demonstration was ordered for the center, not with the remotest hope of carrying the ridge, but to divert the enemy from the imperiled Sherman to a slaughter of our men on the center.

General Grant does not stand altogether alone in distorting the truth and seeking to steal the honors justly due General Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland. It is time that these claimed historians make no reference to imaginary orders. They feel safe in the fact that the general readers give no time to investigation, and when the historical student searches the war records their plausible fiction will be regarded as settled history. In this the historian, Adam Badeau, readily takes the lead, and in his *Military History*, approved by General Grant, we find on page 525 of Volume I, the following:

“Hooker was to draw attention to the right, to seize and hold Lookout Mountain, while Sherman, attacking Missionary Ridge on the extreme left, was still further to distract the enemy; and then, when reinforcements and attention should be drawn to both rebel flanks, the center was to be assaulted by the main body of Grant’s force, under Thomas.”

Again, on page 528 of same volume, we find this: “The rebel center, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the right; and then the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipitated on the weakened point; the center was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won.”

Now, Grant foresaw nothing. He was as much astonished at the events developed before him and the result as we all were. Nor is it true that Bragg weakened his center; he strengthened his right by troops taken from the shortened line of his left.

General Sherman falls into line and informs us on page 364 of Volume I of his memoirs: “The object of General Hooker’s and my attacks on the extreme flanks of Bragg’s position was to disturb him to such an extent that he would naturally detach from his center as against us so that Thomas’s army could break through his center. The whole plan succeeded admirably, but it was not until after dark that I learned the complete success of the center, and received General Grant’s orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek.”

Anxious to illustrate his eminent strategy he tells Adam Badeau (*Military History U. S. Grant*, Vol. I, page 505):

“That he did not consider the hill for which he fought on November 25th as very important in itself, and therefore used only three regiments in the original attack; but he made as much noise and show as he could to alarm Bragg for the safety of that flank, and of the railroad bridge just in the rear. His effort was to induce Bragg to detach as much as possible from the center and so to weaken that which Sherman knew from Grant would be the critical point of the battle.”

When one remembers that this assault was to be a surprise, and the anxiety at head-quarters was so extreme that reinforcements were hastened to Sherman until he had over twenty-five thousand men, the divine tactics of gong-beating to which he resorted, according to this story, is ludicrous. It grows more so in light of the fact that General Hooker, who was to make a prodigious noise at the other end of Missionary Ridge, had been deprived of troops to support our military mandarin until but ten thousand were left.

The great Napoleon said history is the lies agreed upon. It is much to be regretted that these eminent historians did not agree in their fabrications so that they might at least harmonize and so appear more plausible to the reader. One statement alone presents the unanimous support from all, and that eliminates General Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland from the merit of a victory that the one fought to a triumphant close, and the other foresaw and, as far as he was permitted, provided for. Had General Thomas's suggestion in reference to Hooker and his attack on Lookout Mountain been accepted in full Hooker would have been in the rear with a force sufficiently strong to have destroyed Bragg's army. There is, however, no good in repeating events that to the reader must appear plain and unquestionable.

The Army of the Cumberland was in full pursuit when night intervened and Bragg was enabled to retreat unmolested. His loss of men and material was heavy; the first, from his own showing, numbered over six thousand,

while the last was so grievous that the Confederate army was rendered incapable of active operations until the following spring, when a new commander infused a new spirit into the defeated and demoralized force. Grant, however, entertaining, as most of the generals did, an exaggerated estimate of the enemy's numbers, while our advance was making an assault on the rear guard, under General Cleburne, near Ringgold, had Howard's corps so placed as to break the railroad from Cleveland to Dalton, and in that way prevent Bragg from sending reinforcements to Longstreet. Bragg was in no condition to aid Longstreet. His own army was in peril, and time was needed in which to reorganize, while urgent demands were made on the government at Richmond for reinforcements.

Further military operations for the winter ended with the skirmish near Ringgold, and from that the Army of the Cumberland was put on police duty in separate detachments in Middle and East Tennessee. These also were busy rebuilding railroads, bridges, fortifications, and storehouses, and, in view of a movement into Georgia in the spring, vast stores were accumulated at Chattanooga.

It is singular to observe that with Chattanooga in our possession but one man on our side seemed to appreciate its immense advantage. Instead of an advance from Chattanooga such as we had at last forced upon us, Grant countenanced Sherman in a campaign in the State of Mississippi against General Polk with Mobile as an objective point. When this was inaugurated the old fear of a concentration took possession of the general commanding and he gave orders to Thomas to threaten the enemy at Dalton. Bragg had been relieved and General Joseph E. Johnston given command. General Thomas had stoutly resisted uncovering Chattanooga for the purpose of protecting East and Middle Tennessee, and had therefore enough of his army in hand to hold the place and keep intact his lines of supply. When, therefore, he was called on to detach one-half his force from Chattanooga to reinforce the troops at Knoxville, he earnestly protested. When this project was abandoned and General Thomas was ordered subsequently to demonstrate against the

enemy at Dalton he hastened to obey. Our advance found the enemy strongly posted at Buzzard's Roost. Here General Thomas, satisfied that the Confederates held an impregnable position with superior numbers, advised General Grant and proposed falling back from his exposed position. This the General commanding did not approve. General Thomas and his little army with Chattanooga itself could be imperiled, but General Sherman was to be protected. Neither Grant nor Thomas knew at the time that Sherman's campaign had proved a failure and that he with his army had returned to Memphis. As this move illustrates by the light of subsequent events General Thomas's military sagacity we give the dispatches that passed at the time between Grant and Thomas.

Thomas to Grant, February 19, 1864 :

"Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, Sixth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, arrived here yesterday from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon, Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition toward Rome. He reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill ; Stewart's division between Tunnel Hill and Dalton ; Walker two miles out from Dalton toward Spring Place ; Cheatham at Dalton, and Stevenson's and Bates' divisions to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of the camps and estimates their forces between thirty and forty thousand. He moreover states that no troops have been sent away except one brigade of infantry which went to Rome about the first of this month."

Thomas to Grant, from Tunnel Hill, Georgia, February 26, 1864, 7:30 A. M.:

"I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnston occupy the pass at Buzzard's Roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place by assault. General Palmer made the attempt to turn yesterday with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but were met with an equal force exclusive of their cavalry and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's Roost. After expending nearly all his ammunition he returned during the night to Catoosa Platform. Our transportation is poor and limited ; we are not able to carry

more than sixty pounds per man; artillery horses so poor that Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion of Cleburne's division have returned. I will await the developments of this day and advise you further."

Grant to Thomas, February 27, 1864:

"It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended until the fate of Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours and General Howard's wagons. These can be replaced temporarily by yours returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw reinforcements constantly to your point. Can General Schofield not also take a division from Howard's corps? It is intended to send Granger to you the moment that Schofield is thought to be safe without him."

General Grant to General Whipple (Thomas's chief of staff), February 27th, 6 p. m.

"Information has reached Washington that orders have been given Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any such movement and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams from Bridgeport and Stevenson to send supplies to the front? They have teams in great numbers at those places. Every energy should be exerted to get supplies and reinforcements forward. Troops will leave here at the rate of two or three thousand a day for the front. Many of them go to Chattanooga."

Thomas to Grant, February 27, 1864, 10 p. m.:

"Your two dispatches of this date received. I have just returned from the front. My troops after ceaseless labor under the greatest embarrassments for want of transportation reached within three miles of Dalton where they were received by the enemy strongly posted and in force fully equal to my own in infantry. His artillery and cavalry were not only in better condition (as regards horses), but at least

two to one in pieces and men. We found the country entirely stripped of every thing like forage, our mules being in such poor condition that double the number of teams we now have could not supply the troops, I thought it best to come back to Ringgold, and, if workmen could be found by Colonel McCallum, to go to work deliberately to prepare the railroad and advance as it progresses. The present condition of the road is not good and one day's rain would render the part across Chickamauga Bottom impassable for loaded wagons. So it would be absolutely necessary to repair the railroad to supply the troops at Ringgold. The fact of working on the road will hold Johnston at Dalton unless he intended to leave under any circumstances. Howard's teams and the depot teams at this place and Bridgeport are in no better condition than those belonging to the divisions, all being composed of such mules as we have been able to keep after a fashion during the winter. Johnston has no idea of leaving Dalton until compelled, and having a force greater than I now have under my immediate command, I can not drive him from that place.

"If Longstreet has retired, why can I not get Granger's two divisions and my First Cavalry Division back? The little cavalry I had on the expedition is completely run down from constant work and from want of forage?"

Thomas to Grant, Feb. 28, 1864:

"General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry will be sufficient to protect the line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication can be guarded by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Tennessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the state.

"I believe if I commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and Fourth corps in front, with Howard's corps in

reserve, that I can move along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far at least as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad line, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required to guard the bridges along the road."

We also copy from General Thomas's report to the committee on the conduct of the war, wherein he referred to the plan of campaign that he had submitted to General Grant. It reads (page 198 of the committee's record) :

"The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval, and if obtained it was my intention (having acquired, by the reconnoissance of February 23-25th, a thorough knowledge of the approaches direct upon Dalton from Ringgold and Cleveland) to have made a strong demonstration against Buzzard's Roost, attracting Johnston's whole attention to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and cavalry through Snake Creek Gap upon his communications, which I had ascertained from scouts he had up to that time neglected to observe or guard. With this view I had previously asked for the return to me of Granger's troops and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already initiated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it. See the following telegrams and illustration."

It is not necessary to give the dispatches to which the general referred. They contain the details of a proposed campaign in which it appears that all the troops that could be spared from the lines of supplies were to be forwarded to Chattanooga so as to bring his command near that of the enemy. Johnston we now learn had then less than forty thousand men, and relied upon the natural strength of the position he had selected as Bragg once relied on Chattanooga. Thomas proposed attempting with forty thousand men what Sherman subsequently accomplished with a hundred thousand. The telegrams between Thomas and Grant and Thomas's statement to the committee on the conduct of the war are of deep interest as showing the superior generalship of the Virginian, who waited. He suggested to Grant, as he subsequently did

to Sherman, that road to the rear of Johnston through Snake Creek Gap. We shall see how the one accepted it in part, while the other rejected it altogether. The attempt on Dalton was dismissed.

General Thomas was extremely just, indeed kind, in his treatment of the unarmed citizens of the South. He had the Army of the Cumberland so well disciplined that the rules against depredation were well observed. He found this, however, more difficult than to mold these men into an army that could change front under fire and carry a deadly ridge fringed with sixty pieces of artillery, and that without command to do so. The country demoralized by a war in which both sides were obliged to forage for a subsistence was infested by guerillas armed to plunder and holding allegiance to no Government. It was observed that when the Union army was in possession the citizens sympathized with the banditti, giving them information and many times food and shelter. Now, while the men were sullen, they were silent. The women, on the contrary, were outspoken, and to the rank and file extremely exasperating. There was quite a vocabulary of epithets that they shot at our soldiers wherever they appeared. Under the circumstances it was difficult to keep the peace. However, General Thomas, in his impartial justice, did much to relieve the country within our lines of the guerillas, and had no hesitation in holding communities responsible for the violence done in their neighborhood. General Order Number Six that we copy at length illustrates his mode of punishment:

“HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Jan. 26, 1864.

General Orders No. 6.—It having been reported to these head-quarters that between seven and eight o'clock, on the evening of the 23d ult., within one and a half miles of the village of Mulberry, Lincoln county, Tenn., a wagon which had become detached from a foraging train belonging to the United States was attacked by guerillas, and the officer in command of the foraging party, First Lieutenant Porter, Co. A, Twenty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, the teamster,

wagonmaster, and four other soldiers who had been sent to load the train (the latter four unarmed), were captured. They were immediately mounted and hurried off, the guerillas avoiding the road, until their party halted, about one o'clock in the morning, on the bank of the Elk river, where the rebels stated they were going into camp for the night. The hands of the prisoners were then tied behind them, and they were robbed of every thing of value about their persons. They were next drawn up in line about five paces in front of their captors, and one of the latter, who acted as leader, commanded ready, and the whole party immediately fired upon them. One of the prisoners was shot through the head, and killed instantly, and three were wounded. Lieutenant Porter was not hit. He immediately ran, was followed and fired upon three times by one of the party, and, finding that he was about to be overtaken, threw himself over a precipice into the river, and, succeeding in getting his hands loose, swam to the opposite side, and, although pursued to that side and several times fired upon, he, after twenty-four hours of extraordinary exertion and great exposure, reached a house, whence he was taken to Tullahoma, where he now lies in a critical situation. The others, after being shot, were immediately thrown into the river. Thus, the murder of three men—Newell E. Orcutt, Ninth Independent Battery Ohio Volunteer Artillery; John W. Drought, Co. H, Twenty-second Wisconsin Volunteers; and George W. Jacobs, Co. D, Twenty-second Wisconsin Volunteers—was accomplished by shooting and drowning. The fourth, James W. Folley, Ninth Independent Battery Ohio Volunteer Artillery, is now lying in the hospital, having escaped by getting his hands free while in the water.

For these atrocious, cold-blooded murders, equaling in savage ferocity and every thing ever committed by the most barbarous tribes on the continent, committed by rebel citizens of Tennessee, it is ordered that the property of all rebel citizens living within a circuit of ten miles of the place where these men were captured be assessed each in his due proportion, according to his wealth, to make up the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to be divided among the families

who were dependent upon the murdered men for their support.

Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of John W. Drought, of North Cape, Racine county, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and two children.

Ten thousand dollars to be paid to the widow of George W. Jacobs, of Delevan, Walworth county, Wisconsin, for the support of herself and one child.

Ten thousand dollars to be divided between the aged mother and sister of Newell E. Orcutt, of Burton, Geauga county, Ohio.

Should the persons assessed fail, within one week after notice has been served upon them, to pay in the amount of their tax in money, sufficient of their personal property shall be siezed and sold at public sale to make up the amount.

Major-General H. W. Slocum, U. S. Volunteers, commanding Twelfth Army Corps, is charged with the execution of this order.

The men who committed these murders, if caught, will be summarily executed, and any persons executing them will be held guiltless, and will receive the protection of this army, and all persons who are suspected of having aided abetted, or harbored these guerillas will be immediately arrested and tried by military commission.

By command of Major-General Thomas,

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*"

The Army of the Cumberland left a kindly feeling in its wake among the people of the South that had experienced its rule and recognized its justice. We say kind, in comparison with other armies of less discipline and commanded by officers such as Sherman and Sheridan, who openly avowed their belief in the barbarous wars of an uncivilized past. It is well in measuring the moral greatness of our hero to compare his practices with the armed precepts of his brother officers. General Sherman, whose pen was wont to run away with his judgment, has left us a small volume of views on this subject that we could well dismiss as the impulsive utterances of an uncertain man, were it not that he has bequeathed to the world a burning illustration of his practical

use of his axioms. The march of his army was the march of devastation and death, the devastation falling on unarmed citizens and the death liberally shared with his own unfortunate soldiers.

We have not only the views of General Thomas, but we have his practice as well. The matter is deeply impressed upon the memory because of the fact that General Thomas's high sense of justice and considerate regard for the unarmed and helpless were used against him by blind bigots of the North, who saw in his acts the influence of his birth and early association. They heartily approved of President Lincoln's decision: "Let the Virginian wait." General Thomas made no secret of his views on this subject. He said one day, when an order was given to guard a man's house whose loyalty was suspected, but who stood high among his neighbors as a man of good moral character:

"We must remember," he said, "that this is a civil war, fought to preserve the Union that is based on brotherly love and patriotic belief in the one nation. It is bad enough for us to demand that love of a restored Union at the point of the bayonet, but we can justify ourselves by claiming that what we do is from a sense of duty. The thing becomes horribly grotesque, however, when from ugly feeling we visit on helpless old men, women, and children the horrors of a barbarous war. We must be as considerate and kind as possible, or we will find that in destroying the rebels we have destroyed the Union."

One must not suppose from this and other wise opinions left us by General Thomas that he was a politician. He was a pure soldier, and saw all things through the opening of his tent, and considered them as relating to the war on hand. A democrat by birth and breeding, he had an old fashioned belief, that a soldier, like a clergyman or a judge, was precluded from taking an active part in the partisan contentions of the country. He therefore gave great economic subjects but little study, so little indeed that he felt himself disqualified for any office other than the one in his beloved army. In this respect Generals Thomas and Buell stood almost alone, nearly all the other epauletted gentlemen of the war dealt

largely in politics, and reflected in the field much of the passion and prejudice brought out by partisans at home. No man was more conspicuous for this than General Sherman. We copy from Mr. John C. Ropes' article on Sherman that appeared in the *Atlantic Magazine* of August, 1891:

"It would not be right to close a review of General Sherman's character and services without referring to his often announced policy of devastation. It can hardly be doubted that the desire to inflict punishment on the people of the South for their course in breaking up the Union was a strong element in favor of his project of marching across the country. Thus, on October 9, 1864, he telegraphs to General Grant:

"'Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. . . . I can make this march, and can make Georgia howl.'

"October 17, to General Schofield: 'I will . . . make the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war.'

"October 19, to General Beckwith: 'I propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back of Chattanooga to sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the seashore.'

"So when he arrived before Savannah, he wrote to the Confederate General Hardee as follows: 'Should I be forced to assault or the slower and surer process of starvation I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army burning to avenge the national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war.'

"To General Grant, December 18: 'With Savannah in our possession at some future time, if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, north and south, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina to devastate that state in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on the campaign in Virginia.'

“To General Halleck, December 24: ‘I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular: we are not only fighting hostile armies but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. . . . The truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble for her, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. . . . I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there as we did at Milledgeville.’”

These might be taken as the hasty utterances of an impulsive man, were it not that in his appeals to the public, after the war, in the press and in his memoirs, he sought to defend himself against the charge of cruel treatment of an unarmed people that actually occurred. The troops under his subordinates carried into execution, as far as they could, what he had threatened. It will be observed that he justifies the infamous abuse altogether, on political grounds, and not the necessities or necessary consequences of war, and the reasons given are as weak as the intent was wicked—such, for example, as the astounding assertion that because ours was a fratricidal strife, and therefore embittered beyond an ordinary war of alien enemies, we should countenance the condition and carry into it all the barbarous usages of uncivilized races. It is well to contrast this officer’s conduct in this respect with the noble traits and high intellect of the man whose story we are striving to tell, and the comparison comes in here with peculiar force, because of the fact we are called upon to chronicle.

Through act of Elihu B. Washburne, of Illinois, sanctioned by President Lincoln, on the 17th of March, 1864, U. S. Grant assumed command of the armies of the United States, as Lieutenant-General, and immediately the man who was thus thrust into a position once held by General Washington, hastened to inform General Thomas that General

Sherman was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Now, by date of commission, General Thomas ranked General Sherman, and the rank was made positive by a uniform success in the great battles of the war, and a success that really brought the war to a triumphant close in favor of the Union. General Thomas received this startling injustice under the shadows of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and the gigantic fortification of mountains that made the one objective of the war on our side. He was gravely informed that he must serve under a man whose career had been marked by awful disasters as uniform as had been Thomas's success. His incompetency was written in the blood of our brave men at Shiloh, Chickasaw Bluff, and the assaults on Vicksburg, and every epitaph of the soldiers there killed and the soldiers who subsequently died of their wounds in these heartless and heedless butcheries, make a condemnation of a man who owed his promotion to the nakedest favoritism that ever disgraced a service.

The grim, silent, solitary man received this rebuke without a word of remonstrance. He had registered a vow that let any injustice be done him thereafter, he would submit without a word. He was too great a man not to be aware, by this time, of the cause of this injustice. He had seen Buell insolently displaced of his command and returned to private life, he had seen Rosecrans, in the very hour of his triumph, stricken down and sent from camp in disgrace, and he knew the motives and power at Washington that accomplished these wrongs, and he was painfully alive to the fact that he had no friends among the politicians at the National Capital.

We have written these pages in the continued praise of a man who seemed to have no fault in his character, no blemish in his career. We must confess, however, to a defect. General Thomas was a man of violent temper, that through long restraint he had brought under complete control. The dull military minds about him, in this mistook the man. His silent acquiescence in this wrong was taken as the shrinking from the responsibility of an independent command. He should have given some of these conceited supe-

riors some of the wrath that lay smoldering in him. It would have gone far toward forcing a change of condition, and would certainly have saved the confiding public from the mistaken twaddle of loose memoirs. However, the events that followed justified General Thomas so far as the government and our cause is concerned in the course he pursued. This we will see further on.

In preparing for the move against Dalton, the Army of the Cumberland, sixty thousand strong, well drilled and disciplined veterans, had regained their lost renown that for a brief period was under a cloud, and confident in themselves and proud of their general, they were ready to march and again conquer where their beloved commander led.

It was at this time that General Thomas inaugurated at Chattanooga the system of military cemeteries that grew to be so popular. The general who loved his men so heartily when alive had a religious and patriotic respect for their remains when called to their burial. They had given their courage, endurance and lives to their country, and it was fitting and seemly that their last resting places should be monuments to their sacrifice. We have seen how this love of his men dominated the mind of Thomas. He had no life to live from them and no higher duty than to care for their comfort. In this connection we give the testimony of General Gates P. Thruston, a gallant and most accomplished officer whose acquaintance our readers made in the second day upon the battle field of Chickamauga when he carried General Thomas's orders over the space General Sheridan reported to be occupied by the enemy. We acknowledge our indebtedness to Van Horne's *Life of Thomas* for the statement given by General Thruston:

"When I became a member of his staff as judge advocate it was a matter of surprise to me to find how remarkably familiar and accomplished he was in all matters of military law and precedent, and other officers of his staff in the various departments often remarked to me that he seemed to know the usage, details and system of each department of service as thoroughly as though he had passed his entire military service in it. During two years in the judge ad-

vocate's department I devoted almost my entire time in fitting myself to the duties of the position. I sent to Europe for books, and read every thing pertaining to military law and that branch of the service; yet in the preparation of court-martial orders, or in the consideration of questions of law or precedent relating to that department, the general was always ready with useful suggestions and counsel, and seemed to have given more consideration to these subjects than any other officer in the army. He also always gave a willing and patient consideration to every case or question brought before him.

"During his earlier days he made a careful study of military and court-martial law, and had prepared notes of decisions from various works on the subject, showing how painstaking and systematic he was in making himself master of all departments of his profession. . . .

"I mention the foregoing merely to add my testimony to the completeness of his character. What was true of my department was true as to all the other branches of the service, as far as I could judge. He was master of them all."

Our general was not only fortunate in his men under muskets, but also lucky in his subordinate officers. The corps commanders were: Major-General Oliver O. Howard, Fourth Corps; Major-General John M. Palmer, Fourteenth Corps, and Major-General Joseph Hooker, Twentieth Corps. The division commanders of the Fourth Corps were: Major-Generals David S. Stanley and John Newton and Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood; of the Fourteenth Corps, Brigadier-Generals Richard W. Johnson, Jefferson C. Davis and Absolom Baird; of the Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-Generals Alpheus S. Williams, John W. Geary and Major-General Daniel Butterfield. Brigadier-General Washington L. Elliott was chief of cavalry, and Major-Generals Kenner Garrard, Judson Kilpatrick and Edwin M. McCook, division commanders.

The deadly conflict was drawing rapidly to a close. The South began to show signs of weakness. There was no sturdy population to draw upon to fill again the thinned ranks of victorious veterans. Desertions, up to that time

unknown, became frequent, while the earnest call for volunteers had a silent echo in the desolated homes. The fierce fanaticism which pervaded the South when the war began, that made "the rebel yell" the signal of a charge in which the assailants had to be killed to insure victory, had gradually died down, while giving place to a sullen despair almost as potent as the fanaticism. The Confederacy fell, but it fell fighting, and strange as it may seem we were in more danger of defeat toward the end than in the beginning. We will treat of this hereafter, as in the events that follow the luster of our hero brightens as the hour grows darker; and the deadly peril that encompassed the great Republic but for him would have prevailed and the war ended in a nation so torn asunder as to leave in history nothing but the story of a gigantic ruin.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Ignorance at Washington Enlightened by General Grant—The War of Attrition—Both Sides in the Conflict Running to Exhaustion, Neck and Neck—Failure of the Draft—Thomas's Plan of Prosecuting the War to a Speedy and Successful Close.

Said Jefferson Davis after the war, "Chattanooga was the key to the situation, and its loss was terrible to the Confederacy. Our only comfort was, that the people, at Washington did not know what to do with it."

Nor did General Grant. Made lieutenant-general, and as such put in command of all our armies in the field, he put Sherman in command of the Mississippi Department, and hastened to Washington. What his views were, and subsequent plan of campaign, we have his words at the time for the better information of President Lincoln. It reads as follows:

"From an early period in the Rebellion, I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy, and his numerical strength, were far inferior to ours; but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

"The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether

our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose at all for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

"These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country."

A plan of warfare based on mutual slaughter, to be continued until one side or the other is killed—for that is what attrition means—is somewhat new in war. We have seen that, with the exception of the Army of the Cumberland, no other system was thought of or practiced. President Lincoln, in discussing a campaign with General McClellan, said very truly that the enemy could be fought under more favorable circumstances before Washington than at Richmond. But McClellan had accepted the popular cry of "on to Richmond" as the outline and objective point of a campaign, and seeking to use the water ways for transportation, carried his anaconda to a point in sight of Richmond before the mutual slaughter began. From that time until General Grant was

given command of all our forces this brutal slaughter had continued, except, as we have said, in the army that was moving in Tennessee to the only true objective point given us in the war.

The brutal wording of the proposition shocks one. "*To hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources until, by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left of him,*" etc., is what General U. S. Grant deliberately puts in writing and submits to the President. We are grieved to confess that the proposition was not original with the lieutenant-general. It came from a really great man, but one strangely ignorant of how to conduct an armed conflict, although Secretary of War. Mr. Edwin M. Stanton had said, "We have no generals, but we have men, and I will crowd them on until this rebellion is stamped out. We can lose three men to the rebels' one and win."

This system of warfare, if we may term it such, called for no campaign beyond one that found the enemy and fought him. All strategem was dispensed with and defeats were as effective as victories. We had only to calculate the number of dead we could exchange for the killed on the other side and continue the killing. The newly-made lieutenant-general took up the "On to Richmond" project that McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade had all failed to accomplish, which common sense taught us that if accomplished would yet leave us in a worse condition than we were in at the beginning. There are few who recognize the fact that we were about as near exhaustion as the Confederacy. Financially our credit was such that a dollar in the shape of a government note had but the purchasing power of forty cents. The volunteer element had been exhausted and the administration dared not enforce the draft. To avoid this, and yet reinforce our armies, resort was had to the abominable system of substitutes. By the law itself the payment of \$300 allowed a citizen to escape service in the army, a monstrous proposition for a Republic where all men were supposed to be on an equality, especially in defending a government that gave a like protection to all. In the summer previous, draft riots developed in Boston, Jersey City, Troy

and Jamaica, but assuming alarming proportions at the city of New York, where the mob had virtually possession of the place, when Governor Seymour gave his adhesion to the rioters and by a promise to appeal to the President to suspend the draft for a time stayed the hand of violence.

There was nothing saved us from a collapse in the summer and fall of 1863 but the earnest patriotism of a great people. This was shown in the elections of that year and in the re-enlistment of veterans whose term of service had expired. The patriotic student of history looks back to that dark hour of peril with a glow of pride no words can express. Not only did overwhelming majorities at the polls express the firm purpose of sustaining our able administration, but the veterans re-enlisted and from the house of mourning over all the land the young and old, before exempted, shouldered their muskets to fill the places made vacant by death. Nevertheless there was a limit to heroic endeavor. The fighting element that gave us volunteers was nearly exhausted. That which took its place under the infamous system of substitute by purchase had no qualities in it of the soldier. When this system passed from individual purchase to townships and counties the evil grew to monstrous proportions. The business of "bounty-jumping" became universal. That is, a man selling himself in one state would desert at the first opportunity and again sell himself in another. If the man was watched and guarded until he could be got to the field he made an insubordinate grumbler on the march and a cowardly straggler at the rear in the hour of battle. This evil increased until it became necessary to imprison these substitutes until a sufficient number to make a regiment were collected and then march them to the field as so many convicts.

The east suffered more from this evil than the West; while the Army of the Potomac was receiving the worst possible element spawned upon our shores from Europe, the Army of the Cumberland remained mainly native American and in the large showing of volunteers from naturalized citizens we had the better class of sturdy emigrants who had struggled through to the lands of the West. But the evil

grew apace. The South could draw upon its entire population of men and even boys. This, in comparison with the North, was limited, and the Confederacy had reached the limit. It, too, had its draft, but no riots. The few who responded reluctantly to the call were hurried forward and in this the South differed from the North. The long pursuits of a peaceful sort had developed a peaceful nation in the many classes of the free states that remained loyal to the Union. There was no such absorbing pursuit of gain in the slave states, where merchandise was considered less precious than a personal sense of honor. Every man was his own policeman and the whole were better prepared for war. Added to this was the fact that slavery was ever a menace to social order and every slave-holder was trained from necessity in the ways of the soldier.

Let the causes have been what they may, when the lieutenant-general was complacently talking of "hammering continuously against the armed forces of the enemy and his resources," etc., the North and South were running to exhaustion neck and neck. While our material resources were greater than those of the South our expenditures were much heavier, and while we had a greater population to draw upon for men our slaughter of Union soldiers nearly again equalized the difference. Both Mr. Stanton and General Grant were in error as to this although they were unanimous in their confession that we had to rely, however humiliating the fact, on the number of our men and not on the superior ability of our generals. It will be seen as we develop the true story of this war how near utter ruin we were while trying Messrs. Stanton's and Grant's war of attrition.

Had General Thomas been intrusted with the command given Grant he would have placed Rosecrans or Buell in command of a force large enough to cover Washington, and transported the Army of the Potomac to Tennessee. This would have forced Lee to evacuate Virginia and concentrate his forces in the cotton states. We would then have had the immense advantage of but one army of invasion and that

with its base in the very heart of the Confederacy where our fleet could have co-operated in not only keeping open the Mississippi, but menacing the coast of both the Atlantic and the Gulf. This would have been the intelligent warfare on our part that General Thomas saw in the beginning and kept in view until the end. The authors of "attrition" who sought success over the dead of our own armies died without knowing that brain could have saved us blood, and that intellect is rather more necessary to the proper conduct of a war than it is in the purchase of hides and sale of leather at Galena.

NOTE.—Soon after completing his *Life of Thomas* to this point, Colonel Piatt's labors were suspended by an attack of sickness, which resulted in his death. The concluding chapters were furnished by General H. V. Boynton.

BOYNTON'S PREFACE.

At the time of Colonel Piatt's death he had brought his *Life of Thomas* down to the Atlanta campaign. This portion of the volume remains as he left it.

At the request of Mrs. Piatt, and with the understanding that I did not adopt all the views of Colonel Piatt, or concur in every case with his forms of criticism, I agreed to add a few chapters to carry the narrative through General Thomas's subsequent career and complete the volume.

While these concluding chapters are by no means exhaustive, they present the salient points of General Thomas's notable services during the Atlanta and Nashville campaigns, and up to the time of his death in San Francisco.

The chapters relating to the wonderful cavalry campaign following the destruction of Hood's army, which was projected by General Thomas and General James H. Wilson, and executed by the latter, have been given space out of proportion to the other concluding chapters for the reason that this most remarkable cavalry campaign in modern war has not, as yet, received the attention it so richly deserves.

The prompt and full assistance rendered by General Wilson in connection with this portion of the work has placed the writer under the deepest obligations.

H. V. BOYNTON.

Washington, D. C., 1893.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

General Thomas Preparing for a Spring Campaign—Notified by Grant that he Contemplated Marching through to the Sea—Reconnoiters Johnson's Position at Dalton—Finds it Impregnable, but Discovers Snake Creek Gap to the Right of it Undefended—Proposes an Atlanta Campaign with the Army of the Cumberland—Sherman, his Junior, Assigned to Command—Thomas's Proposition to Turn Dalton by Way of Snake Creek Gap Rejected—A Direct Attack on Dalton Decided on—After some Days of Assaulting Precipices, Plan Abandoned, and Thomas's Adopted—Too Late, as Johnson, fully Warned, was able to Withdraw to his Works at Resaca, and After Battle to Safely Cross the Oostenaula.

At the opening of the winter following the battles about Chattanooga, General Thomas and his Army of the Cumberland were at the height of their fame. The country grew more and more enthusiastic over Snodgrass Hill and the "Rock of Chickamauga," over the storming of Lookout Mountain, and the miracle of Missionary Ridge, as it came to know them better. While Grant and Sherman loomed up in the official reports in overshadowing proportions, the country discerned both the merit and the military stature of Thomas.

The entire winter under this new commander was a season of intense activity. The lengthening lines of supplies were worn and inadequate. Longstreet was in East Tennessee, and there was necessity to be always ready to march to the assistance of the forces confronting him. The army was to be refitted throughout. Chattanooga was to be stocked with supplies, and their accumulation was a task of no small proportions. A new plan was devised of defending the railroads which would reduce their guards to a minimum, and enable fresh troops to protect and hold them. The central feature of this was a system of block-houses and supporting earthworks. During the winter the whole line from Chatta-

nooga to Nashville, and from that city to Decatur, was repaired and thus protected. Enormous quantities of supplies were collected at Nashville, and Chattanooga was stocked with a like amount of stores. The morale of the army was all that could be desired. Its spirits steadily rose. Its pride in General Thomas, and its love for him, were never exceeded by the satisfaction of any army with its leader. A very liberal system of furloughing was adopted, and the men, as they returned from their homes, where they had been received with every honor, came with new purpose and still greater devotion to Thomas.

On the 19th of January, General Grant, then in command of the military division of the Mississippi, with headquarters at Nashville, wrote General Thomas, notifying him that a campaign through to the gulf at Mobile was contemplated, with Atlanta and Montgomery as intermediate points. The start was to be at the earliest possible moment in the spring. This campaign had been fully explained by General Grant to General Halleck a few days before. General Thomas at once began preparations for the movement.

While these were in active progress he was ordered by General Grant to make a reconnoissance in force toward General Johnston's position at Dalton, and if possible to capture the place. The real object of this move was to prevent Bragg from detaching against Sherman, then out of sight in the depths of the Meridian raid.

After the defeat of General Bragg, at Chattanooga, the Confederate army took position at Dalton, forty miles southeast of Chattanooga, on the railroad leading to Atlanta. Soon after, General Bragg was relieved by General Joseph E. Johnston.

The position at Dalton was one of great strength. Rocky Face Ridge, a bold range, with steep slopes, covered with tangled timber and loose stone, terminated toward the crest in palisades of rock, which could not be scaled. The only practicable approach to Dalton from the front was through Buzzard Roost Gap, a narrow valley, dominated throughout by precipitous heights, and further commanded by detached ridges of great natural strength. These advantages were

multiplied by intricate fortifications, and by providing for flooding the whole gorge in case of an attempted movement through it. The Confederate force holding this position at the time General Thomas was ordered to examine it by a movement in force was over thirty thousand.

He moved with four divisions of infantry—Cruft's, Baird's, Johnson's and Davis', with cavalry on each flank. He carried Tunnel Hill, a strong range next west of Rocky Face Ridge, and penetrating through several deep valleys, forced his heads of columns into Buzzard Roost, and, after most thorough examination, with his lines close to the enemy's works, pronounced the place impregnable, reported to General Grant that it was not possible to carry it by assault, and withdrew to Ringgold.

During his movement, General Thomas not only reconnoitered the roads and passes to Dalton from the front, but gathered full knowledge of the gaps on the flanks of the enemy's position, and studied them with a view to turning movements when the real campaign should open. Among these he discovered that Snake Creek Gap, which penetrated the ranges to the south of Dalton, and opened opposite Resaca, not only afforded a practical and completely hidden way to the enemy's rear, but that it was entirely unguarded. This was a discovery of vast importance, and had proper advantage been taken of it when General Sherman began the movement of his army two months later, it would have been easy to have ended the Atlanta campaign between Resaca and Dalton.

While the main object with General Grant in ordering the move on Dalton was to prevent General Johnston from detaching against General Sherman, who was then on his raid from Vicksburg toward Selma, it gave General Thomas the information he needed to guide him in the plans he was perfecting for a campaign which should enable him to occupy the railroad at least as far as Atlanta.

The demonstration against Dalton detained all of Johnston's force. But, General Sherman having penetrated to Meridian, turned back without attempting to move on Selma,

as had been contemplated, or toward Mobile, as it had been hoped he could.

General Thomas, having completed his studies of the situation, including the proper guarding of both lines of railroad between Nashville and Stevenson, and the natural difficulties between Ringgold and Atlanta, on the 28th of February telegraphed his proposition to General Grant to enter upon a campaign for Atlanta with the Army of the Cumberland, as set forth by Colonel Piatt in the preceding chapter.

Four days after receiving General Thomas's plan, which had been thoroughly worked out by that careful officer, General Grant, who had been confirmed as lieutenant-general under the law reviving that grade, started for Washington, whither he was ordered, to the command of all the armies. In ten days he returned to Nashville, summoned Sherman from Memphis, and informed him that it had been arranged to assign him to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, with head-quarters at Nashville. On the 17th of March General Sherman took command, and General Grant informed General Thomas of the change.

As has been seen, for the second time, General Thomas found himself assigned to duty under a junior. He ranked General Sherman as a major-general, as he had ranked General Rosecrans. In speaking to one of his brother officers of this treatment, he simply said: "I have made my last protest against serving under juniors. I have made up my mind to go on with this work without a word, and do my best to help get through with this business as soon as possible."

But in spite of the patriotic, dignified, and self-sacrificing manner in which General Thomas acquiesced, it was, nevertheless, a great outrage upon him. He had not, at any time, lost a movement or a battle from Mill Springs to Chattanooga. The laurels of Snodgrass Hill, and Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, were fresh on his brow. The country spoke his name with universal acclaim. He was at the head of a great army which idolized him. He had personally reconnoitered the enemy's stronghold at Dalton; had

made careful examination of all questions involved in a campaign, and had perfected a plan for moving forward to Atlanta, and its preliminaries were in course of vigorous execution. He was fairly and honorably entitled to the command. Instead, a junior was placed over him, by virtue of the fact that this officer was, at the same time, named as the commander of a military division.

The slight thus put upon General Thomas would have been less if the junior placed over him had been equally, or even approximately, successful. But General Sherman had been surprised at Shiloh; had signally failed at Chickasaw Bayou; had protested against Grant's plan by which Vicksburg had been captured; had failed in his assaults on Vicksburg; of the three armies operating at Chattanooga had stood alone in failure to execute his part of the plan, and he was just fresh from the Meridian campaign, which had fallen short. At all these points and every-where his troops and subordinate officers had fought with splendid pluck, and they were not in any case responsible for the want of success which attended the plans and orders which they had unflinchingly risked life to execute.

It was the idea of "getting through with this business as soon as possible" that held Thomas steady after each disregard of his merits. There was no failure on his part, but, on the contrary, unvarying and brilliant success from Mill Springs to Nashville. At the same time there was as constant and uniform failure to reward him by promotion.

When General Rosecrans was assigned to the command of the Army of the Cumberland, after Perryville, his commission was dated back in order that he might rank General Thomas. The latter did not learn this fact until long after the change was made. At the time General Rosecrans came Thomas made the point to Halleck that he had been placed under a junior, and he was not conscious of having done any thing to merit or excuse it. Halleck replied that Rosecrans' commission was the oldest. To this Thomas answered that, knowing this, he had no objections to serving under General Rosecrans. Had he known that Rosecrans had been reappointed, and the date of his com-

mission carried back to meet this case, the reply would have been of a very different character. The three letters on this subject heretofore given in this volume throw strong light on General Thomas's character. He had promptly, and twice, protested against relieving General Buell on the eve of Perryville, because he thought the order was unjust to that general. After the battle this magnanimity on his his part was taken advantage of and made an excuse for ignoring him.

On 24th of October it was decided to send Rosecrans to relieve General Buell. General Thomas's commission as major-general of volunteers dated from April 25, 1862. On the 25th of October, a new letter of appointment for General Rosecrans was made out, which gave him rank from March 21, 1862, and made him senior to General Thomas by a month. Measured by his success, there was ground for defending Rosecrans' assignment, if rank was to be ignored. West Virginia, Iuka and Corinth had all testified to his ability and worth. But when it came to assigning Sherman over Thomas on the threshold of the Atlanta campaign it was establishing uniform and unbroken failure over uniform and unbroken success. As Sherman was assigned to the command of the Division of the Mississippi, by the rulings he commanded every thing in it, and so commanded Thomas his superior in rank. But no such assignment could change the relative military ability of these two officers, or disturb their previous records, the one of success, the other of failure, or even modify the injustice done to Thomas.

At the time of General Sherman's assignment, not only had General Thomas's plan of campaign as far as Atlanta, to be executed with the Army of the Cumberland alone, been perfected and submitted to General Grant, but even its details, such as the number of guards needed at each bridge and minor post had been determined. His army was well supplied, and it would have been ready to advance upon the receipt of orders. It was, in round numbers, 60,000 strong, well equipped, in splendid spirit, and devoted to its leader. The Confederate force at that time was, in round numbers, 40,000 of all arms.

General Sherman, after reaching Nashville, accompanied General Grant as far as Cincinnati on the way to Washington, and received full knowledge of the plans of the commanding general for the spring campaign, which was to open about the first of May with a simultaneous movement of all the armies. The purpose of General Grant to push Sherman's army after Johnston and by way of Atlanta through to the Gulf, or toward Savannah, was also made known to Sherman for his guidance.

The force for the campaign was to consist of the Army of the Cumberland, General Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, General McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, General Schofield.

The Army of the Cumberland was composed of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Corps of Infantry and a corps of cavalry. Each corps consisted of three divisions, and each division was made up of three brigades. There were also three brigades of artillery. Its total, therefore, was 4 corps, 12 divisions, 36 brigades, and three artillery brigades of 42 batteries.

The Army of the Tennessee was made up of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Corps. The first contained four divisions and the others two divisions each. Its composition was 3 corps, 8 divisions, 24 brigades, and 23 batteries.

The Army of the Ohio consisted of the Twenty-third corps of 3 infantry divisions and 1 division of cavalry. It had 4 divisions, 10 brigades, and 8 batteries.

General Sherman's combined forces, therefore, were made up of 8 corps, 24 divisions, 70 brigades, and 73 batteries.

The opposing Confederate army consisted of Hood's and Hardee's corps of infantry, and Wheeler's corps of cavalry. Hardee had 4 divisions, and Hood and Wheeler each 3. General Johnston's army, therefore, was composed of 3 corps, 10 divisions, 34 brigades, and 10 batteries—a force considerably less than half that under General Sherman. Early in the campaign the latter brought forward General F. P. Blair with two divisions and one brigade of cavalry. General Johnston was also re-enforced by Polk's corps of three divis-

ions of infantry, one of them of only two brigades, and three brigades of cavalry. The relative strength of the opposing forces, however, remained throughout the campaign as quite two to one in favor of General Sherman.

When the campaign actually opened General Sherman reported the following force as present for battle :

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Artillery.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>
Army of the Cumberland.....	54,568	3,828	2,377	130
Army of the Tennessee.....	22,437	624	1,404	96
Army of the Ohio.....	11,183	1,697	679	28
Total.....	88,188	5,149	4,460	254

Aggregate for battle, 98,797, and 254 guns.

At the same date General Johnston reported his effective force as infantry, 34,500; cavalry, 2,085; artillery, 2,811—total, 39,396. The returns of the Army of the Tennessee showed the number of “effectives” at this date, 43,887. Some thousands, however, especially of the cavalry, were re-fitting, and not then available.

No general in command at any time during the war had as effective an army put into his hands for offensive use as General Sherman. The men were veterans and devoted to their officers. There was no more competent commander than General Thomas on either side during the war. General McPherson was rapidly rising in all that pertained to a soldier and general of first rank. General Schofield was much like Thomas in his methods and bearing, and both McPherson and Schofield were, like Thomas, held in the highest esteem by their soldiers. The corps and division commanders of these three armies were men of military note and skill, and full of enthusiasm, and the brigade commanders, were as a body, unsurpassed at any time during the war.

Seven weeks after General Sherman assumed command of his hardy veterans his army was reported ready to move. The lines of communication behind him had been opened and effectively guarded by Thomas. They were not interrupted while preparations for moving went forward, and yet, when the advance began, there was much lacking in the way of supplies among those soldiers which General Sherman brought

up for the campaign. But the authorities at Washington did not cry out over these lacks, or this use of time, as when the Army of the Cumberland was being prepared by Rosecrans for the forward movement on Chattanooga. That army rebuilt the railroads to its rear, and in six weeks supplied itself with every thing needed for a month's campaign away from its base, and separated from it by three mountain ranges and a wide river. Its commander barely escaped removal because he was six weeks in preparation. General Sherman took seven weeks, with lines of supply fully established and undisturbed, and the former critics of the Army of the Cumberland were as silent as if they had been dumb. This is not a comparison to show that Sherman had been tardy, for he had acted with vigor, but it serves to illustrate Rosecrans' experiences. When Sherman's army did move under orders from General Grant, fixing the day of general advance for all the armies, it was not better supplied either with clothing or food than was General Rosecrans' for his much criticised campaign. As a whole, however, and speaking of the campaign as a whole, the army was well supplied and equipped and in prime spirits.

When General Sherman moved, it was his intention to attack General Johnston's intrenched position at Dalton. This purpose he announced to General Grant on April 24th, after he had visited General Thomas, at Chattanooga, and heard and rejected his plan of turning the enemy's position by a flank movement through Snake Creek Gap. General Thomas, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made this statement of the rejection of his plan by General Sherman, and its subsequent adoption, after the failure of the attack in front, and when it was too late:

"Shortly after his assignment to the military division of the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga to consult as to the position of affairs and adopt a plan for a spring campaign. At that interview I proposed to General Sherman that if he would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the enemy's position at Dalton by the direct roads through Buzzard Roost Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole

force through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning his position completely, and force him either to retreat toward the east, through a difficult country, poorly supplied with provisions and forage, with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack me, in which latter event I felt confident that my army was sufficiently strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain a position on his communications before he could be made aware of my movement. General Sherman objected to this plan for the reason that he desired my army to form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to operate from. Later, when the campaign in Georgia was commenced, the Army of the Tennessee was sent through Snake Creek Gap to accomplish what I had proposed doing with my army, but not reaching Snake Creek Gap before the enemy had informed himself of the movement, McPherson was unable to get upon his communications before Johnston had withdrawn part of his forces from Dalton, and had made dispositions to defend Resaca."

The opening of the Atlanta campaign, from this failure of General Sherman to promptly accept General Thomas's views and plans, proved one of the most decided and momentous failures of the war. The three armies and their commanders, and the subordinate officers and men, did their full duty. Every order of General Sherman was executed whenever it was possible for iron veterans, who hesitated at no exposure in battle, to carry it out. There was no failure anywhere, except with the commanding general.

The position was a very simple one. General Thomas, during a prolonged and careful reconnoissance, as already related, had clearly ascertained all of its elements. General Sherman, with 100,000 men, had pushed up to the front of Rocky Face Ridge and into the passes which led through and over it to Dalton, where General Johnston was strongly intrenched. The passes had been rendered impregnable. They had been so reported by General Thomas to General Grant, before the assignment of General Sherman. The situ-

ation in front had been fully explained to Sherman. He had also been informed that Snake Creek Gap, ten miles to the south, which opened east of Rocky Face, fifteen miles in the rear of Dalton, was practical for artillery and trains, was hidden from the view of the enemy, and, most important of all, that it had been left wholly undefended, evidently upon the belief that it was impracticable for an army. From the advanced position of the Union troops there was no forward movement possible, except to attempt the assault of precipices and inaccessible slopes. It is perfectly clear to the most casual student of the situation now, as it was clear to all who knew the elements of the position at the time, that, had General Thomas's plan been adopted, General Johnston would have been cut off from retreat along the line of the railroad, and obliged either to give battle against twice his numbers, which must have settled the Atlanta campaign then and there, or to retreat eastward through a broken and barren country, where his army would have been at once short of all supplies, and wholly cut off from any practical line for obtaining them.

The attack began on the 7th of May, being made by the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio. It was a move against precipices and into impassable gorges. On the 9th it was still in progress and lasted through that day. At night General Sherman telegraphed to Nashville and the East that he had "been fighting all day against rocks and defiles." That day, while Schofield, on the north, and Thomas in front of Buzzard Roost, with a combined force of 74,000 men were pushing vigorously but vainly and hopelessly against barriers which could not be passed. McPherson with 23,000 men was sent through Snake Creek Gap with orders to push out to the railroad near Resaca, break it, and return in his discretion to the Gap.

This movement McPherson accomplished with the greatest promptness. He did not even wait for provisions. He gained the road, but the delay in the movement for one thing, which had warned Johnston; the finding of several good roads in front of the Gap leading to Dalton, and by which Johnston could gain his rear; and, above all, the fact

that the corps of General Dodge was entirely out of provisions for men or horses, and had been for more than a day, caused General McPherson to take advantages of the discretionary orders given him and withdraw at night to the eastern entrance to Snake Creek Gap.

Although the fact was known to General Sherman that General Dodge had sent a force through Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, and that it had moved out that night to the vicinity of the railroad and found the country in front of Resaca clear of the enemy, the orders for the movement of the armies through the Gap was not given until the 11th and Thomas and Schofield who had been kept at the work of fighting precipices did not pass through until the 12th and 13th. Johnston, then fully informed of the movement, abandoned Dalton, retired on Resaca, put down his bridges over the Oostenaula to give a safe line of retreat, and awaited Sherman at Resaca. There, in a position of his own choosing, he received Sherman, accepted battle; and after it safely withdrew his army to the south of the river. It is a mortifying story of failure for which General Sherman alone was responsible. Generals McPherson and Dodge had moved promptly though their men and animals were hungry and the trains to supply them had not arrived. They did every thing that willing and seasoned veterans could do. The movement failed solely because it was ordered too late. Had it been in season, it is by no means certain that the lack of supplies for men and horses would not have seriously crippled it.

This was a failure of such vast importance and momentous consequences that every means was taken then in official dispatches, and every effort was put forth after the war in Sherman's Memoirs to conceal the real facts. In the official dispatches of the time it was insisted that the movement in front of Rocky Face and adjacent ridges was only a feint, and that the move through Snake Creek Gap, which had been persistently resisted by Sherman until it was too late to succeed, was the real move for battle. Next, its failure was cruelly and most unjustly attributed to McPherson's timidity. General McPherson "timid"! Never was a grosser blow

aimed at a faithful officer. It was even carried to the extent of suppressing his own full explanation of the movements on Resaca when the Memoirs came to be written in cold blood ten years later. Then, General Sherman, while giving his own letters to McPherson, said of those from the latter that they "were mere notes in pencil not retained." They were, however, all in the files, then accessible in the War Department at General Sherman's hand. They were letters of length and of great moment to General McPherson. Here is the one which shows why he failed, and further brings out the astonishing fact that while it was only the second day of the campaign General Sherman's own army of the Tennessee, both infantry and cavalry, could not obtain supplies for either men or animals, and had actually moved without food or forage, and yet in this condition had made a most vigorous attempt to execute orders which came too late to admit of success:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
CAMP AT SUGAR VALLEY, May 9, 1864, 10:30 P. M.

General:—General Dodge's command moved up and skirmished with the enemy at Resaca this afternoon. While that was going on one company of mounted infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips' regiment, succeeded in reaching the railroad near Tilton's Station, but was forced to leave without damaging the track. They tore down a small portion of the telegraph wire. The enemy have a strong position at Resaca naturally, and, as far as we could see, have it pretty well fortified. They displayed considerable force, and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing till nearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to the Gap for the following reasons: First. Between this point and Resaca there are a half dozen good roads leading north toward Dalton down which a column of the enemy could march, making our advanced position a very exposed one. Second. General Dodge's men are all out of provisions, and some regiments have had nothing to-day. His wagon train is between here and Villanow, and possibly some of them are coming through the Gap now, but they could not have reached him near Resaca; besides, I did not wish to block up the road with a train. It is very narrow, and the country on either side is heavily wooded. I had no cavalry except Phillips' mounted men to feel out on the flanks. If I could have had a division of good cavalry I could have broken the railroad at some point. I shall be compelled to rest my men to-morrow forenoon, at least, to enable them to draw provisions. We have lost some 6 men killed and 30 odd wounded, but have inflicted a greater amount of damage to the enemy, and captured about

25 prisoners. General Kilpatrick is very anxious to make the attempt to cut the railroad. General Garrard is in Lafayette to-night; says his horses are very much fatigued and short of forage; desires to remain there until his forage train comes down from Chattanooga. When I move forward again I would like a division of Hooker's command to hold the entrance to the Gap and the roads at Sugar Valley, thereby enabling me to move forward with my entire command, except train guards. The news from Grant is glorious.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES B. MCPHERSON, *Major-General Commanding.*

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

How energetically Generals McPherson and Dodge and their hardened and splendid soldiers strove to execute their orders is further shown by this extract from General Dodge's report:

During the entire day the command acted under the personal direction of Major-General McPherson, and promptly obeyed and executed all his orders. My transportation had not yet reached me. I had with the entire corps, since leaving Chattanooga, only seventeen wagons, and I had marched out in the morning without rations, most of the command having been without food since the day before at noon; thus a march of sixteen miles was made by the command, the men and animals whereof had had nothing to eat for a day and a half.

After assaulting precipices for three days in direct opposition to General Thomas's advice, and in the face of the abundant information he had gathered as to the impossibility of carrying the position from the front, and the ease with which the enemy's rear could be reached through unguarded Snake Creek Gap, General Sherman addressed General Thomas the following annoying communication, from which the uninformed reader might readily suppose that Thomas had been persisting in the front attack, and that Sherman had suddenly conceived a flank movement by Snake Creek Gap:

I think you are satisfied that your troops can not take Rocky Face Ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us. Two plans of action suggest themselves: First. By night, to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's cavalry, which should be near at hand, and to rapidly move your entire army, the men along the base of John's Mountain, by the Mill Creek road to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson whilst the wagons are moved to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson to move from Sugar Valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton. Could your army

and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston? Second. To cut loose from the railroad altogether and move the whole army on the same objective point, leaving Johnston to choose his course.

And on the night of the 10th, Sherman thus telegraphed General Halleck :

General McPherson reached Resaca, but found the place strongly fortified and guarded, and did not break the road. According to his instructions, he drew back to the debouches of the gorge, where he has a strong defensive position, and guards the only pass into the valley of the Oostanaula available to us. Buzzard Roost Gap, through which the railroad passes, is naturally and artificially too strong to be attempted. I must feign on Buzzard Roost, but pass through Snake Creek Gap, and place myself between Johnston and Resaca, when we will have to fight it out. I am making the preliminary move. Certain that Johnston can make no detachments, I will be in no hurry. My cavalry is just approaching from Kentucky and Tennessee (detained by the difficulty of getting horses), and even now it is less than my minimum.

And yet the dispatches show that General Thomas, after reconnoitering the position in force in February, with four divisions, had reported to General Grant as early as the 26th of that month, and explained to General Sherman upon his taking command later, that it was "not possible to carry the place (Buzzard Roost Gap) by assault." Still three days had been consumed in preparing to carry it, and then when it became necessary to adopt General Thomas's plan, dispatch after dispatch was written to create the impression that Sherman originated it, and had been working upon it from the first.

As a result of all this bungling business, now so easily seen to be so, Johnston was enabled to plant himself upon the railroad between Sherman and Atlanta, and the long and costly campaign which followed became a necessity. Had Thomas's plans and advice been followed, the decisive battle of the campaign could have been fought about Resaca, or Johnston's army have been driven to retreat eastward, which, because of the broken and barren character of the country must have been well nigh as disastrous as a battle. Thus, an army 100,000 strong for battle, made up of three armies, each under a commander of unquestioned ability, and composed of enthusiastic veterans, failed against a force of less than half its strength, through the grave mistake of the general

in command. It is plain to see that had General Thomas been in command, or even if his advice had been followed, the campaign would have opened successfully and not in grave failure.

When General Sherman did decide to adopt the Thomas plan, he found the enemy in the fortifications of Resaca, to which point General Johnston had withdrawn from Dalton, upon the discovery of the belated flank movement through Snake Creek Gap. General Sherman contended, in his official report, that "nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of the troops across the valley almost impossible." And yet, a few days later, the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, moved through this very country in line of battle, without trouble and with brilliant success.

CHAPTER XXI.

From Resaca to the Etowah—Thomas's Boldness Causes Johnston to Retire to Allatoona—The Enemy Flanked out of Allatoona—Union Advance to Kenesaw—Sherman's Secret Attack upon his Commanders—Its Gross Injustice shown by his own Dispatches.

The campaign from Resaca to Etowah River was rapid. Resaca was occupied on the morning of May 16th, and General Sherman ordered instant pursuit. The failure of the prompt movement through Snake Creek Gap, suggested and urged by General Thomas, had, however, enabled the enemy to put down his bridges and retire in order. General Johnston fell back to Cassville, north of the Etowah, where he prepared for battle, and expected to deliver it before the Union army could be concentrated. He was ready to fall upon the Army of the Cumberland, when the vigorous assembling and bold display of his forces by General Thomas the moment the latter found the enemy concentrated, determined General Johnston to retire to Allatoona, south of the river, without a fight.

After a three days' rest for the general repair of equipment and the accumulation of supplies, General Sherman decided to leave the railroad and make a wide detour to the west for the purpose of turning the strong position of the Allatoona Pass and mountains. On the 23d of May the columns started with twenty days' rations in the trains, moving on Dallas. From this point the army was to turn again toward the railroad, when Johnston, by the turning movement, should be drawn out of Allatoona.

General Johnston was quick to move, and arrived in force at New Hope Church, and had his advance at Dallas as soon as Sherman appeared before the latter place. From the 25th of May until the 4th of June there was almost continuous fighting along a Confederate line of works from six to

ten miles in extent, reaching from about Dallas north-eastward to a point some three miles in front of Lost Mountain. This fighting was generally by strong skirmish lines approaching lines of battle in strength, and each protected by hastily constructed but most effective field-works. There were innumerable charges and assaults along the lines in which all the armies participated with the greatest vigor and enthusiasm. As a result, General Sherman, constantly pressing toward the railroad on his left, finally secured it from Allatoona to Ackworth. Thereupon General Johnston, on the night of June 4th, withdrew toward the strong line of the Kenesaw and Lost Mountain ranges, north and west of Marietta. The losses of the Union army for the month of May were 9,299; of these 6,856 were in the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland, 1,271 in the two corps of the Army of the Tennessee, and 1,172 in the one corps and the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio. General Sherman's own estimate of the relative strength of the contending armies was two to one in favor of his own forces.

The next epoch of the Atlanta campaign involved the advance upon the formidable Kenesaw Mountain line. About a week was occupied in opening the railroad to Ackworth and establishing a secondary base of supplies upon the road, and within the natural fortifications of Allatoona Pass. On the 8th of June, General Frank Blair arrived with two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, adding an effective strength of 9,000 men to the Army of the Tennessee. This reinforcement about covered the loss of the campaign, so that for the move upon the Kenesaw line General Sherman reported the strength of his three armies as still aggregating about 100,000 effective men. On the 10th of June the whole army moved forward to Big Shanty, six miles south of Ackworth, from which point the enemy's lines upon Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains could be seen. Heavy rains set in on June 1st, and continued with slight cessations until the 22d. The country was rendered almost impassable in any direction, and General Sherman declared the roads to be "infamous."

While, under these conditions, General Sherman's three army commanders, Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, were

steadily advancing their lines through a country crowded with natural and artificial obstacles, and bravely defended, performing all duties with signal ability, and failing in nothing, General Sherman was rewarding them by such secret attacks in private communications as were contained in the following amazing letter to General Grant:

IN THE FIELD, *June 18, 1864.*

GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

DEAR GENERAL: I have no doubt you want me to write you occasionally letters not purely official, but which will admit of a little more latitude than such documents possess. I have daily sent to Halleck telegraphs which I asked him to report to you, and which he says he has done. You, therefore, know where we are and what we have done. If our movement has been slower than you calculated I can explain the reason, though I know you believe me too earnest and impatient to be behind time. My first movement against Johnston was really fine, and now I believe I would have disposed of him at one blow if McPherson had crushed Resaca, as he might have done, for then it was garrisoned only by a small brigade, but Mc. was a little over cautious lest Johnston, still at Dalton, might move against him alone; but the truth was I got all of McPherson's army, 23,000, eighteen miles to Johnston's rear before he knew they had left Huntsville. With that single exception McPherson has done very well. Schofield also does as well as I could ask with his small force. Our cavalry is dwindling away. We can not get full forage and have to graze, so that the cavalry is always unable to attempt any thing. Garrard is over-cautious, and I think Stoneman is lazy. The former has 4,500 and the latter about 2,500. Each has had fine chances of cutting in, but were easily checked by the appearance of the enemy. My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend; we are the offensive, and yet it seems the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I can not get it out of their heads. I came out without tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a head-quarters camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth; every aide and orderly with a wall-tent, and a baggage-train big enough for a division. He promised to send it all back, but the truth is, every body there is allowed to do as he pleases, and they still think and act as though the railroad and all its facilities were theirs. This slowness has cost me the loss of two splendid opportunities which never recur in war. At Dallas there was a delay of four hours to get ready to advance, when we first met Johnston's head of column, and that four hours enabled him to throw up works to cover the head of his column, and he extended the works about as fast as we deployed. Also here I broke one of his lines, and had we followed it up as I ordered at daylight, there was nothing between us and the railroad back of Marietta. I ordered Thomas to move at daylight, and when I got to the point at 9.30, I found

Stanley and Wood quarreling which should not lead. I'm afraid I swore, and said what I should not, but I got them started; but, instead of reaching the Atlanta road back of Marietta, which is Johnston's center, we only got to a creek to the south of it by night, and now a heavy rain stops us and gives time to fortify a new line. Still I have all the high and commanding ground, but the one peak near Marietta, which I can turn. We have had an immense quantity of rain, from June 2d to 14th, and now it is raining as though it had no intention ever to stop. The enemy's cavalry sweeps all around us, and is now to my rear somewhere. The wires are broken very often, but I have strong guards along the road which make prompt repairs. Thus far our supplies of food have been good, and forage moderate, and we have found growing wheat, rye, oats, etc. You may go on with the full assurance that I will continue to press Johnston as fast as I can overcome the natural obstacles and inspire motion into a large, ponderous, and slow (by habit) army. Of course it can not keep up with my thoughts and wishes, but no impulse can be given it that I will not guide.

As ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

The coloring of this letter grows darker still when the surroundings, as shown by the official dispatches, are examined. On the night of the 13th of June, only five days before it was written, Sherman had telegraphed Halleck from Big Shanty:

We have had hard and cold rains for about ten days. A gleam of sunshine this evening gives hopes of a change. The roads are insufficient here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As soon as possible I will study Johnston's position on the Kenesaw and Lost Mountains, and adopt some plan to dislodge him or draw him out of his position. We can not risk the heavy losses of an assault at this distance from our base.

Thus at this time, as a result of the storm, the condition of the country was such as to make it impossible for General Sherman himself to even study the enemy's position.

The same night, Captain Van Duzer, in charge of military telegraphs at General Thomas's head-quarters, telegraphed General Eckert, at Washington, that rain had fallen steadily all night, and until 4 P. M.; that all movements were out of the question, and concluding: "It will require three clear days to make it possible to move artillery and wagons."

On the night of the 14th, Van Duzer telegraphs:

Weather cleared up, cool winds drying roads fast. Some advance to-day, and Thomas has gained ground, and has one rebel brigade nearly surrounded.

On the night of the 15th General Sherman reported to

Halleck that he had been able after the long storm to examine the enemy's position. Thomas had been "perfectly successful," and had captured a line of strong fortifications. Schofield and McPherson had carried the works in their front. Thomas when he (Sherman) left him had "pushed the enemy back a mile and a half and is still moving."

On the 21st of June, Sherman sent a dispatch to Halleck covering this very period and its conditions, saying:

This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather as far off as ever. The roads are impassable, and fields and woods become quagmires after a few wagons have crossed, yet we are at work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday and the right across Noyes' Creek. The enemy holds Kenesaw, a conical Mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has retired his flank to cover that town and his railroad. I am all ready to attack the moment weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with any thing like life.

The night of the 17th Sherman telegraphed Halleck:

By last night we had worked so close to Johnston's center that he saw that the assault must follow. He declined it, and abandoned Lost Mountain, and some six miles of as good field-works as I ever saw. My right and center are, in consequence, swung forward so that my right now threatens his railroad to Atlanta. I worked hard to-day to get over to that road, but the troops seemed timid in these dense forests of stumbling on a hidden breast-work.

This attack on the courage of his veterans must have been somewhat confusing to those at the War Department in the light of the following dispatch from Captain Van Duzer which had been received half an hour before, showing extended advance by Thomas and Schofield, and heavy fighting by McPherson:

CAMP NEAR NOYES' CREEK, *June 17, 1864.*

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS T. ECKERT:

(Rec'd 10:35 P. M.)

To-day the Army of the Cumberland advanced its right about three miles, swinging upon its left as pivot, and Schofield's command on extreme right has moved not less than four miles during the night from two strong lines of earth-works and across the stream named in the date, on the left bank of which is enemy's near line. McPherson made heavy demonstration on enemy's right to assist the advance. Johnston has lost hold of Lost Mountain and the broken ground between it and Kenesaw, and Sherman's lines now envelop that mountain from north-east to south. A very few days must give us possession of all this side of Chattahoochee. Can make no estimate of loss, but it is slight. Artillery doing nearly all the work, and doing it splendidly.

This immediate record of energetic and successful work

performed in the face of storm, and every species of natural obstacles strengthened by fortified lines, preceded by equally creditable work throughout the entire campaign from each of his armies stamp this letter written the day after the events and the brilliant work recorded in the above dispatches as one of the most unjust to be found in the records of the war.

The casualty list for the month in which this secret attack on Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland was made, affords a grim answer, such as powder-stained veterans might make, to a commander who was thus stigmatizing them.

From the opening of the campaign to the 11th of June, a few days before the date of this letter, and up to the opening of the storm which stopped operations until its date, the Army of the Cumberland had lost in wounded taken to the hospitals 5,069. In the same time the wounded in the Army of the Tennessee numbered 562, and those of the Army of the Ohio 330. These are the figures as reported to General Sherman by his medical inspector, Dr. Kittoe.

In May this was the casualty record of killed, wounded, and missing:

Army of the Cumberland.....	5,747
Army of the Tennessee.....	1,271
Army of the Ohio, exclusive of cavalry.....	983
One division of the Army of the Cumberland, 1st of the 20th Corps lost	1,262

For June the record stood:

Army of the Cumberland.....	5,531
Army of the Tennessee.....	1,334
Army of the Ohio.	467

Of these Hooker's corps (20th), Army of the Cumberland, lost 1,568, or nearly as much as both the other armies.

The Army of the Cumberland was the predominating army in numbers, the ratio of effective strength at the opening of the campaign being 60,000 to 24,000 for the Army of the Tennessee, and 13,000 for the Army of the Ohio. These figures are not introduced to show that the other commands did not do their full duty, for in pluck, en-

duration, and splendid fighting each did all that iron soldiers, under officers worthy of such men, could dare or do. But the figures do show that while General Sherman was secretly stabbing General Thomas and his army, it was bearing its full share of the blows of the campaign, and doing its full proportion of the work.

While these facts demonstrate the unworthy and unsoldierly character of this secret letter, it deserves still further attention. The repetition of the charge of timidity against McPherson, who, as all his soldiers knew, was the embodiment of dash and courage, is indefensible. It was uttered to bolster up the unsubstantial claim in General Sherman's telegrams to Washington that the "first movement against Johnston was really fine," and that it failed because McPherson was timid. This part of the letter had its origin in the fact that Sherman was smarting under the knowledge that his assaults in front of Dalton, and neglect of the open and undefended Snake Creek Gap until it was too late to take advantage of it, was a blunder which called for energetic attempts at concealment. All that he could say of the magnificent McPherson was, that, with the exception of failing at Resaca, he had "done very well." Of the able, energetic, and effective Schofield he had only this faint praise: "He does as well as I could ask with his small force." Of the cavalry one was "overcautious," and one "lazy," and both "easily checked by the appearance of an enemy." The cavalry was "dwindling away" because "we can not get full forage." Well, whose fault was it, if not that of the commander of the army, if there were not sufficient supplies? And then comes the climax of slander in the statement that a fresh furrow in a plowed field would stop the whole Army of the Cumberland and set it to intrenching—the army that stood at Snodgrass Hill and the Kelley Field till nearly every other man was killed or wounded; that scaled Lookout Mountain, and formed that immortal storming army at Missionary Ridge, and whose commander had offered before Sherman came to make the Atlanta campaign alone without help from any quarter! Every body among his subordinates was wrong, or slow, or at fault somehow, and in this long letter there

was not a friendly word for any one, or praise for any one but himself. He felt that Grant knew *he* was earnest and impatient to do, and in proportion as *he* could inspire the slow commanders and armies under him *he* would press on, and try to come up to Grant's expectation. The body of the letter is directed at General Thomas, and it is only a fair illustration of the methods used often in various official quarters to undermine him and keep him from reaping the honors and rewards which were his due.

A sufficient commentary on that part of the letter criticising General Thomas for having tents at his head-quarters is found in Van Horne's *Life of Thomas*: "One evening he observed that General Sherman, who had stopped for the night, was seemingly in destitution of the usual comforts of a commanding general, and almost without attendants. He thereupon sent a company of sharpshooters from his own head-quarters, to pitch tents, and devote themselves in other ways to the comfort of the commander-in-chief. This company and their services were accepted by General Sherman for the remainder of the campaign, and the shelter tents and other self-imposed privations were thrown aside."

CHAPTER XXII.

The Advance on Kenesaw Mountain—A Needless Assault and Inexcusable Butchery—General Logan's Story of the Reasons for It—The Way Open for a Movement on Either Flank—A Final Flanking Movement Dislodges the Enemy without a Battle.

From the 11th of June to the 24th, through rain continuing until the 22d, and a constantly almost impassable country, as heretofore described, Sherman's three armies, each by magnificent fighting and almost superhuman work of marching and intrenching, had pushed their lines close to Kenesaw. McPherson was on the left, enveloping the north end of the mountain and threatening Marietta behind it. Thomas faced its central front, while Schofield, on the right, by the most vigorous work, had pushed to the enemy's extreme left and rear, and was ready to strike there. It was while this work, involving the most serious difficulties which continued fighting in the face of formidable field-works through a country of almost impracticable difficulties could present was being crowned day after day with hard-earned and brilliant success, that the letter of the 18th of June, heretofore quoted, was dispatched to General Grant reeking with its poison.

When the Union lines were thus established in front of Kenesaw, the situation presented no new difficulties, and the same method of treatment which had brought the army successfully from Tunnel Hill would have produced the same results. Having two men to Johnston's one, it was always practical to push a force against his lines, confront them throughout their length, and then throw the surplus Union strength around one or the other flank and force Johnston to retreat. The solution, therefore, of the situation before Kenesaw was plain to all his army commanders, as it will be perfectly plain even to the unprofessional reader who studies it. If Schofield had been strengthened on the right, or Mc-

Pherson on the left, Johnston would have been obliged to abandon the mountain. After the butchery of a needless assault by the Army of the Cumberland, this was proved true by sending McPherson toward Schofield, when, at scarcely no cost of life to the Union army, Johnston immediately withdrew.

The needless assault, made, as is now known, against general and earnest protest from the leading officers of two of his armies, had cost over two thousand men. These prudent, yet able and vigorous commanders, were both sickened and enraged at this useless sacrifice of brave men. But, strong as such feelings were at the time with those who understood the situation, they must be intensified with all who learn the real reasons which led to the orders for this assault on impregnable Kenesaw. These were given to the writer by General Logan, something more than two years before his death, under the obligation not to make them public at that time. A year later, he went over the details again with care, in order that they might be accurately stated, and later still agreed, after a third statement of the facts as he knew them, that they might be used as from a corps commander, but without his name, lest General Sherman should suppose that he had told the story by way of revenge for the failure to make him the commander of the Army of the Tennessee after the death of McPherson.

As the story turns upon the results of General Grant's campaign at the East, it becomes necessary to pass that rapidly in review.

The Army of the Potomac, under General Meade, in accordance with the plan for a simultaneous movement of all the armies, had crossed the Rapidan, May 4th, and moved into the Wilderness toward Lee's flank. On the 5th, he was attacked by Lee, and the bloody battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania inaugurated the campaign of attrition. These battles, with their tremendous losses, had forced Grant to move by his left and seek in that direction a junction with the Army of the James. This was accomplished after the terrible and needless slaughter of Cold Harbor, whose story of killed and wounded, and of wounded in great numbers

lying unsuccored for three days between the lines until, as General Grant himself writes, all but two had died, forms one of the most sickening chapters of the war's butcheries. It had been a repetition of the Vicksburg assault, with its failure, and the subsequent horrible sufferings of the wounded left helpless between the lines. But through these horrors, at the cost of forty thousand men, General Grant had reached the James, crossed it, and pressed on into the rear of Petersburg, and the country was ringing with applause at the sight of the combined eastern armies working vigorously toward the Confederate capital.

"It was the glowing accounts which the newspapers brought of these operations south of the James," said General Logan, "which determined Sherman to order an assault upon Kenesaw Mountain." "For this reason," continued the General, "it was worse than a blunder or a butchery. Let me tell you the story as I know it." General Logan then went on to say, that, being with General McPherson in General Sherman's tent, the night before the orders for the assault on the mountain were given, General Sherman became absorbed in an examination of the newspapers which had arrived filled with the details of the great movements south of the James, and in the rear of and beyond Petersburg. Suddenly, General Sherman said that his army had got to do some fighting, that the whole attention of the country was fixed on the Army of the Potomac, and his army seemed to be entirely forgotten. Now it should fight. He would to-morrow give orders for an assault on the mountain. At this General McPherson said quietly that there was no necessity for such a step, and he could not really be entertaining the plan, since Johnston could be easily flanked out of the position, while to assault it would cost dearly in men. General Sherman replied to this by repeating his first declaration in more emphatic form, saying that he could not fail to take notice of the fact that the Army of the Potomac was overshadowing him, and that all the applause of the country was lavished on the Eastern armies. General Logan, seeing that General Sherman was in earnest, then said in most decided terms that to assault would be to sacrifice

brave men without need, and he had no right to order it. General McPherson joined in with the most vigorous protest supporting General Logan in the position that the order would involve needless slaughter, and be in its essence the butchery and murder of his soldiers. Neither could move him, though both continued to protest, and to restate their reasons. General Sherman, however, persisted, saying that it was necessary to show the country that his troops could fight as well as Grant's, and he would order the assault, and he did.

On the 24th of June, the order was issued directing the attack on the mountain to be made on the 27th. General Thomas opposed it. General Schofield was against it, and the position of General McPherson is related above.

To make this murderous order worse, three days before it was issued, Hood's corps, which had confronted the Army of the Tennessee and blocked its way to Marietta on the the Confederate right, was withdrawn to the extreme left to oppose Schofield's vigorous flank movement in that quarter, leaving cavalry only in McPherson's front. It was a move of great hazard for Johnston, but he was often compelled to such risks because he was continually operating in the face of double his numbers. Had McPherson at this juncture, or at any time for the week preceding the bloody attack on the mountain, been allowed to move directly on Marietta, a battle under most unfavorable conditions for Johnston, or a hasty and disordered retreat would have followed. This McPherson clearly saw, and General Thomas favored such a retreat.

But, the third day after Johnston had left the line of easy advance on Marietta open, came the order for preparing to assault Kenesaw three days later. Nor was this situation a matter of ignorance on the part of General Sherman. The day after Hardee had been withdrawn from in front of McPherson, General Thomas urged a movement on Marietta by the Army of the Tennessee, supported by a sufficient force from the Army of the Cumberland. But nothing could move the commanding general, and, instead of a movement presenting only very ordinary difficulties, with an assured success which would have easily thrown Johnston back of

Marietta, the order for an attack upon a mountain, strong by nature, and rendered impregnable by a veteran army skilled in field fortification, was persisted in. There were no military reasons for it. On the contrary, every sound consideration was against it, and all his leading officers were opposed to it. Only such reasons as General Logan discovers could explain it.

From the 24th to the morning of the 27th of June, the army was busy preparing for the assault. The brunt of it was to fall on the Army of the Cumberland supported by a demonstration to its left by troops from the Army of the Tennessee. The mountain range was rocky, precipitous, and thickly timbered. The enemy's line of works was screened by the forests, and when reached, was found, as was to be certainly expected, protected by slashings of timber and many forms of rude entanglements. Both the assaulting columns of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee moved to their work as testified by General Thomas, and as illustrated by General McPherson's movements, "with the greatest coolness and gallantry." A few official dispatches will sufficiently tell the story. Thomas to Sherman, June 27th, 10:45 A. M.:

Yours received. General Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces of the enemy's breastworks, and was repulsed with canister at that range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner's brigade, of Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so severely handled that it is compelled to reorganize. Colonel Mitchell's brigade, of Davis' division, captured one line of rebel breastworks, which they still hold. McCook's brigade was also very severely handled, nearly every colonel being killed or wounded. Colonel McCook wounded. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The troops are all too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all we have gained.

Sherman to Thomas, 11:45 A. M.:

McPherson's column reached near the top of the hill through very tangled brush, but was repulsed. It is found almost impossible to deploy, but they still hold the ground. I wish you to study well the position, and if it be possible to break the line, do it; it is easier now than it will be hereafter. Hold fast all you make, I hear Leggett's guns well behind the mountain.

This was a conditional order for a second assault. Then at 1:30 came another dispatch showing a decision to

order McPherson to make an assault if Thomas gave any encouragement:

McPherson and Schofield are at a dead-lock. Do you think you can carry any part of the enemy's line to-day? McPherson's men are up to the abatis and can't move without the direct assault. I will order the assault if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Springs road, and the other across Olley's Creek, about two miles to his right and rear.

Thomas to Sherman, 1:40 P. M.:

Davis' two brigades are now within sixty yards of the enemy's intrenchments. Davis reports that he does not think he can carry the works by assault on account of the steepness of the hill, but he can hold his position, put in one or two batteries, to-night, and probably drive them out to-morrow morning. General Howard reports the same. Their works are from six to seven feet high and nine feet thick. In front of Howard they have a very strong abatis. Davis' loss in officers has been very heavy. Nearly all the field officers in McCook's brigade, with McCook, have been killed or wounded. From what the officers tell me, I do not think we can carry the works by assault at this point to-day, but they can be approached by saps and the enemy driven out.

Sherman to Thomas, 2:25 P. M.:

Secure what advantageous ground you have gained. But is there any thing in the enemy's present position that if we should approach by regular saps he could not make a dozen new parapets before one sap is completed? Does the nature of the ground warrant the time necessary for regular approaches?

—still suggesting another assault.

After two attempts to carry the line with most fatal results, a third attack for 5 o'clock was under consideration by General Sherman. Upon receiving notice of this, General Thomas dictated a note to General Sherman which is thus repeated by the staff officer who took it:

The Army of the Cumberland has already made two desperate, bloody, and unsuccessful assaults on this mountain. If a third is ordered, it will, in my opinion, result in demoralizing this army, and will, if made, be against my best judgment, and most earnest protest.

It was not persisted in.

At 6 P. M. General Thomas reported to Sherman:

General:—The assault of the enemy's works in my front was well arranged, and the officers and men went to their work with the greatest coolness and gallantry. The failure to carry them is due only to the strength of the works, and to the fact that they were well manned, thereby enabling

the enemy to hold them securely against the assault. We have lost nearly 2,000 officers and men, among them two brigade commanders, General Harker, commanding a brigade in Newton's division, and Colonel Dan McCook, commanding a brigade in Jeff. Davis' division, both reported to be mortally wounded, besides some 6 or 8 field officers killed. Both General Harker and Colonel McCook were wounded on the enemy's breastworks, and all say had they not been wounded, we would have driven the enemy from his works. Both Generals Howard and Palmer think that they can find favorable positions on their lines for placing batteries for enfilading the enemy's works. We took between 90 and 100 prisoners.

Sherman to Thomas in reply :

General Thomas :—Let your troops fortify as close up to the enemy as possible. Get good positions for artillery, and group your command as conveniently as you can by corps and divisions, keeping reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and we could move by that flank. The question of supplies will be the only one. I regret beyond measure the loss of two such young and dashing officers as Harker and Dan McCook. McPherson lost two or three of his young and dashing officers, which is apt to be the case in unsuccessful assaults. Had we broken the line to-day, it would have been most decisive, but as it is our loss is small compared with some of those East. It should not in the least discourage us. At times assaults are necessary and inevitable. At Arkansas Post we succeeded; at Vicksburg we failed. I do not think our loss to-day greater than Johnston's when he attacked Hooker and Schofield the first day we occupied our present ground.

Even before the wounded were gathered from the field, as the dispatch shows, General Sherman discovered what all the other commanders had insisted on, that the way for flanking Johnston out of position was fully open.

At 9 P. M. Sherman asked Thomas :

Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way.

General Thomas's condition of mind over the murder of his troops may be seen from his reply :

What force do you think of moving with? If with the greater part of the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks twelve feet thick and strongly abatised.

That General Schofield was perfectly aware that the proper line of movement was to turn the enemy's position by his flank is clear from this dispatch to Stoneman, sent at 5 o'clock :

General :—Thomas and McPherson have failed in their attack, and have suffered heavy losses. Our little success on the right is all that has been

gained anywhere. This may be very important to us as the first step toward the next important movement. We must make what we have gained as secure as possible.

The character of the mountain and the lines before the Army of the Tennessee clearly appears from a paragraph in a dispatch from that cool and able officer and excellent engineer, General Grenville M. Dodge :

At 8 A. M. I advanced my skirmish line, consisting of three regiments, and extending along the front of two brigades, up the mountain. They met with very little opposition for half the distance, and until the fire of the enemy on my left and right checked the advance of the connecting lines. My loss was very small. During the afternoon, the skirmishers met with more determined opposition, and up to this time (8.20 P. M.) there are in hospital 27 wounded and several yet on the field. The farther we advanced, the mountain became more difficult of ascent. It is evident that no line could readily ascend it, and I judge from the action of the enemy filling their rifle pits, that they have no fear of our taking it. There is no doubt but that they have a line of battle extending along our entire front.

The Kenesaw affair caused universal dissatisfaction among all who understood it. General Sherman became very restive under this, but in a few days he had worked out a most characteristic excuse, and the more so because it attempted to load the responsibility for failure on General Thomas. He had not moved with vigor enough.

Sherman to Halleck, July 9th :

The assault I made was no mistake; I had to do it. The enemy and our own army and officers had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind any thing like a parapet, why every body would deploy, throw up counter-works, and take it easy, leaving it to the "old man" to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor, mathematically, I would have put the head of George Thomas's whole army right through Johnston's deployed lines on the best ground for go-ahead, while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck down so early, the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle would have all been in our favor on account of our superiority of numbers, position, and initiative.

But, even then, the line "for go ahead" would have been over a rugged and impracticable mountain.

Sherman to Grant, July 12th :

I regarded an assault on the 27th of June necessary for two good reasons: first, because the enemy as well as my own army had settled down

into the belief that flanking alone was my game; and, second, that on that day and ground, had the assault succeeded, I could have broken Johnston's center and pushed his army back in confusion, and with great loss to his bridges over the Chattahoochee. We lost nothing in morale by the assault, for I followed it up on the extreme right, and compelled him to quit the very strong lines of Kenesaw, Smyrna Camp, and the Chattahoochee, in quick succession.

And this of the veterans of McPherson and Thomas! This of the men who, without flinching, had, under Sherman's orders, attacked the impossible position of Chickasaw Bayou, and the frowning works of Vicksburg; who had stormed Lookout Mountain and carried Missionary Ridge; who had assaulted precipices at Rocky Face, assaulted at Resaca, and day after day moved on the enemy's parapets, wherever found, over the long and bloody path from Tunnel Hill to the front of Kenesaw! Considering the history of these veterans and their deeds of valor which illuminated all the years of conflict, it is not too much to say that such unjust criticism of a noble soldiery can not be elsewhere found from any commander in the history of war. It is only necessary to give full force to the condemnation which these facts supply to say that, when, following the failure of the assault on Kenesaw, McPherson was sent to the right to operate with Schofield on Johnston's left, the latter, without waiting, withdrew rapidly, and without further general resistance, to the fortifications about Atlanta. He first deployed his lines at Smyrna Station to check the Union pursuit, but the center of the position was brilliantly stormed and carried by Dodge's corps of the Army of the Tennessee. Johnston then retreated to the strong works which he had constructed some months before to cover the crossing of the Chattahoochee in case it became necessary to fall back beyond it. Thence Johnston retired to the south bank of Peach Tree Creek, along which stretched the outer fortifications of Atlanta. It will be remembered of Thomas that he prevented a third assault on Kenesaw.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Hood Relieves Johnston—Put in to Fight instead of to Continue Johnston's More Prudent Course—Two Bloody Battles Follow at Once—Peach Tree Creek and the Battle of Atlanta of July 22d—General Thomas's Troops Carry the Works at Jonesboro—Consequent Surrender of Atlanta—General Thomas Proposes with His Army to March through to Savannah, Releasing the Union Prisoners at Andersonville and Other Prisons on the Way.

At this critical time for the Confederacy, General Johnston was relieved by General Hood, to the great satisfaction of the Union commanders. These always rated General Johnston as a soldier of the first rank, able, prudent, and brave. He had incurred the prejudice of President Davis, and advantage was taken of the popular outcry which was roused by Sherman's steady advance to relieve him. But he understood and fully appreciated the rapidly decreasing resources of the Confederacy in men, and was careful of sending them into battle where they must fight uncovered against double their numbers. His policy of fighting behind works reduced the Union army much faster than his own, and it was the only wise course. Hood, however, was put in to fight, and he immediately began to carry the new policy into effect.

As a result, two battles followed in four days after his assignment to command—both bloody, and both disastrous to the Confederate army. One was the battle of Peach Tree Creek, fought by the Army of the Cumberland under General Thomas's personal direction, and the other was the battle of July 22d, known as the battle of Atlanta, fought by the Army of the Tennessee under the direct command of General Logan, General McPherson having been killed at the very opening of the attack.

General Hood took command on the 18th of July, on the 19th he posted his columns in front of the Union right, and on the morning of the 20th attacked General Thomas.

The latter then had only seven of his nine divisions in hand, two having been dispatched to the left to connect with the other armies operating from the direction of Decatur. Hood had massed his columns, withdrawn his outposts, and with lines well concealed awaited the approach of the Union forces. The Confederate divisions in mass suddenly burst upon the heads of the Union columns, and the battle at once became desperate. General Thomas commanded in person within close range of the enemy, and exposed himself on every portion of the field. At one of the most critical points he rode himself to bring up a battery to repulse a flank and rear attack, assisted in urging the horses forward, and sat on his horse among the guns the moment they were in position, and helped direct their fire. It was the turning point of the contest, and the resulting repulse of the Confederate line was followed by an abandonment of the field. At the height of the fighting, General Thomas received a dispatch from General Sherman, then some distance from the field, saying, "All your troops should push hard for Atlanta, sweeping every thing before them."

This was a battle of the Army of the Cumberland, less two of its divisions, under the direct eye and sole management of General Thomas, and Hood's army was defeated after most desperate and courageous fighting. The result naturally recalls the offer which General Thomas made before the opening of the spring campaign, to undertake a movement to Atlanta with his own army alone.

On the 22d of July, Hood, having failed in his attack on the Union right, fell unexpectedly upon the Army of the Tennessee, which held the left. That army, in turn, under the eye and sole direction of General Logan, again defeated Hood.

The latter had withdrawn from the outer works along his left and center, and thoroughly deceived General Sherman into the belief that Atlanta was evacuated. Orders announcing the evacuation of the city and directing immediate and vigorous pursuit were sent by General Sherman to each of his armies.

It was while this moving by the flank under General

Sherman's orders to pass to the east of Atlanta in rapid pursuit of Hood was in progress that General McPherson, riding toward the head of his columns, was killed by Hood's troops advancing directly from the rear. The Confederate general had marched east from Atlanta, made a wide detour during the night around the Union left, and without the least warning had fallen on its flank and rear. General Dodge, marching by the flank, halted and faced where his lines stood and checked Hood's further advance in the rear. General Logan received a message from General Sherman notifying him of McPherson's death and directing him to take command. General Sherman did not appear on the field during the day, and those three brilliant corps commanders, Logan, Dodge, and Blair, whom General Sherman, writing fifteen years after in his *Memoirs*, sneered at as political generals, were left alone to fight Hood unaided throughout that long summer day. And, when framing an excuse for this neglect, General Sherman declared that he sent no help because, "if any assistance were rendered by either of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would be jealous."

This battle of the 22d of July was the most desperate and bloody of the campaign. General Logan and the officers and men under him were put to supreme test, and won crowning laurels for the Army of the Tennessee, a fitting climax for its long years of fighting—and a fighting which at all times, and in spite of the mistakes of commanding generals, had reflected the greatest credit upon subordinate officers and the men. Here, after a battle extending into the night, Hood was sorely defeated. General Logan, riding back three miles at the close of the fight, to General Sherman's head-quarters, found it impossible to convince him that the engagement had risen to the dignity of a battle. The reward to General Logan for his able and brilliant generalship in this fight, by which he furnished the supreme proof of his fitness to command an army in the field, and to the officers of rank who with him largely contributed to the victory, was the assignment of General Howard, from another army, to command the Army of the Tennessee as it emerged victorious from the smoke of this great battle. No

wonder that the officers and soldiers of that army resented this action as both unjust and cruel.

After his defeat by the Army of the Tennessee, Hood withdrew to the inner works of Atlanta, and the siege of the place began.

At the end of a month of vigorous operations in front of the city, and much hard fighting, General Sherman decided upon a turning movement, and after securing his line of supplies, and establishing and protecting new depots, he began to extend his army to the right toward Jonesboro. Hood moved parallel with him, and his parapets sprung up rapidly and even in advance of the Union movement. But, finally, at Jonesboro, on the first of September, the Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, again under General Thomas's personal directions and orders, assaulted Hood's works at Jonesboro, and carried them in brilliant style. It was the most complete and successful assault upon formidable works of the whole campaign, and led to the surrender of Atlanta the following day.

Hood's army, in withdrawing from the city and from Jonesboro was widely separated, and General Thomas, discovering this, explained it to General Sherman and asked for such disposition of the forces as would enable him to overthrow these divided columns in detail. General Sherman, for reasons never understood, did not see fit to allow General Thomas to undertake the movement. General Schofield, also discovering the situation from his position, had made a similar request with a like result. This mistake, which closed the campaign, was as glaring and needless as that attending the escape of Johnston at Resaca.

Atlanta was occupied by General Slocum's Corps—the 20th—on the 2d of September, and that portion of the army about Jonesboro, after pursuing Hood to the lines about Lovejoy's station, was withdrawn to Atlanta. During the ensuing three weeks the railroad was repaired to the city and abundant supplies of all kinds were accumulated. An inner and short line of works was constructed so that a small force might hold the place, the citizens—men, women and children, old and young, sick and well—many thousands in

number—were expelled from the city by General Sherman, and the place was turned into a military camp.

General Thomas's great heart was always warming toward his soldiers. He had a father's love for them, and always exercised a father's care. This, more than any other element, controlled what unfriendly critics continually harped upon as his slowness. He keenly felt the responsibility of having the lives of men in his hands. He, therefore, always perfected his plans with extreme care, so that when he struck, there might be no mistake which his foresight could avoid. This ever present and deep sympathy with his men was well illustrated while he was watching from Fort Wood, in Chattanooga, the advance of his troops on Orchard Knob. Turning to Colonel Kellogg, one of his aides, and pointing to a knoll over which the lines were advancing, and where men could be seen falling, he said, "Kellogg, what a beautiful spot that knoll will make for the burial of our dead." And after the battle he ordered it set aside for that purpose. Under his subsequent orders it became the present National Cemetery, one of the most beautiful in the land.

So, when the army reached Atlanta, he was deeply moved over the stories which escaped prisoners brought from Andersonville and other prisons in Georgia, and as soon as the troops were rested, he submitted a proposition to General Sherman which involved the release of the Union prisoners at Andersonville, Americus and Millen. He urged General Sherman to let him take his own army, strengthened with one division of cavalry, and march for these places in succession, securing all the prisoners and taking them through either to Savannah or Mobile. He had demonstrated, by the battle of July 20th, that seven of his nine divisions were able to defeat Hood in battle, and so the movement was an entirely safe one, and at the same time one demanded by every consideration of humanity, and by every claim which our prisoners and their friends had upon the country and the army. General Thomas, however, could not move General Sherman, and, instead, he was soon sent to the rear, without his own army, to look after Forrest's cavalry raid.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Hood Moves on Sherman's Communications—Sherman proposes Leaving Thomas with Two Divisions in Tennessee and Marching Himself to the Sea—Sherman's Anxiety to get away from Hood—The Underlying Motive of the March to the Sea—The Part of the Plan which Sherman Originated—Grant Misled as to the Force left with Thomas.

The third week after the occupation of Atlanta by the Union army, Hood, moving north-westwardly, transferred his forces from Lovejoy's to Palmetto Station. There Jefferson Davis visited the army, and, in a speech, promised the Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that they would soon, through the destruction of Sherman's line of supplies, which would compel him to retreat, tread the soil of their native states. A report of these points reached the Union lines and gave a full key to Hood's movements, and to those of the co-operating column of Forrest which had then appeared in the Valley of the Tennessee.

On the 26th of September, General Grant telegraphed General Sherman that as a first step, it would be better to drive Forrest out of Tennessee. General Thomas was sent back by General Sherman to execute this order, and given two divisions—Newton's, of the Fourth Corps, and J. D. Morgan's, of the Fourteenth.

A week later, General Sherman found that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, sixteen miles south-west of Atlanta, and that his cavalry was moving toward the railroad. General Sherman at once telegraphed General Grant suggesting that, in case Hood moved toward Tennessee, Thomas should be left with the forces which he had to take care of Hood, while he, Sherman, with the rest of the army, should march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston "breaking roads and doing irreparable damage."

At that time only two divisions had been sent to General Thomas, and this fact sufficiently illuminates a proposi-

tion which involved leaving Thomas, with this small force, to be increased from garrisons and every species of odds and ends of organizations, to meet the army, which, for four months, had fully occupied the attention of Sherman's entire army.

Hood moved rapidly on Sherman's railroad communications, Sherman following from Atlanta.

On the 5th of October, Allatoona was unsuccessfully attacked by French's division of Hood's army, being relieved in time by General John M. Corse with his division from Rome, and the enemy driven off after one of the most brilliant and gallant defenses of the campaign. Hood then moved rapidly to Resaca, thence to Dalton and Tunnel Hill destroying the railroad, and then withdrawing to Gadsden. Sherman followed to Gaylesville.

On the 20th of October, Hood moved from Gadsden for Guntersville on the Tennessee. As soon as General Sherman ascertained that Hood had started north from the former point, he prepared to move his own army in the opposite direction, although constantly urged by General Grant to first destroy Hood before undertaking a move toward the coast. It was one of the strangest and most incomprehensible situations of the war, this movement away from each other of two veteran armies marching from the same vicinity, in exactly opposite directions—Hood's army, which had been able to hold its own for months against the combined armies of Sherman, starting toward a collection of fragments largely unorganized which had been hastily assigned to Thomas with the general order to take care of Hood and Tennessee—and Sherman, with nearly the whole force of his combined armies intact marching away from the forces which had stubbornly opposed him from May till October into a country where no considerable veteran forces were either established or likely to come.

The strong anxiety of General Sherman to leave Hood to Thomas shines through all his correspondence with Grant from the day Hood crossed the Chattahoochee and threatened the communications with Atlanta. At every step of Hood's northward advance along the railroad, Sherman in-

sisted upon turning him over to Thomas and marching for Savannah. Grant as steadily insisted that Hood should first be destroyed. The official dispatches give no sufficient reason for this anxiety, nor do they indicate the underlying motive. But the Memoirs of General Sherman give strong color to the idea that his controlling motive was a desire to reach General Grant and have equal share with him and the Army of the Potomac in ending the war. Upon hearing that Hood had marched toward Decatur, in Alabama, General Sherman writes:

I then finally resolved on my future course, which was to leave Hood to be encountered by General Thomas, while I should carry into full effect the long contemplated project of marching to the sea coast and thence to operate toward Richmond.

Again, as the column started toward the sea:

—and I was strongly inspired with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack on the rebel army and the rebel capitol at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for better or worse, it would end the war.

As Atlanta was left behind, he wrote again:

Even the common soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called out to me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting for us at Richmond." Indeed the general sentiment was that we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should end the war. . . . I had no purpose to march direct for Richmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, but always designed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or Port Royal, South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative of Pensacola.

There is no longer any room for historical dispute over the origin of this march to the sea. General Grant's letters and orders make the whole subject plain. In March, before the opening of the Atlanta campaign, General Grant sent General Sherman a map showing the territory it was expected he would occupy, and his line of advance. This was marked in blue pencil on the map. These blue lines extended from Chattanooga to Atlanta, from Atlanta *via* Milledgeville to Savannah, and from Atlanta to Mobile. Before Atlanta was reached the control of Mobile harbor had been secured, and General Grant considered the move toward Savannah the proper one. But he insisted at first, and continued to insist, that Hood's army should be taken

care of first and destroyed. Finally he yielded to Sherman's importunities to be allowed to leave Thomas to take care of Hood and Tennessee, while he himself marched through Georgia with no organized force in his front or near him, making the state "howl" and "smashing things" to the sea. This yielding was secured by the representations of General Sherman that he had left ample forces with Thomas, to wit, 82,000, either present with him or available, when in fact the force left by Sherman was nearly 30,000 less than that, and the great mass of it was either unorganized or widely scattered. Grant, being thus misled as to the force left with Thomas, and saying to Sherman that it seemed sufficient to enable Thomas to "take care of Hood and destroy him," gave permission for the march to the sea. There was one feature of this march, and but one, which General Sherman originated and that was leaving Thomas with the fragments of an army to take care of Hood, and marching away from the theater of war himself before Hood was first destroyed. From the moment that Sherman turned his back on Hood's army, the defense of Tennessee and the blocking of Hood's way to the Ohio was committed to General Thomas.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE NASHVILLE CAMPAIGN.

The Armies of Sherman and Thomas compared—Thomas left with Fragments and Invalids—Sherman Marches to the Sea with no Enemy in his Front—Schofield's Good Work—The Disastrous Defeat of Hood at Franklin—Grant Misled as to the Number of Troops left with Thomas.

The conditions which marked the opening of the Atlanta campaign were exactly reversed for the Union army on the threshold of the Nashville campaign. General Sherman, when he moved on General Johnston in the spring had an effective force—more than double that of the enemy; from the first, and until after the battle of Franklin, General Thomas was outnumbered two to one. General Sherman had had abundant opportunity to refit, supply his army, and deliberately prepare his plans, and his immense force was thoroughly equipped; General Thomas had two small veteran corps which were not acting together, and many fragments scattered over a territory greater than France, and he was obliged to form his plans, organize, supply, and concentrate his forces in the face of the confident and vigorous advance of a veteran enemy. Every condition which seemed necessary to certain military success was present when General Sherman began the Atlanta campaign, namely, overwhelming numbers, veteran soldiers, complete equipment, unlimited supplies, perfect organization, a concentrated army. Above all, and stranger than all, when Hood was confronting Thomas with superior numbers Sherman had no enemy in his front. Thomas was largely outnumbered, the terms of his veterans were rapidly expiring, and their places were to be chiefly supplied by raw troops and civilian employees. It was well for the country that Thomas was in command. His own army, which had grown up under his eye, which he had finally come to command, which was enthusiastically devoted

to him, and which he had asked for, had been denied him by General Sherman, and he had been sent to the rear to command two small corps and fragments and with them confront an enemy which had sorely tried the metal of General Sherman's three armies for half a year. The prospect was dark enough; but in six weeks from the time Hood crossed the Tennessee moving toward Nashville, Thomas had organized a new Army of the Cumberland, which, striking a blow with the old ring, from the hand of the one general who never lost a movement or a battle, so crushed Hood that his army, in organized form, never anywhere reappeared in battle.

Sherman had abandoned his objective, which Grant had notified him was Johnston's army and the breaking it up, and had marched off to the sea, leaving his enemy seventy miles nearer Nashville than when the campaign opened in front of Dalton. Thomas took up the uncompleted task and finished it by destroying Sherman's objective, and causing it to disappear from the theater of war.

Besides abandoning this objective, when Hood appeared on the Tennessee before Thomas, and Sherman was retiring toward Rome as preliminary to starting for the sea, he twice telegraphed Thomas most urgently: "If necessary, break up all minor posts and get about Columbia as big an army as you can, and go at him." This, with subsequent instructions of the same character, taken in connection with the march to the sea, was equivalent to abandoning the country from Atlanta to Nashville, which it had required two years' campaigning and great battles to secure as far as Chattanooga, and a spring and summer to gain as far as Atlanta.

At first, General Sherman intended to leave Thomas only the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, having an effective strength of 13,907. But, upon representations from General Thomas that a stronger force was needed, he sent back the Twenty-third corps, General Schofield, with 10,358 effectives. A comparison between the preparations General Sherman was making to perfect and strengthen the force with which he was to move away from Hood, and the provision he was making to enable General Thomas to meet the army which had held their combined forces back from Atlanta for four

months, is both striking and startling. For himself, Sherman was having his army carefully inspected. Weak and foot-sore men, those partially equipped, those whom the surgeons did not regard as in every sense sound and vigorous, were sent to Thomas. Old equipments were replaced with new. All the "trash," as Sherman characterized it, was sent to the rear—that is, to Thomas. Sherman himself thus presents this matter in his *Memoirs* :

The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army of non-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was to be no place of safety save with the army itself. Our wagons were loaded with ammunition, provisions, and forage, and we could ill afford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on this exhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well armed, well equipped, and provided, as far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and vigorous action.

As a result, Sherman started to the sea with 62,000 iron veterans, with complete field equipment and supplies of every needed sort.

The force he was providing Thomas, and the odds and ends from which an army to meet Hood's veterans and block the way to the Ohio River was to be created, is sufficiently shown by the following dispatches to Thomas :

Stanley should reach Wauhatchie to-day. Schofield will be here to-night, and I will push him right away for Resaca, to go to Chattanooga, if events call for it. Order all recruits and drafted men accordingly, viz., those for the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, to come to the front. Appoint some good man to organize and arm the convalescents I send back. I repeat; should the enemy cross the Tennessee River in force, abandon all minor points and concentrate your forces at some point where you can cover the road from Murfreesboro to Stevenson. Engraft on Stanley and Schofield all the new troops. Give Schofield a division of new troops. Give General Tower all the men you can to finish the forts at Nashville, and urge on the navy to pile up gun-boats in the Tennessee River.

Again :

I have sent Stanley back. Give him as many conscripts as possible and use him as the nucleus. I will also send Schofield back, who will relieve you of all that Knoxville branch, but, if necessary, break up all minor posts and get about Columbia as big an army as you can, and go at him. You may hold all the cavalry and new troops, except the men actually assigned to the corps with me. I would like Dalton held, but leave that to you; Chattanooga, of course, and Decatur, in connection with

the boats. If, to make up a force adequate, it be necessary, abandon Huntsville and that line, and the Huntsville and Decatur road, except as far as it facilitates an army operating toward Florence. Already the papers in Georgia begin to howl at being abandoned, and will howl still more before they are done. Get, if you can, A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions, belonging to my army, from Missouri, and let them come to you via Clifton. Get the gun-boats to fill the Tennessee River, and that will bother him much.

Sherman to Steedman, at Chattanooga, same date :

You must organize and systematize the hospitals and men sent back to Chattanooga. You could use some of them for your forts.

At the same time Sherman was calling for the recruits and drafted men belonging to the regiments with him to be sent up, and Thomas telegraphed that he had directed them all to be pushed forward.

November 2d, General Thomas thus stated his situation at that date, and prospective situation for November 12, the day Sherman had fixed for "cutting loose."

I have just heard from General Croxton, who dispatched to me at 7 p. m. yesterday, who says he has been within two miles of Florence on the Huntsville side, and three miles on the Lawrenceburg side. The enemy is there with a large force, intrenching. They have laid pontoons at Florence, and are reported still crossing. He finds no cavalry, but Forrest is reported crossing below Florence. I think he must be mistaken about Forrest crossing below Florence; it may be Wheeler's force. General Hatch should be with Croxton before this time, and although the rain may have made the roads bad, I am in hopes that the balance of Stanley's troops will reach Pulaski to-day. It will not be possible for me to raise within the next ten days more than Stanley's and Schofield's corps, and Croxton's and Hatch's cavalry, unless I should withdraw railroad guards immediately, which should not be done as long as we must operate the road. The convalescents will only be fit to garrison Chattanooga, Whiteside's, and Bridgeport. It will need all the troops Granger has to hold Decatur; and Steedman's troops, belonging to my army, are almost dwindled away by expiration of service. Eventually, General Wilson can organize 12,000 cavalry from the dismounted men now in Tennessee and coming from the front, but he can not do this in ten days. We will all do the best we can, and Beauregard halts to fortify. I hope we shall be ready for him.

At this time Thomas had a force of 24,000 infantry, and 5,500 equipped cavalry. Sherman's force, headed away from the enemy, was 62,000. Replying to Thomas the same day, Sherman telegraphed among other things :

To make things sure, you can call on the Governors of Kentucky and Indiana for some militia, cautioning them against a stampede.

General Thomas at this date was exerting himself to the utmost to form garrisons for posts and bridges which, in the preliminary movements, and until Hood's designs became apparent, it was necessary to hold. How he fared at this business, and what he had to work with, clearly appears from the following dispatches :

Thomas to Steedman, November 2d :

If you are still required to make up the garrison of Resaca you might send a force from the organization of convalescents now being made up by General Cruft, at Chattanooga.

Steedman to Thomas, same date :

As regards forming garrisons from detachments of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, I have the honor to report that so far all such detachments reported from the front (Sherman's) are with furloughs, and are waiting transportation home.

All that seemed lacking to complete the assortment of feeble odds and ends with which Sherman was equipping Thomas was an order to stuff a few thousand uniforms with straw, and use them vigorously and judiciously along Hood's front.

Sherman to Halleck, November 3d :

I therefore feel no uneasiness as to Tennessee, and have ordered Thomas to assume the offensive in the direction of Selma, Alabama."

Grant to Sherman, November 2d :

With the force, however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.

Sherman to Halleck, November 11th, from Kingston, Georgia :

My arrangements are now all complete, and the railroad cars are being sent to the rear. Last night we burned all foundries, mills, and shops of every kind in Rome, and to-morrow I leave Kingston with the rear guard for Atlanta, which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner, and to start on the 16th on the projected grand raid. All appearances still indicate that Beauregard has got back to his old hole at Corinth, and I hope he will enjoy it. My army prefers to enjoy the fresh sweet-potato fields of the Ocmulgee. I have balanced all the figures well, and am satisfied that General Thomas has in Tennessee a force sufficient for all probabilities, and I have urged him the moment Beauregard turns south to cross the Tennessee at Decatur, and push straight for Selma. To-morrow our wires will be broken, and this is probably my last dispatch. I would like to have General

Foster to break the Savannah and Charleston road about Pocotaligo about December 1. All other preparations are to my entire satisfaction.

The situation in which General Thomas found himself, differed materially from the representations made to Grant and the authorities at Washington, which, as has been seen, gave him 82,000 men, and was thus set forth by General Thomas himself in an official report:

At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General J. E. Johnston, had so skillfully resisted the advance of the whole active army of the Military Division of the Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, reinforced by a well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over 12,000, led by one of the boldest and most successful commanders in the rebel army. My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength of Hood's army to be from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry, and from 12,000 to 15,000 cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the Fourth Corps, about 12,000 under Major-General D. S. Stanley; the Twenty-third Corps, about 10,000, under Major-General J. M. Schofield; Hatch's division of cavalry, about 4,000; Croxton's brigade, 2,500, and Capron's brigade of about 1,200. The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesborough, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications, and hold the posts above named if attacked, until they could be reinforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville or turn toward Huntsville. Under these circumstances it was manifestly best to act on the defensive until sufficiently reinforced to justify taking the offensive. My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly appreciated and executed by him. . . .

On the 12th of November communication with General Sherman was severed, the last dispatch from him leaving Cartersville, Ga., at 2:25 P. M. on that date. He had started on his great expedition from Atlanta to the sea-board, leaving me to guard Tennessee or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It was, therefore, with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence, to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in Tennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama.

Hood completed his crossing of the Tennessee, November 19th, and moved vigorously against the Union forces. The invasion of Tennessee was under full headway, and beyond it lay a campaign to the Ohio formally suggested by President Davis. In six days after Hood's movement developed General Thomas had lost from the time he reached Nashville 15,000 veteran troops by expiration of terms of

service or absence on leave to vote. He had received during the same time 12,000 newly enlisted and perfectly fresh men.

At the same time, the cavalry furnished General Thomas to confront the 12,000 under Forrest suffered in the same way as his infantry. To begin with, the whole of it had been dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, which went with Sherman. It was left largely without transportation, and to a great extent its most serviceable arms had been taken, and those ordered from the East to replace them were delayed more than a month on the way. By characteristic and almost superhuman activity and well directed effort, the cavalry commander, General James H. Wilson, had been able to equip something over 5,000 effective mounted men in time to take part in resisting Hood's advance.

General Thomas remained in Nashville superintending the organization and concentration there, and preparing for a final struggle to check Hood in his northward march at the Cumberland. He put General Schofield in command at the front with general orders for the retrograde movement and for delaying Hood as long as possible, leaving the details of the campaign to this able officer.

General Schofield's force, for various reasons which previously described conditions make clear, was considerably less than his paper force, as shown by the returns, and, as a result, he found himself about Pulaski with 18,000 effective infantry and four brigades of cavalry, confronted by the vigorous advance of Hood with more than double this force. Colonel D. S. Stanley commanded the Fourth Corps, and General J. D. Cox the Twenty-third, and General James H. Wilson the cavalry.

In pursuance of the policy agreed upon, Schofield held hard against Hood, and at the last moment, by a forced night march, he gained the line of Duck River at Columbia before the enemy secured it. Here, by a bold and courageous front, he checked Hood, and delayed his crossing as long as it was possible considering the great disparity of numbers. Wilson's cavalry on the flanks operated with vigor and effect,

discovering every move of Forrest and keeping General Schofield informed. The latter, fully comprehending the vital necessity of delaying Hood while Nashville was being put in condition to meet him by General Thomas, held firmly and tenaciously to Columbia till Hood had crossed on his flank, when by a rapid night March he passed his army along Hood's front, his rear divisions and trains moving within rifle shot of the enemy so close was the contact, and before morning Schofield was fairly between Hood and Nashville at Spring Hill. Hood had failed where success seemed surely in his grasp, and Schofield had succeeded where he has been criticised for risking far too much. But the answer is that he felt the essential element of his campaign to be the delay of Hood, and to accomplish that his plain duty to be to take risks and act boldly. It was one of the closest and most desperate situations of the war, but it is success which vindicates, and he came out of this strait with his army and its whole equipment intact, and the next afternoon he was found in line of battle before Franklin, not only able to meet Hood, but to sorely defeat him. General Schofield reached Franklin before day-break November 30th. Ordering his forces to take position in front of the town as they arrived, he began preparations to cross his army to the north bank of the Harpeth. General A. J. Smith, with the Sixteenth Corps, so long expected from Missouri, and which at the first Sherman repeatedly assured Grant could reach Thomas within ten days, had not arrived at Nashville until the day Schofield was being pressed by the enemy at Franklin.

While preparations were being hastened for crossing the the river at the latter place General Hood suddenly appeared before the town and threw his massed lines upon the Union position. In its completeness it was an unexpected blow and one of the most vigorous and desperate delivered by any Confederate army during the war. For the Confederate soldiers of Tennessee and Kentucky the return to their homes hung upon the result, and thus prompted they fought, and with them their comrades fought as they had seldom, if ever, fought before. That they were worthily led, the death of five general officers and the wounding of six on the Union

breastworks attest. The Union army also excelled itself, and the furious onset of Hood which broke its lines was first checked by brilliant charges, and then, after prolonged and bitter fighting, repulsed. From the moment the Union lines were restored the Confederates assaulted persistently and continuously from 4 o'clock till dark. They fought at short range long after night-fall, but failed to again break the lines. The firing was terrific, and was still severe at midnight. Soon after, Hood withdrew. His loss was considerably in excess of 6,000, while Schofield's, his troops being much of the time protected by their field-works, fell below 2,500. Afterward, in North Carolina, at the surrender of Johnston's army, the talk turning at a gathering of Union and Confederate general officers upon the various battles of the war, there was general agreement among those who had served at the West with Hood that Franklin was by far the most disheartening of all their battles.

During the night Schofield safely withdrew his army and trains and pressed on to the Brentwood Hills, and at noon the next day he reached the fortifications of Nashville. Hood followed closely and established his lines in front of the city. General Thomas's high appreciation of General Schofield's management was strongly expressed in his final report.

CHAPTER XXVI.

General Thomas's Energy at Nashville—The Completeness of his Preparations—An Effective Army Organized from two small Veteran Corps, Invalids, Raw Recruits, and Citizens—Crushing Defeat of Hood—Destroyed by a Vigorous Pursuit—Impatience of General Grant—He twice orders Thomas's Removal—Persistent Ill-Treatment of Thomas—Completeness of Thomas's Victory—Sherman and Grant Saved from Themselves—Hood's Army as an Army Disappears from the Theater of War.

The energy with which General Thomas had pushed the work of organization and preparation at Nashville was not exceeded by the work of any commander during the war, if, indeed, it was equaled by any. No other general had been left with such disorganized and widely scattered fragments to face a veteran army. When it is remembered that this was done with full knowledge, and with deliberation, the case becomes amazing. Of course the Fourth, Twenty-third and Sixteenth Corps were well equipped and well organized veterans, and their officers were able and noted soldiers. But General Schofield had fought the battle of Franklin with a force less than half that of Hood, and General A. J. Smith's corps, which was promised, for the early part of November had not become available at Nashville till Schofield, by desperate fighting, had won his victory at Franklin. Aside from these excellent troops, General Thomas had been busy organizing an army from clerks, citizens, convalescents, unequipped detachments without officers, and perfectly raw troops numbering some 12,000, who had taken the place, though very far from filling it, of 15,000 veterans whose terms of service had expired, or who had been furloughed for various reasons. This latter cause had greatly depleted both the Fourth and the Twenty-third Corps.

During the 2d and 3d of December, Smith's and Schofield's troops and 5,000 men who had arrived with Steedman from Chattanooga, were firmly established along the lines around

Nashville. Wilson was working with an energy which had no rest to remount the force which had been deprived of horses to equip Sherman's expedition. The enemy's cavalry numbered nearly 12,000. Wilson had thus far operated against him with less than half that number. But, while such disproportion would enable a rear guard to be effective in compelling delay, he was now not only to assume the offensive, but, in General Thomas's plan, was to open the fight by turning the enemy's left. As the result of unceasing activity in all parts of the army, General Thomas, on the 5th of December, felt justified in notifying General Halleck that if he could perfect his arrangements, then nearly completed, but depending on the progress of Wilson's remount, he would attack Hood on the 7th.

Meantime, before Schofield and Smith were fairly in position, and before Steedman had arrived from Chattanooga, General Grant, December 2d, telegraphed Thomas to attack, and added that he thought, instead of falling back from Franklin, the offensive should have there been taken against the enemy. But, in fact, Smith's corps, which seemed to have been counted as present by Grant—which, perhaps, is not strange, since Sherman had so emphatically assured its early presence before he marched off from Hood—had not arrived, and Thomas had no forces sufficient to justify Schofield in attempting to stand at Franklin. Indeed, his successful withdrawal was a notable triumph. To assume the offensive was an impossibility.

But it was not strange that Grant should have been filled with anxiety and apprehension. The real meaning of the march to the sea for the country, and its momentous possibilities, were just beginning to be understood at City Point. For the first and only time in the war, Grant's mind bordered closely on panic. So conditioned, he grew restive to the last degree under Thomas's cool and deliberate, but still, as all on the ground knew, most effective preparations. Grant pictured Hood crossing the Cumberland and pushing toward the Ohio. But Thomas was in active co-operation with Admiral Lee, and the river was so effectively patrolled by gunboats that crossing was impossible. Early on the 7th,

Thomas, in obedience to a peremptory order from Grant to attack received late the night before, issued instructions for battle, and preparations were at once made in all parts of the command. These were completed, and the lines were in position and supplied and the hour for attack was fixed for daylight of December 10th. With almost superhuman energy on the part of General Thomas and his able subordinates, it had been impossible to prepare an attack which should insure success an hour earlier. To have moved when any thing remained to be done to render success certain, would have been criminal. For failure involved a campaign by Hood to the Ohio River, and possibly beyond it. Thomas was not only preparing to prevent such a result, but, upon his success or failure, hung the question whether or not those who planned and those who permitted the march to the sea should incur the dire condemnation of the people. By his careful preparations, he was saving Sherman and Grant from themselves. On the 9th, there came on a severe storm of freezing sleet. The country was covered with a sheet of ice. Its character may be judged by the fact that General Elliott, the chief of cavalry, was obliged to send word that he could not reach head-quarters because his horses could not travel on the ice. The following note was dispatched by General Thomas to all commanders:

Dec. 9th. Owing to the severity of the storm raging to-day, it is found necessary to postpone the operations designed for to-morrow morning until the breaking up of the storm. I desire, however, that every thing be put in condition to carry out the plan contemplated as soon as the weather will permit it to be done—so that we can advance immediately the moment the storm clears away. Acknowledge receipt.

On the morning of December 10th, General Thomas sent this note to General T. J. Wood, commanding the Fourth, the strongest corps:

What is the condition of the ground between the enemy's lines and your own? Is it practicable for men to move about on it with facility. I would like your opinions about it.

To this, General Wood replied:

The ground between the enemy's lines and my own is covered with a heavy sleet which would make the handling of troops very difficult, if not impracticable. I am confident that troops can not move with facility.

From the condition of the ground, an offensive movement would necessarily be feeble—and feebleness of movement would almost certainly result in failure.

As late as December 12th, the sleet storm still continuing, General Schofield wrote Thomas :

It seems hardly possible that we can attempt any movement at this time.

It should be remembered that to attack Hood the Union line was obliged to ascend the hills on which he was intrenched.

After General Thomas had notified General Grant, on the morning of the 7th, that, in accordance with his directions of the previous night, orders for attack had been given, and, after the imperative reasons for delay had been explained to him, Grant telegraphed Halleck, the 8th, that, "if Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield."

Halleck instantly replied that, if he wanted Thomas relieved, he must give the order, and the responsibility would be his, as no one in Washington wished General Thomas removed. The next day Grant gave the order.

In compliance with it, the following was prepared for issue at the War Department :

The following dispatch having been received from Lieutenant-General Grant, viz.: "Please telegraph orders relieving him (General Thomas) at once, and placing (General) Schofield in command, the President orders :

1. That Major-General J. M. Schofield relieve, at once, Major-General G. H. Thomas, in command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.

2. General Thomas will turn over to General Schofield all orders and instructions received by him since the battle of Franklin.

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.

Meantime, General Thomas had received the following from General Grant :

Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland, and are scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary, call on the governors of states to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy, if he should cross the river. You surely never should cross except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the fairest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed, he can

never replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing from one end of the land to the other.

To which General Thomas replied :

Your dispatch of 8:30 P. M. of the 8th is just received. I had nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy to-morrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on to-day, which will make it impossible for our men to fight to any advantage. I am, therefore, compelled to wait for the storm to break and make the attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city, and I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt but Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river, with the view of attempting a crossing, but it has been impossible for me to organize and equip the troops for an attack at an earlier time. Major-General Halleck informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me, I shall submit without a murmur.

General Halleck, however, had held the order of relief throughout the day without issuing it, and thus delayed it further by calling attention to the above dispatch of General Thomas, in which the impossibility of attack was made clear.

Orders relieving General Thomas had been made out when his telegram of this P. M. was received. If you still wish these orders telegraphed to Nashville, they will be forwarded. H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff*.

This led to the suspension of the order, and the following telegrams passed regarding the matter :

CITY POINT, VA., December 9, 1864, 5:30 P. M.

Major-General Halleck, Washington.

General Thomas has been urged in every possible way to attack the enemy; even to giving the positive order. He did say he thought he should be able to attack on the 7th, but he did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done so much good service as General Thomas has, however, and will therefore suspend the order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do any thing.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General*.

CITY POINT, VA., December 9, 1864, 7:30 P. M.

Major-General Thomas, Nashville.

Your dispatch of 1 P. M. to-day is received. I have as much confidence in your conducting the battle rightly as I have in any other officer, but it has seemed to me you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me otherwise. Receiving your dispatch to Major-General Halleck of 2 P. M. before I did the first to me, I telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you-until we should hear further. I hope most

sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the order, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

But while the sleet storm was still at its height, and when every one of General Thomas's officers was agreed that it would be madness to attack, General Grant, though fully informed of the situation, thus again directed an attack :

If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood can not stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and most of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements.

To which General Thomas again replied :

Your dispatch of 4 P. M. this day is just received. I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday had it not been for the storm.

On the 12th, General Thomas still further reported to Halleck, and it must be remembered that all dispatches went to Grant :

I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the sleet, which now covers the ground, has melted sufficiently to enable the men to march. The whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move over level ground in any thing like order. It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only been finally effected with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the numbers of horses falling with their riders on the road. Under these circumstances, I believe that an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life.

On the 13th, the sleet storm still raging at Nashville, General Logan, then at City Point, was ordered to Nashville to relieve General Thomas, and on the next day General Grant followed him to assume general command himself. This was the order to Logan :

I. Major-General John A. Logan, United States volunteers, will proceed immediately to Nashville, Tennessee, reporting by telegraph to the lieutenant-general his arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at Nashville, Tennessee. . . .

The same day came this from Thomas to Hallack :

Your telegram of 12:30 m. to-day is received. The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning. Much as I regret the apparent delay in attacking the enemy, it could not have been done before with any reasonable prospect of success.

And the next day this :

Attacked enemy's left this morning, drove it from the river, below city, very nearly to Franklin pike, distance about eight miles. . . .

These were followed fast by details of the magnificent victory which grew into completeness with every hour. Grant abandoned his trip to Nashville, Logan stopped at Louisville where he had met news of the victory and returned to City Point.

At eight o'clock, December 15th, General Thomas's battle began. There was preparation and understanding at every point of the lines. A feint on the Confederate right was entirely successful in attracting Hood's attention from the left where the real blow was to fall. Wilson's cavalry, making a wide detour beyond the enemy's left, dismounted and advanced upon his flank and full in his rear, capturing both works and guns. At this, according to plan, the Union lines assaulted. There was success at all points from the first. The left was doubled back and driven eight miles before night fell. The center was forced from both outer and inner works and pushed to new ground far in the rear where an attempt was made by Hood during the night to establish new lines. At daylight Thomas moved to attack the enemy's new position. At noon it was fully developed upon Overton's Hill and adjacent elevations. At 3 o'clock it was assaulted in front, Wilson's cavalry having already successfully gained the rear. In an hour Hood was routed and his army was every-where in confused retreat. The next day Hood continued his flight, and was vigorously pursued by the whole army. The country was soaked with slush and rain, and it was almost impossible for troops, artillery, or trains to move. However, the pursuit was continued by the cavalry, closely followed by the infantry, with all the vigor that untiring and able officers and enthusiastic troops could exhibit.

But, in spite of the great victory, over which a nation

was wildly rejoicing, and of a pursuit unparalleled for its difficulties and unequaled in its results, since it completed the destruction of an army, the only thing of the kind in the war previous to the final surrenders—General Thomas's opening victory at Mill Springs excepted—in spite of all these things, the nagging and unjust prodding of General Thomas from City Point and Washington were unceasing. The character of his victory, and the knowledge that he was energetically pursuing, did not save him.

In response to Thomas's dispatch to Grant announcing the victory of the first day Grant replied :

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzen, detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army, and make it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country, as the enemy has done. Much is now expected.

The Union army had just foraged once, and Hood's army twice, over the country upon which Grant thus ordered Thomas to depend for supplies. Besides, Hood had been subsisting from it for six weeks. Later, a dispatch of similar tone reached Thomas from Grant. Meanwhile the pursuit was being prosecuted with the utmost vigor. But in spite of this fact, which was well known at Washington, Hallack, on the 21st, thus repeated the burden of the dispatches from City Point :

Permit me, general, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of Hood's army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the great result. If you can capture or destroy Hood's army General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military force in all the Southern States. He begins a new campaign about the first of January, which will have the most important results if Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on your part is, therefore, of vital importance to General Sherman's plans. No sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.

To this General Thomas, now indignant beyond further endurance, replied :

Your dispatch of 12 m., this day, is received. General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another. We can not control the elements, and you must remember that, to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to reorganize and almost

thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought the battle of the 15th and 16th instants with the troops but partially equipped; and, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River, crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and can not be accomplished as quickly as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect, as regards ammunition, supplies, and transportation, leaving me only two corps, partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now, in addition, aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.

Upon seeing these dispatches Secretary Stanton telegraphed the first whole-souled message which General Thomas had received:

I have seen to-day General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday, and your reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration and thankfulness for the great deeds which you have already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than will be done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers of your command.

The day before Stanton had suggested to Grant that Thomas should be nominated to the vacant major-generalship in the regular army, and Grant had immediately and coldly replied:

I think Thomas has won the major-generalship, but I would wait a few days before giving it to see the extent of damage done.

Defeating Hood in battle on two successive days, putting him to flight, pursuing him fifty miles, recovering the vast country for which previous great battles had been fought, preventing Hood from making a campaign to the Ohio, saving Sherman from everlasting ridicule, and Grant from never-ending criticism for letting him leave Hood in his rear—all these were seemingly too small things to merit promotion. There must be a pause to see whether in the end there would be any thing whatever left of Hood.

Here it is in place to turn aside a moment to contrast these affairs with the situation at Savannah, which point Sherman, unopposed, with his magnificent army of 60,000 had reached while the sleet storm was at its height at Nashville. To a letter announcing the arrival at Savannah, Grant thus wrote Sherman :

I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel the same security, in fact would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander. It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he started. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general officers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lost five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three days' operations. . . . Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of your campaign, the like of which is not read in past history, I subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend.

It certainly differed from any thing in past history in the absence of an enemy from its front after it turned its back on Hood.

Within a week Hardee with his garrison, claimed to be 15,000 men, but really, as official reports now show, falling slightly below 10,000, had escaped from Sherman's 60,000, a result for which no possible military excuse can be given, and which caused Secretary Stanton to telegraph Grant :

It was a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get off his 15,000

from Sherman's 60,000. It looks like protracting the war while their armies continue to escape.

But while Grant had persistently persecuted Thomas with groundless complaints, the records do not disclose a murmur from him over the inexcusable escape of Hardee from Sherman.

Nothing more was needed, in fact nothing more would have been possible, unless Sherman had surrendered to Hardee, to make the contrast between Nashville and Savannah striking beyond any comparisons which the story of the war had furnished. Finally, on the 24th, while Thomas was still in the field vigorously pursuing Hood, this pleasant and satisfactory dispatch reached him at Pulaski:

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, *Nashville*:

With great pleasure I inform you that for your skill, courage, and conduct in the recent brilliant military operations under your command, the President has directed your nomination to be sent to the Senate as a major-general in the United States Army, to fill the only vacancy existing in that grade. No official duty has been performed by me with more satisfaction, and no commander has more justly earned promotion by devoted, disinterested, and valuable services to his country.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*.

HON. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

I am profoundly sensible of the kind expressions of your telegram of December 24th, informing me that the President had directed my name to be sent to the Senate for confirmation as major-general United States Army, and beg to assure the President and yourself, that your approval of my services is of more value to me than the commission itself.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major-General Commanding*.

Simultaneously with the ending of the pursuit of Hood, Stoneman closed his brilliant, most destructive, and successful campaign against Breckinridge and his supports, which at the same time that Hood appeared on the Tennessee had invaded East Tennessee from Virginia and advanced in co-operation toward Knoxville. Under full instructions from General Thomas, General Stoneman, whom he had sent to command, advanced December 9th, the day when general attack was ordered in front of Nashville. In a continuing campaign he pushed the enemy back into Virginia, captured Wytheville with its stores, destroyed the main salt-works of the enemy at Saltville, the lead-works in the same region, scores of railroad bridges, and many miles of track, extensive

iron-works, and a great variety and quantity of stores. The destruction of locomotives and rolling-stock was at that period a sore loss to the Confederacy. Breckinridge was driven into North Carolina just as the pursuit of Hood ended, and East Tennessee was as clear of the enemy as the country invaded by Hood.

The brilliancy and completeness of General Thomas's victory over Hood did not save him from the continued criticisms of Grant and Sherman. The latter who had just allowed Hardee with 10,000 men to escape from Savannah while he was resting quietly around it with 60,000, was expressing his astonishment to Grant that Thomas had even withdrawn from the line of the Tennessee River, and his amazement that he had not turned on him at Franklin, and explaining it all by the stock expression between them that Thomas was slow. Grant was replying that it had "been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood," that Thomas was "too ponderous in his preparations and equipments to move through a country rapidly enough to live off it," and that he did not believe Thomas would ever get to Selma or Montgomery. Finally, after his forces had been reduced by sending Schofield east, and A. J. Smith's infantry and 5,000 cavalry to New Orleans for a movement against Mobile, General Thomas was left in comparative peace, so far as carping interference was concerned, to prepare for a cavalry movement against Selma, Montgomery, and Central Georgia, which, in conference with General James H. Wilson, he had determined upon, in case he could obtain permission to make it, weeks before it had been suggested by Grant. At the same time, under directions from the latter, he prepared to send Stoneman again into Virginia and upon the left flank of Sherman's northward advance from Savannah.

This movement into Alabama and Georgia was the greatest cavalry movement of the war on the Union side, and it well deserves detailed attention. As yet, it has never received the consideration in the histories of the war which it so richly merits. For brilliancy of conception and execution, for solid fighting both in the field and against fortified places, and for momentous results, no other cavalry opera-

tions approached these. Stoneman's expedition, which General Thomas started from East Tennessee at the same time that Wilson marched South, was both brilliant and exceedingly effective. It swept through South-west Virginia blocking Lee's communication with that region and diminishing his already scant supplies, and, turning into North Carolina, it captured the prison-pen of Salisbury, and interrupted Lee's railroads through that fertile region. It was a large factor in the pinching situation which was fast forcing the abandonment of Richmond. But Wilson's movement was rather like that of an army than a cavalry raid. It was in fact the campaign of a mounted army. It was, too, although executed by General Wilson at his discretion as to details, and, after the capture of Selma, as to movements also, the closing campaign of General Thomas. It is therefore fitting that its history should be presented at length as part of his towering and enduring monument.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The Cavalry Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi in the Nashville Campaign.

So far, the military operations in the West had been carried on without the efficient assistance of cavalry. In October, 1864, the returns for the three departments constituting the Military Division of the Mississippi showed a nominal strength of nearly 80,000, cavalry and mounted infantry, only about 14,000 of whom were provided with horses and were with the colors for duty. To make matters worse this large force was scattered widely over the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, and Georgia, in detachments of various strength, without unity of organization, equipment, or command. Each army had its separate cavalry organization. The Army of the Cumberland had three divisions which nominally constituted a corps, General Washington L. Elliott, chief of cavalry, commanding. The Army of the Tennessee had two divisions, General Benjamin H. Grierson, chief of cavalry, commanding, and the Army of the Ohio one division and several detached regiments, General George Stoneman, chief of cavalry, commanding. Besides this every army and corps commander had a cavalry escort, and a large number of mounted orderlies, while the dismounted men were on detached service or in the hospitals, widely scattered throughout the Western and North-western States. As a consequence this branch of the service had failed to make itself properly felt, and while a spirit of independence and self-reliance had been developed in both men and officers, it had become quite evident to Thomas, Sherman, and Grant, that the time had come for a radical change in organization and administration. They believed that with a proper organization and a competent leader the Western cavalry would attain a standard of excellence quite equal to that of the

Army of the Potomac, and that this would make it a most potent factor in their final efforts to crush the power of the Confederacy.

Of course the first thing to be done toward securing an effective reorganization was to find an officer competent not only to direct the work, but to lead the troops in the field, and in response to a request from Sherman, General Grant selected and ordered west for that purpose General James H. Wilson, formerly of his staff, but then commanding the Third Cavalry Division under Sheridan in the Valley of Virginia. The next step was to give him full authority and the assistance of a few brigade and division commanders from the Army of the Potomac.

Although General Sherman expressed no great faith in the views and plans which General Wilson submitted to him, he cordially consented to their adoption and frankly declared that he would not undertake to divide the honors which the reorganized cavalry might gain for its new commander. Accordingly, on the 9th day of November, 1864, at Gaylesville, Alabama, he issued the order constituting the entire cavalry and mounted infantry of his three departments as the Cavalry Corps Military Division of the Mississippi, under the command of Brevet Major-General Wilson. As this order put the entire cavalry force under the command of General Wilson, and took its administration from the control of the army commanders, the chiefs of cavalry were at once relieved, and all the details of cavalry administration were centered at the head-quarters of the new corps. As far as practicable, the old division and brigade organizations were retained, but several of the older commanders were replaced by younger men, among the latter was General Upton, a distinguished graduate of West Point, who had already become famous as a commander of artillery and infantry in the Army of the Potomac. The new corps consisted of seven divisions, commanded respectively by Generals E. M. McCook, Eli Long, Judson Kilpatrick, Emory Upton, Edward Hatch, Richard W. Johnson, and Joseph F. Knipe. Croxton, La Grange, Minty, Miller, Atkins, Murray, Alexander, Winslow, Coon, Stewart, Hammond, Harrison, and Palmer,

all old well tried soldiers, but young in years, commanded brigades, while many distinguished colonels commanded regiments. The horse artillery was limited to six guns to each division, and consisted of Beebe's 18th Indiana, Robinson's Chicago Board of Trade, the 10th Wisconsin, Smith's, afterward Rodney's, Battery I of the 4th U. S. Artillery, 1st Illinois Artillery, and 14th Ohio Battery.

Kilpatrick's Third Division, having been selected to accompany General Sherman in his march to the sea, was fully mounted by taking horses from other divisions, and strengthened by bringing forward the detached and extra duty men. The second division, now wholly dismounted, was sent to Louisville for remounts and the remainder of the widely scattered corps was concentrated in Tennessee as rapidly as possible, for the purpose of watching and resisting the advance of Hood. Hatch, Croxton, and Capron kept watch and ward in the country south of Pulaski, while Winslow was hurried from South-western Missouri to join Upton's new division at Louisville. Every effort that a large and efficient staff could make was made to collect and remount the cavalry forces, and to bring them into the field in front of Hood's advancing columns. But withal, when General Wilson took command, in November, near Pulaski, Tennessee, he found only about six thousand well mounted and efficient cavalry, with which to make head against a much larger body under Forrest. Concentrating the available parts of his force for the first time at Columbia, it was handled henceforth as a unit, and notwithstanding it was then falling back in front of Hood's advance, it grew steadily in strength and efficiency till the time came for it to assume the offensive with Thomas's hastily organized army at the battle of Nashville. It participated actively in all the battles and marches which took place during Hood's invasion of Tennessee, giving timely and accurate information of the enemy's movements, and especially of his crossing Duck River and his march on Spring Hill and Franklin. At the latter place, simultaneously with the terrible assault made by the Confederate infantry on the fortified position held by the infantry under Schofield, the cavalry engaged and defeated Forrest's cavalry under Chalmers after

it had crossed Duck River above the town and was threatening to throw itself upon the line of Federal retreat. This was the first fruit of the new organization and the policy of concentration, and was worth all they had cost. It was also the first time the cavalry had played an important part in co-operation with the infantry in any important battle of the West. A casual examination of the circumstances of that battle, with a good map of the theater of operations, will show that had the rebel cavalry succeeded in forcing its way to Schofield's rear, as it could easily have done, but for the interposition of Wilson's cavalry, it would have been difficult to withdraw the infantry from its position in the works of Franklin, and impossible to save its trains and artillery. This was the view taken of it by Schofield on that important day, and it is fully justified by all the subsequent developments.

As soon as Thomas had assembled all his forces at Nashville, which was rendered necessary by the failure of the 16th Corps, under A. J. Smith, to arrive from Missouri in time to permit the concentration to take place at any point further south, every effort was made to render victory certain. The cavalry corps was permitted to cross to the north side of the Cumberland River, and go into camp at Edgefield. Detachments were of course sent at once to watch all the possible crossings of the Cumberland River, both above and below that place, but the main body was held massed, well in hand, ready to strike in any direction. Thomas, himself a selected cavalry officer of great distinction, and one of the few generals in the army understanding the value of that arm, gave his active support and assistance to General Wilson in all his efforts to collect and remount his dismounted men, and to prepare them for the field. In the absence of a proper supply of cavalry horses in the government corrals, and in answer to his urgent request, the Secretary of War authorized General Wilson to impress all the suitable horses he could find in Kentucky and Tennessee. This was an unusual measure, but was employed with great vigor and efficiency. Street railroads, stage lines, livery stables, farmers, private owners, and even circuses, were despoiled of all their horses suitable for cavalry service, and by the 10th of De-

cember over 12,000 cavalry, 2,000 of which were absent in pursuit of Lyon, were in the saddle, and less than 2,000 of those who had reached Nashville were yet unprovided with remounts. Secretary Stanton had railed against the delay, and General Grant had ordered Thomas to march out and fight, whether his cavalry was mounted or not, but that sturdy chieftain, confident that he was right in his determination, would not permit himself to be driven into action so long as his preparations were incomplete and Hood was willing to maintain his defensive attitude.

As the decisive part which the cavalry played in this battle is seldom given due prominence its general features are here presented, notwithstanding the necessity of repeating some of the incidents of the engagement.

When positive orders, as heretofore related, came from Grant, on the 10th of December, to march out and give battle, Thomas called his corps commanders together, not to ask their advice, but to tell them about the orders, and of the reply he had already made to them. That terrible winter sleet storm had set in, and all the country was covered with a glare of ice upon which it was impossible for either infantry or cavalry to march or maneuver. To fight was, therefore, impossible, and when the commanders were assembled this was the sentiment of all. Wilson, the junior, was the first to speak. He declared that efficient operations were, under the circumstances, out of the question, unless his horses were rough-shod, and this was an operation which for 10,000 horses would require several days to carry out. He said that victory could not be made complete, even under the most favorable conditions, unless there should be perfect co-operation between cavalry and infantry, and while he spoke only for the mounted troops and understood perfectly that the horses on the field where the battle must be fought would be used merely for transporting the men rapidly to the front assigned them for delivering their attack, he strenuously urged that no movement should be begun till a favorable change of the weather had set in. So confident was he of the futility of an attack at that time, that he declared, if he occupied Hood's works, with his cavalry dismounted and

each armed with a basket of brickbats, he would undertake to repulse the whole of Thomas's infantry, if it should advance against his position over the ice-covered hillsides in front of it. This remark caused a smile to pass over the faces of Thomas and his companions, and seemed so reasonable that it received general assent. General Thomas J. Wood, commanding the Fourth Corps, also an old cavalry officer, spoke next, and gave his unqualified approval to the opinion expressed by Wilson. General Steedman concurred. Indeed, there was no dissent expressed or even implied from any one. The opinion of all, so far as it was expressed, was against fighting then or doing any thing else to jeopard the victory which all seemed certain of gaining when the weather became favorable. Thomas himself sat impassive and silent during the discussion, which lasted but a few minutes, and when it was over, after expressing his gratification, remarked that he had not called his generals together for the purpose of getting their advice, but merely to tell them of the orders he had received, and of his reply, which had been already sent, and which he now knew that they would approve. That reply, now known to all the world, was, in substance, as has been seen, that the conditions were not favorable, on account of the sleet, to advance, and that he would not fight against his judgment, but that his commission and command were at the disposal of the authorities above him. When the meeting broke up General Thomas asked General Wilson to remain after the others had gone. Knowing that the latter was intimate with Grant and the atmosphere of his head-quarters, where he had served two years as a staff-officer, and had come recently from the Army of the Potomac, Thomas said to him, in a tone of intense earnestness: "Wilson, they treat me at Washington and at Grant's head-quarters as though I were a boy! They do not seem to think that I have sense enough to plan a campaign or fight a battle, but if they will only let me alone a few days, I will show them that they are mistaken. I am sure we shall whip Hood and destroy his army, if we go at them under favorable instead of unfavorable conditions." A pleasant and reassuring conversation followed, when the

two separated for the night, each to continue his preparations for victory. On the 14th the weather had moderated, and on the evening of that day the various parts of the army marched quietly to the position that had been assigned to it. The action was begun three hours later on the 15th than was expected, because of a dense fog, which hung over the city and its surroundings, and rendered it impossible for the generals to see the points upon which they were to direct their preliminary movements. The delay was imperative, and most probably prevented the defeat of the Confederates on the first day of the battle. The plan of Thomas contemplated an advance on the Charlotte and Harding Turnpikes, and after breaking through the enemy's line, a turning movement of both infantry and cavalry against his left center. Of course the cavalry had the extreme right, and was compelled to swing on a much longer radius than the infantry. The thaw, which had been followed by lowering weather, had made the roads and fields extremely muddy, and hence the swinging movement began later and was made less rapidly than it was hoped it would be. Fortunately, however, it was exceedingly successful, and gave to the victorious cavalry, notwithstanding the shortness of the winter's day, several redoubts on the left center of Hood's position, and also a large number of guns and many prisoners by night-fall of the first day. But what was better and of even greater importance, was the fact that it placed the Federal cavalry on the flank and rear of Hood's main line in a position from which it was easy the next day to advance still further and to make victory certain. The fortunate absence of Forrest with a large part of his cavalry relieved the operations of the Federal cavalry from the great peril it would have otherwise incurred; but this favoring circumstance was neither known nor heeded at that time by Wilson or his subordinates.

Beginning as soon as it was light they pushed their dismounted troopers to, and across, the Granny White turnpike, and over the heavily wooded slopes of the Brentwood hills, steadily driving back the rebel skirmishers and pressing closer and closer upon the rebel rear in spite of their stub-

born resistance. The great swinging movement was continued, slowly it is true, but irresistibly. Hatch, Croxton and Hammond handled their dismounted men with skill and persistency, while Alexander, Wilson's chief of staff, with Johnson's division, was hurrying toward the Harpeth river by the Harding pike, for the purpose of crossing it and swinging into Franklin on the road by which the enemy must retreat. By two o'clock it was apparent that the dismounted cavalry skirmishers had reached a position entirely in the rear of Hood's left center, close to his works and facing Nashville. A courier with a dispatch from Hood to Chalmers, directing the latter "for God's sake to drive the yankee cavalry from our left and rear or all is lost," had been sent to Thomas along with the suggestion that the time had come for the infantry to advance. Staff officer after staff officer followed with similar messages, but as the infantry did not move, Wilson, impatient at the delay, galloped himself from behind the rebel lines and around their left flank, to the position occupied by Thomas, with Schofield, near the right of our infantry line. Just as he arrived and was explaining the necessity for an immediate advance of the whole line, he perceived and pointed out the dismounted cavalymen swarming into the rebel intrenchments from the rear, and one of his batteries still farther to the rear, firing rapidly into the rebel lines. At this inspiring sight, Thomas, like Wellington at Waterloo, closed his glass, and turning to his subordinate said, "let the whole line advance." It was then about half past three o'clock, and the whole line from right to left did advance, sweeping every thing before it. The enemy, already harassed beyond endurance by Wilson's dismounted cavalry, now entering their works from the rear, fired wildly and then broke and fled in disorder, as rapidly as possible across the broken country between the Granny White and the Franklin turnpikes. The Union infantry engaged in the final charge met with but little resistance and suffered no loss worth mentioning. Several charges had been made by it at various times and places earlier in the day, but they had all been bloodily repulsed; now the whole line was victorious, and the loss was insignificant. The reason

for this is not far to seek. The turning movement of Wilson's cavalry, enveloping and taking in reverse the rebel line for a mile and a half as it did, rendered it impossible for Hood to hold his position longer or to make an effective resistance to the assault which Thomas ordered, and which put an end to the battle. Had it not been for this turning movement and the persistency with which it was pushed home, Hood could and doubtless would have held his intrenchments stubbornly against the direct assaults of the infantry. The simple truth is the great victory was gained by the proper and efficient coöperation of cavalry, infantry and artillery, all working in harmony to carry out the plans of Thomas. It was the first and only occasion where the three arms of service were properly employed, each according to its own rules and requirements in a great battle, in the west, and the only instance in the country except that of Sheridan's victory over Early, at Winchester. The result amply vindicated Thomas in deciding to wait for the remount of his cavalry, as advised by its commander. The victory was as complete as it could be made, in a short December day. The pursuit was begun at once, but it must not be forgotten that the entire cavalry force on the field had been dismounted and engaged in the attack against the rear of Hood's intrenchments. There was absolutely no reserve, and the horses of the entire force were from a half to three-quarters of a mile in rear, and with all the officers could do, aided by the cheerful alacrity of the men, over a half an hour was consumed in getting to the horses, and mounting for the pursuit. There was no warning of the rebel intention to break, except that contained in Hood's despairing cry to Chalmers; they fought on doggedly and steadily, every man in his place, till the infantry advance began, and then seeing that further resistance would be in vain, they broke all at once and hastened to the rear as rapidly as possible. They had evidently held on till the last minute, hoping for night, in which to escape from capture or destruction. The break occurred at about four o'clock. The dismounted cavalry picked up all the prisoners they could intercept, and after turning them over to the infantry, hastened to find their horses and mount. The pur-

suit began by the first mounted troops at, or a few minutes after half past four. The clouds hung low and were dense and black. It had already begun to rain and this hastened the oncoming of night. By five o'clock or a few minutes later it was dark, and by six a cavalryman could scarcely see his horse's ears, but there was no hesitation or delay. Using the Granny White turnpike as a directrix, the gallant horsemen of Hatch's division, pushed onward into the darkness, picking up prisoners and ruthlessly charging every semblance of a rear guard. Hammond and Croxton followed close upon their heels, and no one in the entire cavalry force thought of halting or going into camp, although the day had been a hard and toilsome one with but little cessation from marching and fighting. The pursuit had not been carried more than two or three miles before the advanced squadrons found a part of Chalmers' division of Forrest's cavalry formed across the road behind a fence-rail "lay out." It was too dark to discern any thing except the flash of the rebel fire-arms, but Colonel George Spalding, commanding the leading regiment, ordered it to follow him in a headlong charge, which scattered the fence-rail barricade, and its defenders, like chaff before the wind. A running fight took place, charge and counter-charge following in quick succession, and in which the shout of the combatants, the clang of sabers, and the rattle of pistols and rifles, made the night one never to be forgotten.

During this demoniac scene, Colonel Spalding encountered the Confederate general, Rucker, and a conflict, as between two knights of old, took place. They were men of great personal strength and skill, and yet it was so dark that both were at a disadvantage. Grappling at each other blindly, as it were, each wrested the saber from his antagonist's hand, and each renewed the fight with the other's weapon. They were both well mounted and both good horsemen, but the issue was a doubtful one till a stray shot broke Rucker's sword arm, when he was compelled to surrender. Of course, Rucker's sword was Spalding's trophy, gallantly won. It remained in his possession, at Monroe, Michigan, for a quarter of a cen-

tury, when it was returned to its original owner, now a successful business man at Birmingham, Alabama.

General Wilson's staff captured three rebel guns shortly afterward. The rebels continued their flight toward Franklin in disorder, but the Union cavalry had also become so scattered, and it was so dark that the pursuit was discontinued at eleven o'clock.

It was renewed at dawn the next day, Hammond's brigade in advance, and a sharp conflict took place at Hollow Tree Gap, in which the semblance of rebel rear guard was again scattered. All day long, and again into the night, the pursuit was continued. The hospitals and many prisoners were captured at Franklin, but the flying Confederates could not be brought to bay long enough to permit a vital blow to be struck. Many brilliant combats took place between the rebel rear guard under Forrest and the pursuing cavalry. Many prisoners and trophies of war fell into the hands of the latter, but Hood finally succeeded in withdrawing the broken and disheartened fragments of his army to the south of the Tennessee River by a bridge at Muscle Shoals. It was hoped that the gun-boats under Admiral Lee would reach and destroy this; and, although they got within sight and range of it, they did not succeed in breaking it.

A detachment of Union cavalry under General Palmer succeeded in crossing the river at Decatur, and continued the pursuit till it had captured the last of Hood's trains.

The question has been asked, why Thomas did not overtake Hood, or cut off his retreat and compel him to surrender, as Grant did Lee, at Appomattox, a few months later. The reply is simple. Thomas's operations were in mid-winter, when the days were shortest, and the weather execrable. It will be remembered, that before the battle at Nashville, it had sleeted and frozen; then it thawed; on the second day of the battle it began to rain, and that it rained, snowed, froze, and thawed, alternately, from that day on till Christmas. The roads, with the exception of the single turnpike ending at Pulaski, on which Hood retreated, were of mud, and became almost impassable quagmires. The creeks and rivers were full and overflowing; the bridges were

swept away and destroyed; the forests, fields, and swamps were impassable, or so nearly so that cavalry could traverse them with the greatest difficulty, and with only such speed as easily enabled the rebels moving on the turnpike to outstrip it. Besides, the country had been swept clean of corn, forage, and provisions, and both the pursuing cavalry and infantry were forced to draw their supplies largely from the rear. The destroyed bridges had to be rebuilt and the roads had to be corduroyed in many places before the trains could go forward. So toilsome was the struggle of the pursuers to get on, that over 6,000 cavalry horses were disabled, and many of them had to be abandoned or destroyed, because their legs were so frozen and diseased that their hoofs dropped off. Notwithstanding all this, Hood's army, which invaded Tennessee over 55,000 strong, was practically destroyed. It lost nearly all its guns and field transportation, besides about 15,000 killed and wounded, and 15,000 prisoners. From the best information that can be gathered, not to exceed 10,000 men, counting both cavalry and infantry, remained with the colors when they crossed the Tennessee River, though a few thousand more gathered later at Tupelo. It is difficult to see how the work of destruction could have been more efficiently performed; and when it is remembered that the rebel army of Tennessee, as an army, never again appeared in the field, it must be conceded that there is absolutely no ground left upon which to found a censure or base a criticism of Thomas or his subordinate commanders. They had annihilated the army of veterans which had fought and eluded Sherman for six months, and they had done it while that erratic leader was engaged in a holiday march which led him from Atlanta to the sea-coast, but which had also taken him from the field of useful military operations almost as completely as if he had marched toward the coast of Lake Michigan.

It is also to be remembered, in contrasting Thomas's defeat and pursuit of Hood with Grant's defeat and pursuit of Lee, that the latter took place in April, over muddy roads at times, it is true, but in spring weather, and through a country not hitherto devastated by war. It should also be re-

membered that, generally speaking, Lee moved first north, and then over an arc of a circle, trying to pass around Grant's left, while the latter marched on the chord. In military phrase, Lee moved on an eccentric line, while Grant moved on an interior line. In the other case, Hood had a run straight away, first on a turnpike, two-thirds of the distance to the Tennessee River, with all the circumstances in his favor. In the first case, the chances were all in favor of Grant; in the second, they were all against Thomas.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

The Operations of the Cavalry Corps in Alabama and Georgia.

After the campaign in Tennessee was closed, the cavalry corps was assembled first at Huntsville, in Northern Alabama, but owing to the impoverished condition of the surrounding country and the difficulty of completing the supply of so large a force by railroad, it was shortly removed to the north bank of the Tennessee River, and placed in cantonments extending about twelve miles from Gravelly Springs to Waterloo Landing, to which place the Tennessee was navigable all the year round for light draught steamboats. Supplies were drawn in abundance by that means from the states traversed by the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The country being covered with timber, broken here and there by fields, and having a high, rolling surface and a gravelly soil, with an abundance of beautiful springs and wholesome water, was admirably adapted to a cavalry encampment at any time, and especially so in winter.

Every effort was made to collect the entire cavalry corps and to put it into efficient condition for a campaign at the earliest possible day. During January and February six divisions were assembled there, only one, that of Kilpatrick, which had accompanied Sherman in his march to the sea, being absent, while a few detached regiments were serving in East Tennessee, and along the river between Decatur and Chattanooga, and could not be drawn in.

The campaign ending with the defeat of Hood had been an exceedingly severe one on both men and horses. The movements had been so constant and so rapid that the command not only ran down in strength and efficiency, but a large percentage of it had been, as before stated, dismounted and somewhat scattered. In addition, Long's division had

been sent to Louisville for a remount, Upton's, one brigade in Missouri and one in West Tennessee, had not been assembled, and La Grange's brigade of McCook's division had been detached to drive Lyon and Crossland from Kentucky, so that none of these organizations was at the battle of Nashville or engaged in the pursuit of Hood. The pause in the campaign, however, gave time to draw them all into the cantonments on the Tennessee, and to weld them, with those already there, into a homogeneous, coherent, and irresistible body of horse. The men were hardy veterans, inured to all the trials and vicissitudes of war. They needed but little primary instruction. They understood perfectly how to march and fight, and wanted merely the larger knowledge and confidence which comes only with the formal organization and discipline of the army corps. It can not be denied that the endurance of the command had been pushed to its ultimate limit, and though the spirits of officers and men had been raised by success in battle and pursuit, the orderly performance of routine duty was for the most part out of the question. Roll calls were frequently omitted, and many essential military details and formalities had been suspended. Notwithstanding all this, which was inevitable in the rush and excitement of such a campaign as the one which had just ended, General Grant and the authorities in Washington seem to have entertained the idea that military operations were to be continued in the west without intermission, or winter quarters, for rest and repair, for any one. Although this rule was not applied to the thoroughly organized and disciplined armies, and army corps of both infantry and cavalry which were operating in Virginia, and especially about Petersburg, and which had first choice and an abundant supply of whatever the country could afford, it was plainly intimated to General Thomas that there was to be no rest for him or any part of the heterogeneous, widely scattered, and badly supplied force which had just gained such a signal victory over the public enemy.

Hitherto, the custom in the west had been to scatter the cavalry, and to treat it as though neither man nor horses ever required rest. Remounts were inadequately if not

grudgingly furnished, and the force was scattered in detachments without purpose or power to inflict serious injury upon the enemy, and this, doubtless, would have been the policy now, but for the fact that Thomas and Wilson insisted upon concentration, remounts, and repairs as essentials to success. Fortunately for them and for the cavalry corps, a rainy winter, together with unusual floods in the rivers and creeks, made it impossible to continue operations, or to traverse the impoverished region that separated them from the enemy's inner strongholds and depots. Fortunately for the country they improved the time which they were thus enabled to secure in correcting the shortcomings and repairing the deficiencies of the command. Wilson called to his assistance a large and efficient staff, with a sufficient number of West Point officers in it to give personal supervision to all the details of organization. Carling, the chief quartermaster, Beaumont, the adjutant-general, Andrews and Noyes, aides-de-camps and inspectors, were officers of great merit and experience, and set a willing example to their associates in the multifarious duties imposed upon them. The organization and especially the size of this staff had arrested the attention of European soldiers and writers. Colonel Chesney, the English military critic, realizing that cavalry requires more looking after than any other arm of service, specially commends it as the best cavalry staff ever organized, and as in every way worthy of imitation. Through its agency and the intelligent and cheerful co-operation of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders, order soon reigned supreme throughout the cantonments. The strictest discipline was every-where enforced. The regulations were strictly obeyed, and all the wants of men and horses were liberally supplied. Comfortable cabins and shelters were constructed, and at every opportune moment the command was exercised in drills, parades, and reviews. All deficiency in clothing and equipments was supplied, and what is of more importance, about 15,000 of the men were armed with the Spencer magazine rifle, at that time altogether the best military fire-arm in the world.

The assembly of so large a command of cavalry in one

place, soon demonstrated that whatever might be the merit of the single rank formation for cavalry when dismounted, it would not do for regimental, brigade, and division formations while mounted, in a heavily wooded country. Inasmuch as a single trooper requires about one yard, it is easy to see that a regiment of 500 men in line would without intervals require 500 yards, while a division of 5,000 would require over 5,000 yards. In view of the fact that the country was generally heavily timbered, with but few fields over 1,000 yards across, the single rank tactics were abolished for all mounted movements, while it was retained for all dismounted operations. As most of the fighting afterward was done on foot, the change in tactics led to no confusion, but was productive of much good.

By the first week of March, 27,000 cavalymen were assembled in the camps between Gravelly Springs and Waterloo. The absolute control which had been given to the corps commander had enabled him to gather in this enormous force from every quarter, and the knowledge that the cavalry had at last secured an organization and a commander to look after it, encouraged both men and officers to make extra exertions to return to their colors. With another month of this work at least 10,000 more troopers could have been brought forward and added to the effective force of the corps. Men were abundant, but the great difficulty was to find remounts for them. Of course every effort was made to gather in and build up the horses which had been exhausted and left behind. The Cavalry Bureau was urged to put forth its utmost efforts to buy and send forward new horses, and there is reason to believe that it did its best, but withal, when the winter was so far broken, and the spring rains so far at an end as to permit operations to begin, there were horses enough for only 17,000 men, leaving 10,000 still dismounted. Hatch's entire division, composed of veterans of the highest quality from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Tennessee, voluntarily gave up their horses and arms in order that they might be used to eke out the supply of other divisions. Arrangements were made to remount and re-arm this splendid division, but there was no chance of get-

ting this done in time to enable it to participate in the earlier stages of the final campaign, but orders were left for it to take the field and join the corps at the earliest possible day wherever it might be. Meanwhile it was to continue in camp at Chickasaw and keep watch and ward as best it might over Northern Mississippi and West Tennessee.

While these arrangements for the complete organization and equipment of an overwhelming cavalry force were in progress, the anxiety of General Grant and the military authorities at Washington for an advance movement, broke out in the usual style of impatient orders to Thomas. It should be remembered that the entire time consumed in these preparations did not exceed nine weeks of midwinter, from the first of January to the first of March, and that none of the other national armies was engaged in active operations. It is not to be denied that the Lieutenant-general, with all his good sense, and the long years of costly experience he had had, followed by the brilliant results of uniting the eastern cavalry under Sheridan, had only partially learned the important lesson that cavalry, in order to produce great results, must not only be thoroughly organized and equipped, but must operate in masses. The disposition to break up and scatter this arm into detachments operating in widely separated regions, was still irresistible, and accordingly, about the middle of February, he ordered Thomas to send one division from Wilson's corps to Canby, operating against Mobile. Knipe's Seventh Division, fully 5,000 strong, and completely horsed, was detached and sent by steamboat to the Lower Mississippi. Of course its future operations produced but little effect in the closing operations of the war. Shortly afterward Thomas was ordered to send Wilson with a force of "say 5,000 men to make a demonstration on Tuscaloosa and Selma," but fortunately before putting this order into effect, he took steamer and went to Waterloo for a conference with the cavalry commander. Immediately after his arrival a meeting took place on board the steamer, in which Wilson represented that a "demonstration" would be of no particular or lasting advantage, and that it would be only a piece of military folly to make a demonstration with

a part of his force when he might go with the whole of it and not only capture both Tuscaloosa and Selma, but march whithersoever the exigencies of the campaign might demand, sweeping every thing before him. Besides, it was known that the hitherto invincible Forrest had been put in command of all the Confederate cavalry in Alabama, Mississippi, and Eastern Louisiana, and after the retreat of Middle Tennessee had taken post at Corinth, where, in imitation of the lesson set him by the Federal commander, he had devoted himself to the concentration, discipline, and reorganization of his command.

The remnants of Hood's infantry, having been concentrated at Tupelo, in Northern Mississippi, Forrest left one brigade of cavalry under Roddy in the vicinity of Tusculumbia, to watch the crossings of the Tennessee. He furloughed Bell's and Rucker's brigades, of Tennessee, to go home for horses and clothing, and gathered the rest of his command at Okolona, in the midst of a country rich in forage. Forrest was an active and resourceful commander, who did not fail to patrol all the country of Northern Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, beyond the lines of Federal occupation. He not only gathered in all absentees that he could find, but mercilessly conscripted all the able-bodied men that were fit for service, while his picked and trusty scouts, familiar with the country, were sent into the Federal lines to gather all the information they could in reference to the strength and future movements of the Federal forces.

General Wilson had not been idle, but had been quite as actively engaged as his wily opponent in gathering information. His spies and scouts had accurately located the Confederate forces, but not content with that, he had sent a clever staff officer with a flag of truce to Forrest, not only to negotiate an exchange of prisoners, but incidentally to gather what he could as to the frame of mind and plans of that commander. Forrest was found at West Point, Mississippi, and was quite outspoken as to his hopes. He was curious to learn what he could of General Wilson, who had so recently appeared in the West, and seemed with unusual temerity about to bring on a conflict with him. On learning

that he was a West Point man, with some knowledge of tactics and strategy, and had recently been commanding a division of Sheridan's cavalry, Forrest reflectively declared that he had not had the advantages of a military education, and knew but little as to the art of war, but he always made it his rule "to get there first with the most men." He added, somewhat contemptuously, that in a cavalry fight he would "give more for fifteen minutes of the bulge on his enemy than for three days of tactics." During the conversation with the Federal staff officer the Confederate chieftain said: "Captain, tell your general that I have picked out a first-rate place for a cavalry battle, and if he'll come down here with any force he pleases to select, I'll meet him with the same number, and agree to win the fight."

Of course the conclusion was, that Forrest, with the three divisions composing the nucleus of his corps, commanded respectively by Chalmers, Buford, and Jackson, and mustering about 10,000 men for duty, was ready for action and on the alert, and that it would be fatal to send so small a force as 5,000 men against any important point in the interior of the confederacy within the reach of that enterprising and able commander. All this was explained to Thomas, with the result, that he adopted Wilson's idea, that the whole available cavalry force should go, not merely to make a demonstration, but with the purpose of capturing both Tuscaloosa and Selma, destroying the furnaces, foundries, factories, and depots, and breaking up the Confederacy's interior lines of supply and communication. Heartily approving the policy of concentration, and operating in mass, instead of by widely scattered detachments, he fully recommended Wilson's plan, and promised that he should start as soon as the weather would permit.

Fortunately Grant also concurred, and gave the necessary instructions, accompanied by the injunction that Wilson should have all the latitude of an independent commander. The result of this was to relieve him in a measure from direct responsibility to both Sherman and Thomas, the former of whom, as commander of the military division, had instructed Wilson, when Hood should be defeated and disposed

of, to gather all of the cavalry he could get his hands on and mount; to sweep down through central Alabama and Georgia, and join him, wherever he might be, in the Carolinas or on the march for Virginia, to take part in the final struggle between Grant and Lee. Thomas, it will be remembered, had fallen heir to the geographical military division, and seeing that there was no great force to withstand him in any part of the Mississippi Valley, gave ready consent to this comprehensive suggestion, and in turning Wilson loose, perceived that he might pass entirely beyond his control. He knew, however, that the cavalry would be strong enough to go where it pleased, and always able to take care of itself.

In anticipation of Wilson's movement, Forrest, on the 17th of March, directed Armstrong's and Stark's brigades, of Chalmers' division, to take post at Pickensville, Alabama. Wirt Adams's brigade, of the same division, was at the same time moved from Jackson to Columbus, Mississippi, to cover the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Two brigades of Jackson's divisions were at West Point, Mississippi, while Buford's division was in the vicinity of Montevallo, Alabama, with Roddy's brigade well to the front, watching the roads upon which the Federal cavalry might advance. Ross's Texans had been left at Corinth to garrison that place, while Armistead and Clanton's brigades were in the vicinity of Mobile, watching the roads from the Lower Mississippi.

It will be seen that the Confederate leader, notwithstanding his great experience and ability, had committed the serious mistake of scattering his forces over a wide extent of country, while the Federal commander had his entire command, except the division with Sherman and the one he had been compelled to send to Canby, well in hand. He had three excellent divisions, all mounted, except 1,500 men, and all armed with magazine rifles or carbines, ready to move in any direction.

It is now quite evident that great uncertainty existed in the mind of Lieutenant-General Taylor, the supreme commander of the Confederate forces in that theater of operations, as well as in that of his cavalry leader, as to the plan and importance of General Wilson's impending movement.

As late as March 27th, or five days after it had commenced, Taylor notified Lee in Virginia that it was only a raid, and that it was his intention to meet and defeat it before it could advance far into the country. A movement from Pensacola toward Pollard and Montgomery, begun by General Steele on the 20th of March, was regarded as of greater importance. In order to meet this danger, Taylor directed Buford, on the 23d of March, to move at once from Montevallo through Selma to Greenville, and Forrest to send both Chalmers and Jackson to the former place, with a view to a concentration at the latter. It is worthy of note, however, that the execution of these orders had hardly begun when they were countermanded. On the 24th, in obedience to instructions received by telegraph, Forrest ordered his forces from Mississippi, with the evident design of concentrating them at Selma, and this resolution was taken before it was definitely known that that place was Wilson's objective. As will be seen, however, it was taken too late to avert the disaster which was soon to overtake the Confederate cause in that region.

General Wilson, having ferried his command across the Tennessee, began his march from Chickasaw and Waterloo through Northern Alabama on the 22d. His force consisted of the First, Second, and Fourth Cavalry Divisions, aggregating 12,500 men mounted and 1,500 dismounted, to act as train escorts till they could be mounted from captured horses. They were all veterans in excellent discipline and condition, and full of enterprise and zeal. The division and brigade commanders were mostly young men, but they had been in the war from the beginning, had had plenty of experience, and knew both how to inspire and command the confidence necessary to success. It may be doubted if a better cavalry command had ever been organized in any country in so short a time, and yet it must always remain a matter of regret that Hatch's splendid division could not have been supplied with horses and arms in time to permit it to take part in the campaign, and that Johnson's was compelled to remain in Middle Tennessee. As it turned out, the marching force was strong enough to perform the task assigned it with extraordinary celerity and completeness, but that could not be

known beforehand, and besides, it is a good rule in war, to go always with your entire force, for nothing is more certain than that if you can not beat the enemy with all your troops you can not fairly hope to do so with a part of them. Each trooper was directed to carry five days' light rations, one pair of extra horseshoes, and one hundred rounds of ammunition. Five days' rations of hard bread and ten of sugar and salt were taken on pack-animals. A light wagon-train carried forty-five days' rations of coffee, twenty of sugar, fifteen of salt, and eighty rounds of ammunition. This allowance was calculated for a sixty days' campaign, including five days' supply for the men and horses while traversing the sterile region of North Alabama. The expectation was that the rich country beyond that region would be reached without material delay, and would furnish the invading force with every thing else necessary for its subsistence. The supply train consisted of 250 wagons, which were sent back to the Tennessee as fast as they were unloaded. There was besides a small canvas pontoon train of 30 boats, hauled by 50 six-mule teams, escorted by a battalion of the 12th Missouri Cavalry, Major Hubbard commanding. Clear and explicit instructions had been given to the division commanders, looking to the successive steps of the campaign as far as the capture of Selma, 180 miles distant in a straight line, but requiring an average march of nearly 250 miles for the various divisions to reach it. In all matters of detail as to marching and maneuvering the division commanders were allowed the fullest latitude. The roads by which the columns marched were divergent at the start, and at that time they were every-where exceedingly muddy, owing to recent and long-continued rains, which in time swelled the numerous streams forming the head-waters of the Black Warrior and Cahawba Rivers. The face of the country is hilly and barren covered with dense forests broken only here and there by small farms and clearings. The creek valleys are narrow and deep, and were often made almost impassable by the absence of bridges and the presence of quicksands and quagmires. It is hard to imagine a more uninviting and difficult country

than this for military operations, or one affording less subsistence and shelter for men and horses.

The initial movements were on divergent routes. Upton's division on the left, marched through Russellville, Mt. Hope, and Jasper, to Sander's Ferry on the west or Mulberry Fork of the Black Warrior River; Long's in the center, by Cherokee Station and Frankfort to Russellville, and thence south by the Tuscaloosa road to Upper Bear Creek, where it turned to the east by Thorn Hill, crossing the forks of the Butta-hatchie through Jasper to the Ford on the Mulberry Fork of the Black Warrior River. McCook's division followed Long's to Bear Creek, thence toward Tuscaloosa as far as Eldridge, where it also turned eastward, by the road passing through Jasper. Upton, with the advance division, crossed the Mulberry Fork at a dangerous and difficult ford on the 27th. A rain-storm setting in on that day threatened to swell the broad and rapid stream, so that it could not be forded by the other two divisions, but with great skill and trouble the hardy cavalymen forced their way through the rising waters, and united the whole corps on the farther bank. Had the enemy been forehanded and ready he would have had, at that place, an admirable opportunity, with a single division, to frustrate the plans of his adversary. At Jasper, on the same day, Wilson had the good fortune to learn from scouts, who had been captured by his own patrols, that Armstrong's brigade of Chalmers' division was marching on Tuscaloosa by Bridgeville. Fearing that this indicated an intention on the part of Forrest to throw himself across the route of the Union advance, Wilson stripped his divisions to the lightest possible marching condition, leaving his wagons and their escort between the forks of the Black Warrior, and taking his pack train and artillery, he pushed on with the greatest possible speed to the crossing of the Locust Fork of the Black Warrior, thence through Elyton, at that time an indigent hamlet, but now the site of the flourishing city of Birmingham, across the Cahawba River to Montevallo, situated in the comparatively fertile country, on the direct road to Selma. As it was raining hard Upton's division marched all night to reach the Locust Fork before it should become

impassable, and after crossing the leading brigade, under Alexander, continued its hurrying march to the Cahawba which it also found rising rapidly and difficult to cross without a bridge. The following brigade, under Winslow, marched down the river a few miles to Hillsborough, where it came to a wooden lattice railroad bridge, with a long trestle-work at each end, which the enemy had failed to destroy. Winslow lost no time in flooring this over with railroad ties and crossing to the other side. The other divisions followed by the same means. The passage of these three rising rivers, without the use of the pontoon bridge, and without delay or opposition, was a notable performance, and brought the cavalry corps into the coal and iron region of Alabama, abounding in corn and bacon, and traversed from north to south by a straight road leading to Selma.

Wilson's divisions were somewhat widely scattered in the earlier days of the campaign, but it will be observed that they were concentrated at Jasper, and thenceforward marched in close supporting distance of each other. Could Forrest have foreseen his opponent's line of operations and concentrated his force at any of the river crossings or even at Elyton, he might have made an effective resistance, but it has been shown that his command had been so widely distributed that concentration in time was out of the question. The Union commander, in order to cover his trains and attract the attention and develop the movements of the Confederate cavalry, had detached Croxton's brigade of McCook's division at Jasper, with orders to move directly on Tuscaloosa, and after capturing that place to burn all the public stores, factories, and bridges, and then rejoin the column east of the Cahawba, which it was hoped he could cross at Centerville on the road to Selma. The first part of these orders was successfully executed, but resulted in an encounter near Trion with Jackson's division and Wirt Adams's brigade, both marching rapidly toward the east for the purpose of covering or throwing themselves into Selma. They interposed, without intending or knowing it, between Croxton and Centerville, and prevented his reaching there, although McCook, with La Grange's brigade, leaving the main column

two days later at Randolph, had reached Centerville ahead of the enemy, and after seizing the bridge, had pushed out and attacked him sharply. The latter was, of course, greatly confused by finding himself assailed, both front and rear, at or about the same time, and might have been broken up and scattered had McCook and La Grange succeeded in communicating with Croxton and managed to act in concert with him against the enemy. It is to be observed, however, that these two brigades had been detached on different days and had marched on widely divergent and circuitous routes, separated by the Cahawba River, and even if Croxton had not been ignorant of La Grange's position it would have been almost impossible to send couriers from one column to the other, except by way of Centerville. That McCook and La Grange, after capturing the bridge at that place, did not succeed in communicating with Croxton was a sore disappointment to Wilson. It led to Croxton's permanent detachment, and compelled him to make a wide detour to the west and south of Tuscaloosa, and then northward and eastward across Alabama into Georgia before rejoining the corps.

From Elyton other detachments were sent off to destroy the collieries and iron works of Central Alabama, while the main body of the corps hurried forward to Montevallo where it was believed that Chalmers and Buford would form a junction and make a stand for the purpose of checking the advance.

During this march an officer of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, of Upton's division, arrested an Englishman named Millington, a civil engineer, who had been employed in planning and constructing the fortifications of Selma, and who made an accurate topographical sketch and description of the works and their armament, and also of the country surrounding the city, all of which were forwarded at once to Wilson. The information thus obtained was of great value, as it enabled the latter to arrange a definite plan of attack before his command had invested the place. The advance, having reached Montevallo with but slight resistance from Buford's skirmishers, halted here over night and long enough the next day to permit the following divisions to close up.

Large quantities of corn and provisions were found in the town, and after the wants of the command were supplied the remainder was destroyed. It was a virgin country, rich in every thing required by cavalry. Foraging was easily conducted, and this relieved the commander of the corps from all anxiety, except that which was inseparable from the hazard of battle with his redoubtable antagonist.

About noon on the 31st of March, while the first and second divisions were arriving in Montevallo, the enemy attacked Upton's pickets, posted on the Selma road about a mile south of the town, and this was a challenge which was promptly accepted. Gen. Wilson, who had arrived at the town, and was conferring with Upton, ordered the latter to move out at once. This was done with alacrity. Alexander's brigade, Colonel Benteen, with the Tenth Missouri, leading, found the enemy well posted on the crest of a hill beyond a creek running athwart the road. With a rapid dash Benteen swept over the bridge, and swinging into a thicket bordering the creek, dismounted his men. Without any greater delay than was necessary to deploy in single rank he advanced with a yell against the enemy's position, which Rodney's guns were already searching with a close and rapid fire. Noble, with the Third Iowa, followed in a gallant charge with the saber, and in an incredibly short time the enemy's line was overwhelmed and in full retreat, with the loss of about 100 men, and many arms and equipments.

While Alexander was mounting and re-arranging his squadrons, Upton, who was, as was his habit, close up to the front, directed Winslow's brigade to take the lead, and give the enemy no time to rally or reform. A running fight of six miles took place, in which Forrest, in person, exerted all his powers to stay the retreat. He seized every advantage of ground and position, and tried countercharge and ambuscade, but in vain. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the National horse, now thoroughly aroused by success. The pursuit was continued as far as Randolph, and even then was arrested only by darkness. It had been an eventful and encouraging day to the cavalry corps, only one division of which had been engaged. It was evident, too, that

the Confederate leader had not yet succeeded in concentrating his forces, while the invading column was absolutely closed up and ready for any emergency that might arise. Selma was only forty-five miles away, supplies were abundant, and a feeling of great confidence inspired both officers and men.

Early the next morning, April 1st, the corps resumed its operations, Upton taking the left hand or Maplesville road, while Long, followed by La Grange, marched upon the main road to Selma. As the two roads are nearly parallel, and nowhere more than three miles apart, the columns were in close supporting distance of each other. Early in the day Upton captured a rebel courier with dispatches from Forrest, showing that his forces were still scattered, and that Jackson was coming from Tuscaloosa *via* Centerville. On this information, which gave still greater confidence to Wilson, he detached McCook with La Grange's brigade to move rapidly to Centerville, only about forty miles away, to seize and hold the bridge over the Cahawba, and to throw himself boldly upon Jackson. It was hoped that this movement would result in reuniting the two brigades of McCook's division, and that together they would destroy Jackson's forces, or at least keep them out of the fight for Selma. As already shown, this hope was only partially realized although McCook advanced beyond the bridge and engaged the enemy at Scottsboro, from which place, after learning that Croxton had withdrawn toward Elyton, he fell back to Centerville, and after crossing to the left bank of the river, burnt the bridge. This compelled Jackson to continue his march down the right bank of the Cahawba, and delayed him so much that he reached the vicinity of Selma too late to make any effective diversion in its favor. McCook rejoined the corps on the 6th of April. The game was an exciting one and skillfully played. Indeed, there is nothing finer in the history of warfare than the rapid advance and admirable disposition of the national cavalry as it approached the objective at which it was aiming. Both columns were confronted by rebel detachments, which kept up a running fight all the way back to Ebenezer Church, situated at the junction of the

two roads on which the Union columns were moving. At this place Forrest had taken up an advantageous position, and had disposed of all the force he could collect, including cavalry, artillery, and a detachment of infantry from Selma. It was evidently his intention to hold on here as long as possible, and to make the best fight he could, so as to gain time for the concentration of the rest of his force. He was, besides, a resolute and resourceful commander of whom it was well for even the most confident antagonist to beware.

Long's division was the first to approach the enemy's position. Fortunately his leading regiment, the 17th Indiana Mounted Infantry, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White, a most gallant and capable officer, who, without a moment's hesitation, rode straight at the rebel line, followed by a battalion of two hundred sabers. The shock was terrific, and resulted in breaking through the rebel lines, crushing down the carriage of one gun, and scattering Roddey's brigade. It was followed by a hand-to-hand conflict, in which the greatest spirit was displayed by both sides. White and his men were completely surrounded, but nothing daunted, they lay about them so fiercely as to convince the Confederates that the whole Yankee force had fallen upon them. White, in person, led his followers into the battery at the junction of the roads, but its defenders were too many for him. Rallying gallantly they gathered about him in such numbers as to leave him no choice but to turn and cut his way out, which he did with heavy loss. Captain Taylor, a gallant boy of not over twenty years, commanding one of White's companies, threw himself fiercely upon Forrest, and assailed that chieftain with such a shower of saber strokes, about his head and shoulders, as to force him in a running fight to turn in his seat and shoot his gallant pursuer from his saddle. In speaking of it afterward, with his arm in a sling, Forrest said: "If that boy had known enough when he was pressing me so hard to give me the point of the saber, instead of striking me with its edge, it would have been all up with me." Before Long could deploy the rest of his division to support White, Alexander, hearing the firing, pushed forward rapidly on the Maples-

ville road, till he struck the right of Forrest's line, which he found extending from the mouth of Mulberry creek, near the south bank of Bogler's creek, to the Selma road. The line occupied a wooded ridge for about a mile, its left crossing the road and resting on a bend of the creek. It was strengthened by a fence-rail barricade, and a slashing of trees, with a battery of six guns at the forks of the road, four sweeping the road on which Long's division was advancing, and two bearing upon that occupied by Upton. The men were dismounted, with horses well to the rear, and every thing indicated that a desperate stand was to be made. It was afterward ascertained that Forrest's force consisted of three brigades of cavalry, commanded respectively by Roddey, Crossland, and Dan Adams, besides the detachment of infantry already mentioned. The Confederate historians claim that Forrest's entire force did not exceed 1,500 men all told, but as the cavalry brigades could hardly have mustered less than a thousand men each, it is probable that his entire force on the field was between three and four thousand men. But be this as it may, Alexander, finding the enemy in strength, did not delay to ascertain his numbers, but dismounted two of his regiments, holding the third in reserve, and advanced at once to the assault, on the left of Long's dismounted line. The fight was a sharp and desperate one, and Forrest held his men, as only he could, tenaciously to their work. Upton, as soon as Winslow's brigade made its appearance, threw two mounted regiments forward on Alexander's left, which caught the rebel line in the flank just as it was breaking to the rear. Nothing could withstand the impetuosity of the Union cavalry. Mounted and dismounted men, vieing with each other, swept irresistibly onward, driving the enemy from the field in confusion. Three guns and four hundred prisoners were the trophies of victory.

The pursuit was continued, with another running fight, till night put an end to it, less than twenty miles from Selma. The corps had advanced twenty-five miles that day, and fought one battle. It had got "the bulge" on Forrest,

and, without neglecting tactics, had kept him moving rapidly from dawn till dark, except for the brief space during which he held his position at Ebenezer Church. Withal, the day was a tiresome one, and both men and officers were glad to find rest and food at the bivouac fires, which were blazing by nightfall in almost countless numbers about the little village of Plantersville.

On Sunday, April 2d, the reveillé was sounded before day-break; horses, arms, and equipments were looked to carefully, and all arrangements were made for a rapid movement and a desperate fight. Long's division, in the advance, was on the road before sunrise. It was followed by Upton at nine o'clock. All servants and impediments were left behind. Mile after mile was covered without a sign of the enemy, but this was not surprising, for Forrest, having been beaten in every encounter for two days, had wisely made up his mind not to fight again till he could shelter himself and his command behind the fortifications of Selma, which it was now their duty to defend at every cost. It was an important place of ten thousand inhabitants, situated almost at the very heart of the Confederacy. It contained a gun-foundry, an armory, and several factories, engaged in turning out military munitions for the Southern government, and had been covered by a well constructed line of earthworks, sweeping in a semi-circle from the Alabama River, above the town, to the river below it. The Confederate authorities and the engineer, who had assisted in laying them out, believed them to be impregnable to any force of cavalry which could be brought against them.

All day long the Union commander rode with the leading division, conversing with Long and his brigade commanders as to the plan of attack and the necessity for success in the coming assault. The Englishman's sketch showed all the necessary details as to the cross-section of the works and their ditches, the palisades covering them, the open ground, the small creeks, the woods, and the marsh outside. This was shown to Minty and Miller, commanding brigades. Nothing was concealed from those gallant soldiers. All the difficulties, so far as known or foreseen, were pointed out and

considered. Even the results of failure and disaster were discussed, till there was nothing further to be said, except that the works had to be carried, no matter what the cost. And they promised to carry them if it was possible for soldiers to do it.

As the Federal column approached the city, Long's division was turned to the right and crossed over to Summerfield road, while Upton continued his advance on the road from Plantersville. Shortly after three o'clock the advanced guards caught sight of the city from the plateau overlooking it; and then the lines were developed, the assaulting regiments and their supports dismounted and told off, and the led horses sent to the rear. Meanwhile, General Wilson and his staff made a sufficient reconnoissance to verify the plan they had of the town and its surroundings. Upton and Long each did likewise in his own front. The sketch was found to be surprisingly accurate; and in a short time all the dispositions were completed for the attack. Long, having posted one regiment, at the creek in his rear, to look out for Jackson and protect the led horses and the pack-train, formed the rest of his division dismounted across the Summerfield road, with his right extended toward Mill Creek, and his whole line about a half a mile outside of the rebel works, and parallel with them. It was entirely concealed from the enemy by a low intervening ridge. There were only 1,550 men and officers in the fighting line; but they were all veterans of the finest quality, and admirably armed with Spencer carbines or rifles. The rest of his available men were in close supporting distance.

Upton's division was halted about a mile from the works, Winslow's brigade dismounted and deployed, Alexander's mounted and ready to move in any direction at a minute's notice. Robinson's battery was on the Summerfield road, Rodney's on the main line, both within effective range.

It had been decided that the main assault should be made by Long, while Upton, with 300 picked men, under cover of growing trees and underbrush, should push out by his left and penetrate the marsh of Bench Creek so as to strike the enemy's works where they were weakest, and most

likely to be badly defended. The attack was not to be made till every body had reached the ground assigned to him. The signal for the advance was to be a single gun from Rodney's battery, but this arrangement was interfered with and could not be carried out. About five o'clock Chalmers' advance attacked Long's regiment at the creek; another regiment was promptly sent back to support it, but foreseeing that further delay in the main attack might result in confusion, and possibly in defeat, Long, without even taking time to refer the matter to Wilson, ordered his line to advance. Led by the general, on foot, assisted by two brigade and four regimental commanders, the gallant cavalymen in a single line, and elbow to elbow, rushed straight at the works in the face of a galling fire of musketry and a storm of shot and shell from twenty guns sweeping the ground over which they were advancing. In less time than it takes to tell it, over three hundred of Long's men were killed or wounded. Long himself was stricken down, together with three out of the two brigade commanders and four colonels, but nothing could daunt or stop the rush of that gallant line. Pausing not to count the cost, the gallant soldiers of the Union scaled the palisades, scrambled through the ditch and over the parapet into the works, where a desperate hand-to-hand fight soon gave it the victory.

Wilson, hearing the roar of the enemy's guns, and the rattle of musketry on Long's front, divined that an important emergency had arisen, and rode at once toward that part of the field. The truth was soon discovered, whereupon, orders were sent to Upton to advance also to the charge, without waiting for further orders or the agreed signal. Every body was at his post, and like a hound straining at the leash, eager to dash forward at the word. The whole plain was instantaneously covered with a whirlwind of battle. Wilson himself, seeing his orders had been obeyed, and his whole command either advancing or supporting the advancing lines, dismounted from the horse he had ridden all day, sprang into the saddle of a splendid gray gelding, and turning to the officer commanding his escort—the invincible Fourth Regular Cavalry—bade them follow at the charge! Straight down the Plantersville highway, directly for the works, the general

and his gallant escort rode, every man, from highest to lowest, with nerves strained to the utmost, and every man acting as though his example was essential to the certainty of victory. Long had swept over the works in his front like a tornado, but Forrest and Armstrong rallied with their men behind an inner but only partly constructed line, and continued to fight like stags at bay. Upton, moving a few minutes later, but with no less determination, carried the works in his front, and this made it possible for the commanding general, whose gallant gray had been knocked down, close up to the works, by a rifle shot full in the chest, to rally the shaken and disappointed squadrons of the Fourth regulars, and lead them through the break left in the outer line of intrenchments for the accommodation of the highway travel. The gallant commanders of the horse artillery, seeing the tide of battle setting strongly toward the doomed city, limbered up and galloped to the front, going into battery again under the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, and pouring a storm of canister and grape into them that added to the rout and confusion. Forrest and his lieutenants did their best to stem the tide of the victorious northerners, but further resistance was futile. Darkness had already set in, but the victory was complete all along the line. The closing scene of that action was one never to be forgotten by those who participated in it. The clatter of sabers, the thunder of the horses' feet, the booming of the guns, the flash and rattle of pistols and carbines,, the blare of the trumpets sounding the charge, and the "noise of the captains and the shouting," were as music to the victors, though they sent a thrill of horror through the hearts of the vanquished, and made a pandemonium for the innocent women and children of that devoted city. Seeing that all was over, Forrest, followed by Armstrong and a few hundred devoted horsemen, under cover of darkness, pushed through the streets to the Burnsville road and made their escape to the open country. Buford and Adams succeeded in finding a boat, which carried them in safety to the south side of the Alabama River, while a number of their men, in endeavoring to swim the great stream, were swept away and drowned. Taylor, the depart-

ment commander, left early by a special train to the westward, narrowly escaping capture. Although it was now dark, it is not to be imagined that the victors drew rein or were idle for a moment. Rapidly forming columns, they rode down the streets of the town, sweeping every thing before them, charging the retreating enemy as opportunity offered, taking prisoners and horses, and picking up the spoils of war. An hour or more passed before the streets were cleared, and another before order was restored and the scattered cavalrymen could be collected into camps and bivouacs.

A few stores were gutted by marauders and drunken negroes, and here and there a fire broke out, but the marauders and negroes were soon cleared from the streets, and the fires were suppressed by the provost guards. By midnight quiet and order were restored, but it was not till late the next day that the full extent of the national victory was understood.

Forrest, who had fled by the Burnsville road, turned across the country to Plantersville, and thence west to Marion, beyond the Cahawba, where he found several of his brigades and the remainder of his artillery, all of which should have reached Selma two days before. On his way during the night he discovered a scouting party of the Fourth regulars, under Lieutenant Royce, who had gone into camp after night a few miles from Selma, and feeling that he was within the Union lines, had failed to post sentinels. Forrest fell upon the party with the ferocity of a wild Indian, and killed every man of it.

The capture of Selma, surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks well and fiercely defended by infantry, cavalry and artillery, was one of the most notable feats ever accomplished by cavalry. The intrenchments contained twenty-four bastions and a number of redans from eight to twelve feet high and from ten to fifteen thick, with ditches of the same width and depth, filled with water at places, and covered on the glacis with a stockade of pine logs firmly planted in the ground. The curtains on that part of the line, fronted by Mill and Bench creeks, were generally stockaded rifle pits, but every foot of the four miles of intrenchment was

sufficiently strong to justify the belief that no cavalry could break through it. But in order to make assurance doubly sure, an interior line of four detached forts had been constructed from the Marion to the Plantersville road, about three-quarters of a mile inside the outer line, and a curtain had been laid out but not finished to make this line continuous. At the time of the assault Forrest had inside the works a force which, his biographer claims, did not exceed 3,100 men, but which really consisted of about 4,400 veteran cavalry, besides detachments of infantry and all the militia and home guards that Forrest could force into the ranks. How many there were of these there is no record to show, but with a city of ten thousand inhabitants to draw from, and the relentless Forrest insisting that every man, including the preachers and lawyers, "should go into the works or into the river," it is fair to assume that there could not have been less than 2,500 of these, or enough to bring the fighting force for the defense of the place quite up to 7,000 men. Forrest, a few days afterward, admitted that Armstrong's brigade alone, which filled the works assaulted by Long, had as many men defending the parapets as were engaged in attacking them.*

When it is remembered that, in addition to the men with small arms in their hands, these works contained for their defense 30 field guns and two 30-pounder Parrott's, so mounted as to sweep all the approaches, and to concentrate their fire on either, and that all of them were manned and engaged in the effort to drive back the assaulting lines, it will be still more difficult to understand why they did not succeed.

Wilson's entire force consisted of only two divisions and two batteries, amounting in all to about 8,000 men present for duty. His losses were 44 killed, 277 wounded, and 7 missing, a total of 328.

No list of Confederate killed and wounded was ever made, but the aggregate could hardly have been so great as that of the Union cavalry.

* For a fuller account of this campaign and the strength of the opposing forces, see "The Story of a Cavalry Regiment," by Wm. Forse Scott. Putnam's, 1893.

The trophies of victory were enormous. They included 2,700 prisoners with their officers and colors, about 2,000 horses, 32 guns in use, 26 field guns with carriages and caissons in the arsenal, 44 siege guns in the foundry, 66,000 rounds of ammunition for artillery, and over 100,000 rounds for small arms. But what was of still greater importance, the capture of the city enabled the victors to destroy the Selma arsenal, consisting of 44 buildings, covering 13 acres of ground, and filled with machinery and munitions; the powder works and magazine, with 7 buildings containing the necessary machinery, 14,000 pounds of powder, and a large number of cartridges; the niter works, with 18 buildings fully equipped and in operation; 3 foundries and their equipment for casting military and naval guns; 3 rolling mills in operation; and a number of machine shops and factories making tools and military equipments, besides the central quartermaster and commissary depots and accumulated supplies for a great department. As far as needed, the captured horses were used to remount the train guards who arrived with LaGrange's brigade on the 6th; the remainder were killed to prevent their being used again by the enemy.

The blow was a fatal one to the Confederacy, for no matter what might be the result of the contest in Virginia, this city, with its government establishments and manufacturing plants, and the resources of the rich country surrounding it, was essential to the further continuance of organized resistance. Fully realizing all this, the Federal commander took every precaution to make the work of destruction complete. The machinery was broken and dismantled, the round shot were rolled into the river, and all the buildings and establishments, used or patronized by the government, were burned, but this was done at night during a heavy rain-storm, when it was comparatively easy to prevent the fire from spreading to private property.

Immediately after the occupancy of the place, Upton was sent out to scour the country, pick up prisoners and property, and bring in the detachments and trains, all of which was accomplished without further fighting or loss.

The first step in the campaign had been taken with rapidity and success, but nothing had been heard from Grant, Sherman, Thomas, or Canby, and hence it was not known at Selma that the Confederacy was tottering on the very verge of ruin. General Wilson knew, of course, that the heart had been torn out of the rebellion in Alabama, and that Canby was simply wasting time in operating against Mobile instead of marching boldly into the interior of the state. Feeling assured that the cavalry corps could do no good by going further south, and that his true theater of operations lay to the eastward, Wilson sent a trusty colored man, who volunteered for the service, in a skiff down the Alabama River, with which he was well acquainted, to deliver a letter to Canby, informing him of the fall of Selma, and advising him to march inland at once. The letter also contained the information that Wilson would cross the river and move by the way of Montgomery into Central Georgia.

Before starting on the new campaign, he felt that he ought to know what had become of Croxton, and as he had a large number of prisoners, he sought and obtained an interview with Forrest under a flag of truce. The meeting took place in the house of Colonel Matthews, at Cahawba, near the mouth of the Cahawba River. Its ostensible object was to arrange for an exchange or parol of prisoners, but this was declined by Forrest, who had but few to release, and felt that it would embarrass the Union commander to retain and care for the large number in his possession. The conversation and exchange of courtesies was continued, however, till Wilson had drawn out the fact that Croxton and his command were still at large and going where they pleased in the country west of the Cahawba River. With this information, all anxiety for Croxton's safety disappeared, and Wilson galloped back to Selma, resolved to hasten his preparations for continuing the campaign to the eastward, with the purpose of breaking up the rest of the enemy's depots and factories, destroying his interior line of railway communication and supply, and ultimately taking part with Sherman in North Carolina and Grant in Virginia, in the destruction of the last armies of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The Capture of Montgomery, Columbus, West Point and Macon.

The first new objective point was Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, and also the first capital of the Confederacy, but as it lay on the south or east side of the Alabama River, it was necessary for the cavalry corps to cross as the first step in its further operations.

Foreseeing this necessity, and finding that all the steamboats had been run beyond his reach, Wilson, on the first day after his occupation of Selma, had set his staff officers at the task of constructing a sufficient number of wooden pontoons with the canvas boats in his bridge train, to span the Alabama River, which was found to be nearly 900 feet wide at the place selected for the crossing. By the use of lumber found near by, and the help of colored carpenters, the boats were finished and the bridge laid by the 9th of April, immediately after which the command began crossing. But as the river was rising rapidly, and carried by a large lot of drift logs, it was with the greatest difficulty that the bridge could be maintained in a condition of safety. It was broken several times, but repaired each time without material delay or loss of life. General Alexander, who was using a small boat for the purpose of warding off the floating logs, was overturned by an anchor line and nearly crushed to death between a floating tree and the bow of one of the pontoons. Three of his ribs were broken, but he was rescued without further injury, and although compelled to travel for a few days in an ambulance, continued in command of his brigade. General Winslow, who had been made military governor of Selma, and had superintended the destruction of the public property with marked ability, brought off the rear guard, and destroyed the wooden boats after the last

man had crossed. The passage of this great river was an important and interesting event, and characterized by many romantic incidents and adventures. After the movement began it was kept up constantly except while the bridge was broken. During the last night the scene was lighted by the blaze of burning frame buildings, which had been selected and set on fire for that purpose.

The corps, after a week's comparative rest and repair, had now successfully commenced its new campaign, but after deducting Croxton's brigade, and the total of killed and wounded, its effective strength was reduced to about 11,000 men, all of whom were now mounted and in better condition for service than ever before. Harness, equipments, and shoeing had been carefully looked after; wagons, pontoon train, and pack-animals had been reduced to the lowest limit, and all camp-followers had been rigidly cut off. A large number of able-bodied negroes had come in, but they were enlisted and formed into regiments, one for each division, under the command of white officers detailed for that purpose. This force was armed with captured rebel guns, and after a few days was mounted on horses and mules impressed from the country. It subsisted by foraging and made itself exceedingly useful by helping with the heavy work of the command during the closing days of the campaign. These regiments were afterward regularly mustered into the Army of the United States as infantry, and served in Georgia with credit for several months after the war was at an end.

The facility with which this organization was made, and the readiness with which it, as well as the mounted men of the train guard were mounted, make it certain that Hatch's splendid division, over 5,000 strong, left on the Tennessee, for lack of horses, might also have accompanied the cavalry army, and remounted itself with horses captured or impressed from the enemy. The lesson is of value, and should not be lost sight of by military men dealing with such subjects hereafter.

The line of march from Selma lay to the eastward through the planting villages of Benton Church Hill and Lowndesborough, and brought the corps with but slight re-

sistance from Clanton's brigade, of Buford's division, to Montgomery, on the 12th of April. The authorities of that city wisely decided that no effective defense of it could be made although an elaborate series of earthworks had been built around it. They therefore resolved to take time by the forelock and place themselves and the town, without delay, under the protection of General Wilson. For this purpose the mayor, accompanied by some of the principal citizens, rode out beyond the fortifications and surrendered their charge, without conditions. This was an unexpected event, and somewhat of a disappointment to both officers and men of the Union cavalry, for they had approached the city expecting and prepared for a battle, but there was nothing to be done but accept the surrender, and show the good people of the first Confederate capital how perfect was the discipline of the invading army.

In perfect order the column closed in platoon front, with every man in his place, flags unfurled, guidons flying, sabers and spurs jingling, bands playing, and the bugles sounding, that war-begrimed host of Union troopers traversed the city, setting the brave but misguided people of that capital an example of discipline far more impressive than a bloody victory would have been. The Union flag had been promptly hoisted over the State House, and as regiment after regiment filed beneath its starry folds, they made the welkin ring with their exultant hurrahs. It was a great day for the country and for the cavalry corps, the men of which seemed instinctively to understand that the city, having surrendered without a fight, belonged to the commanding general, and they were bound in honor to respect his truce. Not a marauder showed himself; not a house was entered, except by invitation; and not a word was uttered to offend the most refined susceptibilities. The flag had made its appearance in the first Confederate capital, not only as the emblem of national unity, but as the emblem of order and justice under the law. While the larger part of the corps camped in the vicinity of the city, and Wilson made his head-quarters there for the night, La Grange pushed on to the eastward, skirmishing with Buford. During the afternoon he drove that leader to Mt. Meigs, ten

miles from Columbus, and ended the day's work by capturing his battle-flag and thirty of his men.

Detachments were sent out from Montgomery to destroy all the vessels and military supplies within reach. Five steamboats, laden with subsistence stores, were captured and burned, and five field-guns, with their carriages, were taken and disabled for further service. At both Selma and Montgomery the Confederate leaders had destroyed immense quantities of cotton, under the mistaken notion that the cavalry corps was hunting for it, and would take possession of it for the Federal government. So long as the insensate policy of burning the only surplus product of the South which could be sold for gold was persisted in by the rebels, General Wilson ordered his subordinate commanders to help them in it with all their might. And so it came about that what the rebels missed or spared the national soldiery sought out and gave to the torch. The consequence was, that many million dollars' worth of this valuable staple went up in smoke at Columbus, as well as at Montgomery and Selma, and many planters, merchants, and warehousemen of Central Alabama and Georgia were impoverished even after they must have known that peace was near at hand. It should be stated in fairness, however, that all the loss did not fall upon private individuals, for such was not the case. It was well known that much of the cotton had been taken by the Confederate government and sold to foreigners in exchange for supplies, which were to be brought in by blockade runners, whose return cargoes were to be the cotton in question. Until it was known beyond question that the war was ended, and the revolted regions brought under sway of the national government, to leave this cotton behind would have been like leaving its value in gold for the purpose of carrying on the rebellion.

While at Montgomery, Wilson got the first intimation that Lee had evacuated Richmond, but there was no suggestion that he had met with disaster or surrendered at Appomattox Court House. If any citizen knew it, he studiously concealed it from the Union commander, and left him to learn it as best he might farther east. The evacuation of Richmond was of itself no insignificant event, for, although

it might presage an immediate collapse of the Confederate cause, it might also indicate a voluntary movement for the union of Lee's and Johnston's armies, and a combined and overwhelming attack against Grant or Sherman. Until it was certainly known what had actually occurred in Virginia, and what the occurrence portended, it served only to arouse the anxiety and quicken the movements of the cavalry commander. Tarrying in Montgomery, only one night, he pushed eastward on the 13th, with celerity, his next great object being to cross the Chattahoochee at Columbus on the direct road to Macon, if possible, or at West Point, farther to the north, if he must. It was known that the river was spanned by bridges at each of those places, and it was hoped that a bold and rapid movement of the main column on the former, with a strong demonstration on the latter, would prove successful at one or both of those places.

Explaining his views to Upton, Wilson ordered that most capable soldier to take the advance with his own division, and to detach McCook with LaGrange's brigade for the side operation. Inasmuch as Long had been compelled by the force of circumstances, to forestall Upton in the attack on Selma, and had not only been severely wounded, but had done most of the fighting and gained most of the glory, it was now fairly Upton's turn to have the lead, and to manage the details of the movement. The sequel shows that he was most worthy of the honor conferred upon him. One of the most brilliant and distinguished commanders of artillery and infantry in the Army of the Potomac, Upton had already shown himself to be one of the best division commanders of cavalry in the west, and was now about to crown his career with his most brilliant performance.

The march of the two columns lay directly east by the same route until they reached Tuskegee, at which point LaGrange left the Columbus road and pushed northeastward toward West Point, near which place he arrived on the 16th. He found a strong bridgehead, the key-point of which was a square redoubt called Fort Tyler, surrounded by a deep ditch and mounting three guns, one of which was a 32-pounder siege piece. The garrison consisted, as was afterward as-

certained, of 265 men, all the redoubt would hold, commanded by General Robert C. Tyler and Colonel James C. Fannin, both officers of extraordinary gallantry. Quickly informing himself of the situation and surroundings of the town, LaGrange led the attack, in person, through the street directly to the bridge, dashed across it, leaping a chasm in the flooring, closely followed by a battalion of his command, beat out the fire which had already been started with lighted turpentine balls, and then wheeled about, recrossed the bridge, and gave his attention to the capture of the fort. His dismounted men had already driven the rebel skirmishers back to the redoubt, and discovered the ditch by which it was surrounded. In an incredibly short time a detachment, without arms, detailed for that purpose, had prepared the materials consisting of the panels of a picket fence with the necessary flooring boards, for three bridges, and a section of parrot rifles had been put in position to sweep the parapet of the fort. Under the fire of these guns which quickly dismounted or silenced those in the redoubt, the way was soon cleared for the bridging parties, and the assaulting detachments to charge upon the enemy's position. The bridges were successfully laid, but the first assault was repulsed. A number of the men fell back, while others leapt into the ditch for shelter. Encouraged by this result, the enemy threw lighted shells over the parapet on to the heads of those below. A part of these shells were extinguished by water in the ditch, a part were stamped out, and a part were hurled back into fort still blazing.

A second and more determined attack followed at once, and this time resulted in complete victory. The bridges which had been laid before were reached and safely crossed, the parapet was scaled, and the gallant soldiers of Wisconsin, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Harden, raced with those of Indiana, under Captain Hill, to see who should have the honor of hauling down the rebel flag. The garrison fought desperately, and yielded only when overpowered. General Tyler, three of his officers, and 14 enlisted men were killed, 28 were wounded, and 219 surrendered. La Grange had one horse killed under him, and lost 7 men killed, and 29 wounded.

He captured 3 guns, 500 stands of small arms, 19 locomotive engines, and 240 cars loaded with army supplies, all of which were disabled or burned. Several large buildings, also filled with army supplies, were taken possession of and devoted to the same fate.

But what was of still greater importance, La Grange had secured a safe passage into Central Georgia, not only for his own column, but for the whole corps should it become necessary for the latter to use it. His operations, although he had throughout the advantage of a superior force, were conducted with rare skill and judgment, and showed him to be a commander of extraordinary ability and promise. The main column continued its movement with rapidity on the direct road for Columbus, making forty and fifty miles per day. Small parties of Confederate cavalry were encountered from time to time, but they were too light to seriously delay the progress of the invading force.

At Tuskegee, a beautiful country town, the seat of a number of schools for girls, the corps added to its renown by passing through the principal street as it passed through Montgomery, with every man in his place, guidons unfurled, and the bands playing patriotic airs. General Wilson's horse was decked out with garlands, and so far as external politeness could show it, the national troopers were regarded as friends rather than enemies.

At this place the provost-marshal of the corps discovered a printing office from which a disloyal local newspaper had been published, and of course he ordered it to be destroyed, but it so turned out that a lady claimed to be its owner, and loudly protested against this arbitrary measure. The officer, although firm, was not altogether without sympathy for the sincere distress of the lady, who begged for a respite till she could see the commanding general. As this was readily allowed she was soon making decided inroads into his sympathies. When she declared that all the school books and Bibles used in that region had also been printed on her press, and pleaded, with a flood of tears, that it might be spared to continue that good work, her case was almost won. The general suggested that if she would enter into contract

never to print another number of a rebel newspaper, and to devote her press henceforth and forever to the printing of Bibles and school books, and would give a bond signed by the mayor and two good citizens for the faithful performance of her undertaking, he would suspend his order indefinitely. To this she eagerly assented. The agreement was at once drawn up, and duly signed, sealed, and delivered, and the good woman went home rejoicing. The general and his staff mounted and rode away, feeling that they were leaving behind at least one loyal woman, but whether she faithfully kept her contract is unknown. The official records of the War of the Rebellion, so far as published, throw no light upon that question. This episode, however, did not for a moment suspend the movement of the column toward its goal on the Chattahoochee. The remnant of Buford's division did its best, by skirmish and ambuscade, to retard the swift march of the advanced guard, but with no other effect than to keep it on the alert and full of determination. General Wilson and his staff twice passed within a few yards of a party of bushwhackers, one of whom took aim and tried to pull his trigger, but failed for lack of courage or because his conscience would not permit him, like an assassin from a place of concealment, to shoot even a general.

By night of March 16th the advance of the column had got within a half-day's march of Columbus, when it went into camp. Before moving out the next morning men and horses were carefully inspected, and every precaution was taken to prepare them for the battle which was expected to take place. Columbus was known to be a city of from ten to twelve thousand people, containing work-shops, gun, sword, and pistol factories, clothing and equipment depots, mills, and supplies of every kind in greater numbers and abundance than any other city left in the Confederacy. It was the most remote city in the South, both from the borders of the loyal states and from the sea-coast, and the idea of its capture seems never to have been seriously considered by the Confederate leaders. It had even been suggested in the

Confederate Congress to make it the capital instead of Richmond, and a navy-yard had been located there. It was known that the three bridges spanning the river at that place had been covered by a strong *tête-de-pont*, in which many guns had been mounted, but nothing definite could be learned as to the trace or profile of the intrenchments. No itinerant engineer was found, as in the case of Selma, to give the invaders a plan, or a statement of the guns in position. They were forced to depend upon their own observation, and were confronted by a necessity for victory even greater, if possible, than at the Alabama River. But Upton, although young in years, was an old and experienced hand at finding the weak spots and assaulting fortifications. He had the advance, and was urged to reach the ground, and after a careful reconnoissance, to make his plan of attack as soon as possible, so that the troops might be brought directly to the positions from which they were to move to the assault. He arrived in sight of Girard, a small suburb situated on the right or western bank of the river, with Columbus itself on the left or eastern bank, at about one o'clock, and found such a formidable and extended line of fortifications as to demand a most careful examination, which he at once began. Girard appeared to be about equally divided by Mill Creek flowing from the north-west and entering the Chattahoochie opposite the center of the city. It also became known that two wooden bridges, about 1,000 feet long, and a half a mile apart, connected the suburb with the city, and that a railroad bridge was situated about a quarter of a mile above the upper wagon bridge. The lower bridge was used by the city road to Eufaula and Crawford, and the middle one by the road to Summerville, Opelika, and Salem, while the upper bridge belonged to the Columbus and Western Railroad. The country on which the line of works was traced, as well as that which surrounds it, is hilly, and at that time was generally covered with a thick growth of scrub-oak. The hills are from one hundred to four hundred feet higher than the river and separated by deep, narrow ravines, which made the country an exceedingly difficult one to define or understand. By the time Upton had mastered it and got ready

to submit his plan, the whole command had arrived, but it was getting quite late, and Upton was disconcerted by the fear that he could not place the troops in time for them to make their attack before dark. After reporting fully to General Wilson, he therefore advised that the troops should be moved to the positions selected for them, and then sleep on their arms till early dawn. Fully approving Upton's plan of attack, the proposed disposition of the troops and their formation, all of which were found to be admirable, and also concurring in the suggestion that the various brigades should be sent at once to the positions selected for them, Wilson decided that, instead of delaying till morning the attack should be made at 9 o'clock that night. He pointed out that the troops were all veterans under perfect discipline, with full confidence in their officers and accustomed to night fighting, and hence could be depended upon to carry out their instructions at one time as well as another. Upton, realizing the force of these suggestions, almost before they were completed, promptly set about carrying them into effect.

Alexander's brigade, having skirmished sharply with the enemy for ten miles, was the first to catch sight of Girard. Upton, seeing that the situation was a complicated one, directed him to make a dash at the lower bridge in the hope of carrying it before the rebels could rally to its defense. Fortunately, the intrenchments were not continuous in front of it, and although the road was swept by the fire of four redoubts and two batteries, the gallant column led by Eggleston with the First Ohio, had reached the very heart of the village, within full sight of the bridge, not a quarter of a mile away, when it was seen to burst into flames. It had been prepared with cotton and turpentine, and the enemy, now thoroughly alarmed, saw that nothing but fire could save it from the invaders. Eggleston, discovering that it was also swept by three guns, and that his column was under a cross-fire from six more, wheeled about and took position with the rest of the brigade, on the Sand Fort road, out of range.

Winslow's brigade, after the plan of attack had been decided upon, was directed across the country out of sight of

the enemy, to a position on the Summerville or Opelika road, upon which the main attack was to be made. It was fully dark by the time he got there and completed his dispositions. Noble's Third Iowa Cavalry, numbering three hundred fighting men, was dismounted and formed in single line, about one man to the yard, with its left resting on the broad Summerville road, which shone white and dusty in the uncertain light of the cloudy April evening. This made it a good directrix, and as it necessarily led directly to the middle bridge, every man was expected to keep it in sight or to guide himself by it. Benteen's Tenth Missouri Cavalry, three hundred and fifty strong, not counting an absent detachment, was formed in column, mounted on the road a few hundred yards in rear of Noble, ready to charge when the latter had captured the works in his front. The Fourth Iowa was halted in column in the rear of Noble's right. It was now between 8 and 9 o'clock, and not a gun had been fired to show that the presence of this brigade, or the point from which its attack would fall, had been discovered. Wilson, Upton, and Winslow were all on the ground and had just completed their final conference and given the final orders, when firing began in front. The charge was ordered, Upton and Winslow riding along the road encouraging the dismounted men, led by Noble in person. The line sprang forward with alacrity, breaking its way through a slashing or rough abattis, and carrying two detached redoubts and a line of rifle pits of greater length than its own front. The astonished rebels opened fire all along their intrenchments, the main and continuous line of which lay inside and to the left of the works already captured. The whole landscape was lit up with the flashing of the enemy's guns, 27 of which were firing into the darkness without aim, and without any other effect than to guide their assailants to their goal. Wilson ordered Benteen to advance as soon as the cheering of Noble's men made it known that they were driving the enemy, and Upton, without knowing that he had not yet penetrated the main line of defense—it was too dark to see any thing but the road and the flash of the artillery and musketry—ordered Benteen to halt his column and send forward two companies to follow

the road to the bridge and secure it at all hazards. This work fell, of course, to the leading two companies, the senior captain of which was Captain McGlasson. Without a moment's hesitation he advanced into the darkness, but had not gone far before he encountered the inner line and real defense of the town and bridges, yet he did not draw rein, but with coolness and self-possession, pushed on through the opening at which the road entered, just as though he belonged to the defending rather than to the attacking force. Once through, he galloped to the bridge, sending a party over it to seize the battery ready to sweep it, but he was soon surrounded by the enemy who had discovered that he was not of their side, and were crowding fiercely upon him. Fearing that he and his whole command would be captured, he wheeled about and made his way back through the hostile lines to his point of departure. Meanwhile, the fact had become apparent that the main line had not been carried and that there was more work to be done. The Third Iowa was again hurried forward, wheeling to the left, facing what was shortly afterward discovered to be the strongest part of the intrenchments. It was covered by a slashing, a marshy brook, and a deep ravine grown up with trees and scrub, through which Noble again led his gallant dismounted cavalymen, with much confusion and hard work, to victory. In the very midst of the racket Winslow dismounted two battalions of the Fourth Iowa and brought them hurriedly into action on the right of Noble. The whole line, now under the lead of Upton, Winslow, and Noble, now rushed through the trees and slashings, across the ravine, up the slope, and over the intrenchments, carrying every thing before them and scattering their dismayed opponents like chaff. No time was wasted on taking prisoners, but the victors swept along the intrenchments, capturing guns and clearing the way to the bridge. The third battalion of the Fourth Iowa, mounted, was led rapidly by Winslow to and across the bridge, which was crowded at the same time by fleeing rebels. The night was so dark that it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and to this circumstance is due the fact that the list of casualties was not

much greater. The lattice work of the bridge was stuffed with raw cotton, saturated with turpentine, and an effort was made by a confederate to light it with a match, but he was stricken down by the swing of a clubbed carbine in the hands of a Union soldier. Two guns were stationed at the east end, and so pointed as to sweep the bridge, but the men in charge of them were restrained from firing by the fear of killing more of their friends than their foes. A fierce fight for the possession of these guns resulted, but it was soon decided in favor of the Iowa men, and this ended the struggle for both Girard and Columbus. The victory was complete. The towns were soon in full possession of the conquerors, and order was promptly restored.

Of course it was not known till the next day, who had conducted the defense of the place, nor what the trophies of victory were. It was then ascertained that Major-General Howell Cobb, assisted by General Tombs and Colonels Van-Zinken and Lamar, with about 3,000 men of the "Georgia Line," had occupied the works and done what they could to defend them.

The enemy's loss amounted to about 1,500 killed, wounded and captured, while the national loss, thanks to the broken ground and the night fighting, was, altogether, only 24 killed and wounded. Amongst the trophies were 27 guns, mounted and used in the defense, 36 in the arsenal, 10 battle-flags, the ram Jackson, mounting 6 guns and about ready to go to sea, and a large number of small arms and military stores. General Winslow, who was placed in command of the city, with Colonel Noble as Provost Marshal, destroyed 7 warehouses containing 125,000 bales of cotton, 15 locomotives, 250 cars, 2 bridges across the Chattahoochee, one navy yard and armory, 2 rolling mills, 1 arsenal and niter works, 2 powder magazines, 2 iron works, 3 foundries, 10 mills and factories, making cotton cloth, paper, swords, guns, pistols, shoes, wagons and other military and naval supplies, besides 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and great quantities of machinery, accouterments, equipments and army clothing, of which no account was taken.

This was the last great manufacturing center of the Confederacy, and the destruction of its establishments, both public and private, was made so complete, that no matter when the war might end, they could contribute nothing to its continuance. In fact, the war was then over, but General Wilson and his command, cut off as they were, from all communication with the North, and hearing nothing from Confederate sources, were still in ignorance of the great events which had happened in Virginia. Pausing, therefore, only long enough to make good the work of destruction, Wilson pushed forward Long's division, now commanded by Minty, in the direction of Macon. It should be noted that this division had not arrived in time to take any part in the capture of Girard and Columbus, and was, therefore, fresh and eager to take the advance. About half of Cobb's force had crossed the river by the railroad bridge, and made haste to escape into the open country. Being mostly militia the men scattered as rapidly as they could to their homes, and left the roads to the Double bridges on the Flint River but slightly guarded. Minty's advance, riding all night, captured them the next day, and thus overcame the last important obstacle on the road to Macon, toward which he was moving at the rate of fifty miles a day.

Two notable incidents, presaging the absolute collapse of the Confederacy quite as much as the destruction of its physical resources, occurred at Columbus. The first was the death of Colonel C. A. L. Lamar, the last commander of the American slave ship, the "Wanderer," formerly the famous sailing yacht "America," who was struck by a stray shot in the street fight near the bridge, and instantly killed. The second was the capture and absolute destruction of the noted secession newspaper, known successively as the "Memphis-Appeal," the "Memphis-Grenada Appeal," and the "Memphis-Grenada-Jackson Appeal." It had been published in and removed by turn from each of the places mentioned in its title, besides Atlanta and Montgomery, but had now brought up in Columbus, though the owner had not had time to set up his presses and issue his peripatetic paper. The proprietor, a fierce rebel named Dill, was arrested and

put under a strenuous oath, and bond prepared by Colonel Noble. If it did not secure the government against every imaginable form of disloyalty that one man could commit it was because the ingenuity of the provost-marshal was at fault.

The new objective points of the cavalry corps were first Macon, and then Augusta, on the direct road to the Carolinas. La Grange, moving from West Point, and the main column on the road by the Double bridges, through Thomaston, met with no serious opposition. They easily and rapidly brushed all show of resistance out of the way, preventing the destruction of every bridge, and arriving at Macon only a few hours apart. Minty's advance, under Colonel Frank White, encountered about 300 men at the Tobesofkee bridge fifteen miles out from Macon. They had set fire to the bridge and taken up a position beyond it for the purpose of disputing its passage, but this was a futile display of resolution. White galloped to the bridge, but seeing that the planking had been torn up, he dismounted his men, and clambering over the stringers in a few minutes put the enemy again to flight. The road to Macon was now clear, and in less than two hours more the gallant White had closed in upon it and received its surrender.

During the day he had been met by a flag of truce borne by a young Confederate brigadier-general named Robertson, carrying a letter from General Beauregard to the commander of the Union forces, advancing on that road. It announced that a truce had been entered into by Generals Sherman and Johnston, "for the purpose of final settlement," and declared that "the contending forces were to occupy their present position," till 48 hours' notice had been given in the event of the resumption of hostilities. White was, however, a man of resources, accustomed to meeting the emergencies of war. Observing that the letter was addressed to the "commander of the forces," and that he had nothing to do with "truces," but had been ordered to go into Macon, he pulled out his watch, remarking that he would send the letter back to General Wilson and give the flag of truce just five minutes to get out of the way. At the end of the time he moved

forward again, and continued his march till Macon was in his possession.

General Wilson, who was eight or ten miles in rear, continued his march with his whole command, stopping nowhere till he reached the city hall, long after dark. White had collected here Generals Cobb, Mackall, Mercer, and Gustavus W. Smith, and conducted General Wilson into their presence. General Cobb received him with hauteur and reserve, and demanded that he and his command should be released, and that General Wilson should retire with his forces to the point at which the flag of truce had met his advanced guard. This demand was promptly denied on the broad and sufficient ground that the Confederate authorities were not a proper channel of communication from Sherman to any other commander, and certainly not to one who was acting far beyond his reach, and in a measure independent of him. Besides, General Wilson declared that he had lost no time in going to the head of his column, which he found in Macon, and which he could not on any condition order to retire from that place. White had done only his duty in going there, and in not permitting himself to be stopped by any one. The argument was ended by a distinct refusal on the part of Wilson to acknowledge the existence of an armistice, to retire from the town, or to release his prisoners. Before announcing this conclusion, however, he remarked to General Cobb that he could imagine but one adequate justification for the existence of the truce, which he did not deny, and thereupon asked if Lee and his army had surrendered. Cobb declined to answer, adding, he was not there to give information, but to ask for his rights under the truce. Turning to General Smith, Wilson asked him the same question. With some hesitation, but frankly and fairly, he replied that Lee had surrendered, and that peace would probably follow soon. Whereupon the Union commander announced his purpose to remain for the present in Macon, and that while he could not admit the application of the truce to him or his command, he should conduct his future operations on the principle that every man killed in action thereafter was a man murdered. He then authorized Cobb and his officers to retire to their

quarters on parol, it being understood that they were to report at the city hall at 9 o'clock the next morning.

The information obtained at this interview, held April 20th, between 10 and 11 P. M., was the first definite knowledge which Wilson and his victorious troopers had received of what had happened in Virginia. No details were given, but the fact of the surrender became known, and it was justly considered as ending the great rebellion. There might be delays, the details might be difficult to manage, and the individual commanders would have delicate duties to perform, but the end was at hand.

The surrender of Macon included four generals, 3,500 men, 5 colors, 60 guns, 3,000 stands of small arms, and large quantities of military stores and supplies, besides many millions of Confederate paper money. Communication was opened the next day, by the courtesy of the Confederate authorities, over the Southern telegraph lines, between Wilson and Sherman. The news of the truce was confirmed, and Wilson was instructed to desist from further acts of war until he should hear that hostilities had been renewed. A few days later, orders were sent through Thomas from the Secretary of War to Wilson, directing him to disregard Sherman's armistice, and to resume operations against the public enemy, but before this order reached Wilson it had become known to him that Johnson had surrendered all the Confederate forces east of the Mississippi, and that peace was absolutely assured. Under the authority allowed him by General Grant as an independent commander, Wilson had governed himself rather by his knowledge of the facts than by orders from Sherman. He had moved his troops where he pleased, had taken possession of the railroads and telegraph lines, and while preserving order, and encouraging the people and disbanded soldiers to return to their homes and resume their peaceful pursuits, he had made arrangements for the arrest of the fleeing confederate chieftains, and the disbandment of all armed bodies of men within the limits of his command, no matter in what direction they might be moving.

On the 1st of May, Croxton's brigade of McCook's division rejoined the corps. He had been detached since the 27th

of March, operating in the enemy's country without communication with the corps or with any other Union authority. He had lost 172 men, mostly captured, but had taken 300 prisoners and 4 guns, and had captured Tuscaloosa, and destroyed the military academy there. He had destroyed 5 iron works, 3 factories, 2 niter works, and large quantities of supplies. His line of march was a hundred miles north of that pursued by the corps, but as directly toward Macon as if he had known that it was the chief objective of the campaign. On the way through Alabama, he encountered a force of several hundred rebels under Hill at Blue Mountain, near Talladega. This affair, which was sharp and bloody, took place on the 23d of April, and constituted the last real engagement of the war. Croxton had marched, between the 27th of March and the 1st of May, something over 650 miles, had crossed many rivers by fording and swimming, and had brought his command into camp in excellent condition.

CHAPTER XXX.

The Capture of Jefferson Davis—The Summary of Wilson's Operations and their Influence upon the Collapse of Rebellion.

Immediately after reaching Macon and learning that Richmond had certainly fallen and Lee had surrendered, Wilson knew that Jefferson Davis, his cabinet, and perhaps some of his leading generals, would endeavor to escape from the country. He, therefore, set quietly about seeking information as to their movements, and fortunately was not long in learning that they had lately been seen in North Carolina, making their way southward. Upton's division was sent to Atlanta, from which place detachments were sent out, northward and eastward. McCook was sent with a part of his division to Southern Georgia and Florida. Meanwhile, Davis had been joined by a party of Union soldiers disguised as rebels, and commanded by Lieutenant George O. Yoeman of Ohio, of Alexander's staff, a most gallant and capable officer, who sent couriers to the nearest telegraph station every night with information as to the movements of the Confederate chief and his party. By these means he was reported as having crossed the Savannah river and gone to Washington, Georgia, and also shortly afterward as having disappeared from there traveling still southward, as it was supposed.

On this information, coupled with the supposition that the country was so well watched toward Dalton and along the lines of the Chattahoochee, the Flint, and the Ocmulgee rivers, to all of which strong detachments had been sent, with instructions to guard all the crossings, that it would be impossible for any considerable party to pass through the state athwart these rivers to the westward, either north or south of Atlanta, Wilson concluded that Davis and his party must continue their flight southward toward the Florida coast.

On arriving at this conclusion he directed La Grange to detach his best regiment and order it to march eastward to Dublin on the Oconee River, leaving detachments at all the cross-roads and patrolling the country in all directions. The First Wisconsin Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harden, was selected for this service, and made a forced march by night and day till it had reached Oconee, where, after several hours' delay, he got information which led him to believe that he had struck the trail he was in search of. Meanwhile, Wilson had received additional intelligence which increased his confidence that Davis was certainly trying to work his way southward through the piney country between Macon and the Atlantic coast, and in order to increase the chance of capturing him, he directed Minty, the next day, to select his best regiment and send it down the right or south bank of the Altamaha, with orders to destroy the ferry-boats and leave detachments at all important points. Minty detached the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard commanding, and ordered him to continue the march till he intersected the route of the fugitives, after which he was to follow them till they were taken. Both Harden and Pritchard were officers of the highest quality, and both were notified that Davis was attended by a party, variously estimated at from ten to fifty men, who would doubtless make a desperate fight before surrendering.

As before stated, Harden was the first to strike the trail at Dublin. After a futile effort to learn any thing concerning the party he was seeking for from the white people of the town, the ferryman's negro assistant came to him after night and gave him such details of a party of men, women, and children, which had crossed the river at that place that morning, with wagons and ambulances, as to leave him but little room to doubt that it was the party he was searching for. The negro man had specially noticed one fine-looking, elderly gentleman, riding a fine bay horse, whom he had heard spoken to as "Mr. Davis," and as "the President." This person had not crossed the river with the party, but had gone down the river several miles further to another ferry, and after crossing, had rejoined the party in the edge

of the village, after which they had all gone south together. Harden, on hearing this, was certain that Davis could not be many miles away, although he had more than 12 hours the start. Hastily selecting 75 of his best men and stoutest horses, the grim old cavalryman took the road which had been pointed out to him, and had not gone many miles before he discovered fresh wagon tracks and the broad trail of a considerable party. It soon began raining, the creeks became swollen, and the swamps filled with water, but the hardy cavalrymen pushed on day and night, sometimes losing the trail but speedily finding it again, and all the time becoming more and more certain that they should not fail to overtake the party. They reached the Ocmulgee River at Bowen's ferry on the 10th of April and learned there that they were only a few hours behind the fugitives, but in hurrying his command across the river the ferry-boat sprung a leak, which made it necessary to reduce the number that the rickety scow could take each trip, so that some time was lost before the command got on its way again.

Meanwhile, the head of Pritchard's column, marching down the south side of the river, had reached this point, and the two commanders met and exchanged information and compared orders. Harden told Pritchard that he was sure he was on the trail and should continue the pursuit as long as he could see the road that night. Pritchard agreed that that was right, adding that he would continue his march down the river, and be guided by such additional information as he might obtain.

The two officers parted, each joining his command and pushing on rapidly as he had indicated. Harden traveled through the dark shadows of the pine forest through which his road lay, till he could no longer see the trail. Feeling assured that the party could not be more than three or four miles further on, he went into bivouac to feed his horses and allow his weary men to make coffee and catch a few hours' rest.

Pritchard had gone only a few miles further down the river when he got information also, it is said, of a negro ferryman, that it was certainly Davis and his party which

had crossed that afternoon at Bowen's ferry, and that it was his duty to join in the pursuit. Accordingly, he selected 150 men, and arriving at Abbeville, a few miles further down the river, took the road from that place to Irwinsville, where it is joined by the one on which Harden was marching. The rest of the regiment continued its march down the river, while Pritchard and his detachment hurried along the forest road to the little country town twenty miles away. It was after midnight when they arrived, and an hour or more later before they had located the camp of the fugitives, and found a negro guide to show them to it. It was pitched about two miles north of the hamlet near a little stream in the edge of the pine forest. Pritchard moved his command noiselessly to the immediate neighborhood of it, and thereafter detaching a party of twenty-five men with orders to make their way through the woods to the road on the north side of the little camp, waited till dawn should bring enough light to enable him to make his descent upon it certain.

Harden, after resting and sleeping a few hours, called his men early to the saddle, and took the road again, hoping to strike the camp before its occupants were astir. He had gone only a few miles when his advanced guard was halted by a challenge and a shot from the road ahead. Hastily dismounting a part of his men and sending a part through the woods, he charged boldly upon the party in his front. A sharp skirmish ensued, in which one man was killed, several wounded, and one prisoner was taken, from whom it was learned that the Wisconsin men were fighting fellow cavalymen instead of rebels.

The firing aroused both the sleeping camp and Pritchard's detachments, and served as a signal for the latter to advance and secure their prisoners. This was done just as day was breaking. Davis himself was caught, wearing a soft hat and a full suit of Confederate gray, but covered by his wife's water-proof with a little narrow shawl wrapped about his head and neck. He was endeavoring to make his way, escorted by his wife and sister-in-law, from his tent through the cordon of soldiers which surrounded the camp to the

rivulet, ostensibly to get water, but really to reach the cover of the forest where an excellent bay horse, saddled and bridled, was ready for him to mount and gallop away. Before the prisoner had been sent back into his tent, Colonels Pritchard and Harden, having stopped the unfortunate skirmish, rode up to the group surrounding him and made sure of their prize. They found that they had not only caught the Confederate President, but Mr. Reagan, his Postmaster-General; Colonels Harrison and Lubbock, his private secretaries; Lieutenant Howell, an aide-de-camp, and his entire family, servants, and followers, numbering twenty-one persons altogether.

There has been much controversy as to the disguise, and what took place at the time of the arrest, and during the march to Macon, but one and another of the persons captured, including Mr. Davis himself, has admitted the substantial accuracy of all General Wilson ever said about it.* Of course these reports were based on the reports of his subordinates, all of whom appear to have been both good soldiers and truthful men. There seems to be no doubt that he was treated by his captors with all the courtesy and consideration consistent with a due regard to his safety. He was received by General Wilson at Macon with a soldier's hospitality, and after he had rested and refreshed himself, was sent forward, under escort, *via* Atlanta and Augusta to Savannah, where he was transferred to a gunboat, which landed him a few days later at Fortress Monroe.

Mr. Benjamin and General Breckinridge, also members of Davis' cabinet, had been traveling with him, but on the night of the capture, fortunately for them, they had slept away from the party and thereby escaped the fate which had overtaken it. The advanced guard of McCook's division rode down to the beach at St. Marks just as they were disappearing in the offing in an open boat which landed them safely in Cuba.

Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President of the

* See A Short History of the Confederate States, by Jefferson Davis, pp. 494.

Confederate States, was found at his house at Crawfordsville, and sent under the same escort with Mr. Davis to the North. A few days later Mr. Mallory, Secretary of the Confederate Navy, was also arrested, and about the same time Clement C. Clay, a Senator from Alabama for whom the government had offered a reward of \$25,000, voluntarily gave himself up to General Wilson.

It is worthy of note that, although the government had also offered a reward of \$100,000 for the arrest of Davis, as an accomplice in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, not an officer or a man of either regiment engaged in the pursuit or capture knew it, or was in any way influenced in the performance of his duty by the hope of gain, or by the expectation of any other reward than praise and promotion, which are ever dear to a soldier's heart for duty well and faithfully performed. As a matter of fact, the reward was duly paid a few years later to Wilson and the officers and men of the two regiments actually present at the time of the capture.

The importance of this event, coming as it did, at the close of the most remarkable cavalry campaign of modern warfare, can not be overestimated. The news of it burst upon the country only a few weeks after the rejoicing over a restored Union had been converted into universal sorrow by the assassination of the President whose wisdom had guided the nation safely through the rebellion. It is now well known from Davis' own declaration that it was his fixed and unalterable purpose to continue the war in the Trans-Mississippi Department if he could reach there.* His capture, together with that of Vice-President Stephens and most of the cabinet, put an end for good and all to every possibility of further organized resistance, inasmuch as it annihilated the entire official fabric of the Confederate government by a single blow.

In the general rejoicing which took place throughout

* See "A Short History of the Confederate States of America, by Jefferson Davis," also Pollard's "Southern History of the war," and his "Life of Jefferson Davis."

the Northern states on the receipt of this unexpected news, but little credit or consideration was given to General Wilson, or to the deeds of his magnificent cavalry army. It is true that the government promoted its commander to the full rank of Major-General, and advanced his subordinate commanders to the grades recommended by him, but no one took time to study the great campaign which had been closed in such a signal manner, or to weigh the influence of its victories upon the final surrender of Johnston's army, and the collapse of the Confederate cause east of the Mississippi river. It would take a volume to properly describe the organization of the cavalry corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and to set forth the details of its performances from the beginning of Hood's invasion of middle Tennessee to the end of its great march at Macon. As has been shown, it was potential while still in an inchoate condition in holding open the door for Schofield's retreat from Franklin to Nashville, and in thus preventing a great disaster to the Union arms before Thomas could unite his forces for the offensive return which he delivered with such overwhelming effect at Nashville two weeks later.

It should be remembered forever in the annals of war, that Thomas insisted upon waiting to remount a portion of the corps before he would consent to deliver battle, and that when he did march forth, against the veteran and almost invincible infantry of Hood, strongly intrenched in his front, it was the cavalry corps which broke through his left, and wheeling grandly in the same direction, captured 27 guns from their redoubts on the first day, and which, continuing its movement on the second day, enveloped and took in reverse the left and left-center of the Confederate intrenchments, and so shook their entire line as to make it a walk-over for the infantry which Thomas finally hurled against them. It was the harassing pursuit of Hood by the cavalry corps which, notwithstanding the rains and sleet and the swollen rivers, broke up and scattered the host which had so confidently invaded Middle Tennessee only a month before. Pausing on the banks of the Tennessee till the rough edge

of winter had passed, to gather in the distant detachments, to procure remounts, clothing, and equipments, and to weld the growing force into a compact and irresistible army corps of horsemen, the cavalry commander, with the full concurrence of Thomas, the beau ideal of American soldiers, began his final and most glorious campaign. No historian or military critic can read the story of the campaign which followed without coming to the conclusion that it was characterized by the most remarkable series of successes ever gained by cavalry in modern warfare. They illustrate first, the importance of concentrating and using that arm in compact masses under one competent commander, and in operations of the first importance; second, the tremendous advantage of celerity of movement, especially in modern warfare where improved fire-arms play such a decisive part; third, that the chief use of horses, notwithstanding that they may in exceptional cases add to the shock of the charge, is to transport fighting men rapidly to the vital point of a battle field, and especially to the flank and rear of the enemy's position, or deeply into the interior of the enemy's country against his lines of supply and communication, and also his arsenals, armories, and factories; fourth, that the best infantry armed with the best magazine carbines or rifles make the best mounted troops, irrespective of whether they be called cavalry, dragoons, or mounted infantry.

When the fact is recalled that the seven divisions of this corps at the close of the war mustered about thirty-five thousand men for duty with the colors, and that, had the war lasted sixty days longer they could and probably would have been concentrated in Virginia, it will be seen to what a high degree of perfection the organization had been brought, and that it fully justified Sherman's declaration that it was by far the largest, most efficient, and most powerful body of horse that had ever come under his command. But when the capture of the strongly fortified towns of Selma, West Point, and Columbus, with all the romantic incidents of night fighting, together with the surrender of the no less strongly fortified cities of Montgomery and Macon, carrying with them

the destruction of the last and only remaining arsenals, armories, factories, storehouses, and military munitions and supplies, and also the destruction of the railways connecting those places, with their bridges and rolling stock, are considered, it will be seen that Johnston and his generals had nothing else left them but to lay down their arms and surrender. It was no longer possible for them to concentrate an army, or to supply it with food, or to keep it armed and equipped. With those places, and the manufacturing plants which they contained, still in their possession, and with the railways connecting them still unbroken, they might have collected together in the Carolinas a force amply able to cope with Sherman, and possibly to overwhelm him before reinforcements could reach him. That brilliant, but erratic leader, with his splendid army, it will be remembered, had avoided Macon on the one hand and Augusta on the other, both the seats of important military industries, and by an eccentric and unnecessary movement from his true line of operations, had gone to Savannah, leaving the direct railroads and highways behind him open and free for the use of the remnants of Hood's army, and of the other scattered detachments which were hastening to form a junction with Johnston, now the sole hope of the Confederacy.

Had it not been for Wilson's wide swath of victory and destruction through and not around the important cities in his way, during which he captured over 8,500 prisoners, and 280 guns, and afterward paroled 59,000 rebel soldiers belonging to the armies of Lee, Johnston, and Beauregard, it would have been easy for Johnston and Beauregard, had they been so minded, to continue the war indefinitely. As it was, to continue it was simply impossible, and for this the country is indebted first, to Wilson and his gallant troopers, and second, to Thomas, who insisted that they should have time to remount and prepare for the work before them. Neither the army nor the country ever appreciated that invincible body of horsemen, or their division, brigade, regimental, and company commanders, or the high character of the enlisted men, or the performances of the whole at their

real worth. There were officers among them fit for any command that could have been given them, and as a body they were as gallant and capable soldiers as ever drew saber or wore uniform. Had the war lasted a few months longer their fame would have been a household word. The leaders, though young in years, were old in war. Wilson himself was at the close, not yet 28. Kilpatrick was about the same age. Upton was several months younger. Winslow, Alexander, Croxton, La Grange, Watkins, Murray, Palmer, Noble, Kitchell, Benteen, Cooper, Young, Bacon, and Weston, were of the younger set, while McCook, Minty, Long, Hatch, R. W. Johnson, Knipe, Hammond, Coon, G. M. L. Johnson, Atkins, Spalding, Pritchard, Miller, Harrison, Biggs, Vail, Israel Garrard, McCormick, Hammond, Pierce, and Frank White were somewhat older, though none of them had reached middle life. Harden, as sturdy as Burleigh of Balfour, and Eggleston, the type of those who rode with Cromwell at Marston Moor, were gray-beards, but were full of activity and courage. Ross Hill and Taylor, although only captains, were mere boys, but full of experienced valor.

The men in the ranks were mostly from the western and north-western, and upper slave states, and of them it may be truthfully averred that their superiors for endurance, self-reliance and pluck, could nowhere be found. After they were massed at Nashville they believed themselves to be invincible, and it was their boast that they had never come in sight of a hostile gun or fortification that they did not capture. Armed with Spencers, it was their conviction that, elbow to elbow, dismounted, in single line, nothing could withstand their charge. "Only cover our flanks," said Miller to Wilson, as they were approaching Selma, "and nothing can stop us!" In conclusion, it may be safely said, that no man ever saw one of them in the closing campaign of the war skulking before battle or sneaking to the rear after the action began. They seemed to know by instinct when and where the enemy might be encountered, and then the only strife amongst them was to see who should be first in the onset. With a corps of such men, properly mounted and

armed, and with such organization and discipline as prevailed amongst them during their last great campaign, no hazard of war can be regarded as too great for them to undertake, and nothing should be counted as impossible except defeat.

When the "records" are all published and the story properly written, it will show that no corps in the army, whether of cavalry or infantry, ever inflicted greater injury upon the "Lost Cause," or did more useful service toward the re-establishment of the Union under the Constitution and the laws, than was done by the cavalry corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Thomas after War—His Rank Ignored in Assignments—Persistently Pursued—Offered Grant's Place at the Head of the Army but Declines—Refuses to have his Name Used in Connection with the Presidency—The Story of his Death—It is little less than the History of an Assassination.

The close of the war brought no relief from a pursuit which fell little short of persecution for General Thomas. The efforts to ignore him, or worse, to disregard his rank in assignments to command, were persisted in. When the country, immediately after the war, was divided into Military Divisions, it was planned to make only five, and leave Thomas, the sixth major-general, in command of a department only. Hearing of this he sent a friend to President Andrew Johnson to protest. He had submitted during the war to promoting juniors over him, and kept quiet under the wrong rather than to hesitate a moment while the conflict was on, but he saw no reason for such course in time of peace. The matter was instantly rectified, Mr. Johnson himself carving out the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia—the country which had been the scene of his military operations and his victories—and establishing his head-quarters at Nashville, the city of his recent renown. But the great soldier was never forgiven for thus asserting himself. There were two reasons; first, he had openly defeated those who were attempting to wrong him, and next, it made it necessary to assign favorite officers elsewhere than where it had been determined to place them.

His arrangement of his extensive department during the early years of reconstruction, was marked with great ability in grasping the difficult questions which constantly arose in the peculiar condition of civil affairs, and by moderation which commanded respect from the conquered, but, at the same time, by a vigor and justice in his rule in which there was

no "variableness or shadow of turning." He remained at Nashville until November, 1866, and thereafter his headquarters were at Louisville, until May, 1869.

During this period he declined a nomination which would undoubtedly have resulted in making him general of the army in place of General Grant. Mr. Johnson, in February, 1868, when his troubles with the Republican party were in progress, and when he was not satisfied with the course of General Grant, nominated General Thomas as brevet lieutenant-general, and brevet general. Had he been confirmed, the next step undoubtedly would have been to assign him to duty as general of the army under his brevet rank. General Thomas understanding this at once protested and declined, thanking the President for the honor intended, but saying: "I have done no service since the war to deserve so high a compliment, and it is now too late to be regarded as a compliment if conferred for services during the war."

The five years of his administration of civil affairs are full of interest, and as successful in their peculiar field as his great work with the armies had been. But it can not be treated at length within the limits of this volume.

Following the move which, if he had not frustrated it, would have led to his command of the army, a strong desire to nominate him for the Presidency began to develop in quarters which would soon have given him great strength. This he resisted with such uncompromising refusals that those who had set their hearts upon work in that direction were obliged to abandon it. But it went far enough to excite keen jealousy and alarm in other quarters.

After the inauguration of General Grant as President, General Thomas was decided upon to command on the Pacific coast. Finding that this was against his wishes, a characteristic way of rebuking him was found by arranging that he should remain in Kentucky in command of a department, when all others of his rank received divisions. Thereupon, rather than submit to the overslaughting of his rank, he asserted his claims and took the Military Division of the Pacific. To still further illustrate the nature of the treatment he continually received, as soon as he reached San Fran-

cisco, the Department of Kentucky, where General Thomas would have been glad to stay if he could have remained without sinking his rank, was at once elevated to a military division.

He had just completed a year of service on the Pacific coast when he suddenly died under the most tragic circumstances, and such as formed a fitting climax to the long series of wrongs with which his magnificent and unparalleled services had been clouded. The story of his death is little less than a tale of assassination.

When he arrived on the Pacific coast to relieve General Halleck this officer gave him a reception. During the evening General Halleck related the details of the attempt to relieve him at Nashville, first with General Schofield, next with General Logan. General Thomas had never known the names of those with whom it was determined to supersede him, in fact, he did not know of the second attempt with Logan at all. General Halleck further explained, what is now known, that it was through delay secured by him that the removal was not consummated when first ordered. During the delay came a telegram from General Thomas in regard to the situation which postponed immediate action. Before the second plan for superseding him by Logan had been worked out, the ice-storm which had delayed the attack broke, and the notable victory was won.

One of those who heard General Halleck's recital to General Thomas gave the facts to an eastern correspondent and he printed it in a form that gave General Logan great concern, since he thought it open to the false construction that he had intrigued to secure General Thomas's place. General Logan thereupon made an arrangement with General Grant, then President, to tell the complete story of Nashville to the Washington correspondent of the *Cincinnati Gazette*. This the President did, the present writer being then that correspondent.

When the story, as related by General Grant, was written out, it was submitted to him for revision. He said that it was in exact accordance with his statement, but that upon having his mind refreshed by the consideration of the sub-

ject he had concluded that the best thing to do would be to give the correspondent all the dispatches relating to the Nashville affair. He, thereupon, ordered General Badeau, then his military secretary, to furnish the whole of them.

General Badeau pretended to comply with the order, and gave the *Gazette* correspondent what he assured him was the complete official history of the contemplated removal, and all the dispatches relating to it. Its publication attracted wide attention, since up to that time the war records had remained, in large degree, a sealed book. The story, as furnished, was creditable in high degree to General Thomas, and his admirers were delighted with it. Two weeks later, however, the correspondent who had published it received a letter from a friend at General Thomas's head-quarters in San Francisco, asking whether every thing supplied from the White House had been printed, and intimating that there had been some very serious omissions. Immediate inquiry was made of General Badeau. He insisted that he had given every thing needed to make the story complete, and that nothing had been suppressed.

A letter quoting this emphatic assurance was started for San Francisco, but before there was time for a reply, the press dispatches announced General Thomas's sudden death.

The story of what had happened is a startling one. Seeing that there had been deliberate suppression at the White House of the strongest dispatches in his favor, and the great number of such proving that it could not have been by accident, he became indignant to a degree that he had never shown before, and his system was wrought up by the feeling of deep wrong to a state of high tension. This condition was still further intensified by the appearance of some public criticisms called out by the published dispatches, which he deemed flagrantly unjust. Thus aroused, and thus stirred by violent emotions, he sat down to write the full story of Nashville. An officer of his staff had gathered the necessary official papers and left him in his private room at work. An hour later he had fallen in the midst of his work. He did not regain consciousness, and a few hours later assassination had done its work, and General Thomas was dead.

His friends, soon after his burial, went earnestly to work to try to obtain the suppressed dispatches. Every attempt made at Washington was blocked. Finally, nearly a year afterward, they were secured, in spite of continuing refusals at the White House, and as persistent declarations that the whole official story had been told.

A sufficient outline of affairs about Nashville before, and following the battle, has appeared in a previous chapter to clearly show the keen injustice done General Thomas by the suppressions now to be indicated.

The official history of Nashville, as furnished for publication upon President Grant's order, by his military secretary, General Badeau, opened with the three dispatches which follow :

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—10:30 A. M. }

Lieut.-Gen. Grant, City Point :

The President feels solicitous about the disposition of Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period, "until Wilson gets equipments." This looks like the McClelland and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing, and let the enemy raid the country. The President wishes you to consider the matter.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

CITY POINT, Dec. 2, 1864—11 AM.

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Nashville :

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, we will lose all the roads back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee river. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm. and put in the trenches, your Quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut.-Gen.*

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 2, 1864—1:30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Nashville :

With your citizen employes armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army, and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive against the enemy, but at this distance may err as to the method of dealing with the enemy. You will suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth, therefore, every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating, give him no peace.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut.-Gen.*

The situation had, however, at this time been fully made known to General Grant in dispatches which Badeau suppressed. First in order came these, which, in view of the fact that Forrest had 12,000 excellent cavalry, while Thomas had been able to mount less than half that number, it is, perhaps, not surprising that they were suppressed.

[Suppressed.]

CITY POINT, VA., Nov. 24, 1864—4 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn.:

Do not let Forrest get off without punishment.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

The rest of this dispatch was not relevant to the subject in hand. General Thomas's reply was to the above extract.

[Suppressed.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,
NASHVILLE, TENN., Nov. 25, 1864—11 A. M. }

Lieut. Gen. Grant, City Point, Va.:

Your dispatch of 4 P. M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbers mine at this time that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of Gen. Smith's troops have arrived yet, although they embarked at St. Louis on Tuesday last. The transportation of Gens. Hatch's and Grierson's cavalry was ordered by Gen. Washburn, I am told, to be turned in at Memphis, which has crippled the only cavalry I had at this time. All of my cavalry was dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went with Gen. Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained at Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. Horses are arriving slowly, and arms have been detained somewhere en route for more than a month. Gen. Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas and from Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he will reach here. Since being placed in charge of affairs in Tennessee, I have lost nearly 15,000 men, discharged by expiration of service and permitted to go home to vote. My gain is probably 12,000 perfectly raw troops. Therefore, as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me, both in infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The moment I can get my cavalry I will march against Hood, and if Forrest can be reached, he shall be punished.

[Signed,]

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Maj.-Gen. Vols., Com'd'g.*

[Suppressed.]

NASHVILLE, Dec. 1, 1864—9:30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Washington, D. C.:

After Gen. Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced that the enemy very far outnumbered him, both in infantry and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville, until Gen. Wilson

can get his cavalry equipped. He has now but about one-fourth the number of the enemy, and, consequently is no match for him. I have two ironclads here, with several gunboats, and Commodore Fitch assures me that Hood can neither cross the Cumberland, nor blockade it. I therefore think it best to wait here until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday. If he remains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, and will move against him at once. I have Murfreesboro strongly held, and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk River bridges have strong garrisons.

[Signed,]

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Then came the three dispatches first given above, with which the White House history began, followed by these:

[Suppressed.]

HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,
NASHVILLE, TENN., Dec. 2, 1864—10 P. M. }

Gen. U. S. Grant, City Point, Va.:

Your two telegrams of 11 A. M. and 1:30 P. M., to-day, are received. At the time Hood was whipped at Franklin I had at this place but about five thousand (5,000) men of Gen. Smith's command, which, added to the force under Gen. Schofield, would not have given me more than twenty-five thousand (25,000) men. Besides, Gen. Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the 5,000 could reach him. As Gen. Wilson's cavalry force, also, numbered only about one-fourth that of Forrest, I thought it best to draw the troops back to Nashville, and await the arrival of the remainder of Gen. Smith's force, and also a force of about five thousand (5,000) commanded by Gen. Steedman, which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of Gen. Smith arrived yesterday morning, and Gen. Steedman's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry; and will take the field any how as soon as the remainder of Gen. McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will in two or three days.

We can neither get re-enforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the North very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of the two weakest corps of Gen. Sherman's army, and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and the task of re-organizing and equipping has met with many delays, which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight.

[Signed,]

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. Vols., Commanding.

[Suppressed.]

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 5, 1864—6:30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn.:

Is there not danger of Forrest's moving down the Tennessee River

where he can cross it? It seems to me, while you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where is.

Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut.-Gen.*

[Suppressed.]

NASHVILLE, Dec. 6, 1864.

Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant, City Point:

Your telegram of 6:30 P. M., December 5, is just received. As soon as I get up a respectable force of cavalry I will march against Hood. Gen. Wilson has parties out now pressing horses, and I hope to have some 6,000 or 8,000 cavalry mounted in three days from this time. Gen. Wilson has just left me, having received instructions to hurry the cavalry remount as rapidly as possible. I do not think it prudent to attack Hood with less than six thousand (6,000) cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has under Forrest at least twelve thousand (12,000). I have no doubt Forrest will attempt to cross the river, but I am in hopes the gunboats will be able to prevent him. The enemy has made no new developments to-day. Breckinridge is reported at Lebanon with six thousand (6,000) men, but I can not believe it possible.

[Signed,]

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols., Commanding.

[Suppressed.]

CITY POINT, VA. December 6, 1864—4 P. M.

Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville:

Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount for your cavalry. There is great danger in delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieut.-Gen.*

What passed between the arrival of this dispatch, upon receiving which, Thomas, while dissenting from its wisdom, gave immediate orders to prepare for attack, and the one next below, appears in a preceding chapter:

[Suppressed.]

NASHVILLE, TENN., Dec. 12, 1864—10:30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Washington, D. C.:

I have the troops ready to make the attack on the enemy as soon as the sleet which now covers the ground has melted sufficiently to enable the men to march. The whole country is now covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery it is utterly impossible for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move over level ground with any thing like order. It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position, and it has only been finally effected with imminent risk and many serious accidents, resulting from the numbers of horses falling with their riders on the road. Under these cir-

cumstances, I believe an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life.

[Signed,]

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols., Com'd'g.

The next day came the order directing the relief of Thomas by Logan, and then, before this order could be executed, the overwhelming victory.

After the suppressions already set forth there can be no further surprise that the following were withheld from this pretended history, although it was being furnished under the orders of President Grant, and upon the President's assurance that it should be complete:

[Suppressed.]

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21, 1864—12 M.

Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas:

Permit me, general, to urge the vast importance of a hot pursuit of Hood's army. Every possible sacrifice should be made, and your men for a few days will submit to any hardships and privations to accomplish the great result. If you can capture or destroy Hood's army General Sherman can entirely crush out the rebel military force in all the Southern States. He begins a new campaign about the first of January, which will have the most important results if Hood's army can now be used up. A most vigorous pursuit on your part is, therefore, of vital importance to General Sherman's plans. No sacrifice must be spared to obtain so important a result.

[Signed,]

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

[Suppressed.]

IN THE FIELD, Dec. 21, 1864.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Washington, D. C.:

Your dispatch of 12 M., this day, is received. General Hood's army is being pursued as rapidly and as vigorously as it is possible for one army to pursue another. We can not control the elements, and you must remember that, to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, I had to reorganize and almost thoroughly equip the force now under my command. I fought the battle of the 15th and 16th instants with the troops but partially equipped; and, notwithstanding the inclemency of the weather and the partial equipment, have been enabled to drive the enemy beyond Duck River, crossing two streams with my troops, and driving the enemy from position to position, without the aid of pontoons, and with but little transportation to bring up supplies of provisions and ammunition. I am doing all in my power to crush Hood's army, and, if it be possible, will destroy it. But pursuing an enemy through an exhausted country, over mud roads completely sogged with heavy rains, is no child's play, and can not be accomplished as quickly

as thought of. I hope, in urging me to push the enemy, the department remembers that General Sherman took with him the complete organization of the Military Division of the Mississippi, well equipped in every respect, as regards ammunition, supplies, and transportation, leaving me only two corps, partially stripped of their transportation to accommodate the force taken with him, to oppose the advance into Tennessee of that army which had resisted the advance of the army of the Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now, in addition, aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured that Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.

[Signed,

G. H. THOMAS, *Major-General.*

[Suppressed.]

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22, 1864—9 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas :

I have seen to-day General Halleck's dispatch of yesterday, and your reply. It is proper for me to assure you that this department has the most unbounded confidence in your skill, vigor, and determination to employ to the best advantage all the means in your power to pursue and destroy the enemy. No department could be inspired with more profound admiration and thankfulness for the great deeds which you have already performed, or more confiding faith that human effort could do no more, and no more than will be done by you and the accomplished and gallant officers and soldiers of your command.

[Signed,]

E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

[Suppressed.]

CITY POINT, Dec. 22, 1864.

Maj.-Gen. Geo. H. Thomas :

You have the congratulations of the public for the energy with which you are pushing Hood. I hope you will succeed in reaching his pontoon bridge at Tusculumbia before he gets there. Should you do so, it looks to me that Hood is cut off. If you succeed in destroying Hood's army, there will be but one army left to the so-called Confederacy capable of doing us harm. I will take care of that, and try to draw the sting from it, so that in the spring we shall have easy sailing. You have now a big opportunity, which I know you are availing yourself of. Let us push and do all we can before the enemy can derive benefit either from the raising of negro troops on the plantations or white troops now in the field.

[Signed,]

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

[Suppressed.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, Dec. 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, *Nashville:*

With great pleasure I inform you that for your skill, courage, and conduct in the recent brilliant military operations under your command, the President has directed your nomination to be sent to the Senate as a major-general in the United States Army, to fill the only vacancy existing in that grade. No official duty has been performed by me with more satisfaction, and no commander has more justly earned promotion by devoted, disinterested, and valuable services to his country.

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

[Suppressed.]

HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
MCKANE'S CHURCH, TENN. }

HON. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

I am profoundly sensible of the kind expressions of your telegram of December 24th, informing me that the President had directed my name to be sent to the Senate for confirmation as major-general United States Army, and beg to assure the President and yourself, that your approval of my services is of more value to me than the commission itself.

GEO. H. THOMAS, *Major-General Commanding.*

There were other congratulatory dispatches, which, if there had been the least friendliness toward General Thomas, would have been published, among them, these:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 15, 1864—11:30 P. M.

Major-General Rawlins, Chief of Staff:

I send you a dispatch just received from Nashville. I shall not now go there. Will remain absent, however, until about Monday.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

This was the dispatch from Nashville announcing the victory of the first day. Its enthusiastically congratulatory character will be readily detected:

CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 16, 1864.

Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant, Washington. D. C.:

If you have any further news of General Thomas's success will you please send it, as it inspires the army here with great enthusiasm.

JNO. A. RAWLINS, *Brig.-Gen. and Chief of Staff.*

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 16, 1864. }

Brigadier-General Rawlins, Chief of Staff:

Your dispatch announcing General Thomas's success has been received with great satisfaction, as the situation of affairs at Nashville were such as

to afford cause for anxiety. I had every confidence in the judgment and high soldierly qualities of General Thomas, and am truly rejoiced to hear of his brilliant success.

GEORGE G. MEADE, *Major-General.*

It is not strange that this culmination of long continued and varied injustice aroused an indignation which overwhelmed even the great physical powers of General Thomas. He had waited silently and patiently through the years for the official record to make his services fully known, and set forth the continuing slights and the many indignities which had been either openly or covertly put upon him from the time when his name was left out of the President's order thanking his army for Mill Springs, the first western victory, down to his deportation to the Pacific coast against his will. And now, after all this waiting, he saw the country deliberately misled as to the real history of Nashville, his greatest victory, and the credit due him deliberately concealed, and apparently by the authority of General Grant. No wonder that, as he roused himself to smite this unexpected and malicious wronging, nature gave way, and the great heart of Thomas failed.

So died the only uniformly successful commander in the Union armies during our civil war.

Others were great, even with the shadows of their grave mistakes upon them; but his military stature surpassed theirs, and, as the result of his uniform deliberation in preparations, which more reckless and perhaps jealous ones called slowness, his record is not burdened with that fearful load which the wasted lives of men imposes.

When the official record is unfolded and studied till its truths clearly appear to the people, there will be many sharp revisions of present popular judgments and misconceptions, and, thereafter, the name of Thomas will head the list of our greatest captains.

THE END.

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